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During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries British and 
Indian troops conducted an almost unbroken series of operations 
against the trans-border Pathan tribes on the North-West Frontier of 
India. Warfare in tribal territory was very different from 
conventional European warfare and other colonial campaigns due to the 
mountainous terrain and tribal military characteristics and armament. 
The localised Punjab Irregular Force developed a unique range of 
principles and minor tactics to conduct military operations in tribal 
territory and acquired a high degree of expertise in frontier 
warfare. These skills were disseminated within the force by means of 
oral tradition, specialised training, and Standing orders combined 
with frequent practical experience. However, such skills were not 
retained or disseminated to the regular Bengal Army which 
concentrated on training for conventional military operations. 
Following the 1897-98 Tirah campaign, the principles and minor 
tactics of frontier warfare were disseminated to the regular army for 
the first time through official training manuals and a formal system 
of training. These skills dramatically increased the efficiency of 
regular imperial troops in*later frontier campaigns, although they 
had to be relearned following the First World War when the Army in 
India suffered heavy losses in Waziristan. Training manuals were once 
again devised and issued to imperial troops serving in the N. W. F. P.. 
Although modern technology now added an important dimension to the 
conduct of operations, infantry remained the key and a high standard 
of specialised training for frontier warfare was therefore required. 
The development of these skills exemplified growing professionalism 
in India directed towards imperial requirements and had a long-term 
influence on other colonial campaigns and post-World War Two counter- 
insurgency operations against similarly lightly equipped and highly 
mobile guerilla adversaries. 
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Introduction 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
British imperial troops, along with a wide range of locally recruited 
irregulars, were almost constantly engaged in a series of military 
campaigns to expand and protect the far-flung British Empire. As 
Brian Bond has noted 'for only two years between 1856 and 1899 were 
the guns silent. " These military operations varied widely in scale 
and extent, but they can be broadly classified under the headings of 
campaigns of conquest or annexation, campaigns to suppress 
insurrections and punitive campaigns in response to aggression. Such 
operations were known collectively as 'small wars, and represented 
almost the staple fare of the imperial armies. Indeed, in many 
respects involvement in conventional European conflicts was an 
aberration from the normal course of military events and small wars 
exerted a major influence on the development the imperial armies as 
institutions. As Victor Kiernan has pointed out the maintenance of 
imperial rule involved the frequent use and display of military power 
to ensure the expansion and control of various colonial possessions. 2 
As the British Empire was so vast in extent imperial troops 
fought in different types of climate and terrain and against a 
multitude of different opponents armed, organised and trained in a 
bewildering variety of ways. The conduct of desert, jungle, bush and 
mountain warfare against opponents with widely varying standards of 
arms, tactics and training, was very different from European warfare. 
Indeed, such operations represented a distinct genre of military 
operations thar- always differed from European military requirements. 
Most campaigns were first and foremost, however, campaigns against 
nature during which commanders and troops had to surmount immense 
difficulties imposed by the terrain, climate and vast distances that 
had to be traversed before contact was made with opposing armies. To 
complicate matters intelligence regarding imperial opponents and 
local geography was normally meagre. Transport and supply problems, 
moreover, meant British officers had to be particularly skilled at 
moving and maintaining troops in remote areas often ravaged by 
disease. To the Victorian master of colonial or savage warfare', 
1 B. Bond, Victorian Military CaRmaicms, (London, 1967), App. 1, pp. 309-11 
2 V. Kiernan, Eurppean Empires from Conquest to Collapse,. (London, 1982) 
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Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the conduct of such operations 
represented an 'art in itself, requiring specific tactics far 
different from those suited to 'civilised, opponents. 3 Following the 
First World War the nature of imperial conflict changed as emphasis 
shifted to controlling vast subject populations and guarding troubled 
imperial frontiers, requiring the development of new military skills 
and training to maintain order. 
The conduct of military operations throughout the British 
Empire has attracted surprisingly little attention from academic 
military and imperial historians, in contrast to that directed 
towards conventional European warfare. 4 As Ian Beckett has observed, 
such low-intensity conflict has always enjoyed a relatively low 
status in the study of war, both amongst professional soldiers and 
new generations of academic military historians. 5 Indeed, the term 
'small war' has been often been used in almost a pejorative sense, 
perhaps denoting the general attitude towards colonial conflict in 
general. The reasons for this indifference are not difficult to 
identify. Despite considerable interest in the popular press, 
contemporary British officers tended to regard experience gained in 
the colonies as an irrelevance, preferring instead to focus on 
contemporary grande guerre, which was both professionally more 
rewarding and always perceived as the primary justification for the 
army's existence. 6 Although many senior officers owed their promotion 
to colonial campaigning and accepted it as the recurrent style of 
warfare encountered by British troops, nonetheless few were willing 
to give this form of conflict priority in terms of theory. For both 
the British and Indian armies, moreover, the immediate military 
demands of colonial warfare could not be regarded as the sole 
determinant of military organisation, equipment and training. The 
'threat' of war with a European power rather than in the British 
Empire always occupied centre stage in military planning and 
3 Maj. -Gen. G. Wolseley, 'The Negro as Soldier,, Fortniqhtly Review, 44,264, 
(1888), p. 703 
4 D. C. Gordon, 'Colonial Warfare 1815-1970', in R. Higham, (ed. ) A Guide to the 
Sources of British Military History, (London, 1975), p. 302, H. Strachan, Europ 
Armies and the Conduct of War, (London, 1983), p. 76 and P. Burroughs, "Imperial 
Defence and the Victorian Army', J. I. C. H., 15,1, (1986), p. 55 
5 I. F. W. Beckett, 'Low-Intensity Conflict: Its Place on the Study of War', in D. A. 
Charters, M. Milner and J. B. Wilson, (eds. ) Military History and the Military 
Profession, (London, 1993), p. 121 
6 Gordon, op cit, p. 229 and See J. M. MacKenzie, (ed. ), Popular Imperialism and the 
MiLIýL2,. ry, (Manchester, 1991) 
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training. Additionally, as imperial troops were faced with a wide 
variety of military tasks and diverse conditions throughout the 
empire, it was impossible to devise a universally applicable system 
of training or to anticipate where or under what conditions troops 
might next be employed. The sheer diversity of conditions and the 
limited scope of most campaigns made it difficult to formulate 
lessons of universal and lasting importance. Instead, the British 
Army concentrated on up-to-date European military organisation, 
equipment and training, believing by that by default the lesser was 
contained in the greater, and tended to regard colonial warfare as a 
diversion from the mainstream of professional soldiering. Such 
attitudes were reinforced as the experience gained on one campaign 
was frequently reversed by the next. Often tactical formations long 
discarded on the European battlefield were resurrected and used 
successfully in the colonies prompting accusations that such fighting 
led to parochialism and encouraged professional conservatism. As 
imperial troops often enjoyed a decisive superiority in firearms, 
colonial campaigns were relatively short-lived and, as no permanent 
'threat' existed, any lessons discerned tended to be regarded as 
unique or trivial, without lasting significance for the British Army. 
What could a serious professional soldier learn of lasting value from 
operations conducted against poorly armed and ill-disciplined 
, savages, who knew nothing of modern military skills and training? In 
some quarters it was believed that lessons learnt in the Empire could 
7 be positively harmful. Colonel Lonsdale Hale, former Professor of 
Military History at the Staff College at Camberley, noted in 1899: 
'An officer who has seen service must sweep from his mind all 
recollections from that service, for between Afghan, Egyptian and 
Zulu warfare and that of Europe, there is no similarity whatever. To 
the latter the former is merely the play of children. 18 Despite the 
fact that many personally participated in imperial campaigns, British 
military intellectuals generally ignored colonial warfare, 
concentrating instead on European practice which had greater 
professional appeal. The normal course of military education for 
officers at the Royal Military College, Woolwich or the Staff 
college, largely ignored imperial campaigning. Accordingly British 
7 E. M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902, (Manchester, 1992), p. 246 
8 col. L. Hale, 'The Spirit of Tactical operations Today', Proc. R. A. I., 16, (1889), p-45 
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officers tended to measure military professionalism solely against 
conventional European standards, despite the fact that they were more 
likely to fight in the Empire than on the continent. As a result of 
these factors the majority of European troops fighting in the 
colonies did so without any specific training, relying instead on 'on 
the spot, improvisation and pragmatic adaptation to local conditions. 
Although occasionally expensive in lives and prestige, 'on the spot' 
adaptation was normally successful as imperial troops were always 
better armed than their opponents. However, such a robustly pragmatic 
approach, an emphasis on 'down to earth' practical soldiering and the 
flexibility of the regimental system meant that the lessons learn 
from colonial conflicts were seldom recorded for the benefit of 
future generations. 9 
The main subject of interest to academic military historians 
has been the conduct of conventional military operations for similar 
reasons to that which determined contemporary professional military 
attention, despite the central role played by military power in the 
establishment and maintenance of imperial rule. All too often 'small 
wars' have been condemned by modern historiography as unequal 
contests during which imperial troops relied almost exclusively on 
technological superiority in firearms and during which they adopted 
retrogressive tactics more suited to the eighteenth than the 
nineteenth century. Attention has focused on the relative ease with 
which numerically inferior British troops inflicted massively 
disproportionate casualties and rapidly defeated indigenous armies. 
This has meant that it has been too readily assumed by historians 
that victory was inevitable. 10 D. R. Headrick's identification of 
breech-loading firearms and machine guns as decisive 'tools of 
penetration', rather that other factors such as military tactics, 
organisation and training has led to widespread belief that superior 
technology was the predominant reason for European military 
success. " To an extent D. Omissi has followed a similar line in a 
recent study of air policing during the inter-war period, although he 
9 K. Jeffery, 'Colonial Warfare', in C. McInnes and G. D. Sheffield, Warfare in the 
Twentieth Century, (London, 1988), p. 31 
10 D. French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000, (London, 1990), p. 141 
11 D. R. Headrick, 'The Tools of Empire: Technology and the Expansion of European 
Empires in the Nineteenth Century', Journal of Modern History, 51,2, (1979), 
pp. 231-63 and D. R. Headrick, Tools of Empire: Technoloqy and European Imperialism 
in the Nineteenth Century, (New York, 1981) 
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is rather more justified with regard to aircraft as local populations 
could only hope to lessen their impact on the battlefield rather than 
employing them themselves. 12 As a result these conflicts have been 
condemned as being of little interest to serious modern students of 
the art of war. The very fact that these were 'small wars, in scale 
and were fought in remote out-of-the-way places about which archival 
material is not easily accessible has also restricted academic 
interest. Finally, P. Burroughs has also attributed a lack of 
interest amongst imperial historians in the army's exploits in 
defence of the empire to the comparatively unappealing character of 
traditional didactic and often antiquarian military history which 
attracted little interest from historians working in other fields. 13 
Those historians that have discussed colonial conflict have been 
content to rely upon a work published in 1896 written by a serving 
British officer as the sole source of information regarding how 
imperial troops conducted small wars. Charles Callwell's Small Wars: 
Their Principles and Practice represents a sophisticated, 
comprehensive and authoritative attempt to cover the diverse 
requirements of conducting military operations throughout the British 
Empire. 14 It has justifiably been described as the only 'truly 
distinctive, work produced by an officer of the Victorian Army and 
also 'a minor classic of compression and sophistication', but it 
should not be regarded as the sole source of information regarding 
British colonial warfare. 15 
The conduct of colonial warfare has recently attracted growing 
interest from academic military historians. A series of important 
studies that focus primarily on the indigenous response to imperial 
encroachment have appeared, rather than the manner in which the 
latter conducted their campaigns. 16 The way in which the British Army 
adapted to the demands of colonial warfare and the influence these 
operations had on reform has formed the subject of only one detailed 
12 D. E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, (Manchester, 1991) 
13 Burroughs, op cit, p. 56 
14 Capt. C. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, (London, 1896), 
2nd Ed. 1899 and 3rd Ed. 1906 
15 I. F. W. Beckett, 'The Pen and the Sword: Reflections on Military Thought in the 
British Army, 1854-19141, Soldiers of the Queen, 68, (1992), p. 6 
16 See J. Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial 
Conflict, (Auckland, 1986) and J. Laband, Kinqdom in Crisis. The Zulu Response to 
the British invasion of 1879, (Manchester, 1991) 
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scholarly study, whose central theme is the contrast between 
continental models of military organisation and conflicting imperial 
requirements. In this seminal study H. R. Bailes noted that most of 
British military thought during the latter Victorian period was in 
direct imitation of continental practice, but he has also identified 
the rise of an 'imperial school, of military thought consisting of 
officers, including Wolseley and Roberts, closely concerned with the 
tactics, training and military organisation required to carry out 
Britain's imperial commitments. 17 While adding materially to 
understanding of how the British Army in England adjusted to the 
demands of colonial warfare, this work leaves many important 
questions unanswered regarding the imperial response to 'small wars'. 
For example, it excludes any study of the Indian Army and its scope 
is limited to the late Victorian period. Apart from a comparatively 
recent collection of essays on imperialism and war, there are still 
too few scholarly campaign studies, accounts of colonial armies and 
discussions of their role in the maintenance in European empires. 18 
As Sir Michael Howard observed in the concluding essay of this volume 
published in 1989, however, there still remains much to be said 
regarding the conduct of colonial campaigns and imperialism and 
war. 19 
The British and Indian troops that garrisoned the Indian 
subcontinent and formed the Army in India merit particular attention 
from historians interested in colonial conflict as they conducted a 
wide variety of campaigns throughout the British Empire. It has all 
too readily been assumed that the training of the Army in India 
followed exactly the same pattern as that of the British Army, 
despite it being an entirely separate military organisation. As R. 
Haycock has observed, British arms in India developed in a manner 
distinct from those of the army in England requiring an investigation 
in its own right. 2 0 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
troops in India carried out the local military commitment of 
maintaining internal order and policing the border of Britain's most 
17 H. R. Bailes, The Influence of Continental Examples and Colonial Warfare upon the 
Refg- of the Late Victorian Army, (University of London, Ph. D., 1980) 
18 J. A. de Moor and H. L. Wesseling, (eds. ) Imperialism and War. Essays on 
Colrmi;; 1 Wars in Asia and Africa, (Leiden, 1989) 
19 Sir M. Howard, 'Colonial Wars and European Wars', in Ibid, p. 223 
20 R. Haycock, 'British Arms in India,, in G. Jordan, (ed) British Military 
ent to Robin Hiqham's Guide to the Sources, (London, 1988), 
p. 457 and Gordon, op cit, p. 307 
16 
important colonial possession and, rather more unofficially, 
conducted military operations throughout the British Empire in 
support of imperial interests. For example, Indian troops 
participated in operations in Abyssinia, Malta, Perak, East and West 
Africa, the Sudan and Egypt as well as providing garrisons for other 
colonial possessions. 21 The vast majority of campaigns fought by the 
Army in India, however, took place along the mountainous land 
frontiers of India against a variety of opponents whose arms, 
military organisation and tactics also varied widely. In microcosm, 
warfare along the extensive borders of India mirrored conditions 
elsewhere in the British Empire with imperial troops involved in 
desert, jungle, bush and mountain operations requiring tactics, 
organisation and training different from conventional European 
warfare. 
The North-West Frontier of India in particular, was the scene 
of repeated small wars' and punitive expeditions, providing British 
and Indian troops with a source of sustained experience in conducting 
military operations against one particular type of tribal opponent. 
This necessitated the permanent commitment of large numbers of 
regulars and a range of irregulars recruited from the local 
population. In common with other imperial frontiers, the North-West 
Frontier marked the limit of conquest and administration of British 
India as well as forming the most strategically sensitive border of 
the Empire. It combined a local and immediate problem of tribal 
control with a serious external threat from Russia and Afghanistan. 
In many respects the former represented a far more difficult problem 
than the distant threat of foreign invasion. The maintenance of 
imperial rule along this unsettled border led to the development of a 
distinctive frontier style of policing and military operations. The 
conduct of such military operations against the trans-border Pathan 
tribes was a constant feature of imperial rule dating from the 
annexation of the Punjab in 1849 until the end of the British Raj in 
1947. The inability of the local political administration to pacify 
the tribal areas, forced recourse to controlling or managing them by 
means of fines, blockades of tribal territory and punitive military 
operations tha-: ranged in scale from minor skirmishes to major 
campaigns involving thousands of men. Between 1849-1914 there were 
21 Bond, op cit, p. 7 
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over 52 punitive operations in tribal no-man's land, as well as 
almost incessant small scale operations associated with what became 
known as the 'watch and ward' of the administrative border against 
the depredations of tribal raiders. As Philip Mason has observed, 
these operations represented the staple fare of the Indian Army 
during the Victorian period, as well as providing imperial troops 
with perhaps more practical experience of colonial warfare than in 
any other part of the British Empire. 22 Such operations continued 
during the inter-war period, exerting a profound influence on the 
Army in India. Writing in 1923 Colonel C. E. Vickery observed: 'The 
soldier of to-day may bemoan the absence of any fresh countries which 
might afford a potential outlet for his energies and his training... 
but there will remain for many years wars and rumours of war on the 
frontiers of India and elsewhere on the marches of empire. '23 The 
conduct of what was known within the Army in India alternatively as 
tribal warfare, mountain warfare, hill warfare or more commonly 
frontier warfare posed a range of unique military problems far 
different from conventional military operations in Europe, other 
Jsmall wars' or from prior experience of the large scale campaigns 
fought on the Indian plains. operations conducted by imperial troops 
in tribal territory were especially hampered by limited intelligence, 
climatic extremes and scarcity of water and food, severely 
complicating the transport, supply and administration of imperial 
troops. In comparison the local population was ideally adapted to 
fighting under such difficult conditions. As Charles Callwell noted 
in 1899: 'Hill warfare may fairly be said to constitute a special 
branch of the military art and indeed 'almost the most trying which 
disciplined soldiers can be called on to undertake., 24 
The lessons learnt by the Army in India regarding the colonial 
warfare against the trans-border Pathan tribes and the particular 
military skills developed on the North-West Frontier have also been 
largely ignored by academic historians, despite the scale and 
frequency of operations in tribal territory. Indeed, their lasting 
contribution and influence on the development of military science has 
been positively down played. This is not surprising since attitudes 
22 p. Mason, A Matter of Honour, An Account of the Indian Army, its Of f icers and 
Men, (London, 1974), p. 337 
23 Lt. -Col. C. E. Vickery, Small Wars', A. Q., 6,2, (1923), p. 307 
24 Callwell 1899, op cit, p. 286 
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towards hill warfare have been romanticised by many observers and 
portrayed as an honourable contest, or game, between worthy 
adversaries. 25 The attention of popular writers and historians 
interested in the Indian Army has focused on its social and political 
history and its development as an organisation rather than in the 
manner in which it trained for and conducted various military 
campaigns. 26 The operations fought to maintain and consolidate 
imperial rule on the frontier of India have been left largely to 
popular historians whose books, intended to entertain a popular 
readership, are based almost entirely on secondary sources and lack 
analytical rigour. 27 
Three important studies exist that represent a starting point 
for any scholarly study of the Indian Army and frontier warfare. A 
book written by Captain H. L. Nevill, published in 1912, intended to 
familiarise British officers with the development of frontier 
fighting during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, forms the 
only instructive analytical account of mountain warfare in India. 28 
However, it does not discuss how the doctrine employed by imperial 
troops was initially developed or how these lessons were disseminated 
to imperial troops. In 1968 Major-General J. G. Elliot attempted to 
examine the role of the Indian Army on the frontier which he believed 
affected the whole outlook of the military in India and its 
ef f ectiveness in other conf licts. 29 The only other attempt to chart 
the development of expertise in mountain warfare in India during the 
nineteenth century appeared the same year. Unfortunately this study 
is poorly written, badly researched and displays an obsession with 
25 A. S. Ahmed, 'An Aspect of the Colonial Encounter on the North-West Frontier', 
Asian Affairs, 9, (1978), p. 319. See Lt. -Gen. Sir G. F. MacMunn, The Romance of the 
Indian Frontiers, (London, 1931) 
26 See T. A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India, 
(London, 1974), D. E. Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: the Indian Army 1860-1940, 
(London, 1994) and T. A. Heathcote, The Military in British India: The Development 
of British Land Forces in South Asia 1600-1946, (London, 1995) 
27 See A. Swinson The North-West Frontier: People and Events 1839-1947, (London, 
1967), R. Wilkinson-Latham, North-West Frontier 1837-1947, (London, 1977), C. 
Miller, Khyber. British India's North-West Frontier, (London, 1977), V. Schofield, 
Every Rock, Every Hill. The Plain Tale of the North-West Frontier and Af qhanistan, 
(London, 1984) and M. Barthorp, The North-West Frontier: British India and 
Afqhanistan, a pictorial history, 1839-1947, (Poole, 1982) 
28 Capt. H. L. Nevill, Campaiqns on the North-West Frontier, (London, 1912). 
29 Maj. -Gen. J. G. Elliot, The Frontier 1839-1947, (London, 1968) 
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technical details rather than presenting a balanced picture of what 
actually occurred. 30 
This thesis seeks to challenge existing assumptions about 
military responses to colonial warfare by carrying out a detailed 
study of the problems encountered by imperial troops operating in 
tribal territory. It show the Indian Army adapted to local conditions 
and tactical requirements and how it developed the military 
principles and minor tactics required at the 'sharp end, during the 
repeated campaigns against the trans-border Pathan tribes. In 
particular, the thesis examines in detail how such military tactics 
were refined and 'passed on' to successive generations of British and 
Indian officers and men. It is based on extensive archival research 
and existing primary and secondary sources. Although extensive use 
has been made of examples from particular operations to illustrate 
changes in doctrine, it is not intended to be an operational history. 
Moreover, a discussion of the R. A. F. 's contribution to the conduct of 
frontier warfare has been deliberately restricted to tactical co- 
operation with the army as the strategy of air control was never 
adopted in India and also because it has formed the specific subject 
of a recent study. 
30 S. Chandra, The Development of Mountain Warf are in the 19th Century, (London, 
m. Phil, 1968) 
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Chapter One 
The Punjab Irreqular Force and the origins 
of Hill Warfare 1849-1878 
The annexation of the Punjab in 1849, in the aftermath of the 
Second Sikh War, brought the British administration in India into 
direct contact with the disparate Pathan tribes inhabiting the 
lengthy chain of mountains marking the physical boundary between 
India and Afghanistan for the first time. The rugged and arid 
mountains of the North-West Frontier stretched 704 miles along the 
border of the Punjab, rising generally in height from the Sulaiman 
range and the Gumal pass in the south to Chitral and the Pamirs in 
the f ar north. 1 The belt of mountainous terrain varied in width 
between twenty and two hundred miles and was pierced by four main 
passes that followed the course of the Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal 
rivers. These formed the main arteries of trade and migration as well 
as the historic invasion routes into India (See Figure 1). The 
character of the terrain varied widely along the length of the 
border. At Chitral, in the far north, the terrain consisted of deeply 
incised wooded valleys and mountains that reached a height of over 
2 20,000 feet. Further south, in Dir, Swat and Bajaur inhabited by the 
Yusufzai, Tarkani and Utman Khel tribes, the mountainous terrain was 
intersected by fertile valleys that varied in breadth from the wide 
alluvial valleys in lower Swat to narrow glens in the upper reaches 
of the Lower Swat, Panjkora and Rud rivers. The height of the 
mountains, offshoots of the Hindu Kush, rapidly increased from 2,000 
feet at the junction of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers to 15,000 in the 
3 
north-west and to 22,000 feet in the north-east of the region. The 
area to the north of the Khyber Pass, inhabited by the Mohmand 
tribes, consisted of desolate, broken rugged foothills varying 
between 3,000-5,000 feet in elevation, intersected by flat open 
I Sir W. Barton, India's North-West Frontier, (London, 1939), p-8 For a general 
description see Lt. C. M. Enriquez, The Pathan Borderland, (Calcutta and Simla, 
1910) and Col. H. C. Wylly, Frcm the Black Mountain to Waziristan, (London, 1912) 
2 Military Report and Gazetteer on Chitral, (Simla, 1928), pp. 20-8 L/MIL/17/13/57 
3 Military Report and Gazetteer on Dir, Swat and Balau , (Calcutta, 1928), p. 55 and 
p. 66 L/MIL/17/13/70/1 
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4 valleys scored by deep dry nalas. The comparatively low lying hills 
in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass were intersected by steep and 
precipitous gorges that rose steadily in height towards the Safed Koh 
range and the Tirah massif, inhabited by the Afridi and Orakzais 
tribes, that separated the Khyber Pass and Kurram Valley. Tirah 
itself consisted of a mass of hills that were offshoots of the Safed 
Koh range interspersed by long narrow steep valleys containing 
significant areas of cultivation. Lateral communications between the 
valleys was difficult as there were only a few passes through the 
hills. 5 The low-lying Kurram Valley represented a dramatic change 
from the mountains, stretching 73 miles long from Thal to the Peiwar 
Kotal pass that linked it with Afghanistan. It was inhabited by the 
Turis (Shia Muslims) who were frequently in conflict with the more 
orthodox (Sunni) surrounding tribes. 6 Further south, Waziristan 
consisted of a tangle of rugged hills and ravines rising towards the 
Suleiman range of mountains in the east. The hills were generally 
low-lying, with the exception of Pir Ghal at 11,517 feet and Shuidar 
at 10,942 feet, but were so rugged that they were generally 
inaccessible except on foot. In the central area of Waziristan the 
comparatively well-watered mountains were wooded and covered in dense 
scrub and supported the majority of the local population. This area 
was primarily inhabited by the Mahsuds and Wazirs, together with the 
smaller Bhittani and Daur tribes (See Figure 2). 7 Although many 
perennial rivers and streams existed, water was scarce throughout the 
mountains limiting cultivation. In the foothills vegetation was 
limited to a scattering of stunted bushes and trees. In upland areas 
the hills were covered with scrub jungle, dwarf palm, ilex, and fir 
trees along with some grassy uplands that provided grazing for flocks 
of sheep and goats. The climate was extremely vigorous. During the 
summer intense heat was experienced in the foot hills and lower 
valleys, although the temperature fell considerably at night at 
higher altitudes. During the winter, heavy snow and rainfall made the 
4 Military Report on the Mohmand Countr , (Calcutta, 1926), 3rd Ed. pp. 10-13 
L/MIL/17/13/91 (Hereafter Military Report on Mohmand Country) 
5 Militar Report on Tribal country between Khyber and Kurram 1930, (Simla, 1930), 
5th Ed. pp. 11-16 L/MIL/17/13/80/1 (Hereafter Military Report on Tribal Country) 
6 Military Report on the Kohat District, (Simla, 1928), 3rd Ed. pp. 18-20 and pp. 35- 
6 L/MIL/17/13/87/1 (Hereafter Military Report on Kohat District) and Maj. C. H. 
Villiers-Stuart, 'The Kurram and Surrounding Country', A. R., 7, (1914), pp. 13-22 
7 Military Report on Waziristan 1935, (Simla, 1936), pp. 104-118 L/MIL/17/13/102 
(Hereafter Military Report on Waziristan) 
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valleys often impassable and the intense cold forced many of the 
inhabitants to migrate to warmer lowland areas. 
The Pushr-u speaking Pathan tribes inhabiting tribal territory 
shared ethnic, linguistic and religious ties with the inhabitants of 
Afghanistan, to which country they owed nominal allegiance. Tribal 
society was intensely democratic and vigorously opposed any 
encroachment into independent territory that was perceived to 
threaten its way of life. The Yusufzai, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, 
Mahsuds and Wazirs and other small tribes were united by a shared 
language, but otherwise were internally divided and normally 
incapable of combining due to religious, ethnic and political 
differences. Each tribe was subdivided into small sections or clans 
and in turn into smaller family groups. 8 The code of Pukhtunwali 
governed Pathan society, representing tribal law within each 
community and directing relations between tribes and sections. Tribal 
society stressed egalitarianism and the right of individuals to 
resort to violence to settle disputes and support the personal 
pursuit of power, status and honour. The tribes spurned leadership 
beyond the loose control exercised by tribal elders in council 
(jirgahs). To a large degree every man was a law unto himself and 
actively pursued his own aims unrestricted by societal controls. As a 
result the trans-border Pathan tribes existed in a state of perpetual 
internal conflict, or what anthropologists have termed 'ordered 
anarchy. 19 The insistent demands of the Pathan code of honour and the 
institution of the feud militarised tribal society resulting in 
constant tribal and sectional warfare and endemic personal feuding. 
Individual tribesmen were always heavily armed for self-defence and 
constantly sought to acquire arms and ammunition to prosecute feuds 
against their neighbours. Tribal settlements, clustered in the valley 
floors near the few cultivable patches of ground, were carefully 
sited for defence and heavily fortified against attack. Small 
hamlets, dotted along the valleys, formed the home of a single family 
in which fortified towers, normally over 30 feet in height, formed a 
refuge of last resort in the event of tribal attack. Feuding 
exacerbated the poverty and lack of alternative employment in the 
8A Dictionary of the Pathan Tribes on the North West Frontier of India, (Calcutta, 
1910) L/MIL/17/13/6 See 0. Caroe, The Pathans 550 B. C. -A. D. 1957, (London, 1958) 
9 A. S. Ahmed, 'Tribes and States in Central and South Asia,, Asian Affairs, 11, 
(1980), p. 156 
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hills. Agriculture was limited to a few herds of livestock and small 
patches of cultivation yielding maize, barley and rice, forcing the 
transhumant tribe to live in an almost symbiotic relationship with 
the settled areas on the plains. The heavily armed Pathan tribes 
posed a constant menace to the security of the trade routes through 
the passes into Afghanistan and an immediate and insistent threat to 
the border areas of the Punjab. From time immemorial the tribes had 
charged for safe conduct through the passes into Afghanistan and 
raided the adjacent plains to seize money, livestock and goods as the 
growing Pathan population was unable to subsist in the barren border 
hills. 10 
The maintenance of imperial rule in the border areas presented 
the British Board of Administration, appointed to govern the Punjab, 
with a complex problem. When it assumed control the trans-Indus areas 
were in a state of virtual anarchy and trans-border Pathan raiders 
operated with virtual impunity from the safety of the surrounding 
hills. Villages along the border were strongly fortified and their 
inhabitants heavily armed for self-protection. Indeed, the former 
Sikh government had only been able to collect revenue in the area at 
sword point using large numbers of troops. The immediate concerns of 
the Punjab authorities were to consolidate British rule within the 
border, protect their subjects from raids, keep open the trade routes 
and to ensure the internal security in the newly annexed areas. A 
system based on conciliation backed by force of arms, intended to 
control the border and maintain internal order, replaced the 
arbitrary punitive measures which had been employed by the Sikhs. 
Tribal independence was recognised and they were actively encouraged 
to trade with British India, given access to medical and other 
assistance and allowed to enlist in the ranks of the police and 
military forces to promote friendly relations. British officials were 
also expressly forbidden to go into tribal territory to minimise 
incidents in what became commonly known as the 'close border, policy. 
Tribal maliks and jirgahs were encouraged to seek the advice of the 
deputy commissioners appointed to administer the six border 
districts: Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera 
10 See A. S. Ahmed, Pukhtun economy and society, (London, 1980) and R. O. 
Christiansen, Conflict and Chanqe Among the Khyber Afridis a study of British 
policy nd Tribal Society on the North-West Frontier 1839-1947, (University of 
Leicester, Ph. D., 1987) 
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Ghazi Khan, in the resolution of disputes and to 
the settled areas. It was soon realised that the 
allowances to the hill tribes gave the political 
by which to exert control and a means to replace 
source of tribal livelihood . 41 
The military threat posed by an estimated 
colonise land within 
payment of 
authorities a lever 
raiding as a main 
100,000 heavily armed 
Pathan fighting men to the security of the Punjab meant that other 
measures were also immediately undertaken to protect and control the 
inhabitants of the border areas. Sir Henry Lawrence was empowered by 
the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, on 18th May 1849 to raise a 
force for the protection of the western frontier and to ensure 
internal security while the strength and location of a permanent 
military garrison of the Punjab was determined. 42 Ten regiments - 
five infantry and five cavalry - were raised at stations throughout 
the Punjab during the summer and autumn of 1849, collectively 
designated the Punjab Irregular Force (P. I. F. ), intended for general 
service in the Punjab and Trans-Indus provinces organised and 
equipped on similar lines to other irregular regiments in the Bengal 
Army. A British Commandant and three officers were appointed to each 
regiment, selected from the regular Bengal, Bombay and Madras armies, 
several of whom had served during the First Afghan War. Each infantry 
regiment comprised 16 Native officers, 96 N. C. O. s and 800 private 
soldiers armed with percussion muskets. The cavalry regiments 
consisted of 599 sabres and similar proportions of European and 
Indian officers, who were armed with a mixture of pistols, carbines, 
lances and swords. Native officers were recruited from the families 
of local chiefs on both sides of the border, while the rank and file 
consisted of a mixture of Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Dogras and both 
cis- and trans-border Pathans organised in mixed companies. The 
P. I. F. was bolstered by the permanent addition of three Light Field 
Batteries, raised from the former Durbar Horse Artillery, equipped 
with 
41 Capt. C. C. Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier 1890-1908, (Cambridge, 
1932), pp. 18-36, W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afqhanistan: A Study of Political 
Developments in Central Asia, (London, 1950), p. 183 and i. w. Spain, The Pathan 
(The Hac 1963), pp. 104-109 Bord2rland, _jue, 
42 H. Elliot, the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor General to 
the Board of Administration for the affairs of the Punjab, 16th May 1849, and 
General order by the Right Honorable the Governor General of India, 18th May 1849, 
H/761 
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six conventional nine pounder smooth-bore guns and a 24 pounder 
howitzer. 13 
After initial uncertainty as to whether it should come under 
the command of the regular Bengal Army, the P. I. F. was placed under 
the direct control of the Board of Administration of the Punjab, with 
regard to its organisation, training and employment. Writing in 
October 1850, Lord Dalhousie, the Governor General, observed that his 
object in excluding the P. I. F. from military control was to 'secure 
for the local Government the full and complete control of military 
means sufficient to effect any object which political considerations 
may, in their -judgement, render it expedient to secure on that 
distant frontier., 14 The decision to localise the P. I. F. solely for 
duty in the Punjab gave the Board of Administration almost complete 
control of the troops stationed along the border, enabling it to 
quickly respond to local developments without recourse to the central 
government for military support. To enable it to carry out its duties 
both infantry and cavalry regiments were given a permanent 
establishment of mules, camels and followers, as no organised 
commissariat system existed west of the River Indus, enabling them to 
respond at an hour's notice to internal unrest or tribal raids. 15 The 
P. I. F. was placed under the command of Brigadier J. S. Hodgson in 
November 1850 and given full responsibility for the 'watch and ward' 
or security of the administrative border stretching between Kohat and 
Mithunkote. Shortly afterwards various changes in the establishment 
of the force were confirmed by the Governor-General as well as its 
status under the direct control of the Board of Administration. 16 A 
garrison of two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment and an 
artillery battery was located in each district and was held at 
instant readiness to stop tribal incursions, maintain internal 
security in the border areas and prevent outlaws from taking refuge 
13 General Report on the Administration of the Punjab, for the years 1849-50 and 
1850-51, (London, 1854), pp. 24-32, Lt. -Gen. H. Daly, 'The Punjab Frontier Force,, 
J. R. U. S. I., 28,77, (1884), pp. 907-24 and R. North, The Punjab Frontier Force. A 
Brief Record of their Services 1846-1924, (Dera Ismail Khan, 1934), p. 1 
14 Col. S. Black, Secretary to Government Punjab Military Dept, to the President 
Army Organization Commission, 8th Sept. 1879, L/P&S/18/A134 
15 Brig. J. S. Hodgson, Commanding Punjaub Irregular Force to Maj. H. R Burn, Deputy 
Secretary to the Board of Administration, 5th Dec. 1850 and Maj. H. P. Burn, Deputy 
Secretary to the Board of Administration to Sir H. Elliot, Secretary to Government 
of India with the Governor General, 17th Dec. 1850, P/42/55 
16 General Order by the Most Hon'ble the Governor General of India, 15th Feb. 1851 
and Sir H. Elliot, Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor General, 
to the Board of Administration for the Affairs of the Punjab, 26th Feb. 1851., 
H/761 
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in the nearby hills. A chain of forts and outposts were immediately 
built along the length of the border between Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera 
Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kurram, Kohat, Asnee and Bahadur Khel. The 
construction of a military road parallel to the border linked the 
outposts and allowed troops to be shifted rapidly from area to area 
in response to tribal incursions. Cavalry regiments were dispersed in 
a chain of small mud forts, blockhouses and outposts that blocked the 
valleys, ravines and other lines of approach leading down from the 
hills used by raiding gangs. Although infantry regiments were 
primarily employed in garrisoning forts and larger border towns, they 
were held in readiness to pursue raiders if news of an impending raid 
was received. Additionally, small detachments held the border forts 
allowing the cavalry to operate in the immediate area. The 
intervening ground between outposts was systematically patrolled by 
cavalry which deterred raids, gathered intelligence and attempted to 
intercept parties of marauders following attacks on local villages. 
Although reasonably effective, these patrols were too few and too 
heavily encumbered to police the line of the ill-defined border 
effectively. Outpost duty formed the normal everyday task of both 
officers and men providing valuable practical training denied to the 
rest of the regular army requiring initiative, resourcefulness and 
physical fitness. Many of the duties involved in the 'watch and ward, 
of the border were more civil than military in character involving 
P. I. F. troops in a range of tasks supporting the local civil 
administration which considerably strengthened the latter's 
authority. Its men garrisoned frontier cantonments and forts, guarded 
treasuries and jails, furnished escorts, safeguarded cattle and 
livestock, protected the lives and property of British subjects 
living near the border. Local magistrates were empowered to call out 
troops in the event of tribal raids or local discontent. As civil and 
military officers were united under the orders of the local 
government close co-operation was ensured in the pacification of the 
trans-Indus areas. Indeed, military and police duties were synonymous 
during the 1850s and the denial of safe refuge in the surrounding 
hills to outlaws escaping British justice formed an important part of 
the P. I. F. 's duties. Several Commandants were assigned civil duties 
in addition to their military work. Captain J. Coke, for example, was 
both Deputy Commissioner of Kohat and C. O. of the lst Punjab 
Infantry. As a result of this constant service along the border both 
29 
officers and men of the P. I. F. acquired a detailed knowledge of the 
tribes, their language, and customs which proved of inestimable value 
in the performance of their joint political and military duties. " 
The Peshawar District, opposite the mouth of the Khyber Pass, 
was the only part of the border entrusted to regular troops of the 
Bengal Army, who were primarily responsible for defending against a 
conventional Afghan attack. As these duties were of a more regular 
nature large numbers of conventionally organised troops were 
permanently garrisoned in the area and were retained under the 
direction of the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal. During the early 
1850s, forts were constructed and garrisoned by troops of the 
Peshawar Brigade at Abazai, Michni, Shabkadr and Fort Mackeson. The 
immediate defence of the border of Peshawar and Kohat districts was 
entrusted to the civil police, distributed in a line of small towers 
and outposts, while the Corps of Guides was made responsible for the 
protection of the Eusufzye border from raiding. 18 
The P. I. F. and the political authorities, however, were unable 
to provide complete security against tribal incursions along the 
lengthy and poorly defined border, despite a defensive system that 
consisted of 15 forts, over 50 outposts and a total of over 12,800 
irregular and 10,821 regular troops in 1855.19 The length of the 
uninhabited border, the broken scrub-covered terrain in the 
foothills, the close proximity of the hills and the location of many 
villages and areas of cultivated land well in advance of the outposts 
meant that a system of passive defence had limited effectiveness. It 
proved difficult to safeguard the local inhabitants as the 
administrative border between tribal territory and the plains was 
ill-defined and because many of the Pathan tribes owned land and 
lived on both sides of the border. Skirm-ishes regularly occurred 
between hostile tribesmen and British troops and villagers, who 
carried out their customary raids as they had under the prior Sikh 
government stealing property, seizing hostages and murdering several 
17 Col. J. G. Medley, 'Defence of the North West Frontier', J. U. S. I. I., 9,45, 
(1880), p. 288 
18 Gen. Sir P. S. Lumsden and G. R. Elsmie, Luimden of the Guides: A Sketch of the 
Life of General Sir Henry Burnett Lumsden, (London, 1899), p. 98 and Maj. -Gen. J. G. 
Elliot, The Frontier 1839-1947, (London, 1968), p. 100 
19 Report Showing the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes, 
Independent and Dependent, on the North-West Frontier of the Punjab from 
Annexation in 1849 to the close of 1855, (Calcutta, 1855), p. 54 and p. 62 V/23/3 
(Hereafter Report Showinq Relations 1849-1855) 
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British officers in the settled areas. 2c The Secretary to the Punjab 
Government, R. C. Temple, observed in January 1856: 
They have kept up their own quarrels, or picked new ones, with 
our subjects in the plains, and valleys near the frontier; they 
have descended from the hills and fought these battles out in 
our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and 
slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and 
isolated murder without number; they have often levied black 
mail from our villages; they have intrigued with the 
disaffected everywhere, and tempted our loyal subjects to 
rebel; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their 
preserve, and its inhabitants as their game. When inclined for 
cruel sport, they sally forth to rob and murder, and 
occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They 
have fired upon our own troops, and even killed our own 
officers in our own territories. They give asylum to every 
malcontent or proclaimed criminal, who can escape from British 
justice. They traverse at will our territories, enter our 
villages, trade in our markets; but few British subjects, and 
no servant of the British Government, would dare to enter their 
country on any account whatever. 21 
The political authorities attempted to control the tribes by 
suspending allowances, punitive fines, the seizure of hostages and 
economic blockades of tribal areas which were often sufficient to 
force a recalcitrant tribe to agree terms, especially those that 
lived close to the border and were dependent on trade with India. The 
ultimate sanction available to the administration, however, rested on 
force of arms to restore order and British prestige. 
The P. I. F., and those regular troops stationed in Peshawar 
District, mounted a succession of counter-raids and punitive 'butcher 
and bolt', 1harry and hurry, and 'tip and run, military expeditions 
across the administrative border into tribal territory in response to 
20 H. W. Bellew, Our Punjab Frontier: Beinq a Concise Account of the various tribes 
by which the North-West Frontier of British India is Inhabited; shewinq its 
present anprotected and unsatisfactory state, and the urgent necessity that exists 
for irnm--diate reconstruction. Also, brief remarks on Afqhanistan and our policy in 
reference to that country by a Punjab Official, (Calcutta, 1868), p. 12 
21 Report showinq Relations 1849-1855, pp. 56-7 
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serious tribal incursions when it was apparent that political means 
had failed, resulting in a state of almost constant warfare during 
the 1850s. A total of 15 punitive expeditions were mounted between 
1849 and 1855 against the Kohat Pass Afridis, Mohmands, Miranzai 
tribes, Utmanzai Waziris, Hassanzais, Ranizais, Utman Khel, Bori 
Afridis, 'Hindustani Fanatics', Shiranis, Kasranis, Michni Mohmands, 
Aka Khels and Orakzais, to exact punishment for offences committed in 
British territory and to demonstrate the ability of imperial troops 
to penetrate their hills at will. However, it was soon clear that the 
conduct of such expeditions in tribal territory posed a range of 
difficult operational and political problems. Indian columns had to 
operate in virtually unknown country without the benefit of maps or 
reliable guides and initially with minimal intelligence regarding the 
fighting strength of the tribes. It was always difficult to identify 
an objective that would enable Indian troops to achieve a decisive 
victory and thereby secure a lasting settlement as no organised 
government, capital city or towns existed in tribal territory. The 
fighting men of a tribe or their villages and crops therefore 
represented the only tangible objective for an Indian column. 
However, when Indian troops approached, the tribes normally abandoned 
their homes and dispersed into the surrounding hills leaving their 
fighting men to conduct guerilla warfare making it impossible for 
Indian troops to inflict serious casualties and thereby compel them 
to surrender. The proximity of Afghanistan or neutral tribes, 
moreover, provided sanctuaries for women, children and livestock and 
areas where fighting men could rest and regroup. Additionally, the 
independent tribes were often given active support by Afghan and 
neighbouring tribes with food and fighting men. As a result, Indian 
troops were forced to exact punishment by seizing livestock and 
destroying villages, fortified towers, water tanks, buried reserves 
of food and standing crops or else to remain in temporary occupation 
of an area until hunger, exposure or the necessity to sow crops or 
compelled the tribe to pay fines of money or weapons. There was 
little compunction to exercise restraint, giving hill warfare a 
distinctive character very different from prior operations carried 
out by British and Indian troops on the plains. Indeed, they departed 
from the accepted principles of 'civilised warfare'. Sir Richard 
Temple, noted in 1855 
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when an expedition is undertaken, then if the enemy were to 
assemble in force and take up a position and offer battle, they 
could be attacked and defeated, and their discomfiture might 
suffice as punishment, without any further measure. In that 
event the affair would be conducted after the manner of regular 
warfare. In civilized warfare, force is directed against the 
armed enemy and his defensible positions, but not against his 
country and subjects, who may be morally unconcerned in the 
hostilities and innocent of offence. But this is not civilized 
warfare; the enemy does not possess troops that stand to be 
attacked, nor defensible posts to be taken, nor innocent 
subjects to be spared. He has only rough hills to be 
penetrated, robber fastnesses to be scaled, and dwellings 
containing people, all of them to a man concerned in 
hostilities... To spare these villages would be about as 
reasonable as to spare the commissariat supplies or arsenals of 
a civilized enemy. 22 
Although frequently criticised on humanitarian grounds, there was 
little alternative to punitive operations apart from the occupation 
and administration of tribal territory which was politically 
unacceptable. The destruction of lives and property often exacerbated 
conflict by increasing the desire for revenge in accordance with the 
tenets of Pukhtunwali and thereby ensured continued clashes between 
the trans-border tribes and imperial troops. The political effect of 
the expeditions were further limited by the fact that tribes always 
attacked the retreating troops, improving their morale and spoiling 
the punitive effect. 
The rugged mountainous terrain in tribal territory was the main 
factor that dictated the conduct of hill warfare by causing a range 
of tactical, logistical and administrative problems. The steep and 
precipitous hillsides, interspersed by a succession of knife-edge 
ridges, rugged spurs, cliffs, and precipices, were impassable to 
organised bodies of men equipped with wheeled transport and cavalry. 
indian columns were compelled to advance along narrow, winding, 
boulder strewn river beds and valleys overlooked from vantage points 
in the surrounding hills. These valley floors were usually broken and 
22 Ibid pp. 59-60 
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intersected by deep ravines and during winter troops frequently had 
to cross rivers and streams. During most of the year water courses 
did not present an obstacle, but after sudden, heavy rainfall they 
could be transformed into spates, capable of sweeping men and animals 
away. An absence of roads, broken terrain and scarcity of water made 
the movement of large bodies of troops difficult and time consuming 
and meant the maximum distance a column could march in a single day 
was severely restricted. The few existing tracks through the hills 
were usually only narrow pathways, winding through defiles and over 
difficult mountain passes often requiring considerable improvement by 
Sappers and Miners or Pioneers before they could be used. 
Indian columns operating in tribal territory had to carry large 
quantities of stores, food and fodder in the barren hills as only 
small quantities of meat, corn, rice, straw, grass, or firewood could 
be foraged from the surrounding area. Pack mules and camels were the 
only form of transport capable of moving across the broken terrain, 
but they placed severe administrative and logistical constraints on 
expeditions that were in many respects a more serious check on 
operations than tribal resistance. The slow-moving columns of pack 
animals were forced to advance in single file lengthening the line of 
march, causing continual stoppages while being difficult to protect. 
Casualties amongst the transport animals by enemy action or disease 
could be sufficient to impede or bring to an end military operations. 
As there was a limit to the number of men and animals that could be 
moved over one road in daylight, large forces had to be broken into 
several columns and moved by separate routes. The movement, 
protection and supply of columns dependent on pack transport limited 
their maximum strength to no larger than four or five battalions, a 
mountain battery and a company of sappers. Such a force required 
approximately 5,000 mules to supply it in the field for only a short 
period of time. Indeed, transport and supply difficulties made it 
imperative that no larger a force than was absolutely necessary was 
employed in the mountains. A large proportion of the carrying 
capacity of pack transport was devoted to carrying forage for the 
animals themselves, whose protection, care and management was of 
particular importance to the troops who were completely dependent on 
them during a hill campaign. 
The conduct of military operations by Indian troops in tribal 
territory could also be hamstrung by the climate and endemic 
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diseases. The sickness and mortality rates amongst imperial troops 
and followers from malaria, sandfly fever, dysentery, diarrhoea, 
enteric fever, typhoid fever, pneumonia, bronchitis and cholera, were 
often greatly in excess of the casualties inflicted during the course 
of fighting. Heat-stroke during the summer and intense cold with 
heavy snowfalls during the winter dictated when and where operations 
could take place and led to heavy casualties that could incapacitate 
entire units. Animal transport was also highly susceptible to 
disease: surra, anthrax, rinder-pest, foot and mouth, and sore feet 
through bad husbandry could bring an operation to a halt. The 
scarcity of water also acted as a powerful constraint and limited the 
areas in which British columns could operate and the length of time 
they could remain in the hills. 23 
The military characteristics, tactics and arms employed by the 
Pathans also determined the tactics employed by Indian troops. Tribal 
society lacked any formal military organisation in a European sense. 
However, when an external threat overrode the internal divisions that 
normally prevented the tribes from acting together, the fighting 
strength of a Pathan tribe or section would unite to form a lashkar 
('war party') whose characteristics reflected the loose social and 
political organisation of tribal society. Mullahs settled internal 
differences and arranged truces between individuals or families at 
feud, allowing a tribe to decide a plan of campaign, the number of 
men to be provided by each section, a rendezvous and date of assembly 
and to choose a leader. The size of lashkars could vary widely from 
small parties to several thousand men, although the capacity of the 
surrounding area to support a force dictated its maximum size. A 
lashkar normally lacked regular leadership, discipline, organisation 
or any form of organised transport or supply arrangements. Command 
would normally devolve on a charismatic individual or religious 
leader with sufficient influence or personal leadership to weld the 
fighting men together. The acephalous and egalitarian nature of 
Pathan society, however, precluded effective leadership over any 
extended period of time. Individual tribesmen would report equipped 
with their own arms, ammunition, blanket and food at a chosen place 
to form the lashkar, which would also be accompanied by unarmed men 
23 Military Report on Waziristan, PP-119-21 L/MIL/17/13/102, Military Report o 
Tribal Count , pp. 17-18 and Military Report on Mohmand Country, pp - 13-14 
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and boys who carried food, ammunition and wounded and acted as 
reinforcements employing discarded weapons when men were killed or 
wounded. A lashkar was incapable of maintaining itself in the field 
for a period longer than ten days and, once the supplies carried by 
individual tribesmen were exhausted, they had to return home or 
forcibly requisition food, water and ammunition from local villages. 
A lashkar would also lose what limited cohesion it possessed if 
defeated, as its discredited leaders lost all authority and were 
unable to rally the tribesmen or organise further opposition. 
Lashkarwals would disperse to their homes carrying their dead and 
wounded, mourn their dead and wait while tribal jirgas deliberated 
the need for further action. The strength of a lashkar therefore was 
liable to fluctuate wildly in accordance with its mercurial morale, 
the state of its provisions and the success of the fighting in 
progress. Despite these inherent defects lightly equipped lashkars 
enjoyed a considerable tactical and strategic advantage over Indian 
troops as they were less circumscribed by supply and transport 
difficulties. Indeed, their ability to assemble or disperse large 
numbers of men at short notice was a source of considerable 
flexibility and strength, although the absence of effective 
leadership, cohesion or collective discipline meant that lashkars 
were often unable to act quickly or to unite and mount a vigorous 
defence. 24 
The martial skills developed and refined by individual 
tribesmen during years of feuding and inter-tribal warfare made 
lashkars highly effective. Accustomed to fighting from youth, Pathan 
tribesmen were physically fit, skilled al. skirmishing, fieldcraft and 
the use of arms and were inured to local diseases. Unlike imperial 
troops, tribesmen were intimately acquainted with the local terrain, 
paths, and resources. Tribal clothing - baggy trousers, grass chaplis 
on feet, flowing grey shirts bound with leather ammunition belts and 
untidy pagris -- and their skill in utilising the hillsides for cover 
and concealment made it difficult to locate tribesmen skirmishing 
over the hills. Tribal lashkars normally attempted to hold defensive 
positions at r-i-dges or passes which were heavily fortified with 
sangars, sited to allow frontal and flanking fire on the probable 
24 Spain, op cit, pp. 76-7, and A. S. Ahmed, 'Pukhtun Tribes in the Great Game' , Asian 
Affairs, 11, (198D), pp. 139-40 
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line of advance of an attacking force, where they would mount a 
determined resistance. Each tribesman fought according to personal 
judgement once fighting began exploiting the terrain for cover and 
concealment, advancing or retiring as the fighting developed. Pathan 
tribesmen would seldom remain to fight at close-quarters with the 
assaulting troops and, if their flanks, rear or line of retreat were 
threatened, would disperse into the surrounding hills before an 
organised pursuit could be mounted. Lashkars excelled at desultory 
hit-and-run guerilla warfare, attacking 4 1_solated parties of troops, 
raiding convoys on the lines of communication, sniping foraging 
parties, and a-L-tacking rearguards at the end of each day's 
operations. When the situation offered a prospect of success the 
tribesmen would seize the opportunity to attack with considerable 
61an and engage in hand-to-hand combat. Their speed and mobility 
across the rough, precipitous terrain, enabled lashkars to ebb and 
flow around Indian columns and easily evade attacks by organised 
bodies of troops giving them the freedom to choose the time and place 
for an attack and to keep the initiative. 
The locally manufactured firearms, long knives, swords, and 
shields employed by trans-border Pathan lashkars also greatly 
affected Indian tactics. Following the First Afghan War the Pathan 
tribes had steadily acquired a large number of matchlock or flintlock 
jezails -a muzzle-loading rifled musket - whose range and accuracy 
outclassed the Brown Bess percussion muskets employed by Indian 
troops giving tribesmen a distinct qualitative advantage in small 
arms. 25 iezails allowed lashkars to harass British columns from out 
of range without effective reply. The acquisition of jezails altered 
tribal methods from reliance on shock tactics and hand-to-hand combat 
to guerrilla warfare against Indian columns. However, jezails were 
not as highly effective as many Indian officers believed. Tests on 
two jezails purchased in the Khyber Pass in 1875, by the Adjutant- 
General for Musketry, indicated that the effectiveness of these 
weapons had been overestimated by those troops against which they had 
been used. Both weapons were crudely manufactured, inaccurate and had 
an effective range of only 300 yards. The majority of the tribesmen 
were armed with swords, knives and shields, making them reliant on 
25 Lt. -Col. W. Gordon, Chief Inspector of Musketry, to the Adj. -Gen., 4th Dec. 
1867, L/MIL/3/784, Christiansen, op cit, pp. 286-7 and Elliot, op cit, p. 111 
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combat at close quarters. However, a combination of charges mounted 
by large numbers of Pathan swordsmen, concerted with Jezail fire, 
posed a difficult problem for imperial troops who were forced to mass 
in close contact with each other making them, in turn, vulnerable to 
rifle fire. 26 
The P. I. F. 's regiments and batteries quickly learnt that 
conventional tactics, training and equipment devised for operations 
on the Indian plains against similarly armed, organised and trained 
troops, were of little use in tribal territory. Indeed, it was soon 
apparent that military operations against the trans-border Pathan 
tribes represented a distinctive form of warfare requiring the 
development of operational principles and specific minor tactics for 
each arm of service. It was fortunate that the ranks of several 
P. I. F. regiments had officers with prior experience of the tribes, 
dating from the First Afghan War, who could provide initial guidance 
in the tactics of mountain warfare against a tribal opponent. 27 
The P. I. F. 's infantry regiments soon learned that the tribes 
were unwilling to engage in a stand up fight with Indian troops. 
Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner at Bannu, noted in September 
1853: 'It is not the policy and never has been the practice of any of 
the tribes on this frontier to meet our troops openly in the field. 
Any operations in which this force has been engaged have been 
skirmishing of greater or less magnitude, on broken or hilly ground... 
The tribes are not likely to alter their tactics which are the best 
indeed they could adopt. When strife occurs therefore it will always 
be of the same character. f 28 The infantry regiments bore the brunt of 
the fighting in tribal territory and their men had to employ light 
infantry skills in place of ponderous formal battalion drill, with 
its reliance on iron collective discipline, close-order line and 
column formations that dominated training in the regular Bengal Army. 
It was impossible to maintain close-order infantry formations or 
exploit disciplined massed firepower across the broken hill sides 
making it essential to employ loose, flexible, skirmishing tactics, 
modelled on those used by their Pathan opponents utilising the ground 
for cover and concealment. Additionally, they had to develop the 
26 Maj. W. MacKinnon, 'Jezail Experiments', J-U. S. I. I., 4,20, (1875), pp. 201-3 
27 Elliot, op, cit, p. 27 
28 Maj. J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner, to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Military 
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 4th Sept. 1853, F/4/2549 
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individual skills of marksmanship and fieldcraft along with 
sufficient physical fitness to enable them to move quickly over the 
hillsides carrying their arms, ammunition and equipment. The 
dispersion required on the battlefield meant officers and men had to 
be self-reliant, well-motivated and able to exercise considerable 
individual initiative in comparison to those serving in the regular 
army. Personal equipment was reduced to a minimum light marching 
order and men frequently wore grass sandals in place of boots to 
increase their mobility. A less conspicuous khaki uniform was adopted 
by infantry regiments in January 1853, instead of the heavy and 
easily noticeable scarlet clothing used in the Bengal Army, to 
provide effective camouflage during operations conducted against the 
brown backdrop of the arid border hills. 29 The smoothbore percussion 
musket, with which the majority of the infantry regiments were 
equipped, also proved unsuitable for fighting in the hills. Its short 
range, inaccuracy and heavy weight placed Indian troops at a marked 
disadvantage when opposed by lightly equipped tribesmen armed with 
jezails. During operations in the hills bordering the Derajat the 
superiority of the rifles arming the 1st Punjab Infantry was quickly 
demonstrated and Brigadier General J. S. Hodgson requested in May 1853 
that the light companies in each infantry regiment should be armed 
with similar weapons, so that they could be brigaded together to form 
a corps of riflemen in event of an emergency: 
The nature of Hill warfare presents almost invariably the same 
characteristics. Viz: an enemy previously posted in favourable 
positions and enjoying the superior advantage of good cover, to 
dislodge them from which necessitates great personal exposure 
on the part of the attacking party. I have therefore considered 
it most incumbent on me to recommend that the Light Companies 
of the Punjaub Infantry should be supplied with the Rifle, as a 
weapon obviously better calculated to meet these difficulties, 
and the possession of which would, besides, inspiring increased 
confidence, enable soldiers so armed to oppose on comparatively 
29 Selections f rcm the Records of the Government of India. (Foreiqn Department). 
No. dministration of the Punjab, Territories, comprisinq the 
the Cis and Trans-Sutlej States, for the Years 1851-52 and 1852- 
53, (Calcutta, 1853), PP-36-7 V/23/1 (Hereafter Selections from Records No. VI) 
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equal terms a well placed foe firing from a rest with the long 
range jezail. 30 
The proposal to rearm P. I. F. regiments with rifles was widely 
supported by political and military officers accustomed to tribal 
tactics, although it was felt that a small proportion of muskets 
should be kept in case of a major incursion into the plains or 
hostilities with Afghan troops. 31 The training given to light 
infantry regiments was also deemed of special importance for fighting 
against Pathan irregulars. Major J. D. Macpherson, Military Secretary 
to the Punjab Government, noted: 'The drill also of Rifle Corps give 
the men a grear- superiority over soldiers trained to the Battalion 
exercise. In the one case the men are taught to act singly, to take 
advantage of all cover, to rely on the excellence of their weapon... '32 
Two complete regiments were re-armed with two-grooved Brunswick 
Rifles so that rifle regiments could be stationed permanently at 
Kohat, and in the Upper and Lower Derajat, in addition to the flank 
companies of the remaining units. Although slow and difficult to load 
in comparison to the musket, the greater accuracy and range of 200- 
300 yards enabled Indian troops to oppose tribal lashkars on equal 
terms for the first time. 33 The number of Brunswick rifles issued to 
the infantry steadily increased until, by 1856, four complete 
infantry regiments and the light companies of the remaining four had 
received the weapon. 34 
The mountainous terrain and lack of roads made the employment 
of conventional horse-drawn wheeled field artillery that equipped the 
P. I. F. 's three light field batteries and those batteries of the 
Bengal Army at Peshawar impossible. Two specialised mountain 
artillery trains, modelled on units improvised during the Nepalese 
30 Brig. J. S. Hodgson, Commanding Punjab Irregular Force, to Maj. H. D. Macpherson, 
Military Secretary to the Cammissioner, 29th April 1853, P/200/36 
31 Lt. -Col. Mackeson, Commissioner & Superintendent Peshawar Division, to Maj. J. D. 
Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 2nd Sept. 1853, Brig. 
J. S Hodgson, Commanding Punjab Irregular Force, to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Off. 
Military Secretary to the Chief Cammissioner, 4th Sept. 1853, and Capt. J. Coke, 
Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, 22nd Dec. 1853, F/4/2549 
32 Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Offg. Military Secretary Chief Commissioner Punjab, to 
Lt. -Col R. J. Birch, Offg. Secretary to the Govt. of India in the Military 
Departinent, 11th Oct. 1853, F/4/2549 
33 Minute by the Governor General, 3rd Nov. 1853, Lt. -Col. R. J. Birch, Off. 
Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Dept. to J. Lawrence, Chief 
Commissioner Punjab, 9th Nov. 1853, F/4/2549 
34 Selections from Records No. VI, p. 37 and Records of the Government of India 
Report on the Administration of Public Affairs in the Puniaub Territories from 
1854-55 to 1855-56 Inclusive, (Calcutta, 1856), pp. 94-5 V/10/2 
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and First Afghan War, were raised by the Bengal Army during the early 
1850s and equipped with light ordnance - 3-pounder guns, 24-pounder 
howitzer and 4 1/2 inch mortars - which could be broken down and 
carried in small loads by pack mules. The Peshawar and Hazara 
Mountain Trains, guns were capable of coming quickly in and out of 
action in the hills at very restricted positions and rapidly 
demonstrated their utility during the Hassanzais expedition on the 
Black Mountain. 35 Brigadier Hodgson requested that a mountain train 
should be added to the P. I. F. in October 1852, but instead two 3 
pounder mountain guns were attached to the light field batteries 
stationed at Kohat and Bannu. 36 The comparative immobility of the 
mountain batteries to infantry and the strain they placed on 
transport and supply arrangements, meant that they normally formed a 
small component of any force operating in the border hills. Indeed 
the paucity of guns, lack of shell power and the difficulty of 
ammunition supply meant the main fighting had to be carried out by 
the infantry although mountain guns provided invaluable close fire 
support to the troops in both the attack and defence. An absence of 
opposing artillery and the short range of tribal jezails meant that 
mountain gunners were able to operate in close proximity to the 
forward troops. Artillery enjoyed an unprecedented moral superiority 
over the poorly armed tribesmen who were unaccustomed to its 
employment, magnifying the normally limited physical effect caused by 
the light weight, small calibre shells which were often unable to 
dislodge defenders entrenched behind boulders and sangars or engage 
tribesmen hidden behind hill crests. During operations, batteries 
were frequently broken into two gun divisions which operated 
independently in support of the infantry. Although such close support 
tactics were highly effective, care had to be taken not to employ 
artillery batteries too early in a battle for fear that they would 
drive off the tribesmen and prevent a general engagement with a 
lashkar. " 
35 Brig. -Gen. C. A. Graham, A History of the Indian Mountain 
Artillery. L (Aldershot, 
1957), pp. 4-6 
36 Brig. J. S. Hodgson, Conrianding Punjaub Irregular Force, to Maj. N. Chamberlain, 
Military Secretary to the Board of Administration, 5th Oct. 1852, and C. Allen, 
offg. Secretary to the Government of India to the Board of Administration for the 
affairs of the Punjab, 10th Nov. 1852, P/43/63 
37 R. H. Scales, Artillery in Small Wars: The Evolution of British Army Doctrine 
186Q-1914, (Ph. D., Duke University, 1976), p. 80 
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The P. I. F. 's cavalry regiments were seldom employed in punitive 
expeditions due to the vulnerability of horsemen in the mountains, 
except for an occasional detached squadron to safeguard the line of 
communications, escort convoys, and for orderly work. Cavalry had a 
valuable moral effect on the tribesmen out of proportion to its 
physical impact since the majority of the hill tribes were 
unaccustomed to horses. An opportunity to use the arme blanche in 
hill warfare was rare and the cavalry were relegated primarily to the 
duties of watch and ward along the administrative border of the 
Punjab during which they developed considerable mobility and skill at 
moving over difficult ground. on several occasions small bodies of 
horsemen dealt with large raiding parties operating out of the safety 
of the hills. 38 
The P. I. F. devised specialised tactics to conduct an attack in 
the hills, protect columns on the march, protect columns when halted 
at night and to govern the conduct of withdrawal in contact with 
hostile tribesmen that were dominated by the twin principles of 
offensive action and the maintenance of security. The maintenance of 
the offensive throughout operations against the tribes was accepted 
as a basic principle of hill warfare, to exploit lashkar's lack of 
cohesion, demoralise its members and exploit the superior discipline 
and training of Indian troops. Attacks on a large scale were an 
exception, however, rather than the rule except at the beginning of a 
campaign when tribesmen occupied strong defensible positions blocking 
a line of advance into the hills. A combination of a frontal attack 
with an enveloping movement on one or both flanks was frequently 
employed to fo: ý-ce tribesmen out of strong defensive positions when 
they stood to fight and to inflict heavy casualties on a retreating 
lashkar which normally bolted when its line of retreat was 
threatened. The short range of Pathan matchlocks and jezails meant 
flanking attacks had only to cover relatively short distances with 
little loss of life and delay. Attacks or retirements were made in 
bounds up spurs or along ridges carefully avoiding low ground or re- 
entrants where troops could be fired upon from above or surrounded. 
Reserves and supports moved closely behind the f iring line, providing 
covering fire as an attack progressed and using flanking fire to 
38 See History of the lst Punjab Cavalry, (Lahore, 1887), History of the Second 
PanjAb Cavalry, (London, 1888) and History of the 23rd Cavalry (Frontier Force), 
late 3rd Regiment, Punjab Cavalry, (No imprint, c!. 1910) 
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clear sangars and breastworks. A close-order line was still required 
shortly before an enemy position was reached to meet a charge by 
Pathan swordsmen. Hill warfare necessitated the dispersion and the 
decentralisation of command and control to give Indian columns the 
degree of flexibility required when operating across difficult 
terrain. Fighting frequently devolved into a series of separate 
unrelated skirmishes, rather than a formal set-piece encounter under 
the direct control of senior officers. 
Indian columns operating in tribal territory seldom encountered 
serious resistance from tribal lashkars. Instead lashkars normally 
concentrated on attacking and harassing Indian columns as they 
marched through tribal territory. The comparative immobility of 
Indian columns to tribal lashkars exposed them to attack from the 
flank, rear and directly against the vulnerable pack transport which 
made ensuring all-round security of special importance. The essence 
of the tactical problem lay in ensuring the security of the main body 
of a column and protecting its long, vulnerable train of pack 
transport from attack from the surrounding hills. It was quickly 
discovered that the key lay in controlling the flanking ground and 
dominating the surrounding area by 'crowning the heights, on either 
side of the route of march with small parties of troops who occupied 
all high ground or tactically important features within effective 
jezail range of a column. The number and distribution of such 
protective detachments varied widely according to the terrain, but 
all had to be built approximately 300 yards from the vulnerable 
transport animals to prevent sniping. The short range of Pathan 
jezails meant that piquets were seldom overlooked by other positions 
within effective range and were secure except from direct assault by 
the tribesmen. A ring of piquets provided all-round defence to the 
main body of the column as it moved along the valley floor denying 
positions from where tribesmen could fire on the troops and blocking 
nullahs and covering lines of approach to the valley below that could 
be used by swordsmen. Tribesmen were seldom prepared to attack uphill 
and were wary of moving in the vicinity of piquets, although piquet 
positions were normally fortified with sangars. 
The piquets deployed on the flanks of an advancing column would 
rejoin the main body once the rear guard had passed out of effective 
range of their position, which could then be safely abandoned to the 
enemy. Piquets retired with speed down -the hill sides in an endeavour 
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to get out of the range of hostile tribesmen occupying their previous 
positions on the hill top and to prevent slowing the column. If 
casualties were suffered it became axiomatic to immediately 
counterattack to recover dead and wounded and to reoccupy the 
position. Piqueting required a high degree of physical fitness, 
drill, co-ordination, intelligence, and personal skill if the 
'crowning, of the heights along the line of march was to proceed 
without impeding a column's progress and ensure complete security. 
The selection of the tactical features that needed to be piqueted and 
the routes by which detachments should advance across the intervening 
ground, required an officer with a practised and skilful eye in the 
advance guard. The posting and withdrawal of piquets led to the 
development of elaborate codes and drills by the P. I. F. The 
evacuation of a piquet was often the point of greatest danger as 
tribesmen sought to seize the vacant position and attack its 
retreating garrison. During a withdrawal the main body of the piquet 
would retire leaving a small party consisting of an officer or N. C. O. 
and a handful of men who would make as much noise as possible and 
then quickly retreat from the position once the rest of the piquet 
had rejoined the main column. The premature evacuation of a piquet 
could endanger the security of an entire column or the other piquets 
and necessitate rapid counter-attacks to recover the position from 
the enemy. 
The protection and security of British encampments at night was 
based on similar principles as those used to protect a column on the 
march. The mountainous terrain forced troops, followers and pack 
animals to encamp on the valley floors, where sufficient level ground 
and water was available, but such locations were vulnerable to 
sniping as they were always commanded by the surrounding hills and 
the ground was often poorly suited to defence. The surrounding 
heights dominating the camp were held by small detachments of troops 
ordered to hold the position overnight to deny the tribesmen sniping 
positions and dominate lines of approach to the encampment below. 
Piquets could not provide complete protection, however, from sniping 
at close range, attacks by tribesmen who infiltrated the outer ring 
of defences or thieves intent on stealing rifles or equipment from 
Indian troops. The defence of the main body from a surprise attack 
was ensured by the construction of elaborate field defences 
encompassing the limits of the encampment. A perimeter wall or 
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breastwork, built from rocks, stores, or bales of fodder, backed by a 
trench was constructed to stop tribesmen rushing a camp, to provide 
cover from sniping, shelter for sleeping troops and to prevent rifle 
thieves from infiltrating an encampment. Infantry units were deployed 
along the length of the perimeter while the central area was reserved 
for the transport, cavalry or other non-combatant units. within its 
walls, messes and sleeping places were often dug down into the ground 
or sangared in an endeavour to protect against sniping into the 
densely packed perimeter camp. The construction of such elaborate 
defences was t1me consuming and meant that columns had to encamp long 
before nightfall in order to allow sufficient time for their 
completion while it was still light. However, the importance of such 
elaborate perimeter defences was demonstrated on numerous occasions 
when large parties of swordsmen penetrated the surrounding ring of 
piquets and launched desperate attacks on the troops in the valley 
below. 
The conduct of a withdrawal in contact with hostile tribesmen, 
an operation that occurred frequently, was the most difficult phase 
of an expedition in tribal territory during which the heaviest 
fighting normally occurred. A lashkar would normally interpret a 
withdrawal as a sign of success causing the scale and intensity of 
attacks to dramatically increase. The superior mobility of tribal 
skirmishers and local knowledge gave them an advantage in pressing a 
retirement which normally left commanding positions in tribal hands 
from where heavy fire could be delivered on the withdrawing imperial 
troops. The gradual retirement of a rearguard had to be covered by 
infantry and artillery in successive layback positions until out of 
effective range of the tribesmen. Such operations required 
considerable skill, discipline, intelligence, careful control and eye 
for the ground by officers in order to be achieved without loss. 
mountain artillery normally acted as the mainstay of a withdrawal 
leap-frogging back from successive firing points in the same manner 
as the infantry. The loss of dead and wounded necessitated rapid 
counter-attacks to recover casualties before they fell into tribal 
hands as European or Hindu prisoners were normally tortured and 
mutilated greatly affecting the conduct of operations by Indian 
troops. As the numbers of wounded increased, so the pace of the 
retreat would slow as men were encumbered with dead, wounded and 
rifles which could not be allowed to fall into tribal hands. 
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The principles and minor tactics devised by the P. I. F. to 
conduct what became known as hill warfare were a practical, pragmatic 
and highly effective response to local conditions. During the 1850s 
P. I. F. regiments carried out the majority of hill campaigns alone 
giving it an unrivalled expertise in mountain warfare. Free from the 
overall direction and straitjacket of the regular military 
authorities, it was able to adapt its arms, equipment and training to 
take local conditions into account and meet the local military 
requirements of mountain warfare. A permanent establishment of 
regimental pack transport allowed P. I. F. units to move quickly and 
with comparative ease through the border hills and was critical in 
ensuring the success of military operations in which so much depended 
on transport and supply. As a result of the P. I. F. 's permanent 
commitment to the watch and ward of the border, both officers and men 
gained an intimate knowledge of tribal territory and its inhabitants 
together with practical experience of mountain warfare during 
repeated punitive expeditions and skirmishes with trans-border Pathan 
lashkars. During such operations and while on outpost duty both 
British and Indian officers learnt to exercise a degree of initiative 
and self-reliance unknown in the regular army. A high state of 
efficiency was maintained by Brigadier General Hodgson during the 
brief periods of peace along the border, who directed that both 
regiments and batteries should frequently exercise their men and 
transport in full marching order near their cantonments as if engaged 
against hostile tribesmen. 39 Isolated from the mainstream of military 
life in India by distance and the Indus river and relieved only 
between the border cantonments its officers and men developed a high 
standard of military professionalism devoted solely to local 
political and military requirements. The resulting close co-operation 
that developed between its regiments and batteries, high standard of 
training and 6sprit-de-corps within the force that developed added 
considerably to its effectiveness. Indeed, despite the harsh 
conditions in the border cantonments, the unrivalled opportunities 
for active service and its growing reputation meant competition was 
fierce amongst officers to serve in its regiments and batteries. 
39 Brig. -Gen. J. S. Hodgson to Maj - H. D. Macpherson, of f g. Military Secretary to the 
Chief Commissioner, 10th March 1853, P/200/25 
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In comparison, the regular Bengal Army regiments and British 
units that garrisoned Peshawar District, trained solely in 
conventional operations, lacked knowledge of tribal tactics or 
suitable transport, equipment and training adapted to the exigencies 
of mountain warfare. Armed with muzzle-loading muskets, clothed in 
scarlet uniforms and accompanied by large quantities of baggage, 
regular troops proved highly vulnerable in the hills. Knowledge of 
mountain warfare could only be acquired through close contact with 
the P. I. F. in the field or had to be bought by experience by the 
successive commanders and regiments posted to Peshawar District at a 
high cost in lives, reputations and prestige. Columns composed of 
regular troops employed in the hills lacked a similar degree of 
mobility as P. I. F. units, as prior to 1861 no standing transport was 
maintained by regular units during peacetime and it had to be 
extemporised before each campaign. The collection of sufficient 
animals, carriage and followers in the Punjab often delayed 
operations for several weeks. Additionally officers lacked local 
knowledge of the country, its inhabitants, and tribal tactics which 
could not be obtained in the normal course of service when corps were 
relieved every two or three years. S. S. Thorburn later observed: 
In hill fighting the garrison was only strong through numbers 
and discipline. In fact, no troops in the Bengal army were 
adapted for guerilla warfare in the mountains: Britishers and 
Hindustanis alike were plainsmen, not cragsmen, and neither 
moved unless accompanied by immense baggage trains. Owing to 
these disabilities expeditions launched from Peshawar were 
infrequent, and when undertaken were very costly, formal, and 
ineffective campaigns carried on close to a base within our 
border than the rough-and-ready sort of marching customary in 
the Dera- 40 j at. 
The periodic relief of units carried out within the Bengal 
Presidency, militated against the assimilation or dissemination of 
local knowledge and practical experience of mountain warfare. Any 
information gained through practical experience was soon lost before 
it could be passed on to the rest of the regular army as units 
40 S. S. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War, (Edinburgh and London, 1904), p-294 
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returned to the mainstream of professional soldiering in India with 
its emphasis on conventional European warfare. 
The P. I. F. proved a highly successful military response to the 
exigencies of the watch and ward of the administrative border and 
punitive operations in tribal territory. In 1855 it assumed 
responsibility for the watch and ward of the border between Mardan 
and Abbottabad, with Peshawar District intervening between its 
existing garrisons at Kohat and in the Derajat. During the 1850s the 
P. I. F. regiments served without relief in the isolated border 
cantonments, despite the harsh conditions, apart from an occasional 
interlude at Abbottabad in the green mountains of Hazara. The 
strength of the force steadily grew to five regiments of cavalry, six 
regiments of Punjab infantry, the Corps of Guides, four regiments of 
Sikh infantry, three Light Field Batteries, two mountain trains and a 
garrison battery. " An additional Gurkha regiment was raised at 
Abbottabad in 1858, to provide sufficient manpower to police the new 
part of the border and to provide a Hindu counterpoise to the rest of 
the largely Muslim regiments. 42 The P. I. F. 's officers and men were 
highly efficient in their military duties as by 1857 some of its 
units had participated in no less than 20 different expeditions or 
skirmishes with the trans-border tribes. Indeed, the isolation of the 
P. I. F. from the rest of the Indian Army along the remote border of 
the Punjab had wider significance during the summer of 1857, 
following the outbreak of mutiny within the ranks of the Bengal Army, 
when its regiments and batteries formed the backbone of the force 
despatched from the Punjab to central India, the North-West Provinces 
and Oude to suppress the rebellion. Its training, experience and 
rough and ready organisation proved ideally suited to operations on 
the Indian plains, refuting claims that troops trained solely to 
mountain warfare were incapable of holding their own in conventional 
military operations. Indeed, it was so successful that it formed the 
model on which the whole native army was reorganised when the 
fighting ended. 43 
41 Report on the Administration of Public Affairs in the Punjaub Territories from 
1854-55 to 1855-56 Inclusive, (Calcutta, 1856), p. 97 V/10/2 
42 History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) 1858-1928, (Aldershot, 
1929), p. 3 (Hereafter History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, ) 
43 A. H. Shibly, The Reorganisation of the Indian Armies, 1858-79, (London Ph. D., 
1969) p-124 
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The P. I. F. resumed the watch and ward of the administrative 
border when the fighting in central India ended, replacing tribal 
levies raised during the war, although the independence of such a 
large number of men outside the jurisdiction of the Commander-in- 
Chief was questioned during the ensuing debate regarding the 
reorganisation of the Indian Army. 44 The resulting discussions 
reflected the perceived military and political importance of a 
localised force being maintained in the Punjab. Brigadier-General Sir 
N. Chamberlain, the P. I. F. 's current commander, emphasised the joint 
political and military role of the force and stressed the importance 
of it being localised in the Punjab to maintain its intimate 
knowledge of the frontier and its inhabitants. He argued that its men 
had become accustomed to mountain warfare by repeated operations 
against the trans-border tribes and that by experience, organisation, 
recruitment and training the P. I. F. was now ideally fitted for the 
conduct of military operations against the hill tribes. The 
Commissioner of Peshawar, Captain W. James, was more effusive in his 
support for the continued localisation of the P. I. F. and emphasised 
the unique character of the fighting in which it was employed: 
Everyone who has been engaged on expeditions on this frontier 
must admit that it is a peculiar kind of warfare, requiring 
special training of officers and men. Independent of the 
harassing duties attendant on campaigning everywhere, there are 
peculiar difficulties to be encountered in the hills on the 
border, and which are overcome by practice only. I have no 
hesitation in saying that troops freshly and indiscriminately 
brought to the work must fail; even physically they would break 
down. I can assure the Government that I have seen sepoys of 
the Regular Army shot down and cut down on the hill side 
perfectly helpless, whilst their comrades of the Irregular 
Force have been driving the enemy up a neighbouring hill; and 
if we look to smaller matters (which in truth make up the 
efficiency of the whole) we shall see how the Irregular of the 
Punjab Force excels his comrade of the Regular Army... It is 
necessary to occupy many points, and to keep up communications 
44 Maj. R. C. Lawrence, Secretary to Government, Punjaub, Military Department, to 
Maj. -Gen. R. J. Birch. Secretary to the Government of India Military Department, 
with the Governor General, 25th Oct. 1859, P/191/144 
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with them all; this involves the detachment of many parties, 
and Native officers and Non-Commissioned officers are 
frequently Commanding small but important posts, in which 
intelligence, care, and prudence of mind, and knowledge of the 
enemy's tactics to extricate themselves from, Such incidents 
are unobserved generally, but the enemy is acquainted with 
them, and they frequently tend, as much as more open signs of 
power and skill, to the successful result of the day; and to 
establish a wholesome fear of our men. 
Such whole hearted support for the P. I. F. contrasted sharply with the 
biting criticism he reserved for the ability of the regular Bengal 
Army regiments: 
Conceive a General had never before seen an expedition of the 
kind, with a force which found itself on the frontier in 
ordinary course of relief!! Supposing the General and his 
Officers to be even superior to the ordinary men; - we require 
no prophetic skill to calculate the rest - not aware of the 
style of the enemy's warfare, of the nature of the country he 
is about to penetrate, of the arrangements found by experience 
to be required for the efficiency and comfort of his men, of 
the weak points of our organisation under such circumstances, 
of the manner in which the enemy can most readily inflict loss 
on us, of the arrangements for the wounded, and above all of 
what men can and what they cannot do, it would be a miracle if 
he avoid a disaster... Nothing which I have said can, I trust, be 
considered in any way disparaging to the officers of the other 
divisions of the army. I simply assert that, while the main 
principles of war must be the same anywhere, yet its details 
are necessarily dependent on the character of the enemy and 
that these can be mastered only by experience and practice: any 
attempt to theorize will prove abortive, and just as peculiar 
training is necessary for the various departments of the same 
profession in civil life, so it is essential in the Army. 45 
45 Maj. G. Hutchinson, Offg. Secretary to Government Punjab, Military Department, 
to Maj. -Gen. Sir R. G. Birch, Secretary to the Government of India in the Military 
Department, Ist Oct. 1860, P/191/44 
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Despite the Commander-in-Chief's continued objections, the P. I. F. 
remained under the orders of the Punjab Government. 46 In 1860, it was 
involved in military operations in Waziristan which graphically 
demonstrated its proficiency when, in the space of a fortnight, a 
column penetrated into the heart of the area and forced the local 
tribes to agree terms. Although major changes were implemented in the 
regular Indian army during the 1860s, the organisation of the P. I. F. 
remained essentially unaltered although the strength of its regiments 
and their transport was reduced. 47 After the Military Police 
battalions and levies serving in the Punjab were abolished, Sir N. 
Chamberlain became responsible for the entire system of border 
defence in May 1862 outside the confines of the Peshawar District. A 
new irregular force, the Frontier Militia, was recruited from Pathan 
tribes on both sides of the administrative border in an endeavour to 
provide alternative employment to raiding and to enlist local 
support. Henceforth the line of outposts in the Bannu, Dera Ismail 
Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpore districts was placed under the 
control of the commandants of the P. I. F. cavalry regiments while the 
militia, consisting of 403 horsemen and 217 infantry, garrisoned the 
intermediate posts either alone or in conjunction with troops. The 
Frontier Militia provided local knowledge, acted as guides and 
collected valuable intelligence regarding raids and offences 
committed by the trans-border tribes which considerably increased the 
efficiency of the troops in their duties in peace and war. 48 
The efficiency of the P. I. F. was maintained primarily by 
frequent practical experience combined with the large cadre of 
seasoned officers and men remaining in its ranks, despite heavy 
casualties during the Mutiny, who 'passed on' their knowledge of hill 
warfare to new subalterns, while Indian officers, N. C. O. s and men 
disseminated their own experience to successive generations of new 
recruits. Despite its continued specialised role when General Sir 
Hugh Rose, the Commander-in-Chief, inspected the frontier garrisons 
46 Maj. -Gen. R. J. Birch, Secretary to the Government of India Military Department, 
to the Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, 19th Nov. 1860, and 
Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence that the Punjab Irregular Force should be kept 
under the Control of Local Government subject to the orders of the Governor 
General, 8th Dec. 1860, Lawrence Mss, Mss-Eur. F. S, 0/23 
47 General Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies, for 
1859-60 (Calcutta, 1860), pp-40-1 V/10/13 
48 Annual Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, for the year 
1861-62, (Calcutta, 1862), p. 17 V/10/17 
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in 1862, however, he was highly critical of the decision to arm its 
troops with rifles and artillery, the absence of any British troops 
in the border cantonments, the system of divided responsibility for 
the defence of the border and the continued independence of the force 
outside military command. Despite being generally pleased with the 
drill, discipline and efficiency of the P. I. F., he also pointed out 
that considerable variations existed in light infantry drill between 
its regiments. 49 The Lieutenant -Governor once again vigorously 
defended the P. I. F. pointing out that it was specially organised, 
trained and equipped solely for hill warfare and that the normal 
standards applied to the Bengal Army were simply inappropriate while 
the political exigencies of the frontier necessitated it remaining 
under local control. With regard to the P. I. F; s standard of training 
he observed: 
The men are trained to hill warfare. Regiments are therefore 
frequently practised on the hill side over difficult ground, 
which takes away from the time that can be given to battalion 
and brigade movements, and it is not to be expected that in 
these, high precision can be attained, nor is it essentially 
necessary. It may perhaps be doubted if the excellence of the 
regular and irregular can be combined. 50 
A Standing Order was issued by Brigadier-General Chamberlain on lst 
October 1862 which directed that the commanding officer of each 
infantry regiment should move his troops into camp each year for the 
purpose of light infantry training on the hill sides. Henceforth 
training camps were held for a fortnight each year in the hills near 
each station to accustom the troops to Light infantry skills and the 
special training required during operations over mountainous terrain. 
In addition, they provided British and Indian officers with the 
opportunity to organise and control each unit's baggage, equipment, 
pack transport, and hospital establishments under operational 
conditions. Practical training was deemed of special importance due 
to the complex administrative requirements of hill warfare and to 
49 Report of the Visit of His Excellency the Coranander-in-Chief to the Trans-Indus 
Frontier, 5th July 1862, P/192/17 
50 Minute by the flon'ble the Lieutenant -Governor of the Punjaub, 3rd Dec. 1862, 
P/192/17 
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reduce the amount of transport accompanying the regiments in the 
field. 51 Training was given added realism when mock fights were held 
between opposing parts of the regiments, simulating attack, defence 
and retirements from positions in the hills. Annual inspections of 
the border outposts, cantonments and each regiment and battery by the 
commander of the P. I. F. frequently coincided with the light infantry 
training camps, providing him with an opportunity to assess the 
performance of his units under simulated active service conditions 
and to ensue tactical uniformity. 52 
The conduct of mountain warfare on the North-West Frontier did 
not completely escape professional attention in the regular army 
during the 1860s. The hastily formed Eusufzye Field Force, which 
assembled during the autumn of 1863 for punitive operations against 
the colony of 'Hindustani Fanatics' at Sitana, consisted of 5,000 men 
and 18 guns and represented the largest force assembled on the North- 
West Frontier since the First Afghan War. Six P. I. F. infantry 
regiments, the Queen's Own Corps of Guides and two mountain trains 
from the Derajat and Kohat garrisons, formed the backbone of the 
force which was bolstered by two regular British and three Indian 
regiments. When the force assembled it became apparent that the 
equipment and transport of the regulars units was inappropriate for 
the planned operations. Mules and equipment had to be taken from 
P. I. F. light field batteries to make the Royal Artillery battery 
effective. As --he punitive expedition advanced into the mountains it 
immediately encountered difficulties as 4. -he hastily collected 
transport, baggage and heavy equipment accompanying the regulars 
slowed the pace of advance to a crawl. 53 The advance ground to a halt 
at the Umbeyla Pass when the force was attacked by over 15,000 Swati, 
Bunerwal and Hindustani tribesmen emboldened by its slow progress 
through the mountains. It assumed the defensive on 22nd October under 
continuous and sustained tribal attack, altering the entire plan of 
campaign and transforming a minor expedition into a major war. Heavy 
fighting for the possession of Crag Piquet, Eagle's Nest, and Conical 
Hill, which dominated the position in the Umbeyla Pass, continued for 
51 Brigade Standing Orders issued by the Brigadier General Commanding Punjab 
Frontier Force, 6th July 1867, P/436/42 
52 Gen. Sir J. L. Vaughan, My Service in the Indian Army - and After, (London, 
1904), p. 33 and p. 46 and G. W. Forrest, Life of Field Marshal Sir Neville 
Chamberlain, (London, 1909), p. 409 
53 Col. E. Hawthorne to the Secretary Government of India Military Department, 26th 
Sept. 1863, L/MIL/7/10631 and Forrest, op cit, p. 419 
53 
two months. Tribal jezails outranged the muskets and Brunswick rifles 
used by Indian troops and provided effective covering fire to 
swordsmen utilising the network of ravines, rocks and broken wooded 
terrain to close and engage in hand-to-hand combat with troops 
defending the breastworks and sangars blocking the pass. 54 The key to 
the position, Crag Piquet, changed hands on three occasions, with 
heavy losses on both sides before it was finally recaptured by Indian 
troops. 55 Deadlock continued during October and November 1863, 
focusing the attention of Sir Hugh Rose and the Governor-General on 
the operations and provoking calls for an ignominious withdrawal back 
to the plain. After two officers were sent by the Commander-in-Chief 
to report on the situation, reinforcements were despatched from the 
regular army which included two British and three Indian regiments . 
56 
The strengthened Eusufzye Field Force assumed the offensive in 
November and the destruction of the village of Malka on 22nd December 
ended the campaign. However, this was after it had suffered 238 
killed and 670 wounded, which represented the highest losses ever 
inflicted on Indian troops during a campaign on the North-West 
Frontier. 57 
The Umbeyla campaign briefly focused professional attention in 
the Bengal Army on the requirements of hill warfare and gave regular 
British and Indian troops practical experience of the inherent 
difficulties of military operations against a 'savage' tribal 
opponent in mountainous terrain devoid of roads. Particular criticism 
was directed towards the standard and type of transport that had 
accompanied the column. After inspecting the force at Umbeyla Colonel 
J. Adye noted: 'The great difficulty in moving a force in a country 
like the present, is the amount of carriage required and the number 
of Camp followers; and should further operations of the kind be 
contemplated, this question must be carefully considered and 
organized. f58 However, despite proposals to create permanently 
54 Thorburn, op cit, p. 176 
55 Anon., 'Notes on the Late Campaign on the Punjab Frontier, Cornhill Magazine, 9, 
51, (1864), p. 860 and Col. C. E. Stewart, Through Persia in Disguise with 
Reminiscences of the Umbeylah Campaiqn, (London, 1911), p. 52 
56 Field Marshal Lord F. Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, (London, 1897), Vol. II 
pp. 9-10 and Gen. J. Adye, Recollections of a Military Life, (London, 1895), 
pp. 207-20 
57 Nevill, op cit, p. 62 
58 Extracts from the Reports of Colonel J. Adye to His Excellency General Sir Hugh 
Rose, Conunander-in-Chief India, regarding the position at Umbeyla and the 
operations of the Eusufzye Field Force, 13th Jan. 1864, L/MIL/3/746 
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organised transport at Peshawar suitable for operations in the 
mountains little was done. 59 The military requirements of hill 
warfare were discussed in several books and lectures. An essay on 
mountain warfare was published in England in 1866, using examples 
from the 1816 Gurkha War, the First Afghan War, Umbeyla and European 
mountain warfare, intended to redress the meagre amount of 
information on the subject currently available to officers serving in 
India. Lieutenant C. M. MacGregor recommended that 'everything should 
be done to raise the efficiency of our own soldiers, by subjecting 
them beforehand to practice of the style of warfare in which they 
will soon be engaged, by nerving them gradually to the hardships they 
will have to undergo, and by equipping them in the manner most suited 
to the climate and features of the enemy's country. 16O A further 
volume, written by the same author, listed the special equipment 
required by regulars in mountainous terrain. These volumes provided 
the only source of practical guidance available to British officers 
regarding the tactics of mountain warfare. 61 The problems inherent in 
a mountain campaign in India were discussed at length in a book 
written by Colonel J. Adye, who mirrored Colonel James, earlier views 
regarding the effectiveness of conventionally organised, trained and 
equipped Indian troops in mountain warfare: 
Offensive Mountain warfare, in a hostile unknown region, is the 
prosecution of a difficult art under most trying circumstances. 
All the ordinary obstructions to successful campaigning present 
themselves in an aggravated form. Whether in climbing steep 
ridges, or in forcing rocky defiles, the advantages of ground 
and the knowledge of locality are in entirely the favour of the 
enemy. They not only hold the commanding points, but the very 
habits of their daily life render them particularly adapted to 
irregular fighting. The well fed soldier of the plains, on the 
other hand, toiling wearily over the unwanted difficulties of 
the ground find that the advantages of the regular formations 
and severe drill are of little avail under conditions 
59 Memorandum on the Field Carriage and Camp material of the Brigade of Troops in 
the Peshawur Valley and the Punjaub Irregular Force by Brigadier General A. Wilde, 
Conrianding Punjab Irregular Force, 1st Nov. 1864, P/192/30 
60 Lt. C. M. MacGregor, Mountain Warfare: An Essay on the Conduct of Hill Operations 
in Mountainous Countries, (London, 1866), p. 19 2nd Ed. 
61 Lt. C. M. MacGregor, Field Equipment of Troops for Service amonq Mountains, 
(London, 1866) 
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antagonistic to normal routine. But the difficulties of moving 
large and regularly organised bodies of men, over a steep and 
almost pathless country do not end here. The transport for the 
carriage of food, ammunition, medical stores, and the hundred 
details which go to meet the almost critical wants of modern 
armies, render rapid locomotion almost impossible... So that now 
when we have arrived at the foot of a mountainous tract... our 
traditional habits, bad enough before, render us peculiarly 
unfitted to encounter the novel circumstances of the case. 62 
The dearth of appropriate transport was once again singled out for 
criticism, since it had represented the Achilles heel of the regular 
army throughout the campaign. Adye concluded by suggesting that 
British troops should be given experience of hill warfare and that 
organised transport should be provided for all troops at frontier 
stations. 63 In April 1867, the attention of the influential Royal 
United Services Institute in London was brought to the lack of 
knowledge and appropriate training for mountain warfare in India 
amongst British officers. Major G. V. Fosbery of the Bengal Staff 
Corps complained that while the French army had learnt from its 
service in Algeria, the British Army had ignored 'lessons' gained in 
India. He observed: 
Comparatively few English officers know what Indian mountain 
fighting means; the remainder, when brought face to face with a 
brave, numerous, and formidable enemy, on ground very different 
from the valleys of Aldershot, or the plains where so many of 
our triumphs have been won, are apt to find the ordinary 
regulations, manuals, and drill books less than what is 
necessary for ordinary success. English courage and English 
resources eventually win the day, but both courage and 
resources are often wasted in the winning. True, we have men 
such as Neville Chamberlain, Reynel Taylor, Wilde, Vaughan, 
Green, P. --obyn, Keyes, Brownlow, and others, whose very names 
are a terror to the tribes with whom we are in contact; but 
they are so, not merely because they are brilliant soldiers or 
62 Col. J. Adye, ýSitana: A Mountain Campaiqn on the Borders of A-fqhanistan in 1863, 
(London, 1867), pp. 34-5 
63 Ibid, p. 85 and p-92 
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diplomatists, but because they possess special knowledge, not 
possessed by the rest of our Services; an experience, too, 
which unhappily dies with them. 64 
Despite the brief period of interest displayed in India and England 
following the Umbeyla campaign, the P. I. F. 's virtual monopoly on the 
watch and ward of the remote border of the Punjab remained 
unchallenged. rhe knowledge of mountain warfare that had been bought 
at heavy cost by Indian regiments was soon lost as they returned to 
the mainstream of professional soldiering in India with its emphasis 
on instruction for operations against regularly organised trained and 
equipped European troops. 
The P. I. F. maintained a high degree of efficiency during the 
1860s and the likelihood of further operations against the Pathan 
tribes meant its regiments were maintained on a permanent war-footing 
by the Punjab Government. After the annual inspection in the summer 
of 1865 its commander reported that drill, parade work and light 
infantry skills of its units were of a high standard, facilitated by 
the recent publication of the P. I. F. 's Standing Orders and Chundah 
rules. In addition, the numerous Brigade Circulars issued by its 
commanding officers were collated to provide officers with guidance 
and a means of standardising training in the special duties required 
in the trans-Indus areas. 65 In September 1865 the P. I. F. was 
redesignated the Punjab Frontier Force (P. F. F. ) after the irregular 
system was adopted throughout the Indian army, although its 
organisation remained unaltered. 66 The growing amount of transport 
and baggage accompanying its regiments into their annual training 
camps was a particular source of concern to its commander. In an 
endeavour to maintain its mobility in the border hills a maximum 
scale of one camel and three mules for each company was laid down by 
Standing Order in July 1867, with an additional 32 camels to carry 
regimental stores in the field .6' The commander of the P. F. F. 
proposed in September 1867, that manoeuvres should be held for the 
64 Maj. G. V. Fosbery, 'The Umbeyla Expedition', J. R. U. S. I., 11,46, (1868), p. 549 
65 Brig. -Gen. A. Wilde, Coimianding Punjaub Irregular Force, to Major S. Black, 
Secretary to Government, Punjaub Military Department, 17th June 1865, P/192/39 
66 Military Department Letter No. 485 to 1865: General, 7th Nov. 1865, and Col. 
H. W. Norman, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the 
Secretary to Government, Punjaub, Simla, 19th Sept. 1865, L/MIL/3/761 
67 Brigade Standing Orders issued by the Brigadier General Conmianding Punjab 
Frontier Force, 6th July 1867, P/436/42 
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border garrisons during the coming cold season, to assess their 
performance in exercises involving all three arms of service and to 
monitor the amount of baggage accompanying its regiments into the 
field. Brigadier General A. Wilde observed: 
It has been my desire for some years past to inspect 
occasionally the troops of this Brigade in "Camps of Exercise, " 
instead of visiting them year by year in cantonments; the 
object being to enable me to supervise more fully the working 
condition and saddles of the mounted branches, and the public 
cattle and camp equipage of the Infantry. It will also give me 
the opportunity to exercise the Cavalry and Artillery in rough 
and unknown ground, and to practise the Infantry on the hill 
side as light troops. 18 
During the winter of 1867-68 Camps of Exercise were held for the 
garrison of Kohat at Goombut, for the garrisons of Bannu and Dera 
Ismail Khan at Amakhail and for the garrisons of Dera Ghazi Khan and 
Rajanpore at the outpost at Harrand. A series of exercises and 
inspections were conducted at each location directly supervised by 
the Brigadier-General. The Camps of Exercise were an unqualified 
success and similar manoeuvres were proposed for the future. 
Brigadier-General Sir Alfred Wilde concluded: 'I believe the 
exercising of the troops on the hill side, in parts of the country 
not often visited by the Officers of the Force, has done good and 
afforded the younger officers of Regiments some idea of the 
difficulties attending all Military operations in mountainous 
countries. ' 69 
The punitive expedition against the Akazais and Hassanzais 
clans inhabiting the Black Mountain in October-November 1868, 
consisted primarily of regular British and Indian troops from 
stations in the Punjab and North-Western Provinces in an endeavour to 
extended practical experience of hill warfare to the regular Bengal 
Army and to prevent weakening the border garrisons. The scale of 
equipment taken by the Indian regiments was deliberately kept at a 
68 Brig. -Gen. Conmanding Punjab Frontier Force, to the Secretary to Government, 
Punjab, Military Department, 25th Sept. 1867, P/435/44 
69 Brig. -Gen. A. Wilde, Conmianding Punjab Frontier Force, to the Secretary to 
Government, Punjab, Military Department, 24th June 1868, P/435/55 
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minimum mindful of the earlier experience at the Umbeyla Pass. A 
Field Force order, issued at the start of the campaign, laid down: 
'The success of all military operations on mountainous countries 
depends, in a marked degree, on the organization of the Columns 
employed. The advance of British troops unencumbered with tents or 
baggage cannot be long checked by the Hill tribes. r70 However, the 
dearth of appropriate training and experience in hill warfare amongst 
the selected regular regiments concerned the commander of the 
expedition. Major-General Wilde circulated a memorandum in September 
1868 to the commanding officers of the regiments and batteries in the 
Hazara Field Force containing guidance regarding skirmishing, the 
role of artillery and piqueting when opposed by a tribal opponent. " 
Both brigade commanders were specifically instructed to ascertain 
that all commanding officers understood the 'spirit of the orders' 
and to ensure they acted in accordance with them in the field . 
72 It 
was perhaps fortunate that the Hazara Field Force encountered little 
resistance during the three week long cainpaign on the Black Mountain 
although a considerable improvement was evident over prior operations 
involving regular troops. The reduced scale of baggage and the number 
of camp followers normally accompanying regular units materially 
increased their mobility and indicated that regular units were 
capable of undertaking a hill campaign as long as sufficient 
preparations were made beforehand . 
73 The Commander- in-Chie f, 
enthusiastically observed: 
The spectacle has been seen of British troops, European and 
Native, operating over and among mountains 10,000 feet high, in 
bivouac for three weeks... It is placed on record that the 
English : egiments moved as easily and with as little 
encumbrance as the Native; this fact even extending to the 
commissariat arrangements for rations. It is further shown that 
the healt-h of neither English or Native troops suffered in any 
70 Maj. -Gen. A. Wilde, Conm-kanding Hazara Field Force, to the Q. M. G., 16th Sept. 
1868, P/235/57 
71 Maj. -Gen. A. Wilde, Cormnanding Hazara Field Force, to the Adj. -Gen., 11th Oct. 
1868, P/235/57, and Brig. -Gen. A. T. Wilde, 'Circular Memorandum for the information 
and guidance of Officers Conuanding Batteries and Regiments, Huzarah Field Force, 
Sept. 1868, P/615 
72 To Brigadier -General s Bright and Vaughan, Commanding Nos. 1 &2 Brigades, 28th 
Sept. 1868, P/615 
73 Maj. -Gen. A. Wilde, Commanding Hazara Field Force, to the Adj. -Gen., 26th Oct. 
1868, P/435/58 
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significant degree... a great lesson has been learnt in mountain 
warfare which should never be lost sight of in future hill 
campaigns in India; it being certain that in all such 
operations, the presence of heavy trains and comparatively 
useless baggage is more fatal to the initiative of the General 
in immediate command than any positive resistance it may be in 
the power of the enemy to offer. 74 
Despite such sanguine views the commander of the Hazara Field Force 
was less optimistic regarding the lessons of the campaign. In May 
1869 Brigadier General A. Wilde submitted a detailed memorandum which 
outlined the type and quantity of carriage, provisions and equipment 
required to conduct military operations in the mountains, pointing 
out that the recent fighting had been hampered by lack of rifled 
ordnance, four different types of small arms, insufficient equipment 
adapted to mountain warfare and the absence of organised and armed 
followers. Although several of these defects were in the process of 
being rectified, he warned of the tendency to increase the amount of 
transport and equipment required by imperial troops. Wilde was aware 
that it was impossible to keep regular troops in a permanent state of 
readiness for hill warfare due to the expense, but he noted that it 
would be possible to equip and raise columns within a reasonably 
short space of time if suitable equipment was kept close at hand. 
After stressing the importance of transport and supply in hill 
warfare he suggested that regular transport and trained muleteers, 
organised on military lines, should be formed on a permanent basis in 
Peshawar District. Wilde noted: 
I would remark, that the Government cannot expect a permanent 
peace on the North-West Frontier; encounters with the tribes... 
will periodically occur, and be successfully met; in the event, 
however, of the slightest check to our troops, as at Umbeylah 
in 1863-64, the disturbing influence amongst the fanatical and 
disaffected inhabitants of our frontier districts makes it a 
paramount duty in the military advisers of the Government, to 
be prepared to overcome very formidable combinations. I 
74 Lt. -Col. P. S. Lumsden, Q-M-G- of the Army, to the of f g. Secretary to the 
Government of India, Military Department, 5th Nov. 1868, P/435/58 
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advocate preparedness in equipment and carriage, to enable the 
Local Government to strike a blow, readily and effectively at 
the shortest notice, and, at the same time, to have means at 
hand to move up to the base of operations the necessary 
supports, without which, no force should ever be permitted to 
enter the passes, even for a day; ... these simple and warlike 
tribes owe their power of resistance to the nature of their 
country, and the general absence of centralization, making it 
often difficult to subdue them at a blow, and rendering it 
necessary to conquer them man by man. In mountainous countries, 
regular troops cannot fight in close order, and their 
superiority is often imperilled by novel positions they find 
themselves suddenly placed in. My object in writing this letter 
is to induce Government to adapt our soldiers, by exercise in 
the hills, and by organization in equipment and carriage, to 
these new conditions of Indian warfare. 
Brigadier-General Sir A. Wilde concluded: 'The North-West Frontier of 
India, like Algeria and the Caucasus is, as regards the science of 
war, a field yielding special wants and experience. r75 
The Hazara campaign did not lead to any serious endeavour to 
adapt the organisation, equipment and training of the Bengal Army to 
these new conditions, of Indian warfare, apart from prompting an 
attempt by Sir William Mansfield to absorb the P. F. F. into its ranks. 
The Commander-in-Chief argued that there was now no difference 
between the P. F. F. 's duties and that of the regulars and blamed its 
isolation for --he fact that information regarding the tribes, 
independent territory and the repeated military operations along the 
border had been lost to the rest of the Indian Army. 76 Although the 
proposal was supported by Brigadier General A. Wilde, with the 
proviso that the force would remain localised in the Punjab to 
maintain its intimate knowledge of the tribes and the border, the 
suggestion was strongly resisted by the Government of the Punjab who 
feared the force would lose its distinctive character if it was 
75 Brig. -Gen. A. T. Wilde, Offg. Military Secretaxy to the Gove=nent Madras, to the 
Adj. -Gen., 5th May 1869, P/615 
76 Minute by His Excellency General Sir W. Mansfield, 25th Aug. 1869, Keyes Mss, 
Mss. Eur. D. 1048/8 
61 
absorbed into the line. 77 The P. F. F. therefore remained a separate 
unit solely for frontier service under local command. To rectify the 
dearth of transport suitable for mountain warfare, two permanent mule 
trains, each consisting of 500 animals with necessary followers and 
equipment, were formed in November 1868, modelled on the P. F. F. 's 
regimental transport, as part of the Peshawar and Rawalpindi Moveable 
Columns. 78 In addition, two Royal Artillery mountain batteries were 
added permanently to the establishment of the Bengal Presidency in 
1869, to give British gunners experience of hill warfare which had 
hitherto been confined to Indian troops serving in the P. F. F. The 5- 
25th Brigade, equipped with bronze seven pounder guns, was the first 
Royal Artillery battery deployed on the North-West Frontier when it 
was stationed at Abbottabad in 1869.79 
The 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War diverted attention in India 
from local military requirements of mountain warfare and directed it 
towards the study of strategy and tactics used against similarly 
equipped, organised and trained European troops. At the camps of 
exercise held at Dehli and Hussan Abdal in 1872-73 the new system of 
conventional warfare was studied by Indian troops. 80 The 
'Prussianisation, of the drill books, used by both the British and 
Indian troops, after 1870 dominated training in both India and 
England and diverted professional attention back to conventional 
if 
military operations to the exclusion of all other forms of warfare. 81 
The blame attributed to Algerian military experience for the defeat 
of the French Army in 1870, moreover, devalued the perceived 
importance of the lessons derived from imperial military campaigns. 
An anonymous author writing for the influential Wellington Prize 
Essay competition in 1872, mirrored the similar views within the 
British Army, observing: 'The service which our soldiers have seen in 
India, or China, or New Zealand, will not stand them in much stead; 
77 Memorandum by Brigadier-General A. T. Wilde, 17th April 1869, and Major S. Black, 
Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Maj. -Gen. H. W. Norman, Secretary to Government 
of India, Military Department, 19th March 1870, Keyes Mss, Mss. Eur. D. 1048/8 
78 Maj. -Gen. H. W. Norman, Secretary to the Government of India, Military 
Department, to the Offg. Commissary General, 20th April 1869, P/436/4 and 
Executive Commissariat Officer, Peshawur, to Lt. -Col. T. H. Sibley, Deputy 
Commissary General, Upper Circle, 2nd April 1872, P/620 
79 Military Department Despatch No. 434 of 1868: Decision to maintain two Mountain 
Batteries in the Bengal Presidency, 7th Nov. 1868, L/MIL/3/788 
80 Maj. -Gen. P. S. Lumsden, Q. M. G, to the Secretary to the Government of India, 
Military Department, 16th Jan. 1873, L/MIL/3/833 and "Beechwood", My Diary of the 
Punjab caml) of Exercise, 1872-73, (Bombay, 1873) 
131 Brig. -Gen. C. H. Brownlow, 'Notes on the Native Army of Bengal: Its present 
material and organisation, as compared with the past', Sept. 1875, L/MIL/17/2/468 
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the lessons gathered in such warfare, unless read with great 
intelligence, might prove rather the reverse of useful, just as the 
Algerian experience, there is reason to believe, was positively 
injurious to the French army. 1 82 Sir Robert Napier introduced new 
systems of drill and training in the Indian army, modelled on the 
Prussian system, revolutionising its training during the 1870s which 
emphasised musketry, attacks by infantry swarms and the use of 
skirmishers. 83 In many ways the skirmishing tactics that now 
dominated training were similar to the tactics developed by the 
P. F. F. for military operations against the border tribes. General L. 
Vaughan noted: 'When many years later the Franco-Prussian war came 
and the world - surprised by the great superiority of the German 
troops - inquired how it was brought about, we on the frontier smiled 
to find how, by the use of a bit of common sense and freedom from red 
tape, we had anticipated a great deal of what was best in the German 
system of training. '84 Both the standard training manuals used by 
British and Indian troops, the Field Services and Exercises of 
infantry, and the various unofficial books used for instruction 
focused on the lessons drawn from continental military practice under 
conditions far different from the requirements of warfare in India. 85 
The new in-house periodical of the Indian Army, the Journal of the 
United Services institute of India (J. U. S. I. I. ), reflected the 
emphasis now placed on the lessons of European warfare. Few articles 
even mentioned colonial military requirements and failed to have a 
impact in increasing awareness of the general requirements of 
fighting in the British Empire. Although several pieces of literature 
were published addressing the conduct of mountain warfare for regular 
troops engaged in operations on the North-West Frontier, they had 
limited impact on the mainstream of military thought in India. 86 
The watch and ward of the administrative border was left 
primarily in the hands of the P. F. F. during the 1870s, apart from the 
comparatively small and ever-changing garrison of Peshawar District, 
82 By an Adjutant, An Essay on Tactics, (London, 1872), p. 4 
83 Maj. -Gen. H. W. Norman, 'Memorandum on the Native Army, I 13th Jan. 1875, 
L/MIL/17/5/1670 
84 Vaughan, op cit, p. 46 
85 See Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry, (London, 1874), E. B. Hamley, 
Operations of War, (London, 1866), and Capt. C. Clery, Minor Tactics, (London, 
1875) 
86 See Lt. A. Gaselee, 'On the Carriage of Ammunition in Mountain Warfare', 
j. U. S. I. I., 1,3, (1871), p-102, and Maj. -Gen. L. Shadwell, Mountain Warfare: 
Illustrated by the Campaiqn of 1799 in Switzerland, (London, 1875) 
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despite growing fears that the security of India was threatened from 
Afghanistan and beyond. By 1870 its strength had grown to that of a 
large division of all-arms, despite being classified as a brigade 
command, consisting of 12 regiments of infantry, five of cavalry, 
four light field batteries, two mountain batteries, and one garrison 
battery and the attached Frontier Militia. 87 The P. F. F. 's units were 
among the first in India to be issued with modern rifled arms, 
dramatically increasing their effectiveness and giving them a 
qualitative advantage in armament over the tribes for the first time. 
Both the Peshawar and Hazara mountain batteries were re-equipped 
during 1869 with bronze seven pounder rifled mountain guns with 
greatly improved range and accuracy, while four guns and their 
equipment were placed in store at Kohat for the Light Field Batteries 
which retained smoothbore guns. 88 The two remaining Light Field 
Batteries were finally equipped with 2001b steel seven-pounder 
muzzle-loading rifled mountain guns in November 1876 and were 
permanently redesignated as mountain batteries. 89 Infantry regiments 
in the P. F. F. were given muzzle-loading Enfield rifles between 1869- 
71 with greatly superior range to their current small arms. 90 Three 
years later Indian units stationed at Peshawar, Nowshera, Kohat, and 
Mardan were re-equipped with single-shot breech-loading Snider rifles 
which had a greatly increased rate of fire and accuracy. 91 
The number of punitive military expeditions carried out by the 
P. F. F. declined during the 1870s, as relations between the 
independent tribes and the imperial authorities steadily improved. 
After a reorganisation in 1873-4 the militia and civil police 
performed many of the duties hitherto carried out by its cavalry and 
87 Brig. -Gen. C. P. Keyes, Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, to Lt. -Col. S. Black, 
Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, 7th Nov. 1870, P/620 
88 Military Department Separate Letter No. 349 of 1869: On the subject of army 
reduction, 4th Oct. 1869, L/MIL/3/102, and Maj. -Gen. F. Turner, Inspector General 
of ordnance & Magazines, to the Secretary to the Goverment of India, Military 
Department, 9th Oct. 1868, L/MIL/3/833 
89 Col. S. Black, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, to Col. 
H. K. Burne, Secretary to the Goverment of India, Military Department, 3rd Aug. 
1877 L/MIL/3/876 and Brig. -Gen. C. P. Keyes, Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, to 
Col. S. Black, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, 13th Nov. 
1876, P/951 
90 Military Department Separate Letter No. 183 of 1870: Reporting the arming of 
certain Native Regiments with the Enfield Rifles, 15th July 1870, L/MIL/3/104 and 
Memorandum from Brig. -Gen. C. P. Keyes, Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, to 
Captain C. S. McLean, Offg. Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, 
22nd Sept. 1871, P/608 
91 Military Department Letter No. 147 of 1874: Reporting the measures taken for the 
commencing to arm the Native Troops with breech-loading arm, 1st Aug. 1874, 
L/MIL/3/844 
64 
infantry regiments. As a resultf troops were withdrawn from outposts 
and concentrated at cantonments where they were held in immediate 
readiness to respond to any major tribal incursions. 92 The training 
and garrison duties carried out by the P. F. F. increasingly differed 
in few respects from those performed by the line army and the force 
slowly began to lose the distinctive 'rough and ready, character that 
had hitherto differentiated its regiments from the Bengal Army. 93 
After the annual inspection in 1872 the commander, Brigadier General 
C. P. Keyes, complained that its commandants paid too much attention 
to the drills laid down in the battalion exercise and smartness, 
rather than to the 'essential qualities requisite for the special 
service of the Frontier. '94 As a result during the 1870s the P. F. F. 
continued to carry out annual training camps nearby their cantonments 
to exercise their pack transport and practise light infantry skills 
required in hill warfare. 95 A Camp of Exercise was held at Paniala, 
for example, by Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes during January-February 
1874, for the garrisons at Dera Ismail Khan and Edwardesbad during 
which simulated attacks on and the defence of mountain passes were 
carried oUt. 96 After the manoeuvres Sir Henry Davies, the Governor of 
the Punjab, once again endorsed the system of practical training and 
urged that similar manoeuvres should be carried out in future. 97 
Instruction of officers was also facilitated by the publication of a 
detailed official history of prior frontier expeditions, written by 
Colonel W. H. Paget, Commandant of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, with 
information 'as might render the work a valuable guide to those who 
might have future dealings with those turbulent neighbours. 1 This 
survey was, unfortunately, little more than a dry narrative of 
earlier campaigns. It did little to collate practical lessons for 
British officers serving either in the P. F. F. or the regular army, 
92 Brig. -Gen. C. P. Keyes, Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, to Offg. Secretary to 
Government, Punjab, Military Department, 17th Feb. 1873, P/958, and Lepel Griffin, 
Offg. Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of 
India, Foreign Department, 28th Feb. 1873, P/958 
93 J. M. Ewart and E. Howell, Story of the North-West Frontier Province, (Peshawar, 
1930), p. 13 
94 Brig. -Gen. C. P. Keyes, Commanding Punjab Frontier Force, to the Secretary to 
Government, Punjab, Military Department, 19th Oct. 1872, L/MIL/3/831 
95 Maj. G. A. Furse, Studies on Military Transport, (Bombay, 1877), p. 38 
96 The Historical records, the 3rd Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, (No 
Imprint: 1903), p. 33, History of the 1st Sikh Infantry, 1846-1886, (Calcutta, 
1903), pp. 90-1 and History of the Second Panj6-b Cavalry, (London, 1888), p. 26 
97 Lt. -Col. S. Black, 
Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Dept. to Col. H. K. 
Burne, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Murree, 8th Aug. 
1874, L/MIL/3/847 
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except for the publication of extracts from orders issued by 
Brigadier-General Chamberlain-98 After Brigadier-General Keyes held a 
further Camp of Exercise at Zam, near the cantonment at Dera Ismail 
Khan, in March 1876, the Military Secretary to the Punjab Government 
noted: 
In carrying out the inspections of Regiments at Dera Ismail 
Khan, Brigadier-General Keyes was enabled to give these 
regiments some practical working and exercise in the hills, in 
front of that station; and the Lieutenant-Governor is glad to 
observe that there is evidence of much good in these exercises 
over broken and hilly ground. So much time is now taken up in 
musketry and other duties, which confine the troops to their 
cantonments, that the Lieutenant Governor is afraid the 
important and essential duty of teaching regiments how to face 
an enemy on the hill side, has in a great measure to be set 
aside... much of the efficiency of the force depends on this kind 
of training; and he thinks, that whenever the musketry course 
has finished, no economy ought to be allowed to stand in the 
way of giving to each regiment and battery some exercise in the 
hills, under the guidance of the Brigadier-General Commanding. 
Indeed... the special character of -the force cannot be maintained 
without it. 99 
When the P. F. F. 's mountain batteries were ordered to submit training 
reports similar to those supplied by regular Royal Artillery 
batteries in India and to standardise training, the Punjab Government 
vigorously defended its system of practical, varied training carried 
out throughout the year which differed radically from the stereotyped 
methods used by the regular gunners. 100 
The Jowaki Afridis provided the P. F. F. and the regular garrison 
of Peshawar District with a practical opportunity during the winter 
of 1877-78 to assess the effectiveness of their training, breech- 
98 Lt. -Col. W. H. Paget, Expeditions versus the North West Frontier Tribes, 
(Calcutta, 1874), pp. 451-3 
99 Col. S. Black, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, to Col. 
H. K. Burne, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, 15th Sept. 
1876, P/951 
100 Brig. -Gen. C. P. Keyes, Conimanding Punjab Frontier Force, to the Secretary to 
Government, Punjab, Military Department, 14th July 1877 and Col. S. Black, 
Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, to Col. H. K. Burne, 
Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, 3rd Aug. 1877, P/1181 
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loading small arms and modern rifled mountain, field and heavy 
artillery in hill warfare. It became immediately clear that the 
Snider and Martini-Henry loading rifles and modern rifled artillery 
conferred a decisive technological advantage. Throughout the 
operations Indian columns brushed away large Afridi lashkars with 
comparative ease and moved at will through the hills meeting only 
desultory resistance. 101 After suffering heavy casualties the Jowakis 
learnt not to oppose Indian troops en masse and reverted to hit-and- 
run tactics and long range rifle fire using a handful of captured 
Enf ields. 102 Following the fighting on 8th December, Brigadier- 
General C. C. Ross noted: 'The Afridis appear to have found that their 
traditional tactics were absolutely useless against the arms and 
disciplined soldiers opposed to them, and with the exception of a few 
individuals, none of them on this occasion attempted to hold their 
ground or fire upon our men during their retreat. r 103 Nine-pounder 
field guns, carried by elephants, supplemented the mountain batteries 
during fighting in the Bori valley. The rifled artillery firing from 
positions on the Shergadra ridge forced the tribesmen to abandon 
strong defensive positions and covered parties of infantry destroying 
villages and towers in the area. Major-General Frederick Roberts 
observed: 'The accurate and long-ranging fire of the 9-pounders was 
of great assistance in this duty, and totally prevented the Afridis 
from following up our parties when retiring. Thus one of the 
principal dangers of this warfare was totally eliminated, and at the 
close of each day's operations 'the troops retired to the Shergasha 
exactly as if on parade. 104 A total of only 11 killed and 50 wounded 
were suffered by imperial troops throughout the campaign which had 
been completely successful. After the campaign Colonel S. Black, 
Military Secretary to the Punjab Goverment, observed: 
Throughout the operations our troops were able to move without 
serious opposition over the enemy's hills, which are extremely 
101 Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies for the year 
1877-78, (Lahore, 1878), pp. 13-4 V/10/335 
102 Capt. E. Walsh, I Mountain Guns f or Indian Frontier Service', Proc. R. A. I. , 11, 
(1881), p. 34 and Maj. -Gen. F. Howard, Reminiscences 1848-1890, (London, 1924), 
p. 254 
103 Brig. -Gen. C. C. Ross, Ccnmianding Field Force Peshawar District, to Q. M. G., 21st 
Dec. 1877, L/MIL/7/15379 
104 Maj. -Gen. F. Roberts 'A short account of the operations carried out against the 
Jowaki section of the Adam Kheyl Afridis' 8th Feb. 1878, L/MIL/7/15378 
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rugged and difficult. This is the first time that a force armed 
with breech-loading arms has been employed in any hill 
expedition, and the results obtained prove most conclusively 
that the coercion of any hill tribe is now a matter of 
comparative ease and certainty. Our own troops have gained 
confidence in their weapons, whilst not only the Jowakis, but 
the whole Afridi tribe, now know that they cannot safely 
venture within range of our rifles, which carry so much further 
than their own weapons. 105 
Such views were supported by other officers who agreed that rifled 
'arms of precision' and mountain, field and heavy artillery had 
important implications for infantry tactics, the composition and size 
of columns required for operations in the border hills. Captain J. M. 
Trotter concluded: 'It seems probable that two compact brigades of 
thoroughly disciplined infantry, armed with breech loading rifles and 
with a strong proportion of artillery will always be found at least 
as efficient for service against the Afridis as a whole Corps 
d'arm6e. r 106 Indeed, modern rifles largely compensated for the lack of 
knowledge of the specialised tactics of hill warfare amongst the 
regular troops employed in the Bori Valley, and also counterbalanced 
the strategic inferiority they suffered when operating in tribal 
territory in terms of intelligence, immunity to disease and transport 
and supply difficulties. 107 
105 Col. S. Black, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department to Col. 
H. K. Burne, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, 25th April 
1878, L/MIL/7/15379 
106 Capt. J. M. Trotter, I Narrative of the Jawaki Campaign J-U-S-I. I. , 7,3 1, 
(1878), p. 49 
107 H. Strachan, F ram Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technoloqy and the British 
Army 1815-1854, (Cambridge, 1985), p-54 
68 
Chapter Two 
The Indian Army and Mountain Warfare 
November 1878 - April 1898 
The Second Afghan War introduced a large part of the Indian 
Army to the operational and tactical exigencies of mountain warfare 
against a tribal opponent. The extended fighting in the bleak, 
treeless and precipitous hills of Afghanistan and along the lines of 
communication through tribal territory, in 1878 and 1879-80, was very 
different from those conditions envisaged in the standard military 
text-books on which training in India had hitherto been based. ' 
Despite recent claims, it is simply incorrect to suggest that the 
regular Indian Army had an authoritative doctrine or system of 
training for mountain warfare at the outbreak of the war, although, 
as already noted, a code of tactics and body of experience had been 
2 devised and refined by the P. F. F. since 1849. Although information 
relating to the conduct of hill warfare was circulated within the 
P. F. F. and passed on informally within its units by means of an 'oral 
tradition, it was never published outside its regiments or batteries 
or made readily available to British and Indian regulars stationed in 
either Peshawar District or the northern Punjab. The reasons for the 
failure to disseminate such information are not hard to find. As the 
P. F. F. was retained under the independent administrative control of 
the Punjab Government, rather than the military authorities, the 
force was not responsible for the circulation of tactical information 
beyond the few regulars that accompanied it on active service. The 
small scale of the early military expeditions against the trans- 
border tribes and the remoteness of tribal territory are also 
responsible. Initially, reports of frontier expeditions were not 
circulated beyond the Punjab Government which meant the regular army 
lacked any information regarding tribal territory. As long as P. F. F. 
units could cope with fighting the frontier tribesmen with limited 
outside assistance, there was simply no need to develop a tactical 
doctrine for training the rest of the British and Indian armies. The 
1 See Afghan Campaign, 1879-80,1st Feb. 1881, L/MIL/17/14/28 and The Second Afqh 
War: Compiled and collated under the orders of Major-Genl. Sir C. M. MacGreqor, 
(Simla, 1885), 6 Vols. 
2 B. Robson, The Road to Kabul: The Second Afqhan War, 1878-1881, (London, 1986), 
p. 66. See also B. Robson, Roberts in India The Military Papers of Field Marshal 
Lord Roberts 1_876-1893, (London, 1993) p. 4 
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systems of reliefs, moreover, prevented regular units gaining 
sustained experience or building up a cadre of trained officers, 
N-C. O. s or men with personal knowledge of mountain warfare, trans- 
border Pathans and the border hills. As a result of these factors the 
experience and lessons learnt from fighting on the North-West 
Frontier remained locked in the minds of individual officers who had 
served along the border, or scattered and in the pages of memoirs 
usually unavailable to officers serving in the area or to the regular 
army as a whole in any systematic form. 
The P. F. F. 's regiments and batteries formed a large part of the 
troops deployed in Afghanistan. A total of four mountain batteries, 
three cavalry regiments, four infantry regiments and the Corps of 
Guides being placed under the command of the military authorities by 
the Goverment of the Punjab when hostilities broke out. Throughout 
the two campaigns, heavy reliance was placed on these highly trained 
and experienced units, whose equipment and training was ideally 
suited to operations in mountainous terrain and whose proficiency in 
hill warfare was widely acknowledged. 3 For example, they formed a 
large proportion of Major General F. S. Roberts' Kurram Field Force 
when it advanced towards the Peiwar Kotal at the beginning of the 
campaign. Although many officers and men in the Bengal Army had some 
personal experience of hill warfare during service alongside the 
P. F. F., relevant information had only been disseminated in an ad hoc 
manner by word of mouth to the rest of the army. Apart from the 
British mountain batteries and the current garrison of Peshawar 
District, who had participated in the recent Jowaki and Utman Khel 
operations, the majority of British and Indian regiments from 
stations on the plains were composed of inexperienced and untrained 
men who knew little of mountain warfare and lacked sufficient 
equipment or means of transport adapted to service in the North-West 
Frontier. At the beginning of the campaign, only two mule trains and 
eight mountain batteries - two British and six native - existed that 
were specifically organised, trained and equipped for operations in 
mountainous terrain. These were clearly insufficient for the scale of 
the extended operations undertaken by the Indian Army in 
3 Surgeon-Major J. H. Evatt, 'Personal Recollections of the Afghan Campaigns of 1878-79- 
801, J. U. S. I. I., 19,82, (1890), p. 305 
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Af ghanistan. 4 Those units without experience had to learn the 
rudiments of mountain warfare while on active service or else rely on 
the training given at the discretion of individual commanders. For 
example, before the attack on Ali Masjid, Major-General Sir Sam 
Browne, a P. F. F. officer, circulated a memorandum to the 1st Division 
at Peshawar outlining methods for an attack on a position, an advance 
in the hills, piqueting, skirmishing tactics and musketry against 
dispersed tribal lashkars on the mountain sides. 5 
The Second Afghan War demonstrated to regular Anglo-Indian 
troops that the tactics and training devised for European conditions 
were unsuitable when employed against a 'semi-civilised' opponent. 6 
As Lieutenant M. Martin critically observed: 'The study of tactics in 
India is generally conducted (longo intervallo) after the European or 
Prussian model, i. e. it assumes an enemy possessing breech-loading 
arms... It is hardly necessary to say this was not the practical 
experience of the Afghan campaign., 7 Indeed, in many ways the Afghan 
war was simply another punitive hill campaign on a large scale during 
which orthodox European tactics gave way progressively to those more 
suited to 'savage warfare,, although to some extent the initial 
operations against regular Afghan troops did conform more to 
conventional warfare. 8 Following the fighting at Ali Musjid and the 
Peiwar Kotal, however, the rapid dissolution of the regular Afghan 
army meant that the invading Indian columns were opposed by irregular 
and poorly armed tribal levies against which advanced tactical 
formations, derived from the experience of facing breech-loader 
rifles in Europe, were clearly inappropriate. As a result of the 
terrain and the tactics used by Afghan regular and irregular troops 
the brunt of the fighting in tribal territory and Afghanistan fell on 
the infantry. 9 The decisive technological superiority enjoyed by 
Indian troops equipped with 'arms of precision, compensated for the 
4 Col. H. B. Hanna, The Second Afqhan War, 1878-79-80: Its Causes, Its Conduct, an 
Its Consequences, (Westminster, 1899), Vol. 1 pp. 271-8 
5 Memoranda for the Guidance of the Peshawar Field Force by order of Lieut. -General 
Sir Sam Browne, Commanding 1st Division, 17th Nov. 1878, Browne Mss, N. A. M. 7703- 
49-5 
6 R. Gillham-Thomsett, Koh&t, Kuram, and Khost; or, Experiences and Adventures in 
the Late Afqhan War, (London, 1884), pp. 96-7 
7 Lt. M. Martin, 'Tactics in the Afghan Campaign', J. U. S. I. I., 10,47, (1882), p. 1 
8 Maj. J. H. Crowe, An Epitome of the Afqhan War, 1878-9 and 1879-80, (Woolwich, 
1905), p-26 
9 Lt. -Col. G. T. Pretyman, 'Rough Notes on the Kabul-Kandahar March of August, 18801, 
Proc. R. A. I., 12, (1884), p. 5 
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strategic superiority in terms of supply and communications enjoyed 
by the Afghan irregulars. Martini-Henry and Snider breech-loading 
rifles and rifled mountain, field and heavy artillery enabled the 
numerically inferior columns of imperial troops to brush away vastly 
superior numbers of tribesmen and to inflict massive casualties. 
Lieutenant C. G. Robertson observed: 
The tables have been turned since the days when the deadly 
jezails used to harass our men, who were powerless to reply. 
The change is dead against all accepted rules of tactics in 
Afghanistan. If a Pathan can crouch behind a rock and shoot you 
in safety, he enjoys himself amazingly; but he hates risk, and 
of there is any chance of your shooting him instead, the sport 
is entirely spoiled in his eyes. 10 
Skirmishing was placed at a premium on the Afghan mountain sides. The 
skirmishing tactics which had been devised for use against European 
troops, armed with breech-loading rifles and artillery, proved of 
some relevance during the fragmented and dispersed fighting on the 
hill sides which occurred as British and Indian the troops moved 
forward to assault successive positions. A combination of frontal 
offensives, flank attacks and turning movements successfully cleared 
Afghan regular and irregular troops from out of their defensive 
positions in the mountains. Imperial troops also learnt in 
Afghanistan that thin and dispersed formations were suited to 
military operations in the hills. It proved difficult, however, to 
exercise effective command or control of the dispersed Indian troops 
on the hill sides and few Indian officers possessed sufficient 
initiative or skill to fight effectively in small detachments out of 
the direct control of British officers. Some of the inherent problems 
of hill warfare were revealed during the attack on the Peiwar Kotal. 
Major J. A. Colquhoun observed: 'A line of skirmishers extended in a 
pine wood over a rocky hillside is soon lost to the view, nor can the 
officers do much as regards its superintendence, when, excepting 
those close to hand, their men cannot be seen. Fighting under these 
circumstances becomes a series of hand-to-hand combats. Numbers do 
10 Lt. C. G. Robert-son, Kurwn, Kabul & Kandahar Being a Brief Account Record of 
Impressions in Three Campaiqns under General Roberts, (Edinburgh, 1881), p-170 
72 
not tell at first; afterwards, of course, the advance must be on the 
side of the troops who can pour the larger force in succession into a 
given position. I" Attacks by imperial troops were therefore prone to 
fall into disarray as they became strung out on the mountain sides, 
out of control of their officers and the thin skirmishing lines were 
in turn vulnerable to counter-attacks by Afghan swordsmen. All too 
often such advancing troops masked the fire of their own comrades 
moving up in support. 12 Light infantry drill was of vital importance 
throughout the campaign as small parties of infantry advanced in 
small rushes exploiting every scrap of cover during attacks. 13 
The Afghan tribesmen, although deprived of modern firearms and 
artillery, were still formidable opponents and relied heavily on 
shock tactics supported with, often ineffective, rifle and jezail 
fire against British and Indian troops. It was, however, found to be 
impracticable to maintain Indian troops in extended skirmishing 
order, which lacked sufficient solidity or cohesion to meet charges 
made by swordsmen en masse. Such tactics therefore dictated the 
14 formations that had to be employed by imperial troops. Close order 
formations proved essential to maintain morale and ensure the 
development of sufficiently intense rifle fire to halt attacks. For 
example, at Ahmed Khel, British and Indian troops deploying into an 
extended attack formation for an attack on a strong defensive 
position, were charged by cavalry and thousands of Ghazi swordsmen 
and Sir Donald Stewart's force only narrowly escaped defeat when a 
line formation was improvised, rallying squares were formed by the 
reserves and both heavy and field artillery were hurriedly committed 
to the battle. An estimated 2,000 dead and wounded Afghan tribesmen 
were left on the battlefield following the engagement, whilst British 
casualties only amounted to 17 killed and 124 wounded. 15 However, not 
all the operations during the campaign were so one-sided. At Maiwand 
on 27th July 1880, for example, the tables were turned when Afghan 
regulars and irregulars led by Ayub Khan inflicted a decisive defeat 
11 Maj. J. A. Colquhoun, With the Kurrum Field Force, (London, 1881), p. 110 
12 Capt. C. B. Mayne, Infantry Fire Tactics, (Chatham, 1885), pp. 390-1 
13 Maj. R. C. Mitford, To Cabul with the Cavalry Briqad , (London, 1881), 2nd ed. 
p. 25 
14 Col. T. L. Bell, I The Of f ensive-Def ensive by Inf antry in Extended Order 
J. R. U. S. I. 25,109, (1881), p. 157 and Martin op cit, p. 2 
15 Capt. R. Elias, 'A Streak of the Afghan War - Lieutenant General Sir Donald 
Stewart's March from Kandahar to Ghazni: with actions of Ahivied Khel and Urzu, 
J. R. U. S. I. 24,107, (1880), pp. 670-1 and Maj. E. S. May, Achievements of Field 
Artiller , (Woolwich, 
1893), pp-144-51 
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on a poorly handled brigade of Indian troops. 16 It became apparent 
that the best formation opposed to masses of swordsmen, intent on 
hand-to-hand fighting, was the adoption of the close-order shoulder- 
to-shoulder line, which allowed the maximum development of fire and 
gave sufficient solidity to the ranks to receive a massed attack. For 
one officer this seemed to herald a return to the line, '... the old 
formation so dear to British arms, ' as perhaps best suited for 
mountain warfare against a 'savage' opponent rather than the 
dispersed skirmishing formations which had been laid down in the 
training manuals in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. " 
Several other officers who had served in Afghanistan concurred with 
this observation: 'In a serious engagement with determined swordsmen, 
and under no crushing fire, it does not appear that the fighting line 
is best disposed in skirmishing order. On the contrary such lines are 
out of hand and unsteady. Companies become mixed and all control is 
sometimes lost. 18 
The Second Afghan War confirmed many of the lessons that had 
been learnt by the P. F. F. and the mountain artillery since 1849, with 
regard to offensive tactics and the importance of piquets, perimeter 
camps and skirmishing. Moreover it acquainted many British officers 
with the special conditions and requirements of warfare in 
mountainous terrain for the first time. Throughout the fighting, 
P. F. F. regiments and batteries demonstrated their effectiveness in 
mountain warfare, refuting accusations that the efficiency of the 
force had declined during the 1870s. The Government of the Punjab 
concluded in 1879: 'The records of the two Kabul campaigns show 
conclusively, and the fact is acknowledged by every military 
authority of position, that the best troops for work in mountainous 
country like Afghanistan, are those which have been accustomed 
throughout their service to military duties on the border. 119 
During the war, the British and Indian mountain artillery 
batteries had been heavily employed as they represented the only type 
of ordnance capable of operating in the mountains, other than on the 
Kandahar line where field and heavy artillery was also employed. 
16 B. Robson, 'Maiwand, 27th July 18801, J. S. A. H. R., 51, (1973), pp. 194-221 and 
17 Capt. C. Hoskyns, 'A Short Narrative of the Afghan Campaigns of 1879-80-81 from 
an Engineer's Point of View', J. R. U. S. I., 26,116, (1882), p. 442 
18 Martin, op cit, p. 4 
19 Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies for 1878-79, 
(Lahore, 1879), pp. 22-3 V/10/336 
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General Roberts' decision to accompany the force sent from Kabul to 
relieve Kandahar in August 1880 with only mountain batteries, had 
attracted considerable public and professional interest both in 
England and India and brought the gunners into prominence. 20 During 
the war their effectiveness was increased when at Zawa, in the Kurram 
Valley, 2.5" screw-guns were used for the first time in India, adding 
to the technological superiority enjoyed by British arms. 21 Two 
mountain batteries were added to the regular Indian establishment 
after the war increasing the number to six permanent British mountain 
batteries stationed in India. 22 A manual of mountain artillery drill 
was published in India for the first time in 1882, although it 
contained a meagre amount of tactical information for officers new to 
operations against the trans-border Pathan tribes and concentrated 
more on the interior economy of the mountain artillery batteries and 
technical questions. 23 
The tactical lessons of the Second Afghan War for the regular 
army were, however, mixed and often contradictory. While the 
skirmishing tactics devised for European warfare were vindicated, 
they had been frequently discarded by British officers for close 
order formations to meet massed attacks by Afghan swordsmen. To a 
limited extent, however, the war had lessened the impact of European 
military thought in India, by exposing the limitations of 
conventional tactics in mountainous terrain against opponents reliant 
on hand-to-hand combat. It also stimulated a growing realisation that 
the tactics and arms of an opponent had to be taken into account in 
addition to the terrain when determining suitable tactics. It did not 
provide a catalyst, however, for the development and dissemination of 
tactics and appropriate training for hill warfare throughout the 
British or Indian armies, whose focus remained based on those skills 
required in conventional military operations. Nevertheless, officers 
and men in a large number of regiments, especially those in the 
20 Roberts, op cit, p. 344, Pretyman, op cit, pp. 5-6 and Lt - -Col - E. F. Chapman, 'The 
March from Kabul to Kandahar in August and the Battle of the 1st September, 
J. R. U. S. I. 25,111, (1881), p. 286 
21 Capt. G. T. Cari. -6, 'Zaimukht Expedition, under B rigadi er -General J. A. Tyler,, 
Proc. R. A. I., 11, (1881), pp. 399-402 
22 Military Department Despatch No. 141 of 1881: Recommendat ions in regard to the 
strength of the European troops in India, with reference to the proposals of the 
Indian Army Commission, 24th April 1881, L/MIL/7/10100 and Maj. -Gen. C. E. Callwell 
and Maj. -Gen- J. Head-lam, A History of the Royal Artillery from the Indian Mutiny 
to the Great War, (Woolwich, 1937), pp. 263-4 
23 Manual of Mountain Artillery Drill, (Simla, 1882) 
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Bengal Army, had now gained practical experience of military 
operations against the trans-border tribes. The 'lessons' of the 
Second Afghan war tended to be viewed solely by the military 
authorities in terms of their relevance to conventional military 
operations. Several officers quickly reminded their peers who had 
fought in imperial campaigns that the adoption of close order 
formations was an aberration and potentially disastrous in the face 
of breech-loading rifles. 24 The example of the French Army in Algeria 
and the events of 1870-71 were still fresh in the minds of British 
officers. Lieutenant M. Martin summed up the consensus of opinion in 
India: 
It seems unlikely that many hints can be gained from our late 
experience which would be useful to us in any European 
struggle, and further, that our late practice should be 
conscientiously studied least we may haplessly engraft the 
faults of self confidence into a system which is very far from 
perfection. It is then hardly in the political, strategical or 
tactical aspects that much practical information can be added 
to our knowledge, but rather in the perfection of the 
organisation, equipment and use of the several combatant arms 
and subsidiary departments. 25 
As a result, the tactical lessons learned were discounted in India. 
General Sir 0. Cavenagh noted in 1882: 'If the Indian Army is to 
prove a source of strength instead of weakness to the Empire, it must 
be prepared to meet the best troops of civilized Europe, for the 
struggle to check the invasion of Hindustan may take place in Egypt 
or in Asia Minor. 26 No sooner had troops arrived back in India than 
their attention became focused, once again, on preparing to meet a 
'civilized, opponent as the perception of a Russian threat to the 
security of British Indian steadily increased. Further factors also 
explained the failure to disseminate a doctrine for mountain warfare 
in the aftermath of the Second Afghan War. The marked superiority of 
the arms of precision' used by the British and Indian troops masked 
24 Bell, op, cit, pp. 157-8 
25 Lt. M. Martin, 'Notes on the operations in the Kurrum Valley, 1878-79f, 
J. U. S. I. I., 10,47, (1881), p. 7 
26 Gen. Sir 0. Cavenagh, 'Our Indian Army,, J. R. U. S. I., 26,48, (1882), p. 763 
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the need to develop specific training adapted to warfare against 
tribal opponents. In addition, the number and scale of frontier 
campaigns decreased during the early 1880s, doing little to encourage 
the dissemination of appropriate tactics to the rest of the Indian 
Army. 
The Second Afghan War and a series of other small wars, fought 
by British troops in Africa since 1879 stimulated a growing awareness 
of the distinct general requirements of colonial warfare. Several 
officers who had served during these campaigns questioned the 
emphasis placed on conventional European warfare in training as it 
was clearly apparent that the tactics and attack formations laid down 
in the training manuals were either completely inapplicable or 
required considerable modification to meet the altered conditions of 
colonial warfare. An examination of the military requirements of 
colonial warfare was spurred on by the defeats at Isandhlwana and 
Maiwand. In an essay published in the Professional Papers of the 
Corps of Royal Engineers in 1881, Lieutenant R. de Costa Porter 
noted: 
To attempt to reduce to a rule campaigns that have been, and 
yet may be, carried on against our numerous uncivilised 
neighbours, would prove a hopeless task, each new campaign as 
it is fought exposes our gaze to a new form of warfare, and the 
experience gained by our predecessors is but partially 
applicable to ourselves. The strategy of an Afghan campaign 
must differ from that of the New Zealand War; the tactics 
suited for the bush fighting of Ashanti would not be suitable 
for the open plains of Ulundi. Each campaign that we have 
fought has a character all its own... But as much as our past 
savage wars must differ from each other, there are certain 
points of common resemblance, certain main principles run 
through them all, which may service as guides in future cases. 
These it may be worth while to note, to underline as it were, 
and bring into proper prominence. 27 
27 Lt. R. de C. Porter, 'Warfare against Uncivilised Races; or, How to fight Greatly 
Superior Forces of an Uncivilised and Badly-ArTned Enemy', P. P. R. E., 15, (1881), 
pp. 305-60 
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A series of articles were published in the English service press 
during the early 1880s discussing the conduct of what was 
increasingly referred to as 'savage warfare', reflecting a growing 
realisation that appropriate training should be devised and 
implemented during peacetime to meet Britain's imperial 
cornmitments. 28 The square became widely accepted as an authoritative 
battle formation against opponents reliant on shock tactics and hand- 
to-hand combat, after it was used repeatedly in South Africa and in 
the Soudan by British troops. However, a reversion to such an 
outdated tactic, long abandoned in European warfare, provoked an 
extended debate in the service press in England which revealed a wide 
diversity of opinion regarding the conduct of colonial warfare and a 
growing realisation that Britain's military obligations differed from 
those of other continental powers. Sir P. L. MacDougall, a prominent 
military theorist, condemned the close-order formations that had been 
adopted by British troops to combat 'savage' opponents, 
notwithstanding the dramatic improvements in firearms. Writing in 
1884, he advocated a return to the line formation in the British army 
in place of the square or the dispersed Prussian attack formation to 
meet tribal opponents. 29 The comments of Colonel H. H. Knollys, editor 
of the United Service Magazine, in 1884 were indicative of changing 
attitudes in England towards imperial military operations: 
Of more immediate and practical use to a British officer than 
the tactics to be adopted against a well-armed, well-trained 
enemy, are those suitable for employment against a savage foe, 
such as the Ashantees, the Zulus, the Afghans, or the 
Soudanese, for the reason that regular warfare is with us 
exceptional, while a campaign against a uncivilized foe in some 
parts of the world may be considered chronic. 30 
28 Col. W. H. Goodenough, I General Gordon on the Employment of Artillery in Irregular 
Warfare', Proc. R. A. I., 8, (1885), pp. 121-25, Lt. C. E. Callwell, 'Notes on the 
Tactics of our Small Wars', Proc. R. A. I., 12, (1884), pp. 531-52 and Lt. C. E. 
Callwell, 'Notes on the Strategy of our Small Wars', Proc. R. A. I., 13, (1885), 
pp. 403-20 
29 Sir P. L. MacDougall,, The Late Battles in Soudan and Modern Tactics', Blackwood's, 
135, (1884), pp. 54-60 
30 Col. H. H. Knollys, 'The Present Position of Tactics in England, U. S. M. ,2 (1884), 
p. 467 
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The relative merits and weaknesses of the square were discussed in 
the presence of several influential military critics at the R. U. S. I. 
revealing a wide variety of opinions with regard to the conduct of 
colonial warfare. 3 1 The lessons derived from recent colonial 
campaigns formed the subject of the influential Royal United Services 
Institution prize-essay competition in 1887. In the prize-winning 
essay, Captain Charles Callwell discerned both tactical and 
strategical lessons from Britain's disparate colonial military 
operations since the Crimean War. The paper recognised that lessons 
of significance could be derived from colonial warfare that would be 
of value for British troops serving throughout the Empire, including 
India. Callwell concluded: 
The operations of a few thousand British soldiers in remote 
theatres of war pitted against adversaries without arms of 
precision and without organization, bear no comparison, as 
strategical and tactical studies, with the momentous events of 
1866 and 1870; but the lessons to be deduced from their story 
are none the less interesting and valuable... These operations 
illustrate the vicissitudes of irregular warfare in every 
form.... They teach us lessons strategical, tactical, and 
administrative. 32 
It was significant for the Army in India, however, that no specific 
mention was made of the trans-border Pathan tribes, although it was 
recognised that the training of British and Indian troops should be 
based partly on 'savage, warfare against opponents very different from 
those envisaged in the official training manuals. It was clearly 
impossible to employ a square formation in the border hills of the 
Punjab due to both the terrain and the large target it would present to 
tribal jezails. The discussion regarding the appropriate tactics for 
colonial warfare did not, however, have an appreciable impact on 
official training either in England or India during the 1880s, which 
31 Maj. C. Cooper King, Soudan Warfare', J. R. U. S. I., 29,81, (1885), pp. 887-908 and 
Lt. -Gen. G. Graham, 'Fire Tactics: 
Attack Formations and Squares', J. R. U. S. I., 30, 
83, (1886), pp. 233-74. See also Col. W. W. Knollys,, Sir Gerald Graham on Infantry 
Tactics', u. S. M., Part 1, (1886), pp. 291-304 
32 Capt. C. E. Callwell, I Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British 
Forces have been employed since the year 18651, J. R. U. s. i., 31, (1887), p. 412 
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remained based primarily on the lessons of the 1870-71 Franco- 
Prussian War. 
The P. F. F. units that had fought in Afghanistan resumed the 
watch and ward of the border after the Second Afghan War and 
conducted a succession of minor campaigns, largely without outside 
military support, to punish those tribes that had been hostile during 
the operations in Afghanistan. During the Mahsud-Wazir expedition in 
1881, its troops enjoyed a decisive superiority over the poorly-armed 
tribes in Waziristan who were still armed with swords, matchlock 
jezails and a handful of Enfield rifles enabling comparatively small 
forces of regular troops to deal with greatly superior numbers of 
ill-armed and undisciplined tribesman. 33 
The Pendjeh incident in 1885 and the threat of war with Russian 
troops in northern Afghanistan, however, transformed the situation 
and had important implications for the organisation and deployment of 
troops on the North-West Frontier, as well as on British policy 
towards independent tribal territory. The incident immediately 
reinforced the emphasis being paid to conventional military training 
against similarly organised European troops. At a series of large 
camps of exercise, held by the regular army during the 1880s, British 
and Indian troops trained intensively for operations against Russian 
or Afghan troops. 34 During the 1880s large numbers of regular troops 
were deployed in the Punjab for the first time in preparation for a 
possible campaign in Afghanistan. The presence of 14,036 men in the 
ranks of the P. F. F. along the border outside the jurisdiction of the 
Commander-in-Chief in India, however, prompted repeated requests for 
their assimilation into the Bengal Army as the prospect of war in 
Afghanistan increased. 35 A decline in the number of punitive 
expeditions, the extension of British administration in Baluchistan, 
improvements in communications and the pacification and disarmament 
of the trans-Indus districts of the Punjab, moreover, made it appear 
that the P. F. F. had lost its formerly distinctive role. It was 
33 Col. S. Black, Secretary to Government, Punjab, Military Department, to Col. G. 
Chesney, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, 24th Feb. 1881. 
P/1730 and The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition 1881, (Simla, 1884) L/MIL/17/13/107 
34 Capt. J. K. Trotter, 'Should the European Army in India continue as at Present 
Constituted, or Should it be Converted in Whole or in Part into a Local Force', 
J. R. U. S. I., 29,129, (1885), p. 349 
35 military Department Despatch No. 135 of 1885: Proposals for an increase to the 
Indian Army, 14th Aug. 1885, and Military Despatch No. 275 of 1885,29th Oct. 
1885, L/MIL/7/5446 
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finally incorporated into the Bengal Army in August 1886, after the 
political authorities in the Punjab had assured that it would 
maintain its close connections with political officers and the 
militia, finally giving the Commander-in-Chief complete control of 
all the troops along the border and making the Indian Army solely 
responsible for military operations against the tribes for the first 
time. However, despite the change in overall command, the P. F. F. 
remained localised in the Punjab and was allowed to retain the 
distinctive character that had made it so effective against Pathan 
lashkars. 36 The threat of external attack also had important 
implications for policy towards independent territory and relations 
with the trans-border tribes following the adoption of the 
'scientific frontier' in Afghanistan as the basis of Indian strategy 
in the event of a Russian invasion in 1888. The safe passage of the 
Field Army and its maintenance in Afghanistan focused military 
attention on fostering and securing the support of the trans-border 
Pathan tribes living astride the main lines of communication through 
the mountains and exploring the border hills, transforming a hitherto 
local problem into one of strategic importance. 37 
The P. F. F. continued to act as the 'Warden of the Marches' 
during the 1880s, along with various militias and levies, leaving the 
regular Indian Army free to concentrate on training in conventional 
European warfare. Its infantry regiments continued to carry out 
training devoted to hill warfare and carried out frequent light 
infantry training across broken terrain in camps nearby their 
stations in accordance with Standing Orders. 38 A high standard of 
training and efficiency in the P. F. F. was maintained by Major-General 
Sir J. McQueen who carried out week-long annual inspections of each 
regiment to assess its performance in the field. An officer who 
served with the 4th Sikh Infantry later (-: )bserved: 'Hill warfare was 
the real game. He would take post on the top of a hill some 1000 feet 
high and make us attack it and then retire off it. If he was not 
36 Military Department Despatch No. 111 of 1886: Transfer of the Punjab Frontier 
Force under the orders of the Conmiander-in-Chief India, 6th Aug. 1886, L/MIL/3/136 
and Extract from General order by His Excellency the Governor General In Council, 
23rd July 1886, L/MIL/3/961 
37 See L. Harris, British Policy on the North-West Frontier of India, 1889-1901, 
(London, Ph. D., 1960), pp. 1-41 and also J. Harris, 'A Scientific Frontier for 
India: Background to the Forward Policy of the Nineties', Canadian Journal of 
Histor , 1, (1966), pp. 
46-71 
38 Standing orders of the Punjab Frontier Force, (Simla, 1889), p. 10 
L/MIL/17/5/4310 
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satisfied we jolly well had to do it all over again and if an attack 
of gout seized him there was no end to the job until we were 
absolutely worn out. f 39 The conduct of mountain warfare became a 
subject of growing importance to regular officers serving in India as 
large numbers of regular troops were deployed in close proximity to 
tribal territory. The lessons derived from the experience of the 
mountain artillery batteries and their tactics were examined for the 
first time in the 1880s in the service press. Their organisation, 
equipment and training was discussed at length in the Proceedings of 
the Royal Artillery Institution in its 1887 annual prize essay 
competition, but the brief section devoted to tactics was derived 
primarily from European experience and made no reference to India. 10 
Captain H. C. Simpson, one of the foremost commentators on mountain 
artillery, noted in 1888 the continuing lack of official instruction 
and provided a brief summary of mountain artillery tactics based on 
European manuals and his own personal experience. 41 A former P. F. F. 
mountain battery commander, moreover, challenged the reliance on 
European sources and argued that Britain had its own distinctive 
tradition and experience of mountain warfare equally worthy of 
discussion. Major E. J. de Latour noted: 'The proceedings of foreign 
mountain batteries are certainly interesting but hardly as 
instructive as those of our own service, if only for the reason, that 
of late years few nations have had the same practical experience in 
mountainous countries., 42 At the request of the local commander, 
Captain J. M. Grierson lectured to the newly formed Peshawar Military 
Society in July 1888 on the lessons of the Umbeyla Campaign to 
exemplify the problems of mountain warfare for officers serving in 
the local garrison as preparations began for a punitive operation in 
Hazara. 43 
The punitive expedition on the Black Mountain in 1888 exposed 
the continued limitations of the training system in India. 44 The 
39 Memoirs of Briqadier-General E. W. S. K. Maconchy 1860-1920, (Unpublished T. S. 
Memoir), Vol. 1, p. 59 N. A. M. 7908-62-1 
40 Capt. W. L. White, 'Mountain Artillery: Its Organisation, Equipment and Tactics', 
Proc. R. A. I., 15, (1887), pp. 403-17 
41H. C. Simpson, 'Tactical Employment of Mountain Artillery' U. S. M. 1, (1888), 
pp. 712-22 
42 Maj. E. J. de Latour, 'Mountain Artillery', Proc. R. A. I., 16, (1889), p. 519 
43 Capt. J. M. Grierson, 'Mountain Warfare as exemplified by the Ambela Campaign, 
18631, Proc. R. A. I. 17, (1890), pp. 319-36 
44 See Capt. A. H. Mason, Expedition aqainst the Black Mountain tribes by a forct 
under Major-General Sir J. W. McQueen in 1888, (Simla, 1889). L/MIL/17/13/52 
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sixteen regular British and Indian regiments forming the majority of 
the force still relied on guidance in hill warfare from the officers 
and men of the three experienced P. F. F. regiments serving alongside 
them or that gleaned from the Standing orders issued at the beginning 
of the operation. General F. Roberts instructed Major-General 
Galbraith, commander of the 2nd Brigade, to train the inexperienced 
officers under his command in the conduct of hill warfare before the 
operations commenced. 45 A memorandum originally written by Brigadier- 
General A. Wilde in 1868 was also circulated to the troops, which 
provided a bare outline of the tactics of hill warfare. 46 However, 
the decisive technological superiority of British firearms: Sniders, 
Martini-Henrys, Gatling guns and mountain artillery still masked the 
need for appropriate training during the 1880s for regular troops. 
Throughout the Black Mountain campaign, the poorly armed tribes 
avoided direct confrontation and attempted to come to close quarters 
with the troops on only a few occasions. At Kotkai on 24th October 
1881 No. 4 Column was attacked by a mass of swordsmen who were mown 
down by rifles and Gatling guns before they could engage in hand-to- 
hand combat. Following the engagement, the Hazarawals abandoned 
resistance in the open and Sir J. McQueen observed: 'The severe 
lesson learnt by the tribesmen in this action broke down all 
organised opposition, and in facing the other columns, the enemy 
confined themselves to guerilla warfare in thick forest, a trying 
style of fighting which was productive of numerous casualties to our 
troops, but in which the enemy suffered severely and soon lost 
heart. t47 
The 'forward policy, adopted by the Government of India during 
the late 1880s provoked a series of campaigns against the trans- 
border Pathan tribes, which led to the commitment of a growing number 
of regular British and Indian troops, without training or prior 
experience of hill warfare, alongside the P. F. F. regiments on the 
North-West Frontier. The concurrent campaigns which took place along 
the Takht-i-Sulaiman, the Samana Ridge, the Black Mountain, Hunza and 
Naga stimulated professional interest in the exigencies of hill 
warfare in England and India, coinciding with a growing acceptance 
45 Roberts to Galbraith, 21st Sept. 1888, L/MIL/17/5/1615/11 
46 Circular Memorandum f or the inf ormation and guidance of Of f icers Ccumianding 
Batteries and Regiments, Hazara Field Force, 30th Sept. 1888, L/MIL/17/5/1615/6/1 
47 Maj. -Gen- J. W. McQueen, Commanding Hazara Field Force, to Adj. -Gen. in India, 19th 
Nov. 1888, P/3484 
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during the 1890s of the importance of experience derived from 
colonial military operations. " A series of articles appeared in the 
service press describing the conduct of various military operations 
against trans-border Pathan lashkars. 49 During the Black Mountain 
campaign the decisive superiority in firearms of imperial troops was 
increased when a privately owned Maxim machine gun was used by a 
British battalion for the first time in mountain warfare .50A 
detailed account of the 1891 Miranzai campaign was published in the 
J. U. S. I. I. in 1892 as it '... affords a very typical example of the 
kind of warfare which officers serving in India may find themselves 
called upon to take part in. ' During the campaign it was still all- 
too apparent that the Orakzais lashkars were at a marked disadvantage 
against British troops armed with breech-loading rifles and modern 
artillery. Captain A. H. Mason confidently observed: 
Since the Jowaki campaign in 1877-78 a revolution has taken 
place in the matter of frontier expeditions, and the ill-armed 
tribesmen are now beginning to see that it is certain 
destruction to try and stand up against breech-loaders. In the 
days of the Brown Bess things were different, and they were 
then able to meet us with a weapon which, if not so good in 
some respects, yet the matter of range was equal to, if not 
better than, our own, and at Ambela they were able to inflict 
heavy loss on our troops. The advent of the Snider and then of 
the Martini has, however, altered all this, and now they are 
beginning to understand that to be shot down at 1,000 yards or 
more by breech-loaders when your own weapon is a muzzle-loader 
which may possibly carry an erratic bullet 300 yards, is a one- 
sided business and a game that does not pay... It is now, 
therefore, becoming a safe maxim that if a Pathan tribe has 
once fairly stood up to fight breech-loaders, it will never do 
so again. 51 
48 Spiers, op cit, p. 250 
49 See D. A. A. G. R. A., 'Mountain Artillery with the Hazara Field Force N. -W. Frontier 
of India, 1888', Proc. R. A. 1., 17, (1890), pp. 257-70, Lt L. C. Gordon, 'The Miranzai 
Expedition 1891', Proc. R. A. I., 18, (1891), pp. 4"75-88, and Capt. P. T. 
Buston, 'Short Account of the Bridging Operations of Bengal Sappers with the Hazara 
Field Force, 1891', P. P. R. E., 19, (1893), pp. 147-56 
50 Adj. -Gen. in India to the Secretary Government of India Military Department, 
22nd Sept. 1892, L/MIL/7/14713 
51 Capt. A. H. Mason, 'The Miranzai Expedition of 18911, J. R. U. S. I-., 36,168, (1892), 
p. 123 
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Throughout the expedition the only casualties suffered had been those 
inflicted by the weather and disease and it ended with the 
construction of a line of forts along the Samana Range garrisoned by 
regular troops. An attack on a detachment of troops constructing a 
road, however, provoked further operations against the Orakzais later 
the same year. writing after the second Miranzai campaign one 
commentator noted: 'A second time General Lockhart showed how easily 
and effectively a thoroughly well organised, scientifically armed, 
smartly led British force can brush away superior numbers of ill- 
disciplined, disorganised, poorly armed tribesmen. '52 Further to the 
north, however, during the Hunza-Nagar campaign Indian troops had 
been opposed, during the attack on Nilt Fort, by tribesmen armed with 
Russian Berdan, Martini-Henry, Snider, Spencer and Winchester rifles 
in addition to local matchlocks in sufficient quantities to affect 
the course of the fighting. 53 
The increasing number and growing size of military expeditions 
on both the North-Western and North-Eastern frontiers of India 
involving a higher proportion of regular troops stimulated a growth 
of professional interest amongst British officers as well as giving 
large numbers practical experience of mountain warfare. (See Figure 
3) It was apparent that the 1889 edition of Infantry Drill, which 
emphasised conventional European warfare and contained little more 
than one sentence suggesting the use of close-order drill when facing 
poorly armed opponents reliant upon shock tactics, was of limited 
interest to officers currently engaged in mountain warfare. 54 A paper 
that specifically dealt with the conduct of mountain warfare was 
published for the first time in 1892 by the J. U. S. I. I., though 
symptomatically it was a translation of a paper written by a French 
officer from the Journal des Science Militaires, based on European 
military experience. Major H. C. Simpson, who contributed the article 
to the United Service Institution, observed that there was no text 
book on the conduct of mountain or other forms of 'rough' warfare 
available in India and appended a list of French and German books on 
52 E. P. Oliver, 'Pimitive Operations on the North-West Frontier of India', Fortniqhtly 
Review, 50, (1891), p. 93 
53 E. F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet A Narrative of Recent Travel in Kashmir, 
Western Tibet, Gilqit, and the adjoining Countries, (London, 1893), p. 373 and 
Nevill, op cit, p. 365 
54 Infantry Drill, (London, 1889), pp. 207-8 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Punjab Irregular /Frontier Force and Regulal 
Army Regiments during expeditions against trans-border Pathan tribe 
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7 1853 Shiranis 
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19 1868 Black Mountain Tribes 
20 1868-9 Bizotis 
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22 1877 Jowakis 
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24 1879 Kam Dakka 
25 1878-9 Zaimkuhts 
26 1880 Mohmand 
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the subject of use to interested officers. 55 The specific 
requirements of warfare on both the North-Western and North-Eastern 
frontiers of India were discussed for the first time in a series of 
articles and books written by officers serving in India. Writing in 
1892, Captain H. V. Cox, for example, complained that there was 
insufficient guidance in the Drill Book on jungle warfare in the 
hills of Burma, where Indian troops endeavoured to bring to battle 
bands of elusive dacoits. 56 
The 1892 provisional edition of Infantry Drill included a 
section that discussed the conduct of colonial warfare, but it 
referred solely to tactics in terms of close-order formations that 
were clearly inappropriate in mountainous terrain. Indeed, these were 
a liability against increasingly better armed Pathan tribes, whose 
tactics did not rely on massed assaults. It officially recognised the 
term 'savage warfare, ' employed to describe colonial campaigns in the 
military press during the 1880s, which it used to denote the entire 
class of operations conducted against poorly armed tribesmen 
57 throughout the British Empire. It accepted that certain 
modifications, necessitated by the differing conditions encountered 
by imperial troops, were of sufficient importance that they should be 
studied separately and this section was a first step towards 
discerning authoritative principles. The guidance provided by non- 
official literature available in India, primarily intended to aid 
officers preparing for promotion examinations, still either lacked 
any guidance for colonial warfare or was based on Sudanese experience 
that had little relevance for officers preparing for frontier 
service. 58 An attempt was made by Brigadier-General A. A. Kinloch to 
lay down two forms of attacks suitable for use in mountain warfare by 
imperial troops in 1892, but it is doubtful whether this had any real 
impact on instruction in India. 59 Annual training carried out by 
P. F. F. regiments and a series of practice camps held for the mountain 
55 Lt. -Col. E. Paquie, 'Warfare in Mountainous Countries', J. U. S. I. I., 21,98, 
(1892), pp. 525-43 
56 Capt. H. V. Cox, 'Jungle Fighting', J. U. S. I. I., 21,97, (1892), pp. 443-7 
57 Infantry Drill (Provisional), (London, 1892), p-185 
58 Lt. -Col. E. Guilter, Outlines of Modern Tactics, (London, 1893) and Capt. J. 
Sherston, Tactics as Applied to Schemes, (London, 1894), pp. 49-50 
59 Brig. -Gen. A. A. Kinloch, Forms of Attack, (Allahabad, 1892) 
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batteries during the 1890s, therefore, represented the only attempt 
to give specific training in mountain warfare. 60 
The conduct of mountain warfare along India's extensive 
frontiers was discussed at length in the Institute's influential 
annual prize essay competition for 1892-93. Two essays were published 
which outlined the intrinsic problems posed by the climate, terrain, 
transport and supply for regular troops operating across India's 
North-Western and North-Eastern borders and went on to attempt to 
discern general principles to govern the conduct of future operations 
and peacetime training. In a telling critique the Gold Medal prize 
winner, Major G. M. Bulloch of the Devonshire Regiment, lambasted the 
military authorities'failure to provide a suitable training doctrine, 
and criticised the unsatisfactory nature of instruction for the young 
officer in hill warfare. In a detailed paper he noted that 
insufficient a-, --tention was paid to mountain warfare and suggested 
that British troops should make use of the period spent in the hills 
in the cold weather to ensure they were physically fit and to provide 
training in piqueting, sangar building and field firing to ensure 
uniformity of drill and training. Bullock concluded: 
Nearly every year some portion of the army is engaged in more 
or less important operations in the hills. Yet of these 
operations there is seldom to be found a satisfactory history. 
The lessons learnt, the mistakes made, the steps taken to 
rectify these mistakes, may be recorded for the benefit of 
Head-Quarters Staff, but they are not published in any form 
which is generally available for the army. The young soldier 
who wishes to study mountain warfare in India, has to be 
content with a very few books as a rule, and those are not 
always obtainable, being old and often out of print. It is not 
a subjec-- of instruction at garrison classes, and what is known 
of it is chiefly derived from experience, and from the training 
so many officers have had in many a mountain war. 
Bu-c is this satisfactory? Should not the lessons of the 
past be collected, and available for all to learn? 
60 See Report on the Mountain Artillery Practice Camps at Dhaqul and Rajpur, 1892- 
93, (Simla, 1893), Report on the Mountain Artillery Practice Camps held at RaIpur, 
Dhaqui, and Paniala in 1893-94, (Simla, 1894), L/MIL/7/10831 and Report on the 
Mountain Artillery Practice Camps held at RaIpur and Dhaqul in 1894-95, (Simla, 
1895) L/MIL/7/10834 
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Should not the warfare we are likely to engage be a 
subject of study, in preference to a warfare in which our army 
seems never likely to engage? 
The lines of our military education has been laid down 
too much by those whose eyes are dazzled by the great wars of 
the Continent, and forget that the work we have to perform is 
equally arduous, requires as careful a study, and that the 
material for that study are to be found in our own "little 
wars.,, 61 
The author of the second published contribution to the essay 
competition attempted to chart the historical development of military 
expertise in mountain warfare in the clear belief that valuable 
lessons could be derived from past experience. Captain F. C. Carter 
stressed the importance of wider preparation for hill warfare, 
especially in --erms of the provision of training manuals, and 
suggested the addition of special notes on the requirements of 
jungle, desert, and mountain warfare to the new Drill Book, but he 
too recognised the intrinsic difficulty of laying down any precise 
tactical instruction for such varied operational conditionS. 62 
The J. U. S. I. I. and the service press in England published a 
succession of articles relating to the development of a doctrine and 
appropriate training for hill fighting during the 1890s, reflecting 
growing professional interest and awareness Of the specific 
requirements of colonial warfare in India. Although the 1893 Drill 
Book was regarded as a considerable improvement on the earlier 
edition it was still deficient in guidance on the subject of jungle, 
desert and mountain warfare. 63 Writing in the Proceedings of the 
Royal Artillery institution, Major H. C. Simpson urged that the theory 
and practice of mountain artillery tactics and irregular warfare in 
general should be taught to the officers and men in mountain 
batteries stationed in India and England. A French pamphlet was 
recommended to complement the artillery drill books after noting that 
nothing had been published in English on mountain and irregular 
61 Maj. G. M. Bullock, 'Mountain Warfare as Applied to India,, J. P. S. I. I., 22,107, 
(1893), p. 330 
62 Capt. F. C. Carter, 'Mountain Warfare as AppliE! d to India,, J-U-S-I. I--, 22,110, 
(1893), pp. 414-66 
63 Infantry Drill, (London, 1893) 
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warfare since 1875.64 The basis of training in India still remained, 
however, predic-ated primarily on military operations against 
similarly organised, trained and equipped Russian troops. The 1894 
J. U. S. I. I. prize essay competition directly discussed the 
difficulties of devising suitable training programmes for an army 
operating in widely differing theatres of war and against opponents 
that changed with bewildering rapidity. The prize winning author, 
Captain F. C. Carter, reiterated his belief that the military 
authorities had failed by not providing the bulk of British and 
Indian troops with appropriate training for local requirements, with 
emphasis instead being placed on training along continental lines. He 
noted that additional information was required to complement that 
already contained in the Drill Book and suggested the inclusion of an 
authoritative "Indian Appendix" which would contain hints and 
precepts dealing with operations against tribesmen on the frontiers 
of India over difficult terrain that could become the recognised 
authority on the subject. Carter went on: 
Until the present drill season, however, I believe no attempt 
has been made... to exercise troops with a view to warfare other 
than that against civilized foes in fairly open, level, or 
partially heavy country. Mountain and jungle warfare against 
savage tribes has, in all our big camps, been an unknown 
factor... That some of our troops are extremely proficient in 
Guerilla and Mountain Warfare, there is no doubt; but this is 
due more to experience gained during the ever frequent little 
frontier wars, rather than to the intuition given in times of 
peace; and in many cases, 'ere officers and men have become 
thoroughly "aguerri" to this description of fighting, they have 
had to undo a great deal learnt on the parade ground, and start 
afresh with experience and common sense as their guides in lieu 
of the drill book. I remember full well, during one campaign, 
after many little brushes with the enemy and not a few night 
attacks, a Sikh Officer asked me if we were ever going to 
advance against the enemy in "pucca (real) attack formation. " 
64 Maj. H. C. Simpson, 'Notes on Mountain Artillery Establishments, their training, 
and Personal Equipment, ' Proc. R. A. 1.21, (1894), p. 265 
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This remark is instructive as showing within the narrow grooves 
the inst-ruction imported to our soldiers has been laid. 65 
Carter concluded that the present system of training and drill books 
were palpably incomplete and needed revision to reflect imperial 
requirements. 66 
The interest in mountain warfare continue unabated in the 
military press the following year, when a second contribution to the 
1894 prize essay competition was published that argued in a similar 
vein. Captain W. G. Hamilton recognised that the Indian Army would be 
forced to rely on personal experience for some time to come because 
of the absence of training manuals or books and the inaccessibility 
of other literature relating to the conduct of 'savage warfare,. The 
practical training of British and Indian troops for mountain warfare 
posed certain practical difficulties for the army in India given the 
limited number of hill stations with terrain suitable for training 
purposes and officers accustomed to hill warfare. The wide 
differences in the armament and tactics of various 'savage, opponents 
also militated against the development of a system of widely 
applicable training for warfare along the frontiers of India. 
Hamilton observed: 
Our troops, it may be urged, have had so much practice in 
fighting savage tribes, that tactical instruction in such a 
matter is superfluous. This is true to a certain extent, but 
the experience gained by part of the army in India requires to 
be imparted to the whole. There are no text-books on the 
subject and the literature of savage warfare though fairly full 
is not generally accessible. It would, I think, be of undoubted 
assistance if the accumulated experience gained in many wars 
with many kinds of savages were crystallized in the form of a 
short official text-book; meanwhile the personal knowledge and 
experience of individuals must be our guide... While it would be 
a work of supererogation to teach the troops of the Punjab 
Frontier Force, for instance, how to fight Pathans or, to 
65 Capt. F. C. Carter, 'On the Tactical training in District Concentrations, Best 
Prepared for Preparing the Army in India for War: - (a) Against a Civilised Enemy. 
(b) Against Savage Tribes in mountain or Jungle Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 23,117, 
(1894), p. 146 
66 Ibid, p. 175 
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instruct the Burma battalions in the subtleties of jungle 
warfare, the experience of recent hill campaigns shows that 
some preliminary instruction is certainly required in many 
cases, and especially in the case of British or Native 
regiments new to the work required.. How many regiments, to give 
but one instance, with out some experience, know how to deal 
with the common form of Pathan offensive tactics, firing into 
camp at night? Yet regiments may be subjected to the ordeal the 
first night they cross the frontier, and in such cases the 
result has not infrequently proved more encouraging to foe or 
friend. A few days practical training at a camp would be 
invaluable to a regiment likely to be so circumstanced. This is 
one example out of many which suggest themselveS. 67 
The development and adaptation of training to the varied exigencies 
of colonial warfare around the British Empire, and more immediately 
on the frontiers of India, posed a complex problem. Hamilton believed 
that experienced officers represented 'the natural teachers in the 
theory of savage warfare,, and proposed a detailed programme of 
progressive training commencing with a few companies and working up 
to the use of a full brigade of all arms. Small camps of instruction 
should be held, at such places as Ranikhet or the Murree Hills, with 
a skeleton enemy provided by men accustomed to tribal tactics as well 
as the establishment of permanent schools to provide combined 
tactical training in hill warfare at which troops could be instructed 
for a month each autumn. The discussion in the J. U. S. I. I. during 
1894-95 was a significant recognition of the importance of 
appropriate training and indicated some of the fundamental problems 
involved in devising suitable training for regular troops in such a 
specialist form of warfare. 68 Despite these detailed suggestions, the 
Adjutant-General in India made no attempt to formally alter the 
existing system of training to reflect the growing awareness of the 
peculiar requirements of warfare on the North-West Frontier or to 
absorb the lessons of the early 1890s. Apart from a small pamphlet 
written by major O. C. Radford, the Commandant of the 4th Punjab 
67 Capt. W. G. Hamilton, 'On the Tactical Training in District Concentrations best 
fitted for Preparing the Army in India for War,, J. U-S-I-I--, 23,119, (1894), 
pp. 103-4 
68 Ibid, pp. 105-7 
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Infantry, for probationary officers serving in the Punjab and the 
Standing Orders of the P. F. F. regiments there were still no sources 
of guidance available for British officers in mountain warfare. 69 
The steady extension of British influence along the line of the 
strategic passes into tribal territory during the mid 1890s brought 
the Indian Army into further conflict with the trans-border tribes. 
In November 1893, the Durand Agreement defined relative spheres of 
influence between India and Afghanistan giving the Government of 
India a free hand in dealing with the independent tribes without 
outside interference. However, a growing number of regular troops 
were required to police tribal territory, provide new garrisons and 
to secure their lines of communication as the P. F. F. lacked 
sufficient manpower to control the entire border. The delimitation of 
the Durand Line in Waziristan during 1894 provoked further military 
operations against tribesmen who regarded the construction of 
boundary pillars as a direct challenge to their political 
independence. A mixed Mahsud and Wazir lashkar attacked the military 
escort to the delimitation party at Wano on 4th November 1894, 
successfully overrunning the camp. After heavy hand-to-hand fighting 
the tribesmen were defeated and pursued into the surrounding hills, 
but only after serious casualties were inflicted on the Indian column 
and several rifles stolen. 10 The ensuing punitive operations, 
conducted under the command of General William Lockhart, was 
predominantly composed of the highly trained and experienced P. F. F. 
regiments. 71 During the winter of 1894-95 three columns traversed 
Waziristan, destroying villages and seizing food and livestock, 
suffering a total of only 23 casualties during skirmishes with the 
poorly armed local tribesmen. Unfortunately due to the absence of 
resistance there was little opportunity for inexperienced British 
officers accompanying the P. F. F. troops to learn much about frontier 
warfare . 
72 
69 Maj. O. C. Radford, Notes for Panjab Probationers on 1. Castes 2. Hill Tactics 3. 
Customs 4. Idicmatic Sentences, (Lahore, 1894), pp. 25-31 
70 Brig. -Gen. A. H. Turner to Adj. -Gen. in India, 16th Nov. 1894, L/MIL/7/15362 
71 See Lt. -Col. A. H. Mason and Lt. G. K. Cockerill, Operations aqainst the Mahsud 
Waziris by a force under the conmiand of Lieutenant -General Sir William Stephen 
Alexander Lockhart in 1894-95, with a short account of the events which led up to 
the expqdLtion, 1897) L/MIL/17/13/108 L_ (Simla, 
72 Gen. Sir A. Haldane, A Soldier's Saqa: The Autobioqraphy of General Sir Alymer 
Haldane, (Edinburgh and London, 1948), pp. 76-7 
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The mobilisation of the 1st Division in March 1895 to relieve 
the beleaguered British Agent and garrison at Fort Chitral, 
revitalised interest in the conduct of hill warfare. The Chitral 
Relief Force that assembled at Mardan, under the command of Major- 
General Sir Robert Low, to relieve the garrison by an advance through 
Lower Swat towards Chitral, totalled 15,000 troops and over 30,000 
pack animals required to maintain it in the field. 73 The majority of 
the estimated 12,000 tribesmen that defended the Malakand Pass on 3rd 
April were armed with swords or resorted to rolling boulders down the 
mountain sides at the advancing British troops, while the remainder 
possessed a mixture of muzzle-loading and breech-loading firearms .71 
Tribal sangars and breastworks were clearly marked with standards 
allowing rifle volleys, mountain artillery and Maxim machine guns to 
exact a heavy toll of the defenders. As one observer observed: 'The 
Maxims playing from right and left of the gorge created an ideal 
picture of a civilised attack on a savage enemy. '75 At the cost of 
only 60 casualties the 2nd Brigade captured the position after 
killing over 500 of the comparatively poorly armed tribesmen. 76 The 
decisive defeats inflicted at the Malakand and at Khar on 4th April 
ended all major resistance, except for some minor fighting at the 
Panjkora River, sniping of camps at night and attacks on small 
parties and individuals during the advance up the Swat Valley. Fort 
Chitral was finally relieved by a column of Imperial Service Troops 
advancing from Kashmir restoring peace to the border after a six week 
campaign. 
The Chitral campaign re-confirmed the importance of the study 
of hill warfare by the Indian Army. Throughout the fighting the 
highly trained and experienced P. F. F. regiments had demonstrated 
their proficiency in the tactics of hill warfare and it also extended 
further practical experience to regular British and Indian troopS. 77 
The operations had also indicated that the technological superiority 
73 See Capt. W. R. Robertson, An Official Account of the Chitral Expedition 1895, 
(Calcutta, 1898) and Capt. G. J. Younghusband and Capt. F. E. Younghusband, The 
Relief of Chitral, (London, 1895) 
74 Field Marshal Sir W. Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal, (London, 1921), p. 71 
75 The Chitral Expedition 1895 containinq an account of the adventures and 
captivity of Lieutenants Fowler and Edwards toqether with full details of the 
operations of General Low's force, (Allahabad, 1895), p. 29 
76 G. O. C. C. R. F. to the Adj. -Gen. in India, 5th April 1895, White Mss, 
Mss. Eur. F. 108/35 
77 Maj. W. G. Hamilton, 'The 2nd Brigade in the Chitral Relief Force,, J. R. U. S. I., 
40,224, (1896), p. 1237 
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enjoyed by British arms was on the decline, when the Imperial Service 
Troops advancing from Kashmir and the defenders of Fort Chitral were 
opposed by tribesmen armed with Sniders and Martini-Henry rifles 
qualitatively superior to their own weapons. 18 After Dir Fort was 
captured evidence was found indicating the tribes were actively 
seeking to secure their own arms of precision' and revealing the 
existence of a lucrative arms trade on the North-West Frontier . 
79 The 
inability of the recently introduced Lee-Metford rifle to stop 
charges by determined Pathan swordsmen, however, led to the 
development of Dum-Dum. pattern expanding bullets, designed 
specifically with improved stopping power, for British troops 
engaged in 'savage warfare' on the North-West Frontier. 80 The 
campaign prompted the publication of further lectures, articles and 
books during 1895, that discussed the special conditions and 
requirements of mountain warfare in India. 81 At a lecture at the 
R. U. S. I. in London, Major F. C. Carter noted that recent operations in 
India could be characterised exclusively as mountain warfare and 
stressed the need for training and preparation for future campaigns. 
His lecture provoked a lengthy discussion during which General J. J. 
Gordon called for the publication of a condensed record of British 
experience gained in mountain warfare and emphasised the value of 
small wars for instructing officers in initiative, eye for ground and 
common-sense. 82 The professional interest in hill warfare and 
developing appropriate training regimes continued during the 
following year, in a series of articles that attempted to deduce 
lessons from the recent campaigns on the North-West Frontier. 83 A 
detailed article was published in the J. U. S. I. I. in 1896 discussing 
hill warfare conducted on both the North-Western and North-Eastern 
78 Townshend to Durand, 25th April 1895, White Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 108/37 and Lt. C. G. 
Stewart, 'An Account of the Relief of Chitral Fort from Gilgit and the Siege of 
Chitral', Proc. R. A. I., 22, (1895), pp. 399-404 
79T. R. Moreman, 'The Arms Trade and the North-West Frontier Pathan Tribes, 1890- 
19141, J. I. C. H., 22,2, (1994), pp. 191-2 
80 See E. M. Spiers, 'The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet in Colonial Warfare', J. I. C. H., 
4,1, (1975), pp. 3-14 
81 See H. C. Thomson, The Chitral Campaiqn: A Narrative of Events in Chitral, Swat 
and Balour, (London, 1895), Capt. F. E. Younghusband, 'The Chitral Carnpaign', 
J. R. U. S. I., 40,215, (1895), pp. 5-23 and Capt. G. F. Herbert, 'The Artillery in 
Chitral, Proc. R. A. I., 22 (1895), pp. 501-10 
82 Maj. F. C. Carter, 'Mountain Warfare in India', J. R. U. S. I., 39,213, (1895), 
pp. 1071-1100 
83 Maj. A. W. Radcliffe, 'Convoy Escort Duties in Mountain Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 24, 
121, (1895), pp. 226-8, and Capt. O. C. Williamson, 'Encanipments in Hill Warfare on 
the North-West Frontier of India', Proc. R. A. I., 24, (1897), pp-243-49 
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Frontiers of India, which noted that Indian troops lacked suitable 
equipment and -zxaining- Its anonymous author observed that each 
enemy's tactics needed to be studied and copied by Indian troops as 
they were suited to the terrain, and that losses had been suffered by 
imperial troops because of a lack of appropriate training. 84 Both 
official and non-official manuals continued to emphasise pragmatic 
adaptation to 'Local conditions or provided limited information on the 
use of the square in open terrain. As Lieutenant-Colonel Gunter 
observed: 'The methods employed must vary with and be adapted to 
those of the enemy, to his fighting character, weapons, to the 
description of country, and to the object to be attained. No rules 
could, therefore, be of universal application... f 85 
The growing professional interest in the conduct and 
requirements of 'small wars, displayed in the military press in 
England and India indicated that the brief section on 'savage 
warfare, in Infantry Drill was no longer regarded by many British 
officers as a sufficient basis of instruction. It was perhaps 
indicative of these changing attitudes that a leading military 
theorist and 'crammer,, called directly for instruction in Britain's 
imperial military requirements. T. Miller Maguire observed: 'While 
looking at the stars we tumble in a ditch, and while lost in wonder 
at how to move effectively from Strasbourg, Mayence, and Metz towards 
Paris with many divisions of cavalry and armies consisting each of 
from three to eight corps, we may forget how to handle a few 
battalions in the passes of the Suleiman Range or in the deserts of 
Upper Egypt. r 86 During the 1890s the War Office had received a 
growing number of requests for guidance in the conduct of 'small 
87 
wars', from officers serving throughout the Empire. A small manual 
published under the auspices of the Intelligence Department, written 
by Britain's acknowledged leading authority on the conduct of 
colonial warfare was a direct response. Captain Charles Callwell's 
Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice represented the first 
detailed comprehensive systematic study devoted to the military 
84 A Frontier Soldier, 'Notes on Mountain Warfare,, J. U. S. I. I., 25,124, (1896), 
pp. 19-43 
85 Lt. -Col. E. Gunter, Outlines of Modern Tactics, (London, 1895), p. 239 
86 T. Miller Maguire, 'Our Art of War as Made in Germany,, U. S. M. 13,810, (1896), 
p. 126 
87 Maj. -Gen. E. A. Wood, comments on Maj. W. D. Conner, 'Incidents of Bush Warfare', 
Proc. R. A. I., 23, (1896), p. 92 
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requirements of Britain's colonial campaigns. It dealt at length with 
the peculiar tactical and strategical exigencies of colonial warfare 
and stressed that unmodified European methods were unsuitable for 
military operations in the Empire. Callwell observed: 'The conduct of 
small wars is in fact in certain respects an art by itself, diverging 
widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but 
not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which 
permit comparisons to be made. 188 Although the book was of clear 
value to the Indian Army, with its discussion of the general 
requirements of colonial warfare, it did not address the peculiar 
tactical requirements of the North-West frontier against the hill 
tribes. It was favourably reviewed by the J. U. S. I. I. and recommended 
as a 'valuable textbook, in light of the marked increase in military 
operations throughout the Empire, but it was not widely available to 
officers serving in India until after the close of the century. 89 
The large-scale tribal risings that broke out along the length 
of the North-West Frontier during the summer, autumn and winter of 
1897-98, provided a catalyst for further professional interest 
regarding the specific military requirements of colonial warfare in 
India. The fighting began when a British Political Officer and his 
military escort were unexpectedly attacked by Madda Khel Wazir 
tribesmen during a jirga at Maizar in Northern Waziristan on 10th 
July 1897. Heavy losses were inflicted on the surprised troops before 
they fought their way clear of the village and withdrew to Datta 
Khel. Major-General G. Corrie Bird advanced into Waziristan during 
the summer with two brigades, consisting primarily of P. F. F. troops, 
to punish the section implicated in the attack, overawe the 
surrounding tribes and to prevent the localised incident spreading 
along the frontier. Although the unrest was quickly suppressed by the 
Tochi Field Force without serious resistance, fighting quickly spread 
along the rest of the North-West Frontier. " The isolated fort at 
Chakdara, on the road to Chitral, was surrounded on 26th July by 
thousands of tribesmen from the Swat Valley, who then advanced 
towards the BrItish garrison at the Malakand Pass. An initial attack 
overran part of the position, but heavy fighting continued between 
88 Capt. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, (London, 1896) 
89 'Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice by Captain C. E. Callwell, R. A. 
J. U. S. I. I., 25,125, (1896), pp. 228-9 
90 See Maj. G. V. Kemball, Operations of the Tochi Field Force in 1897-98, (Simla, 
1900) L/MIL/17/13/101 
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26th-30th July 1897 while reinforcements were rushed to the area to 
support the hard pressed Indian troops. The fierce hand-to-hand 
fighting against men predominantly armed with knives and swords was 
reminiscent of earlier frontier campaigns, but the presence of other 
tribesmen armed with Martini-Henry rifles inflicted significant 
casualties. Although the assault on the Malakand continued for the 
following four nights, though with decreasing enthusiasm after over 
3,000 casualties were inflicted on the lashkar, the position was 
secured until reinforcements arrived to relieve the hard-pressed 
troops. 91 
The Malakand Field Force successfully relieved Chakdara and 
conducted punitive operations in the Swat Valley throughout August, 
although it encountered little resistance and returned at the end of 
the month. An attack on the fort of Shabkadr in Peshawar District on 
7th August by Mohmand tribesmen, reinforced by Utman Khel, Mullagoris 
and Afghans, widened the scope of hostilities. The Malakand Field 
Force and the newly mobilised Mohmand Field Force in British 
territory commenced operations during September to punish the hostile 
tribesmen for complicity in the attack. Two brigades of the Malakand 
Field Force moved southwards through Bajaur and Mohmand country while 
further British and Indian troops advanced northwards via the Gandab 
Valley to join forces. The advance brigade of the Malakand Field 
Force reached Nawagai without encountering resistance, but the 2nd 
Brigade was unexpectedly attacked at Markhani by Mamund tribesmen 
dislocating the entire plan of campaign. While the 3rd Brigade halted 
pending the arrival of reinforcements, Brigadier-General Jeffreys' 
2nd Brigade conducted operations in the Mamund Valley to punish the 
local tribesmen for their attack. The fighting between 15th and 30th 
September against lashkars heavily armed with Martini-Henry and 
Remington rifles, as well as plentiful supplies of ammunition, was 
dramatically different from that earlier in Waziristan and at the 
Malakand. Mamund lashkars refused to attack at close quarters and 
relied on long-range rifle fire to harass the Indian columns, only 
attacking in strength when the Indian troops began to withdraw at the 
end of the day's fighting. During the withdrawal to camp on 16th 
September a portion of the force was benighted in a small village 
91 Capt. H. F. Walters, The Operations of the Malakand Field Force and the Buner 
Field Force 1897-98, (Simla, 1900), pp. 15-20 L/MlL/17/13/55 
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several miles from the perimeter camp. 92 Following the engagement 
Brigadier Jeff-eys observed: 'We can do a lot of damage and kill a 
few men but we cannot make a bag. They retire on our advance right up 
the hills, fire at long range 1800 to 2000 yards, and as soon as we 
commence to withdraw down they come from rock to rock., 93 The heavy 
fighting on 16th September cost the 2nd Brigade 150 killed and 
wounded, the highest loss suffered by the Indian Army on the North- 
West Frontier for twenty years. 94 
The 3rd Brigade was attacked at Nawagai at night on 18th and 
20th September by over 3,000 swordsmen, who attempted to rush its 
entrenched perimeter camp under the cover of rifle fire from the 
surrounding hills. Although the assault was conducted with 
considerable tactical skill, it was repulsed by shrapnel and rifle 
volleys with heavy casualties under illumination provided by star 
shells. A total of 32 casualties including the brigade commander, 
however, were suffered within the encampment and 133 transport 
animals were also killed or wounded. 95 The sophisticated fire and 
movement tactics employed by the lashkar led Sir Bindon Blood to 
suspect the presence of trained Afghan or ex-Indian soldiers in its 
ranks. The limitations of the training of the British and Indian 
troops were exposed during the operations by the Malakand Field Force 
against the Mamunds. Writing to the Commander-in-Chief in October, 
Sir Bindon Blood observed: 'There is no doubt that our officers and 
men have much to learn in regard to keeping together, and seeing to 
mutual support, and to the ground, when they get away from direct 
authority. All the mishaps that have occurred here are traceable to 
carelessness on these points - which is brought out by the superior 
smartness of the enemy. ' 96 
The Mohmand Field Force encountered little resistance when it 
advanced up the Gandab Valley from Shabkadr, and it established 
contact with the Malakand Field Force on 21st September at Lakarai. 
The Badmanai Pass, occupied by the Adda Mulla and his lashkar, was 
captured by the combined force and the troops destroyed the tribal 
92 Lt. Viscount Fincastle and lt. P. C. Elliot-Lockhart, A Frontier Campaiqn: A 
Narrative of the Malakand and Buner Field Forces on the North West Frontiers of India, 
(London, 1898), pp-133-4 
93 Jefferys to White, 21st Sept. 1897, White Mss, Mss-Eur. F. 108/38 
94 B. Blood, Four Score Years and Ten: Sir Bindon Blood's Reminiscences, (London, 
1933), p-302 
95 Maj. -Gen. Sir Bindon Blood to Adj. -Gen. 20th and 21st Sept. 1897, L/P&S/7/96 
96 Blood to White, 7th Oct. 1897, White Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 108/38 
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stronghold at Jarobi, against only desultory opposition from the 
tribesmen who declined to fight a decisive action. A jirga held with 
representatives of the mohmand tribes on 28th September agreed terms 
bringing an end to the fighting, but the Mohmand Field Force occupied 
the area until the fines had been collected. Although the operations 
in the Mamund Valley dragged on during September, tribal resistance 
declined after heavy casualties were inflicted on a lashkar around 
Agrah and Gat villages on the 30th September. Following the 
destruction of the village of Badalai on 3rd October active 
operations against the Mamunds ended and Indian troops withdrew back 
into British territory. 91 
The operations in Waziristan, Swat, Bajaur and the Mohmand 
country were a prelude to the largest and most difficult campaign 
fought by the Indian Army in 1897-98, as unrest spread southwards to 
affect the Afridis and Orakzais. The British garrisons stationed at 
the mouth of the Khyber Pass, along the Samana Ridge and in the 
Kurram, Valley were reinforced as it became evident that the tribes 
were actively hostile. on 23rd August Afridi lashkars attacked 
outposts and forts in the Khyber Pass held by garrisons of the 
locally recruited Khyber Rifles (See Figure 4). Although the 
defenders successfully resisted until 25th August, they then 
surrendered with the loss of the garrison's Snider rifles and 50,000 
rounds of ammunition, closing the Khyber Pass. Fighting continued 
throughout August and September with a series of skirmishes along the 
Samana ridge and in the Kurram Valley. At Sadde on 16th-17th 
September, a camp occupied by the 1st Brigade was attacked by 2,000 
Massuzai tribesmen, who were repelled with heavy casualties after 
they attempted to rush the perimeter. The forts on the Samana ridge 
were attacked in strength by a mixed Afridis and Orakzais lashkar 
during mid September. Fort Saragarhi fell to the tribesmen with the 
death of the entire garrison of 21 sepoys from the 36th Sikhs 
following a determined resistance. Following this defeat, a force 
from Kohat under General Yeatman Biggs relieved the other isolated 
forts and ensured the security of the border while preparations were 
underway for future operations. 98 
97 G. O. C. Malakand Field Force to Adj. -Gen., 2nd Oct. 1897, L/P&S/7/96 
98 Foreign Department Despatch No. 143 of 1897 (Frontier): Disturbances on the 
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The punitive expedition which assembled at Shinawari during 
September and October 1897, to conduct operations against the Afridis 
and Orakzais, represented the largest concentration of imperial 
troops ever deployed on the North-West Frontier. It was expected that 
a British advance would meet strong resistance from the two tribes, 
who possessed an estimated combined fighting strength of 40-50,000 
men and who were known to be well equipped with breech-loading rifles 
bought with income from subsidies and military salaries. 99 In 
addition, an estimated 2,000 Afridis were serving in the ranks of the 
Indian Army and many more of their kinsmen had passed through its 
ranks swelling the number of men aware of the tactics employed by 
Indian troops. To complicate matters the area remained virtually 
terra incognita despite being only 60 miles from Peshawar and the 
approach of winter placed severe time constraints on any operations. 
The Tirah Expeditionary Force (T. E. F. ) consisted of two divisions of 
infantry, cavalry and mountain artillery totalling 34,506 troops and 
19,858 non-combatant followers, with 14,593 mules, 8,119 horses and 
ponies as well as 2,811 camels to transport and supply it in the 
field. 100 Line of communication troops maintained the flow of supplies 
and reinforcements 73 miles back across the Indus to a railhead at 
Khushalgarh. A further two columns were formed to operate in Peshawar 
District and the Kurram Valley, with an additional brigade held in 
reserve at Rawalpindi. 101 The advance was delayed pending the arrival 
of troops, the provision of necessary supplies and the pack transport 
animals required to maintain all the parts of the T. E. F. in the 
field. An acute shortage of trained transport officers, attendants 
and pack animals represented a critical problem throughout the 
campaign affecting the mobility of the force and severely 
complicating the tactical and administrative conduct of the 
operations. 102 The 3rd Sikh and 3rd Punjab Infantry were the only 
P. F. F. regiments, along with the No. 1 (Kohat) and No. 2 (Derajat) 
mountain batteries, to serve with the force during the campaign, due 
99 White to Elgin, 1st Sept. 1897, Elqin Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 84/71 
100 Christiansen, op cit, p. 376 
101 See Capt. H. F. Walters, Operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force 1897-98, 
under the conmiand of General Sir William Stephen Alexander Lockhart, (Simla, 1900) 
L/MIL/17/13/99 
102 See Report on the C ommis sariat -Transport Arranqements of the Tirah 
Expeditionary Force, 1897-98, (Calcutta, 1899) L, MIL/17/5/1856 
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to ongoing operations elsewhere and the large number of Afridi sepoys 
enlisted in the ranks of its other regiments whose loyalty was 
questionable. 103 Several regular British and Indian units had served 
in tribal territory before in 1895 - the 2nd Battalion King's Own 
Scots Borderers, lst Gordon Highlanders, 15th Sikhs and the 1/3rd and 
2/4th Gurkhas - or had formed part of the Mohmand Field Force. The 
vast majority, however, were regiments from cantonments on the Indian 
plains lacking any experience or knowledge of the requirements of 
hill warfare and whose training was based solely on the Drill Book. 
The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, for example, had served in 
India for fifteen years, but only one or two officers had ever been 
west of the River Indus during that period. 104 A small section on 
tactics was included in the Standing Orders issued by the 
headquarters of the T. E. F. at the beginning of the campaign, which 
covered skirmishing and other elementary hill training. 105 The vast 
majority of the British regiments were given their first rudimentary 
introduction to the tactics of hill warfare when the force was 
concentrated at Shinwari. Captain A. K. Slessor noted: 'One morning by 
way of variety the Battalion was taken out to practice the attack, in 
the direction of the Kotal, and realized very forcibly that the 
pretty little manoeuvres and formations of the parade ground or 
ordinary field day on the plains have to be chucked overboard when it 
comes to scrambling about hills like the side of a house, as was the 
case with most things laid down in the Infantry Drill. ' 'In fact, the 
first thing the British soldier has to do, ' the same author went on 
'when he goes on active service, is as a rule, to renounce the drill- 
book, like the devil and all his works, and start to learn his trade 
afresh. f 106 
The Second Division reconnoitred the route into Tirah in 
strength on 18th October, culminating with an attack against 
tribesmen occupying the precipitous ridgEý that dominated the line of 
advance. After a successful attack, the British force abandoned the 
position and retired to Shinawari later the same day due to the lack 
103 H. W. Mills, The Tirah Campaign - beinq the Sequel of the Pathan Revolt in 
North-West India, (Lahore, 1898), pp. 40-2 
104 Col. H. C. Wylly, From the Black Mountain to Waziristan, (London, 1912), p. vii 
105 Standing orders by General Sir. W. S. A. Lockhart, Comanding Tirah Expeditionary 
Force, 9th Oct. 1997, N. A. M. '1997-98' (549.14) 
106 Capt. A. K. Slessor, The Second Battalion Derbyshire Reqiment in Tirah (London, 
1900) p. 44 and p. 95 
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of supplies of food and water. When the inain column commenced its 
advance on 20th October it found Dargai occupied in strength by 
Afridi and Orakzais tribesmen armed with Enfield, Snider and Martini- 
Henry rifles. rhe attack carried out by the 3rd Brigade at Dargai on 
20th October 1897 graphically illustrated the impact of modern arms 
of precision, on the conduct of hill warfare. When the assaulting 
troops attempted a frontal attack on the position, they were unable 
to cross a narrow neck of ground below the ridge for most of the day 
which was swept by intense rifle fire from the heights above. 107 A 
series of costly attacks were carried out by five battalions of 
infantry illus-ýrating the difficulties of attacking a fortified 
position defended by resolute tribesmen armed with modern rifles. The 
fire of massed batteries of mountain artillery was unable to dislodge 
or suppress the riflemen hidden in crevices in the cliff or in 
carefully constructed sangars. Dargai was finally captured when a 
concerted rush was made across the neck by the Gordon Highlanders, 
forcing the tribesmen to hurriedly abandon the ridge. The scale of 
the casualties inflicted on the T. E. F. at Dargai, 172 killed or 
wounded, was unprecedented and indicated that the decisive 
technological superiority in firearms enjoyed by imperial troops 
since the Jowaki campaign had ended. 108 
The seizure of Dargai represented the last major set-piece 
-he Tirah Campaign. Both the Afridi and Orakzais engagement of 4. 
lashkars made no determined effort to defend the passes which blocked 
the advance of the Indian troops and conducted a delaying action 
against the T. E.. F. as it moved across the Chagru Kotal into the heart 
of Tirah. 109 Imperial troops advancing towards the Sampagha Pass 
through the Khanki Valley were heavily sniped by riflemen hidden on 
the hill sides along the line of march and skirmishes occurred each 
day between small groups of tribesmen and foraging parties. It soon 
became apparen---- that the possession of modern rif les by the tribes 
would greatly complicate the conduct of military operations in Tirah. 
107 G. O. C. T. E. F. to Adj. -Gen. in India, 20th Oct. 1897, L/P&S/7/97, Yeatman Biggs 
to White, 23rd Oct. 1897, White Mss, Mss-Eur. F. 108/38 and Lt. -Gen. Sir G. F. 
MacMunn, 'The Stonning of Dargai (20th December 1897) 1, A. Q. , 17,2, (1928), 
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108 Foreign Department Despatch No. 158 of 1897 (Frontier): Correspondence 
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Afridi marksmen hidden in the pine-covered hills commanding the 
valley inflicted over 50 casualties during the night of 25th October 
against the occupants of Karappa Camp, who had neglected to take the 
elementary defensive precaution of 'crowning the heights, or building 
adequate defences surrounding the camp. 110 The vulnerability of the 
densely packed perimeter camp to long-range rifle fire, led to the 
hurried construction of large fortified piquets each containing a 
company of infantry on the surrounding heights at a distance of one 
mile from camp. Their size reflected the continued expectation that 
massed attacks would be made by tribal swordsmen. Within the camp the 
construction of shelter trenches and protective walls provided a 
partial solution to sniping and diminished the number of casualties 
amongst the combatant troops. However, the transport animals could 
not so easily be protected and suffered heavy losses, while the 
civilian followers took no precautions at all and had to be 
restrained from building fires that provided aiming marks for the 
snipers. "' The lightly equipped and specially trained Gurkha Scouts, 
formed from men drawn the 3rd and 5th Gurkha Rifles, attached to the 
T. E. F., however, proved a highly effective solution to the problem by 
actively stalking the Afridi snipers harassing the camp. 112 
Skirmishing with the Afridi and Orakzais lashkars made it readily 
apparent that the majority of the T. E. F. were considerably less 
efficient than the regiments who had hitherto monopolised the conduct 
of frontier warfare. Lockhart's Aide-de-Camp later observed: 'The 
great part of the Tirah Expeditionary Force... did not realise what it 
meant to be confronted by an active and agile enemy who knew every 
inch of his country and would be ready to seize every opportunity for 
turning the tables on his civilised foe., " 3 
The administrative and logistical problems involved in 
transporting and supplying two divisions with the requisite 
ammunition, food and supplies needed in the barren hills dictated the 
pace of the advance into Tirah. A week long delay was imposed in the 
Khanki Valley as the pack transport belonging to the 2nd Division 
110 Col. C. E. Callwell, Tirah 1897, (London, 1911), p. 64 and Field Marshal Lord 
Birdwood, Khaki and Gown: An Autobioqraph , (London, 1942), p. 85 
Ill Col. L. James, Hiqh Pres ure: Beinq Some Record of Activities in the Service of 
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112 Lt. -Col. Sir F. O'Connor, On the Frontier and Beyond: A Record of Thirty Years' 
Service, (London, 1931), p. 11 
113 Haldane, op cit, pp. 107-8 
105 
crossed the Chagru Kotal, while tracks in the area were improved, new 
paths constructed and supplies of corn, straw, and wood collected by 
foraging parties from the surrounding area. The movement of masses of 
ponies, mules and camels across the border posed immense difficulties 
and the advance was further hampered by the poor quality of the 
animals and their equipment, as well as indiscipline amongst the 
hastily impressed civilian attendants. Supply columns moved across 
the passes in single file at a snails' pace into Tirah due to the 
poor state of the roads and animals and had to be heavily guarded 
from attack. It took the 20,000 pack animals and attendants over 48 
hours of daylight to advance seven miles towards the Sampagha Pass 
along the Khanki Valley. 114 The Sampagha Pass was captured with 
relative ease on 29th October, after a bombardment by the largest 
concentration of mountain artillery ever used in frontier warfare, 
opening the route to Mastura Valley, but transport and supply 
problems slowed the advance leaving forward troops without tents or 
blankets for five days and nights. 115 A lack of resistance at the 
passes clearly indicated that the tribesmen had learnt that it was 
impossible to resist the combined strength of the punitive column in 
open battle without heavy casualties. Instead the lashkars waged 
gueirilla warfare against the vulnerable columns of British and Indian 
troops melting away before determined attacks, pressing their attacks 
during withdrawals while all the time relentlessly harassing 
perimeter camps and convoys. 116 
The 2nd Division entered the Maidan Valley on 31st October 
1897, confidently expecting that the Orakzais and Afridis would 
submit, now that British troops had penetrated to the heart of Tirah. 
The majority of the inhabitants had, however, fled with their 
livestock and valuables leaving behind their fighting men to contest 
the occupation of the area. Afridi and Orakzais jirgas were summoned 
to hear terms on 4th November, but lashkars continued to resist the 
Indian troops in Maidan exploiting the nullahs, ravines and rugged 
terrain in the area to make incessant small scale attacks. The 
perimeter camp at Maidan, containing the 2nd Division and a brigade 
of the 1st Division, was regularly sniped by Afridi riflemen. A 
114 Gen. H. Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, (London, 1925), 
pp. 82-3 
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steady toll of dead and wounded was inflicted within the encampment 
each night, requiring the hurried construction of elaborate field 
defences to provide some protection, whilst the Scouts stalked the 
marauders who had penetrated the outer ring of defences. The columns 
which moved out of Camp Maidan to destroy villages, conduct surveys 
and forage for food and fodder from the local area were harassed by 
snipers and were heavily attacked by Afridi lashkars once the 
withdrawal commenced at the end of each day. As the campaign 
progressed British officers widely admired the mobility and skilful 
skirmishing displayed by the Afridi warriors. 117 W. Birdwood observed: 
'Certainly it is always an object-lesson to see Afridi skirmishers in 
action, unhampered by any equipment; the rapidity of their movements 
has to be seen to be believed. They just scatter and disappear, their 
astounding agility apparently quite unaffected by the steepness of 
the hillsides. 1118 The Af ridis" gueirilla tactics proved highly 
effective against the cumbersome columns operating in Maidan. Colonel 
T. H. Holdich observed: 
Afridi tactics by night were effective enough. They were almost 
more effective by day. Neither by night or by day would they 
trust themselves to open resistance or solid attack, but by day 
they could watch from their nests above the valley the 
scattered threads of transport moving in lines for foraging 
purposes, the little bands of scouts covering the survey party 
that was making its way slowly up the hillside, working its way 
comfortably within their range; or they could hang about the 
cliffs and woods whilst an advance in force was in progress, 
ready to mass themselves with most surprising rapidity on any 
luckless party that might get involved in the spider-web of 
nullahs. There was not an army of them. I doubt whether on any 
occasion their numbers could be actually counted into 
thousands. Certainly no British officer ever counted them. But 
this small brigade of bandits owed quite as much of their 
extraordinary mobility to the fewness of their numbers, as to 
their loose organisation and mountaineering instincts. They 
simply played around the British force, and with the facilities 
117 MillS, op cit pp-119-20 
118 Birdwood, op cit, p. 86 
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with which they possess of attaining safe cover when too hard 
pressed, the hunting of them with an army of two divisions was 
not unlike hunting rabbits with a pack of foxhounds. 119 
The close-order formations used by imperial troops to move and fight 
- even companies in extended order had only had a gap of half a pace 
between each man - proved too large and conspicuous a target and were 
vulnerable to long range rifle fire. Easily identifiable British 
officers were singled out by Afridi snipers and suffered a high 
proportion of casualties during the campaign, materially reducing the 
effectiveness of some Indian units. Indeed it became a maxim amongst 
the British other ranks not to stand near officers or white boulders 
to avoid Afridi rifle fire as casualties mounted. 120 General Lockhart 
observed: 'Moreover, it must be noted that even at present the 
Afridis and Orakzais appear to be as well armed as our own native 
troops, they have ample supplies of ammunition, they shoot with 
remarkable accuracy and they are adepts in skirmishing and guenilla 
warfare. There are many pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers 
among them who doubtless impart the military training they have 
themselves acquired in the ranks of the Native Army. '121 Words of 
command taken straight out of the Drill Book were heard on several 
occasions directing attacks on British troops while Afridi servicemen 
provided effective leadership and discipline and gave cohesion to the 
lashkars which considerably increased their tactical effectiveness 
during the campaign. 122 
The punitive and foraging operations mounted by flying 
columns, operating from Camp Maidan during November 1897 exposed poor 
leadership, insufficient training and limited knowledge about the 
peculiarities of hill warfare in both British and Indian regiments. 
It was rapidly apparent that the existing tactical training regimes 
were almost entirely inapplicable to the conditions faced on the 
frontier. As one officer noted: 
119 Col. T. H. Holdich, The Indian Borderland, (London, 1901), p. 362 
120 Lt. -Col. R. G. Thomsett, With the Peshawar Col, -um, Tirah Expeditionary Force, 
(London, 1899), p. 212-3 
121 G. O. C. T. E. F. to Foreign Secretary, 5th Nov. 1897, L/P&S/7/97 
122 A. H. Atteridge, The Wars of the 'Nineties. A History of Warfare in the Last Ten 
Years of the Nineteenth Centur , (London, 1899), p. 511 
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We at once found out the deficiencies of our peace training. In 
the firsL place the system of attack which we had taken so much 
trouble to learn was quite out of place in the hills. In the 
second place we had not been in action five minutes before we 
found that volley-firing was useless, for the targets never 
remained in position long enough for us to go through all the 
elaborate preliminaries. In the third place, companies, and 
even sections, had to a great extent fight their own battles, 
for it was impossible to supervise them, and sometimes even to 
see them; and lastly both officers and men were very much at 
sea in the skirmishing tactics which the ground made necessary... 
As regards the last, I must acknowledge that all were not 
tarred with the same brush, and some regiments, notably several 
belonging to the native army, were at home from the first... 
Tommy Atkins was nearly as clever a skirmisher, although hardly 
as agile as his Pathan Comrade. But of course while he was 
learning his business, the losses were both heavy and 
unnecessary, and this is certainly a reflection on our system 
of training. 123 
The broken terrain made the stereotyped system of attack and 
retirement laid down in the Drill Books of little use to British and 
Indian troops. Indeed, the system of collective fire control and 
discipline, based on carefully directed and controlled volley firing, 
proved singularly unsuited to fighting against widely dispersed 
Afridi skirmishers. In fact, it played directly into their hands on 
numerous occasions. Captain E. W. Maconchy graphically described the 
problems encountered on 21st December when the 21st Madras Regiment 
engaged the Afridis: 'Their fire discipline and the volleys were 
perfect but on the word "Ready" the Afridis would step out from 
behind the rock and get in two or three very accurate shots before 
the smoke of the volley disappeared when they stepped back under 
cover of the rock... This finally convinced me that volley firing was 
not the way to conduct hill fighting, however useful it may be 
against an enemy in the plains of India or even Europe. '124 British 
and Indian troops were forced to acquire the skills of individual 
123 Lt. -Col. G. F. R. Henderson, Technical Traininq of Infant (Dublin, 1899), 
pp. 9-10 
124 Maconchy, op cit, pp-239-40 
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marksmanship and snap-shooting and to assimilate the lessons of 
frontier warfare during the course of the fighting in Tirah while 
opposed to the adept tribesmen. 
The British and Indian troops operating in Tirah suffered a 
series of minor tactical defeats at Afridi hands due to a lack of 
disseminated knowledge of the principles and tactics of frontier 
warfare. During its withdrawal from Saran Sar ridge on 9th November, 
the 4th Brigade encountered serious difficulty when the rearguard, 
heavily encumbered with wounded, came under heavy attack at the end 
of the day's operations. 125 Colonel Chaytor, the Commanding Of f icer of 
the Northamptonshire Regiment, ignored the advice of experienced 
officers and withdrew two infantry companies from the crest without 
leaving a small party to cover their retirement. The retreating 
troops were caught on a congested mountain path by tribesmen on the 
crest above wh(D were able to inflict heavy casualties on the troops 
as they attempted to join the main rearguard. 126 A small detachment 
wandered into a deep nullah during the confusion where they were 
killed by between 12-30 Afridis resulting in the loss of their Lee- 
Metfords and ammunition. A Court of Enquiry convened at Camp Maidan 
on 11th December to investigate the cause of the incident, concluded 
that the troops lacked training and experience in hill warfare and 
that both Brigadier Westmacott's and Colonel Chaytor's tactical 
dispositions had been poor. 127 The fault also lay with Brigadier 
Westmacott who had moved too far along the Saran Sar crest, delaying 
the entire day's operations and the later retirement to camp. 128 Sir 
William Lockhart, the Commander of the T. E. F., was more explicit and 
identified the root cause of the losses suffered by the Brigade 
during the engagement. He observed: 'I fully recognise that hill- 
fighting, especially in such difficult country as Maidan, is an art 
that can only be learnt by experience, and that British soldiers, 
especially those regiments that have not served before on the North- 
West Frontier, are at a serious disadvantage when opposed to Afridis, 
who are experts in guerrilla warfare, and who are lightly equipped 
125 G. O. C. T. E. F. to Adj. -Gen. in India, 10th Nov. 1897, L/P&S/7/97 
126 Maconchy, op cit, p. 225 
127 Military Department Despatch No. 4 of 1898: Enquiry into the circumstances 
attending the losses sustained by the Northamptonshire Regiment in Tirah, on the 
9th November 1897,4th Jan. 1898, L/MIL/7/15882 and Lockhart to Adj. -Gen. in 
India, 26th Jan. 1898, L/MIL/7/15887 
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and fully acquainted with the ground they work over. F 129 The senior 
officers of the Northamptons simply lacked the training, experience, 
and practical knowledge of the tribesmen"s methods and tactics that 
would have enabled them to withdraw successfully under attack through 
such difficult terrain. 130 
The military operations continued in Maidan during November, 
although the Afridis were unable to secure successes against better 
led, trained and increasingly more experienced troops. A force under 
the command of Brigadier A. Gaselee, an experienced 'Piffer', 
successfully reconnoitred the Saran Sar ridge on 11th November and 
conducted the operation with such skill it did not provide the 
tribesmen with an opportunity to inflict casualties on the column. "' 
British regiments, however, were particularly vulnerable to tribal 
attacks during November, since both officers and men seemed incapable 
of adapting to the requirements of frontier warfare. Their lack of 
experience and training resulted in frequent tactical errors, which 
the watching tribesmen were ready and willing to exploit. For 
example, the 3rd Brigade was badly mauled during its withdrawal from 
Waran through the Tseri Kandao Pass to Camp Maidan on 16th November 
after the rear guard was heavily attacked by the Zakka Khel Afridis. 
The reinforcements sent out to aid the retirement were benighted in a 
small village and during the confusion half a company of the 
Dorsetshire Regiment wandered into a deep ravine and were overwhelmed 
by the tribesmen. 132 Such losses made it apparent that British junior 
officers and N. C. O. s urgently required some official guidance to 
prevent the repetition of similar incidents. writing immediately 
after the fighting Sir William Lockhart complained bitterly: 'This is 
the second occasion on which a British regiment has shown its 
inexperience of hill warfare, the first during the retirement from 
the first reconnaissance of the Saran Sar heights, when a proportion 
of the 1st bat-: ýalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, allowed itself to 
become isolated, entered a deep ravine, and lost heavily in 
consequence. '133 The two British regiments that had been roughly 
handled by the Afridis on the 9th and 16th November were addressed 
129 Gen. Sir W. S. Lockhart to Adj. -Gen. in India, 14th Nov. 1897. L/MIL/7/15882 
130 
131 
Col. H. D. Hutchinson, The Campaiqn in Tirah, 1897-1898, (London, 1898), p. 124 
Gough, op cit, p. 58 
132 G. O. C. T. E. F. to Foreign Secretary, 17th Nov. 1897, L/P&S/7/99 
133 G. O. C. T. E. F. to Adj. -Gen. in India, 20th Nov. 1897, White Mss, 
Mss. Eur. F. 108/43 
ill 
personally by the G. O. C. who attempted to pass on some of the lessons 
of frontier warfare to the troops. Lockhart pointed out the necessity 
of keeping in touch and choosing suitable ground when withdrawing in 
the face of a Pathan opponent and gave other hints regarding mountain 
warfare on the North-West Frontier. 134 The headquarters of the T. E. F. 
issued a memorandum on 18th November 1897 to every unit listing 
principles governing the conduct of rearguards that, in effect, 
constituted an ad hoc guide to the conduct of hill warfare. 
It must be remembered that the Force is opposed to perhaps the 
best skirmishers and best natural rifle-shots in the world; and 
that the country they inhabit is probably the most difficult on 
the face of the globe. The enemy's strength lies in his 
knowledge of the country, which enables him to watch our 
movements unperceived by us, and to take advantage of every 
rise in the ground and every ravine. Our strength lies in our 
discipline, controlled fire, and mutual support. Our weakness 
lies in our ignorance of the ground, and the consequent 
tendency of small bodies to straggle and get detached. The 
moral of this is that careful touch must be maintained; and, 
should small parties become isolated from any cause, instead of 
seeking shelter in ravines where they offer themselves as sheep 
to the slaughter, they must stick to the open as far as 
possible. It is to be hoped that we may have the opportunity of 
wiping out all old scores with the enemy before many days have 
elapsed, and meanwhile there is no occasion for us to be 
depressed because some of us have been outnumbered and 
overwhelmed by the enemy. 135 
Issuing such guidance to the troops during the course of fighting was 
an open admission that the regular British and Indian regiments 
lacked appropriate training for the operations in which they were 
engaged in Tirah. However, it is doubtful whether the memorandum had 
an appreciable influence on the conduct of the campaign and the 
regiments composing the T. E. F. were forced to acquire experience and 
134 Gen. E. G. Barrow, 'Campaign Diaries', Barrow Mss, Mss-Eur. E. 420/27, p. 21, and 
Hutchinson, op cit, pp. 146-7 
135 'Field Force Memorandum' , 18th Nov. 1897, White Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 108/38 
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learn the lessons of hill warfare during the fighting, with the 
Afridis as their willing tutors. 
The punitive operations against the Afridis continued after 
18th November from a new base at Bagh, to inflict punishment on the 
remaining hostile sections. The government's terms were announced to 
the tribes on the 20th November, including a fine of 50,000 rupees, 
restoration of Goverment property, forfeiture of allowances and the 
surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles, but few attempts were made to 
comply. While awaiting a decision by the tribes, punitive operations 
in Maidan continued with columns moving to Dwa Toi and on 27th 
November, in co-operation with the Kurram Moveable Column, against 
the Orakzais and Chamkanni section inhabiting the western side of 
Tirah. A successful reconnaissance of Dwa Toi between 22nd-24th 
November was attributed directly to the skilful handling of the 
rearguard by Brigadier Westmacott and the growing experience of the 
mysteries of piqueting, perimeters and patrols amongst British 
officers, N. C. O. s and men acquired as the result of a hard month's 
practical experience in Maidan. It became apparent as the fighting 
continued that the majority of British arid Indian troops had now 
learnt the appropriate tactics and defensive measures required for 
hill warfare and both the number of casualties and incidents 
declined. Such proficiency had, however, been dearly bought during 
the opening stages of the campaign when the tribesmen had been able 
to run rings around regular British and Indian troops. 136 
The T. E. F. began preparations to withdraw at the end of 
November despite continued Afridi resistance as the weather 
deteriorated and forage for the pack transport animals became scarce. 
Heavy baggage, surplus stores, and excess personnel were sent back to 
Shinawari while the main body prepared to withdraw north-west towards 
Peshawar District. The two divisions cut themselves free from their 
fixed line of communications and began to withdraw in two separate 
columns on the 7th-8th December 1897. The 1st Division moved 
unopposed down the Waran and Mastura Valleys, but the advance of the 
2nd Division via Dwa Toi and the narrow Bara Valley, in constant 
contact with Zakka Khel lashkars, resulted in the heaviest fighting 
of the campaign. The 3rd Brigade came under accurate sustained sniper 
fire immediately after it left camp on 11th November from Afridis 
136 Callwell 1911, op cit, p-105 
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armed with captured Martini-Henry and Lee-Metford rifles, who fired 
with deadly effect upon the vulnerable column of densely packed 
troops, camp followers and transport animals. The leading brigade 
withdrew its route piquets before the 3rd Brigade arrived making it 
necessary to replace these positions under heavy fire from the 
tribesmen, now using rifles firing smokeless ammunition, whom it was 
impossible to locate on the broken hill sides. Colonel R. Warburton 
noted: 'We were at the time under the cover of a high bank, and had 
no conception from where the bullets came or from what quarter the 
Afridi marksman fired his rifle. This is one of the advantages of 
your rifle with the smokeless powder falling into the hands of Jack 
Afridi... You are made to feel the bullet long before you hear the 
crack of the rifle. t 137 The time-consuming piqueting of the heights on 
either side of the route of march, together with driving snow, sleet 
and rain slowed the pace of the withdrawal, which became 
progressively disorganised as the straggling, unarmed and frozen camp 
followers tried in desperation to reach the safety of the perimeter 
camp established at Sher Khel. The heavily encumbered rearguard was 
forced to take shelter overnight in a nearby village unsupported by 
the main body of the brigade which reached camp apparently 
unconcerned about its comrades. During the heavy tribal attacks on 
11th December a total of 41 troops and 100 followers belonging to the 
3rd Brigade were killed or wounded, together with 150 baggage 
animals. 138 A series of desperate attacks on the 2nd Division and 
continual sniping continued for the next few days after the march 
resumed on the 13th December as the Afridis seized their last 
opportunity to oppose the heavily encumbered Indian troops. One 
correspondent graphically described the intense fighting during the 
retreat: 
Road the. ý'e was none, but the river bed. For 
nights i-z was an unbroken rearguard battle, 
troops and transport were the constant mark 
vicious snipers. At times the baggage train 
uncontrollable mass, more or less bogged in 
that skirted the water-way.... Time and time 
four days and 
and the masses of 
and quarry of 
became an 
the rice fields 
again the situation 
137 Col. Sir R. Warburton, Eiqhteen Years on the Khyber, 1879-1898, (London, 1900), 
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became so critical that the Medical Officers marching with the 
wounded became combatants in hand-to-hand struggles. The rear- 
guard and flank-guards were fighting without respite from sun 
up until nightfall. 139 
During the withdrawal piquet and rear guard duties were particularly 
severe as the rearguard of the 2nd Division was constantly harried by 
large numbers of Afridis. Zakka Khel riflemen moving parallel along 
the hills, inflicted severe losses on the Indian troops, camp 
followers and animals from ranges of 1,800 yards using Lee-Metfords 
and ammunition captured during the campaign. The badly disorganised, 
haggard and gaunt troops of the 2nd Division finally joined the 
Peshawar Column at Swaikot on 14th December but had lost during the 
withdrawal a further 33 killed and 133 wounded. 140 
The Tirah campaign dragged on into 1898 while the Peshawar 
Column and the 1st Division carried out further operations against 
hostile Afridi sections inhabiting the Bazar Valley and Khyber Pass, 
while the 2nd Division reorganised within Peshawar District. Despite 
the destruction of houses, villages and large quantities of 
foodstuffs in Tirah, several Afridi sections continued to resist. 
When imperial troops reoccupied posts along the length of the Khyber 
Pass during January, Zakka Khel tribesmen inflicted a steady trickle 
of casualties. 141 Throughout the spring, desultory fighting continued 
while a settlement was negotiated at a series of jirgahs attended by 
Lockhart and tribal maliks. The premature retirement of a piquet 
resulted in heavy casualties amongst the 36th Sikhs and the King's 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry at Shinkamar on 29th January 1898 after 
an order was misunderstood. 142 moreover, while fighting continued 
against the Afridis, the Buner Field Force carried out a short-lived 
campaign against the Bunerwals culminating in an attack on the Tanga 
Pass, following which they rapidly submitted. 143 The threat of a 
renewed campaign in Tirah, however, finally led to a settlement with 
139 James, op cit, p-43 
14 0 Thomsett, op cit, pp. 146-7 
141 Foreign Department Despatch No. 25 of 1898 (Frontier): Punitive operations 
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the remaining hostile sections in April 1898, bringing active 
operations to an end. The T. E. F. was disbanded on 6th April, although 
three brigades remained near the Khyber Pass to ensure the final 
payment of outstanding fines. Despite its victorious end, the 
protracted and indecisive fighting had forcibly demonstrated that the 
Indian Army had much to learn regarding the conduct of military 
operations against a tribal opponent and that several trans-border 
Pathan tribes had acquired their own 'arms of precision, profoundly 
altering the conduct of mountain warfare. 144 
144 Foreign Department Despatch No. 69 of 1898 (Frontier): Settlement with the 
Afridis and the opening of the Khyber Pass, 5th May 1898, L/P&S/7/103 
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Chapter Three 
A Doctrine for Frontier Warfare 
May 1898- August 1914 
The 1897-98 military operations exposed many defects in the 
organisation, equipment and training of the Army in India. During the 
most serious outbreak of resistance to British rule in India since 
the Mutiny, nearly the entire strength of the Field Army was 
mobilised, involving the deployment of over 59,000 regular troops, 
4,000 Imperial Service Troops, and 118 guns in parts of the Pathan 
borderland that were still virtually terra incognita. ' Imperial 
troops lost a total of 470 dead, 1,524 wounded and ten missing in 
action during the extended fighting, losses exceeding those suffered 
during the Second Afghan War. 2 Despite the benefits of modern 
military science: Dum-Dum bullets, machine guns, a rocket battery, 
field and mountain artillery, the large British and Indian force 
encountered serious, albeit unco-ordinated, resistance from the 
trans-border Pathan tribes. At the Malakand and at Chakdara imperial 
troops met tribal opposition similar to that encountered in prior 
campaigns, but the fighting against the Orakzais and Afridis had been 
markedly different. Indeed, it represented a new form of warfare 
never before experienced on the frontiers of India. The Tirah 
Campaign was the most difficult and protracted military operation 
carried out during the rising, despite initial expectations that 
British and Indian troops would only be opposed by lashkars still 
reliant on hand-to-hand combat supported by limited jezail or rifle 
fire. Major-General Sir William Lockhart summed up on 24th February 
1898 the difficulties encountered by imperial troops: 
No campaign on the frontiers of India has been conducted under 
more trying and arduous circumstances than those encountered by 
the Tirah Expeditionary Force. Its operations have been carried 
out in a country destitute of roads, the physical configuration 
of which is such as to present the maximum of difficulty to the 
movement of regular troops. The enemy were for the most part 
1 K. M. Saxena, The Military System of India (1850-1900), (New Dehli, 1974), pp. 268-9 
2 Summary of Measures considered or carried out in the Military Department of the 
Government of India during the Viceroyalty of the Earl of Elqin and Kincardine, 
January 1895 to December 1899 (Calcutta, 1899), p. 55 L/MIL/17/5/1616 
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skilled marksmen, exceptionally active and well armed and 
expert in guerilla tactics. While avoiding serious resistance 
to the advance of the troops they have lost no opportunity of 
harassing both on the march and in bivouac, a system of 
fighting admirably suited to the nature of the country, and 
which has necessarily occasioned us considerable loss, not only 
in action, but also from toil and exposure. 3 
The improvement in the military effectiveness of Afridi lashkars had 
been perhaps the most striking feature of the Tirah campaign. The 
large quantity of rifles captured by imperial troops and the 
surrender of further weapons as part of the political settlement, 
confirmed that in certain parts of tribal territory the size and 
quality of the tribal arsenal had dramatically improved. 4 Fighting in 
Tirah had graphically demonstrated the impact such 'arms of 
precision, had on the nature of frontier warfare, compounding the 
operational problems faced by regular troops operating in the border 
hills. During the withdrawal down the Bara Valley, the Zakka Khels 
Afridis' skilful use of a handful of captured Lee-Metfords indicated 
what might happen in the future if they obtained further supplies of 
magazine rifles firing smokeless ammunit4 Lon. Writing to the Viceroy 
on 16th December 1897, Sir William Lockhart observed: 'When the 
number of long range breech-loaders in the hands of the Afridis shall 
have reached a higher figure than at present, I think that the next 
invasion of Tirah will be perhaps the hardest piece of work that 
troops could ever be called upon to undertake. It is the accuracy of 
the fire, not the number of rifles, that has caused my recent 
losses. '5 However, few experienced officers realised the enormous 
difference tha-- the acquisition of long range breech-loading rifles 
would have on tribal resistance or the numbers of weapons they had 
obtained. An enquiry conducted in the immediate aftermath of the 
fighting determined that the trans-border tribes possessed a total of 
49,000 firearms, including 7,700 breech-loading rifles firing 
government-pattern ammunition. moreover it indicated that the breech- 
3 Adj. -Gen- in India to the Secretary to the Government of India Military 
Department, 24th Feb. 1898, L/MIL/7/15887 
4 Foreign Department Despatch No. 120 of 1899 (Frontier): Returns showing in detail 
the results of the examination of rifled arm surrendered by tribes on the North- 
West Frontier, 22nd June 1898, L/P&S/7/114 
5 Lockhart to Elgin, 16th Dec. 1897, Elqi-n Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 84/71 
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loading Snider, Martini-Henry and Lee-metford rifles in tribal hands 
had been obtained by capture or theft directly from the Indian Army, 
as gifts from the political department, by local manufacture using 
stolen components obtained from condemned government rifles or by 
means of an illicit trade in arms conducted in military cantonments 
throughout India during the 1890S. 6 It was perhaps ironic that the 
majority of weapons used so effectively against the Indian Army 
during 1897-98 had been obtained from the military and political 
authorities in India. With regard to the recent operations, Colonel 
T. H. Holdich observed in 1898: 
They have taught us something of the nature of that new phase 
of trans-border military existence, which is rapidly developing 
on our borders, i. e., the existence of a people brave and 
warlike (as, indeed they have ever been), becoming daily better 
trained and educated in military science, armed with weapons as 
good as ours, and just beginning to feel their way towards 
military combination under experienced leadership. All this 
puts an entirely new complexion on our little frontier fights 
of the future (for we cannot disarm them) ... Nothing stands still 
in the evolution of time, certainly not the military 
development of the Afridi, the Swati, the Bonerwal, the Afghan 
or the Wazir; and it is probable that after recent experiences 
even the Baluchi will understand that a small, well-armed, and 
well-disciplined force is not to be annihilated by a mob, 
however brave. If we have purchased our recent experiences in 
Tirah somewhat dearly, we have at least secured much matter for 
useful reflection. Like the man in the fable who created a 
tiger, we have now to consider what to do with our creation. 7 
It soon became apparent that it would be impossible to control the 
traffic in arms effectively as new sources of supply replaced those 
within India. 8 Writing in September 1900, Lord Curzon observed: 'The 
fact is that, now that the Zulus and Matabeles have been subdued, and 
6 The North-Western Frontier Arms Trade 
Government of India Foreign Department, 
7 Col. Sir T. H. Holdich, 'Tirahl, Geoqra 
8 See Foreign Department Despatch No. 1, 
view to stopping -the illicit trade in a 
Frontier, 29th Aug. 1901, L/P&S/7/136 
Conunittee to the Secretary to the 
18th April 1899, L/P&S/7/114 
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that the Dervishes have been defeated in the Soudan, there are no 
first class fanatics left anywhere in the world except on the Indian 
frontier, and it is these individuals unfortunately who by theft, 
smuggling, and otherwise, are gradually acquiring an armament not 
greatly inferior to our own. ' 9 
The Tirah Campaign had been fiercely criticised by the press in 
India and England surprised by the difficulties encountered by 
imperial troops and the heavy losses which were sustained. 10 one 
anonymous author summed up popular opinion: 'Tirah is but the history 
of a failure, redeemed by the gallant pluck and endurance of the 
fighting ranks and their officers. "' News of relatively minor 
tactical defeats was magnified out of all proportion by the popular 
press into major disasters for British arms and invidious comparisons 
were made between the Khartoum and Tirah campaigns, indicating that 
few observers appreciated the difficulties inherent in mountain 
warfare. 12 British and Indian regiments in Tirah had lost 87 dead and 
853 wounded, representing the heaviest casualties suffered in the 
various operations conducted during 1897-98.13 Such heavy casualties 
focused attention on the need for appropriate training and knowledge 
of hill warfare. Captain F. M. Edwardes observed: 
on the whole the losses which have been incurred are only the 
natural result of operations undertaken by an army, many units 
of which had had no previous experience of frontier warfare, 
and no corps of which had had experience of an exactly similar 
mode of warfare before. You can't make war without suffering 
losses. The fact is the British public, and the army also, have 
got so accustomed to the small and comparatively bloodless 
campaigns on the Indian frontiers that when a campaign of 
greater magnitude takes place, and we are pitted against foes 
who are above the average of frontier tribesmen, both in 
9 Curzon to Hamilton, 4th Sept. 1901, Curzon Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 111/160 
10 Hamilton to Elqin, 21st Jan. 1897 and 11th Feb. Elqin Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 84/16, 
Elgin to Brackenb ury, 23rd Jan. 1898, ElcTin Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 84/33a and Atteridge, 
op cit, p. 533, 
11 'Guerilla', 'The North-West Frontier', Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, 8, 
15, (1899), pp. 42-3 
12 L. Oppenheim, 'The Tirah and Khartoum Expeditions', Nineteenth Century, 44,262, 
(1898), pp. 1041-47 and James, op cit, p. vil 
13 Government General Order publishing numerical and amended nominal returns of 
killed, wounded, and missing in the Tirah Expeditionary Force from the 12th 
October 1897 to the 6th April 1898,3rd June 1898, L/MIL/3/1082 
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cuteness and arms, we find the game of war is not so easy as we 
have been accustomed to expect. 
14 
The numerous 'petty mishaps' that had occurred in Maidan and 
elsewhere were primarily attributable to inexperience or a lack of 
more generally diffused knowledge and practice of the requirements of 
frontier warfare. As had been apparent during the Second Afghan War, 
apart from those British and Indian troops serving in mountain 
batteries, few regular units had had any specific training in 
mountain warfare unless they had fought in campaigns conducted during 
the 1890s. As a direct result of leaving frontier warfare as the sole 
prerogative of the P. F. F. during the late nineteenth century, 
appropriate training for military operations on the North-West 
Frontier had been neglected by the rest of the Army in India. Despite 
being officially part of the Bengal Army since 1886, the P. F. F. was 
still not prepared to share its knowledge with the regiments that had 
not served the same hard apprenticeship in the border hills. As 
Charles Callwell later observed: 
Mountain warfare was their business, and not that of the army 
of the "plains", to which they scarcely belonged. What wonder 
of the lessons learnt in the rough school of the Khyber Hills 
found no place in the training manuals, but were jealously 
guarded as trade secrets in the standing orders of the 
regiments and batteries? 15 
The sheer scale of the tribal risings, however, meant that the P. F. F. 
had been incapable of carrying out all the punitive operations, 
leading to the mobilisation of large numbers of regulars whose 
training had been predicated solely on the basis of conventional 
European warfare. 16 Despite the Standing Orders issued by the H. Q. of 
the T. E. F. at the beginning of the campaign and the rudimentary 
instruction while at Shinwari, casualties had been unnecessarily 
heavy as inexperienced troops violated the principles or ignored the 
elementary minor tactics required in tribal territory and got into 
14 Capt. F. M. Edwardes, 'Recent Frontier Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 27,132, (1898), p. 335 
15 Callwell and Headlam, op cit, p. 266 
16 'The North-West Frontier: By a Frontier Political Officer', I. A. Q. R., 5,9, 
(1898), pp-5-6 
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difficulties. Writing in March 1898, the Chief of Staff of the 
T. E. F., Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson, observed: 'In mountain 
warfare much has to be left to the judgement & capacity of officers 
commanding units or detachments, however small; and a petty mistake, 
such as the premature withdrawal of a piquet by the officer in charge 
of it, may produce the most serious results. In the present campaign 
the regimental officers have behaved as gallantly as was to be 
expected, but many of them were new to the game and did foolish 
things until they learnt wisdom by Experience. ' 17 Whilst Gurkha, 
Pathan and Sikh troops recruited from hill districts were familiar 
with fighting in the mountains, it was apparent that British troops 
and Indian regiments recruited from the plains were out of place in 
the hills. 18 An absence of training was compounded by the fact that 
few British service officers were willing to take advice from 
experienced soldiers before the campaign began. Accordingly they 
suffered heavily at tribal hands before they learnt the principles 
and minor tactics of hill warfare established by P. F. F. regiments. 
Many senior officers who had fought in Tirah acknowledged that if 
they had had prior knowledge and training in mountain warfare at the 
beginning of the campaign many 'regrettable incidents' and casualties 
could have been avoided. 19 Sir George White, the outgoing Commander- 
in-Chief in India, commented on the lack of appropriate training for 
local Indian requirements in his farewell speech to the Indian Army 
on 21st March 1898: 
Although brilliant exceptions exist, the bulk of our infantry 
is insufficiently trained in the theory and practice of hill- 
warfare, the class of service for which the most constant and 
the most severe calls are made on our Army. It is true that at 
very many stations no ground exists where this can be 
practically taught, but there are others, especially those in 
the hills, where full opportunity for such training is 
afforded. In those latter cantonments the troops should be 
worked more consistently and for longer hours over the most 
difficult ground available, and practised in all the 
requirements and incidents in hill warfare, so that the 
17 Nicholson to Spenser Wilkinson, 2nd March 1898, Spenser Wilkinson Mss, M. O. D. 45 
18 Atteridge, op cit, pp. 533-4 
19 Maconchy, op cit, Vol. I p. 222 N. A. M. 7908-62-1 
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officers and men may not only be acquainted with the theory of 
hill-fighting, but may also be at all times kept physically fit 
for it by constant practice. 20 
Such views were shared by many British officers that had served in 
the recent operations. Indeed, the Tirah Campaign stimulated a debate 
on the tactics of hill warfare in India and a dramatic re-evaluation 
of British methods in the aftermath of the fighting. 
The United Service Institute of India at Simla was at the 
forefront of the professional debate during 1898 regarding the 
perceived importance of appropriate training in frontier warfare. At 
a lecture on the lessons of the campaign attended by the Viceroy, the 
acting Commander-in-Chief in India and other senior members of the 
Government of India, Colonel H. D. Hutchinson, the Director of 
Military Training in India, called upon the institution to aid in 
collating the valuable experience gained during the 1897-98 
operations in its annual essay competition, which could be 
incorporated as an appendix to a future Drill Book or in a manual 
devoted to hill warfare. 21 Such views were supported by the Military 
Member of Council, who urged the introduction of practical camps of 
exercise and training for both staff and men in the tactics developed 
by the P. F. F.. Major-General Sir E. Collen observed: 'If we are to 
really profit by the experience we have had, the great thing is to 
collect all the evidence we can, to sift it, and to apply the lessons 
we learn, so that those who run may read. f 22 The emphasis on training 
in the tactics of the Drill Book to the complete detriment of those 
required for mountain warfare was roundly condemned during the 
ensuing discussion. Major-General G. de C. Morton, the Adjutant- 
General in India, commented: 
It has always been a surprise to me that the authors of our 
drill-book have not devoted more attention and space to the 
tactical formations suitable to warfare with an uncivilised 
enemy. I-: will be within recollection of my military hearers 
that it was not until the introduction of the 1896 drill-book 
20 Maj. A. C. Yate, 'North-West Frontier Warfare', J. R. U. S. I., 42,248, (1898), 
pp. 1191-2 
21 Col. H. D. Hutchinson, 'The Story of Tirah and the Lessons of the Campaign', 
J. U. S. I. I., 27,132, (1898), p. 243 
22 Collen, coments on Ibid, pp. 255-6 
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that what is there termed 'Savage Warfare, is even alluded to, 
and even then only one page is devoted to it; now as we have in 
the last forty-two years, since the Crimean War, been engaged 
with no civilised enemy, but on the other hand have been 
engaged in constant conflict with uncivilised tribes in New 
Zealand, Abyssinia, in the Sudan, the Cape, India and 
elsewhere, it seems strange that what is our normal condition 
has received so little consideration at the hands of those 
responsible for our military training, for, though we are told 
on page 128 of the drill-book that formations are to be adopted 
with reference to the nature of the enemy and the manner in 
which he is armed, it follows that those formations cannot be 
carried out unless troops are trained in them in times of 
peace, and that is where I think the lecturer has made a point 
and called attention to a defect in our training. 23 
The J. U. S. I. I. provided the main forum for discussion regarding 
appropriate tactics and training for mountain warfare against the 
trans-border Pathan tribes. A series of articles were published 
written by British officers who sought to discern further lessons 
from the campaigns and to examine specific training required by 
British and Indian troops. These ranged from specific tactical 
proposals to detailed accounts of the recent operations intended to 
aid fellow officers. 24 An article written by Colonel H. A Pollock, 
based on twenty years of experience serving in the P. F. F. with the 
lst Sikh Infantry, was published later the same year by the 
Institution as a pamphlet and sold at a price of two annas to British 
officers. 25 The U. S. I. I. quickly responded to the Director of 
Military Education's request and set the title of its 1898-99 
influential prize-essay competition as 'The Tactical Principles and 
Details Best Suited to Warfare on the Frontiers of India. ' It 
attracted a total of eleven entries from officers who had served 
during the 1897-98 campaigns and who were intimately acquainted with 
modern frontier warfare. Four essays were published between 1899-1900 
23 Morton, conTnents on Ibid, pp. 256-7 
24 Lt. -Col. H. A. Pollock, 'Notes on Hill Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 27,131, (1898), 
pp. 131-47, R. C., 'Proposal for Infantry Attack in Mountain Warfare,, J. U. S. I. I., 
27,132, (1898), pp. 479-80, and H. T. Kenny, 'A German Account of the North-West 
Frontier Campaign', J. U. S. I. I., 27,132, (1898), pp-481-98 
25 Lt. -Col. H. A. Pollock, Notes on Hill Warfare, (Simla, 1898) 
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providing a detailed survey of the conduct of warfare along the 
extensive frontiers of British India. These contained detailed 
information regarding tribal territory, its inhabitants and the 
conduct of operations for all three arms of service against tribesmen 
armed with modern rifles. Moreover, they also provided information 
regarding military operations in the jungles and bush of the North- 
Eastern Frontier against opponents very different from the trans- 
border Pathans. 26 
The service press was complemented by a series of books written 
by war correspondents, many of whom were serving officers, who had 
accompanied the various punitive expeditions and sought to 
extrapolate detailed lessons from the conduct of the campaign. 27 
Captain L. J. Shadwell, former correspondent of the Pioneer and London 
Daily News, made direct comparisons between European and frontier 
warfare in a detailed didactic account of the Tirah Campaign written 
aboard ship while returning to England. 28 The clamour for a source of 
practical guidance prompted the publication of several unofficial 
text books on r-he conduct of military operations on the frontier, 
which formed a valuable stop-gap for imperial troops until the 
military authorities in India could officially respond. Those books 
and pamphlets published in England and India during 1898-99 took 
widely differing approaches ranging from detailed descriptions of 
tactics required across the border to more ambitious attempts to 
discern wider principles governing the conduct of 'savage warfare, 
throughout the British Empire. Captain G. J. Younghusband's Indian 
Frontier Warfare, written before the 1897-98 campaigns, was largely 
based on experience gained between the Second Afghan War and Chitral 
Campaign. Though of considerable interest with regard to general 
information regarding the conduct of military operations along 
India's extensive frontiers, it did not discuss the implications of 
, arms of precision, on hill warfare in any depth. The preface, 
26 Col. J. P. C. Neville, 'The Tactical Principles and Details Best Suited to Warfare 
on the Frontiers of India', J. U. S. I. I., 28,136, (1899), pp. 191-223, Lt. -Col. H. H. 
Hart, 'The Tactical principles and Details Best Suited to Warfare on the Frontiers 
of India', J. U. S. I. I., 28,136, (1899), pp. 244-72, Capt. E. Peach, 'The Tactical 
principles and Details Best Suited to Warfare on the Frontiers of India,, 
J. U. S. I. I., 28,137, (1899), pp. 329-60, and Lt. -Col. J. G. Ramsey, 'The Tactical 
principles and Details Best Suited to Warfare on the Frontiers of India', 
J. U. S. I. I., 29,138, (1900), pp-85-110 
27 Lt. W. L. Churchill, Story of the Malakand Field Force. An Epitome of Frontier 
Warfare, (London, 1898), pp. 283-301 and Hutchinson, op cit, pp. 224-46 
28 Shadwell, op cit, pp. 88-107 
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written by the Editor of the wolseley series and a leading 'crammer', 
Captain W. H. James, reflected contemporary wisdom regarding colonial 
warfare prior to the 1897-98 campaigns: 'Strategy is the same, 
whether used against Arabs or Frenchmen. The tactics differ as the 
weapons of the enemy differ. But the soldiers trained to meet the 
highest class of opponents are, ipso facto better qualified to deal 
with the inferior. '29 However, the majority of the books and 
pamphlets published in India were more up-to-date, reflecting an 
important awareness of the new conditions of frontier warfare. In the 
preface to a small manual on hill warfare published at Allahabad in 
1898, Brigadier-General C. E. Egerton noted that there was little new 
in his guidelines: 
It is not claimed that these notes contain anything new or 
original, they merely comprise in a collected form the tactics 
which experience of others has found it best to adopt in the 
various situations which arise in the course of frontier 
expeditions, and are contained in some form or other of the 
Standing Orders of the Regiments of the Frontier Force, the 
conditions of service in which embrace wide opportunities for 
the study of this special subject. It is hoped that by placing 
the results of this experience in a collected form, some of the 
mistakes which so commonly occur in regiments which have no 
previous experience in hill warfare may be obviated. 30 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Martin's small pamphlet, entitled 'Mountain 
and Savage Warfare,, followed a similar vein, containing little more 
than a brief resume of skirmishing, piqueting and the other minor 
tactics that had been so successfully employed by the 5th Gurkha 
Rifles during repeated punitive expeditions on the Frontier during 
the nineteenth century. 31 However, several of f icers were more 
ambitious and went further in their analysis of the recent 
operations. In a larger volume, Captain E. A. Peach postulated the 
existence of distinct principles underlying the conduct of 'savage' 
warfare throughout the British Empire and suggested that they were 
29 Capt. and Brevet Maj. G. J. Younghusband, Indian Frontier Warfare, (London, 1898) 
30 Brig. -Gen. C. E. Egerton, Hill Warfare on the North West Frontier of India, 
(Allahabad, 1899), p-1 
31 Lt. -Col. A. R. Martin, Mountain and Savage Warfare, (Allahabad, 1898), 2nd ed. 1899 
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best illustrated in hill warfare, which he regarded as the most 
difficult of all such operations. He divided the subject into 
'savages' armed without arms of precision and those armed with 
rifles. Regarding the latter he noted: 'In this group we have 
conditions approaching more closely to those of warfare against 
regular troops. And they are conditions that we may expect to meet 
more and more in the future. For even savages march with the times, 
and we have had experience lately of how soon they learn to 
appreciate the power of long range and accurate weapons. '32 A 
comparative approach to the subject was taken by Major E. H. Rodwell, 
who discussed both 'civilised, and 'savage' warfare in a collection 
of essays that made wide use of historical examples from military 
operations on the frontier. 33 The dearth of general information 
available to British units regarding the frontier and its inhabitants 
was particularly noticeable, however, during the autumn of 1897. 
Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Plowden, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd 
Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry, wrote a short guide for 
regiments new to the border containing general information and 
guidance regarding the appropriate tactics required against the 
trans-border Pathan tribes and operations in tribal territory. It 
included sections on camps, transport, marches, convoys, advanced 
guards, rear guards, attacks, piquets, retirements and other details 
regarding the conduct of mountain warfare. 34 
The books, pamphlets, lectures and essays written by serving 
British officers after the Tirah Campaign shared common themes and 
ideas ranging from criticism of the Drill Book to detailed 
prescriptions of tactics and training required for 'savage, warfare. 
The 1896 Drill Book was condemned by the majority of authors with 
regard to its emphasis on frontal attacks, volley firing, quarter- 
columns and apparent disdain for cover as these were irrelevant to 
Indian troops fighting in tribal territory. The tactics of 
conventional European warfare and the formations recommended for 
dsavage, warfare against opponents armed with close-quarter weapons 
in open terrain were condemned as clearly inappropriate for 
operations on -ýýhe Indian frontier. Although the Drill Book did allow 
considerable latitude in terms of the deployment of troops and 
32 Maj. E. Peach, Handbook of Tactics for Savage Warfare, (Allahabad, 1898). 2nd ed. 
33 Maj. E. H. Rodwell, Four Banqalore Lectures, (Lahore, 1899) 
34 Lt. -Col. F. H. I)lowden, The Battalion on the Frontier, (Lahore, 1899) 
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stressed general principles which were applicable to all forms of 
war, commentators agreed it contained insufficient guidance in the 
special military conditions encountered by Indian troops in 
mountainous terrain. All agreed that some form of special guidance 
was required for imperial troops in the principles and minor tactics 
of hill warfare, although, whether that guidance should appear as an 
integral part of a new edition Infantry Drill or as an Indian 
supplement remained a subject of discussion. The vast majority of the 
tactical proposals appearing in the military press were classic re- 
statements of the principles known and practised on the frontier by 
the P. F. F. since 1849, although there was some discussion on various 
minor tactics on the frontier. The intricacies of piqueting, 
perimeters and patrols had to be disseminated amongst the regiments 
of the regular British and Indian armies during peace time. Training 
was deemed of special importance since operations in tribal territory 
threw such responsibility on junior officers and N. C. O. s. Indeed, a 
faulty piquet position, a badly placed sangar, or the clumsy handling 
of a small body of troops in retirement by a junior officer or N. C. O. 
during the 1897-98 operations had often been the cause of unnecessary 
and heavy loss of life. The value of the tactical and operational 
lessons derived from prior campaigns, known to the officers and men 
of experienced frontier regiments, was widely acknowledged. Regular 
troops had, for example, to be taught that attacks had to be mounted 
along the crests of converging spurs rather than in ravines where 
they would themselves be vulnerable to attack. In particular, 
guidance was required in respect of the tactics developed to ensure 
the all-round security of a column on the march or while halted when 
operating in tribal territory. The conduct of a withdrawal in contact 
with hostile tribesmen obviously also merited special attention 
following the repeated Afridi successes in Tirah Maidan. Major A. C. 
Yate summed up the opinion of many officers when he launched a 
scathing attack on the failure of the military authorities to provide 
an official training manual for either 'savage' warfare in general or 
Indian frontier warfare in particular. Referring directly to the 
operations carried out by the T. E. F. he observed that: 
Our best frontier officers and soldiers found themselves foiled 
and at times worsted by these unorganised guerrillas. Surely 
the inference to be drawn from this is that in the future Her 
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Majesty'S Officers and soldiers must be systematically educated 
to meet these foes. It is not a matter to be left in the hands 
of irresponsible and unofficial essayists... A manual of 
instruction for uncivilised warfare is required. Her Majesty's 
troops, and more especially those stationed in India and in our 
colonial possessions should be instructed and practiced, not 
only in --he exercises and manoeuvres prescribed for modern 
European warfare, but also in the irregular methods of fighting 
which must be adopted against uncivilised races. 35 
The acquisition of 'arms of precision, and large quantities of 
ammunition by the trans-border Pathans necessitated important 
modifications to the principles of hill warfare developed by the 
P. F. F. during the nineteenth century. When jezails had formed the 
main firearm used by the Pathans, tribesmen had had to approach 
Indian columns to relatively close proximity and, each time they 
fired, their position had been marked by a puff of black powder 
smoke. Now, when tribesmen used rifles firing smokeless ammunition, 
their positions were masked, making it difficult to mount outflanking 
or direct attacks until they could be located. Piquets, responsible 
for the protection of columns on the move and in encampments at 
night, now had to be positioned over 1,500 yards from the main body 
in order to ensure their protection from long range Martini-Henry and 
Lee-Metford rifle fire. During the Tirah Campaign, however, it had 
also been found possible to reduce the strength of piquets from a 
company to 10-12 men, as tribesmen armed with modern rifles appeared 
unwilling to mount determined hand-to-hand attacks en masse. A single 
determined marksman could now impede the passage of an entire column 
through tribal territory and inflict significant casualties on both 
the troops and the vulnerable transport animals on which they 
depended. The vulnerability of perimeter camps to long-range sniping 
had been graphically demonstrated during the Tirah campaign, but 
continued attacks by tribal swordsmen indicated that they could not 
be abandoned, forcing troops to attempt to augment the defences 
surrounding and within the encampments to shield themselves from 
rifle fire. 
35 Yate, op cit, p. 1191 
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The attack at Dargai had graphically illustrated what could be 
expected when --oo closely grouped tactical formations were opposed by 
resolute tribesmen armed with modern rifles. open formations proved 
indispensable throughout the fighting in Tirah. The necessity of 
greater tactical dispersion on the battlefield and increasing 
initiative, self reliance, skill and intelligence on the part of the 
troops in the field during attacks and retirements in the face of a 
tribal opponent, was evident. When opposed by some of the finest 
light infantry in the world, British troops had to re-discover light 
infantry skills that had largely been forgotten by regular troops. 
The importance of skirmishing on the mountain sides by well trained 
marksmen, making careful use of the ground for cover and concealment, 
when fighting Pathan lashkars was recognised. Unfortunately, the 
section on skirmishing had been removed from the training manuals 
since the 1892 edition of the Drill Book. Individual and small unit 
training therefore became the key to tactics in hill warfare as 
soldiers moved out of the direct command of their officers. In a 
general engagement, fire and manoeuvre was vital as the widely 
extended troops worked their way up the hill sides covered by their 
fellow infantr, y and the firepower of the mountain artillery. The 
efficacy of a flanking movement combined with a frontal assault 
against 'savage' opponents was reiterated again and again in order to 
exploit the lack of discipline and cohesion amongst Pathan lashkars. 
The range of modern rifles meant flanking attacks had to be mounted 
over wider frontages than before, becoming increasingly difficult and 
time consuming. Scouts, or skirmishers, would be deployed before the 
advancing main body, although close order formations and cold steel 
still remained essential in the final stages of an attack when it was 
possible tribal swordsmen might counter-attack. In addition, modern 
rifles compounded the difficulties encountered during withdrawals in 
contact with hostile tribesmen, increasing the number of casualties 
and making it difficult to break contact with the enemy. 36 
The system of musketry training used by British and Indian 
troops was heavily criticised after its ]-imitations had been exposed 
during the fighting, when Afridi tribesmen had demonstrated their 
superior marksmanship. Captain A. A. Campbell later observed: 'Trained 
as our soldiers were to fire volleys exclusively, they proved that 
36 Peach 1899, op cit, p-344 
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the excellence of their fire discipline and the deficiency in the 
system of their education, by omitting to load and fire except by 
word of command in a country and against an enemy and on occasions, 
when the volley was precisely not the description of fire to 
employ. f 37 The collective system of volley firing and musketry was 
condemned in light of its obvious limitations against dispersed 
tribal skirmishers who presented fleeting targets to the infantry, 
and it became evident that Indian troops had to develop new systems 
of musketry training. Volley firing had to be replaced by individual 
marksmanship for which British and troops armies were not trained. 
The Tirah campaign led to the introduction of highly realistic live- 
firing exercises over broken, hilly terrain which placed emphasis on 
long range fire, snap-shooting and firing at moving targets. As one 
commentator observed: 'The first and main point to be attended to in 
the training of troops for frontier warfare is musketry instruction. 
To meet the frontier tribes on their own ground and in accordance 
with their methods of fighting, we require an army of skilled 
marksmen. r38 
The Gurkha Scouts, composed of specially selected men, trained 
and led by Lieutenant C. G. Bruce, had proved so successful during the 
fighting in Tirah that the formation of permanent specialist light 
infantry units in India organised, trained and equipped solely for 
hill warfare was widely discussed. 39 The results achieved by the 
Scouts in Tirah, 120 men and three officers, had been far out of 
proportion to the size of the force and prompted General Sir William 
Lockhart to declare: 'During the present expedition the scouts drawn 
from the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas have proved specially valuable. Being 
trained mountalneers and accustomed to guerrilla warfare, they were 
able to climb the most precipitous hills, lie in ambush at night, and 
surpass the tr-Lbesmen in their own tactics. r40 An additional 
battalion of Scouts had been requested as reinforcements during the 
campaign and, in January 1898, Captain Lucas had been despatched to 
Abbottabad to select 500 men from the 5th Gurkhas, who were specially 
37 Capt. A. A. Campbell, 'The Limitations of Infantry Fire Control and Discipline', 
J. U. S. I. I., 330,143, (1901), p. 120 
38 Neville, op cit., pp. 219-20 
39 Finance and Commerce Department Despatch No. 275 of 1898: Proposal that 
Lieutenant the Hon'ble C. G. Bruce, Adjutant, 1-5th Gurkhas, should be granted 
compensation for the loss of half staff pay as Adjutant, while employed with the 
Gurkha scouts, Tirah Expeditionary Force, 8th Sept. 1898, L/MIL/7/15916 
40 Gen. Sir W. S. Lockhart to the Adj. -Gen. in India, 26th Jan. 1898, L/MIL/7/15887 
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armed with Lee--Metford rifles . 
41 The term scout, was essentially 
inaccurate, however, since these troops had acted as skirmishers, 
pursuing and engaging the tribesmen on their own terms, and had 
ignored conventional scouting duties. Debate within the Indian Army 
focused on the organisation best suited for scouts in the future: 
complete battalions, light companies, or individual men within each 
unit. The inherent difficulties involved in raising and maintaining 
British scout battalions were rapidly appreciated because of short 
service, the interchange of units between stations throughout the 
Empire and the necessity of having to rotate units between the plains 
42 and the hills because of the climate. Similar problems were not so 
apparent for Gurkha or Indian troops who were normally stationed in 
India throughout their service. The importance of trained scouts, 
within each battalion, in hill warfare became widely recognised, but 
their training remained a bone of contention, especially in light of 
43 the later experiences during the Second Boer war. 
The lessons regarding weapons and equipment carried by the 
infantry were also carefully considered after the Tirah campaign. The 
large scale of heavy personal equipment carried by individual regular 
soldiers - boots, ammunition, great coats and rations - attracted 
considerable criticism and prompted attempts to reduce the amount 
carried by each man in the field, although it was apparent that 
regulars would never be able to match the mobility of lightly clothed 
tribesmen carrying nothing but a rifle, a few cartridges and food. 
During the campaign the effectiveness of Lee-Metford rifles, now 
firing Dum-Dum pattern expanding ammunition had been confirmed. 
However, captured ammunition was used with equally deadly effect 
against imperial troops, demonstrating the shattering effects it had 
on a human body. 41 An attempt to prohibit its use, however, following 
the 1899 Hague Conference which had banned its used in European 
warfare, prompted the military authorities in India to mount a 
41 Lockhart to White, 16th Nov. 1897, White Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 108/38, and Deputy 
Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department to the Adj. -Gen. in 
India, 7th Feb. 1898, L/MIL/7/15886 
42 Anon., 'The Gurkha Scouts', Blackwood's, 165,502, (1899), pp. 802-15, Peach 1899, 
op cit., pp. 332-4, and Ramsey, op cit, p. 109 
43 Capt. R. G. Burton, 'Shikar as Training for Scouts', 28,134, J. U. S. I. I., (1899), 
pp. 88-90 and. R. D. Alexander, 'A System of Training Scouts for Hill Warfare', 
i. u. S. I. I., 33,157, (1904), pp. 397-406 
44 Principal Medical Officer, Army Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the 
Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India, 10th March 1898, 
L/MIL/7/12026 
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vigorous defence, arguing that such ammunition was essential against 
'fanatical savages' who did not recognise the laws of war and 
mutilated Anglo-Indian casualties. 45 A quantity of Mk II Indian 
Pattern ammunition was manufactured in India and retained 
specifically for use in savage warfare' on the North-West Frontier, 
although in 1902, after the War Office had decided to discontinue its 
use, it was agreed that such ammunition should not be issued to 
troops on active service. 46 Ten million rounds of 'unmade up, 
ammunition was, however, later manufactured and kept in reserve in 
Indian arsenals, following requests in 1903 for Dum-Dum. ammunition 
for use in Somaliland. 47 
The Maxim machine guns, which equipped British regiments and 
various posts, had once again failed to have any significant impact 
on the fighting, due to their heavy weight, unsuitable carriages and 
the dispersed fighting formations employed by lashkars. They had, 
however, proved useful on a few occasions. At Chakdara on 2nd August 
1897, for example, they had inflicted heavy casualties on the 
tribesmen attacking the fort. 48 Additionally, when employed en masse 
during deliberate attacks, such as at Landakai and the Bedmanai Pass 
during the Mohmand expedition, they proved effective, but more 
generally they were restricted to the defence of fixed posts and 
perimeter camps. 
The mountain artillery provided invaluable close support to the 
infantry throughout the fighting and were used, in particular, to 
suppress the fire of tribal riflemen. However, the short range of the 
guns employed, less than 500 yards, made them vulnerable to tribal 
riflemen during withdrawals, when most of the fighting took place. 
45 Military Department Despatch No. 90 of 1900: Patterns of bullet for . 303, inch 
arm to be manufactured in future, 28th June 1900, Military Department Despatch 
No. 149 of 1900: Reserves of ammunition to be maintained in India. Proportion of 
bullets of Indian pattern, 11th Oct. 1900, Military Department Despatch No. 81 of 
1901: Retention in regimental charge of ammunition with Mk II, I. P bullets at 
certain stations near the North-West Frontier of India, 13th June 1901 
L/MIL/7/12030 and Officiating Adj. -General in India to Secretary to Government of 
India, Military Department, 2nd March 1901, L/MIL/3/157 
46 Military Despatch No. 96 to Governor-General of India in Council, 16th Aug. 
1901, Military Despatch No. 175 to Governor General of India in Council, 12th Dec. 
1902 and Maj. F. W. Cardew, Deputy Secretary to Government of India Military Dept. 
to Adj. -Gen. in India, 5th Aug. 1902 L/MIL/7/12030 
47 Military Department Despatch No. 152 of 1903: Manufacture and maintenance of a 
reserve of ten million . 303" mark II, I. P. bullets, 20th Aug. 1903 and Military 
Despatch No. 122 -to Governor-General of India in Council, 2nd Oct. 1903 
L/MIL/7/12030 
48 Capt. M. E. Cart-hew Yorstoun, 'Machine Guns', J. U. S. I. I., 27,131, (1898), pp. 208- 
19, and Lt. H. P. de la Bere, 'With Machine Guns in Tirah, , U. S. M., 19, (1899-1900), 
pp. 165-72 
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The 2.75 inch mountain artillery gun, had been heavily criticised 
following the Tirah Campaign due to its inability to suppress Pathan 
riflemen during the attack at Dargai on 20th October 1897, despite 
having fired over 1,300 rounds during the engagement. The flat 
trajectory and the light weight of its shells made them ineffective 
against sangars or dispersed tribesmen taking advantage of rocks, 
boulders and crevices for cover. 49 At the Sampagha and Arhanga 
passes, batteries were used for the first time en masse, but it was 
doubtful whether they had much effect on the scattered defenders. 
Most mountain artillery batteries had been broken down into small 
sections, usually of two guns, which were parcelled out to the 
foraging and reconnaissance parties operating in Tirah. An increase 
in the number of batteries in India was requested following the 
fighting since it was apparent that they had represented the only 
distinct technological advantage enjoyed by Indian troops operating 
in tribal territory. The Government of India observed in February 
1898: 
The part played by mountain batteries in operations against 
frontier tribes is one of great and increasing importance. we 
have found that these tribes can, and do, obtain breech-loading 
rifles of modern type which they know well how to use, and 
though we may hope to check the passage of arms across the 
frontier, it is not likely we shall be able to suppress it 
altogether, or prevent the tribesmen in future from obtaining 
arms in some manner or other. They have, however, no artillery, 
and cannot become possessed of it, and increase in the number 
of mountain guns will therefore be of distinct value in the 
maintenance of our position on the frontier. 50 
The following year these same arguments were re-emphasised when a 
further battery was added to the Indian establishment. 51 
49 Capt. G. F. Mactlunn, 'The Artillery at Dargai', Proc. R. A. I., 25, (1898), pp. 173- 
78 
50 Military Department Despatch No. 31 of 1898: Addition of another Battery of 
Native Mountain Artillery to the Establishment of the Army in India, 24th Feb. 
1898 and Maj. -Gen. G. de C. Morton, Adj. -Gen. in India, to the Secretary to the 
Government of India, Military Department, 3rd Jan. 1898, L/MIL/7/10133 
51 Military Department Despatch No. 194 of 1899: Improvements in the organisation 
of the horse, field, and mountain, batteries on India, 2nd Nov. 1899, 
L/MIL/7/10139 
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The mountain artillery had been supplemented by an improvised 
Hale's rocket battery was also hurriedly formed at the request of Sir 
William Lockhaýft and was also used at Dargai and Kharappa, but its 
rockets had more of a moral than material impact and considerable 
difficulty was found firing them accurately at long ranges. 
Conventional wheeled artillery batteries were also used against the 
tribes wherever possible. At the beginning of the campaign four guns 
of the 51st Field Battery had helped to repel the attack at Shabkadr, 
and other batteries were employed inside the administrative border. 
The 10th Field Battery penetrated deep into the border hills during 
the Malakand campaign where its heavy guns were used with great 
effect against the tribesmen unaccustomed either to their range or 
the power of their shells. An improvised elephant battery equipped 
with 121b B. L. guns was also formed at Peshawar in case the T. E. F. 
required heavy fire support in areas inaccessible to wheeled 
artillery, although this was never deployed. 52 
The 1897-98 operations had demonstrated once again the fact 
that, except in the wide Kurram, Panjkora and Swat valleys, cavalry 
had a limited role in hill warfare due the mountainous terrain. 
During the fighting at Chakdara and the Malakand large numbers of 
tribesmen were caught in the open by Indian cavalry on several 
occasions and the continued psychological value of mounted shock 
action against men unaccustomed to horses had been demonstrated. The 
value of the arme blanche during these engagements had been 
reaffirmed, although the cavalry proved increasingly vulnerable to 
long-range rifle fire. As a result dismounted fire action began to 
replace traditional cavalry tactics in the hills, although cavalry 
was used to maintain the security of the line of march in British and 
Indian columns, for liaison duties, and on occasion, mounted charges. 
The weakness of dismounted cavalry armed with carbines against 
tribesmen equipped with rifles, however, had been displayed during 
the operations in Bajaur in the Watelai Valley when tribal riflemen 
had engaged them from long range without reply. During the fighting 
in the Kurram. Valley, the Central India Horse and 6th Bengal Cavalry 
fought on foot during the defence of Sadde camp, and it had once 
52 Capt. G. F. MacMunn, 'The Artillery in the Indian Campaigns of 1897-81, Proc. 
R. A. I. , 26, (1899), pp. 
229-42, Lt. C. B. Ballard, 'The Diary of the 10th Field 
Battery R. A., with the Malakand Field Force', Proc. R. A. I., 25, (1898), pp. 419-38 
and Lt. E. F. Delaforce, 'Experience of the 10th F--i. eld Battery R. A. in the Malakand 
and Bunerwal Expeditions', Proc. R. A. I., 26, (1899), pp. 561-8 
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again become apparent that a better weapon than the short Martini 
Henry carbine was required against opponents armed with rifles. A 
single squadron accompanied the T. E. F. when it advanced into Maidan, 
which was soon relegated to the lines of communication as the terrain 
and the skirmishing tactics used by the Afridis limited the 
opportunities when it could be used with effect. 53 
The lessons learnt in the Mamund Valley and Tirah Maidan were 
also discussed in the military press in England, with regard to the 
provision of appropriate training and also in terms of the experience 
gained from fighting against opponents armed with small-bore, long- 
range magazine rifles firing smokeless ammunition. Indeed, the Tirah 
campaign provided a valuable first source of information regarding 
the impact of the 'second firepower revolution, on the conduct of 
warfare in general, and was eagerly studied by military theorists in 
England. In a lecture at the R. U. S. I. in October 1898, Major A. C. 
Yate launched a scathing attack on the failure of the military 
authorities to provide any instruction in North-West Frontier warfare 
or 'savage warfare' in general. 54 After discussing at length the 
changed nature of frontier warfare and the merits of the various 
books and pamphlets published since 1898 in India and England, he 
observed: 
An officer has only two means of acquiring experience in 
frontier warfare, viz, by personal active service, and by 
study... No manual of instruction in this class of warfare 
exists. The libraries of the Indian United Services 
Institutions are not within reach of one officer in a hundred. 
The officer who desires to study Indian Frontier Warfare must 
make his own library at great trouble and expense (for the 
books are now mostly scarce and costly), and that not one 
officer in thousand can or cares to do. It is for the War 
office to produce a good manual on "Savage Warfare", and 
bracket it with the other indispensable text-books with which 
every officer ought to be conversant. 55 
53 Capt. W. B. James, 'The Training and Equipment of Cavalry and Mounted Infantry in 
India and their Respective Roles in War', J. U. S. I. I., 32,150, (1903), pp. 34-76, 
and Capt. D. C. Crombie, 'Cavalry in Frontier Warfare', J. U. S. I. I. , 39,178, (1910), 
pp. 109-18 
54 Yate, op cit, pp. 1171-93 
55 Ibid, p. 1182 
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At the R. U. S. I. in October 1899, Major-General Sir William Gatacre 
argued that British troops in England should be instructed in the 
requirements of Indian hill warfare and emphasised the wider value of 
the skirmishing tactics used on the North-West Frontier. Although he 
was a firm advocate of specialised training, he believed that the 
recent experience should be applied to the existing Drill Book rather 
than devising special forms of drill for hill warfare. 56 The ensuing 
discussion revealed much about current attitudes in England towards 
the provision of manuals and training specifically for colonial 
warfare. The indefatigable Lieutenant-Colonel F. C. Carter urged the 
military authorities to make fuller use of the facilities in England 
to train regiments preparing to serve in India, suggesting that 
suitable terrain existed near Aldershot where 'semi-civilised and 
savage wood and mountain warfare could be carried on'. Moreover, he 
complained that the Staff College at Camberley completely ignored 
colonial warfare before concluding: 
one would think that the British Army was every year engaged in 
fighting nothing but European foes. It is, however, very nearly 
half a century since we fought in Europe; whilst every day 
along the marches of our vast Empire the British soldier and 
his dusky companion in arms is fighting across mountains and 
deserts and through jungles and swamps, and it is training for 
that kind of fighting which we want for Tommy Atkins and his 
officers, as well as for our native troops. 
General Sir J. J. Hood Gordon, the chairman of the meeting, concurred 
with Gatacre's views regarding the value of the existing Drill Book 
and concluded: 'I believe thoroughly in our Drill-Book. Its 
principles, when properly applied, suffice for the world-wide field 
which the British Army is constantly called on to act in. We do not 
require forms or rules; principles are the only guide in war, and we 
56 Maj. -Gen. W. F. Gatacre, 'A 
Few Notes on the Characteristics of Hill-Fighting in 
India, and Training of Infantry Necessary for sam Possible in England', 
J. R. U. S. I., 43,260, (1899), p. 1066 
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must fit them to the locality or enemy. We must study our enemy and 
his country. Each tribe, each clan, has its characteristics and 
special tactics, and a knowledge of these is half the battle. 57 
The Drill Book was also strongly defended by other influential 
officers in England, aware of the growing pressure for amendments 
containing guidance for colonial warfare. At a lecture held by the 
Military Society of Ireland in March 1899, Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. R. 
Henderson, Professor of Military History at the Staff College, 
stressed the wider significance of the lessons gained from fighting 
the Afridis, in a campaign against Russian troops in Afghanistan. 
Additionally he defended the value of the existing Drill Book by 
emphasising its general importance for training of the British Army 
throughout the Empire: 
When troops find themselves on service under conditions with 
which their ordinary training has done nothing to familiarise 
them, and to which their ordinary formations are absolutely 
inapplicable, a cry is once more raised against the Drill-book. 
We have all heard it. At one time, when the losses in desert 
fighting have been severe, it has been, "Why does not the 
Drill-book teach us something about savage warfare? ' At 
another, when the foe has been a mountaineer, "Why does not the 
Drill-book teach us how to fight in the hills? ' The next time 
it may be, "Why does not the Drill-book teach us how to fight 
in the jungles of Africa, or in the swamps of China? " I think, 
however, that by anyone who looks at it as a whole, and not as 
a single campaign, the constant variety of ground, of climate, 
and of tactics, such complaints against the official teaching 
will hardly be approved. The Drill-book does not pretend to be 
an exhaustive tactical treatise. It is nothing more than a 
compendium of tactical principles adopted to almost every kind 
of warfare. They lay down a few rules for the most difficult of 
all operations, the attack and assault of a defined position 
over open ground, but that is all. It does not attempt to show 
how these rules must be modified under other conditions, for 
these conditions, as I have already said, are so infinitely 
57 Ibid, pp-1080-1 
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diversified that it would be impossible in one volume to deal 
with them in detail. 58 
Despite such strong opposition, the importance of officially 
sanctioned training and guidance was supported by other officers in 
England. A second revised edition of Small Wars: Their Principles and 
Practice, published in 1899, included a detailed chapter on hill 
warfare for the first time, based on information derived from the 
numerous books and pamphlets produced in India. Major C. E. Callwell 
acknowledged that hill warfare was a distinct form of military 
operation and joined in the growing clamour for both practical and 
theoretical instruction, after praising the first hesitant steps 
taken to introduce training in India. 59 It was now for the military 
authorities in India and England to decide whether the growing 
pressure from within the army for guidance in the tactics of 'savage' 
warfare on the North-West Frontier should lead to a change in the 
existing system of Drill Books and training used by the Indian Army. 
The professional debate conducted in the pages of the 
J. U. S. I. I. and military periodicals in England clearly reflected the 
perceived importance attached to the provision of appropriate 
training for hill warfare. As a direct result of recent experience 
training in the principles and minor tactics of frontier warfare were 
studied for the first time by the large numbers of regular troops 
temporarily stationed in a state of readiness at Peshawar, Nowshera 
and Rawalpindi pending a settlement with the Afridis. 60 Those British 
and Indian regiments stationed in the Khyber Pass during the spring 
of 1898 were given instruction in frontier warfare and rapidly 
increased in efficiency during training enlivened by occasional 
sniping. 61 A training syllabus was issued by the Commander - in-Chie f 
in India in 1898, which laid down a progressive and continuous system 
of instruction, from company to battalion, for those troops stationed 
in the hills. It suggested that each day's training should be 
carefully prepared for companies by their commanders, with the use of 
a few men as a 'skeleton enemy' and that mountain guns should train 
58 Henderson, op cit, p. 18 
59 Maj. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: 1899), 
pp. 346-7 
60 'Life on the P'Lmjab frontier', Navy & Army Illustrated, 7, (1898), p. 45 
61 Maj. A. Keene, The British Soldier in India', J. U. S. I. I-., 27,132, (1898), 
pp. 406-7 
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in co-operation with the infantry when available. The chief objects 
of company training were to provide elementary knowledge of the 
nature of hill warfare; to ground imperial troops in the first 
principles of the different forms of military operations in tribal 
territory; to make them physically fit and accustom them gradually to 
working in hilly terrain, working up to carrying the heavy weight of 
full field service equipment. Finally scouts were to be selected to 
provide a cadre of highly trained skirmishers and marksmen to cover 
the operations of each company. The General Officers Commanding 
districts were directed to supervise the training of battalions and 
smaller units under training. An 'Indian Army order on Instruction in 
Hill Warfare' was also circulated, recommending four of the newly 
published unofficial books, pamphlets and lectures about 'savage' 
warfare on the frontier to act as guides for training purposes to the 
principles and minor tactics of frontier warfare. 62 Both the syllabus 
and guidelines, combining both theory and practice of hill warfare, 
were warmly welcomed within the Indian Army. Such training was in 
addition, however, to the tactics of conventional European warfare 
which remained the main topic of study for the Army in India at the 
turn of the century. 
The conduct of colonial warfare was also studied at stations 
elsewhere in India and during several large exercises involving all 
three arms of services. General Penn Symons, former commander of the 
1st Division in the T. E. F., exercised the troops at Umballa during 
1898 in a combination of European, bush, forest and mountain 
warfare. 63 Additionally, a number of British and Indian regiments 
were given training at hill stations for the first time in the 
64 elementary principles of frontier warfare. During the cold season 
of 1898 large training grants were made to stations such as Quetta 
and in the northern Punjab with mountainous terrain suitable for 
realistic training in the immediate vicinity. 65 A 'Camp of Exercise 
in Hill Manoeuvres, attended by the Lieutenant General Commanding the 
forces in Bengal took place in the hills at Almora and Ranikhet 
between 24th and 30th October 1898, representing the first serious 
opportunity to study hill warfare on a large scale since the need for 
62 Hart, op cit, p. 268, Peach, Op cit, pp. 357-8 and Maj. A. C. Yate, 'Sixty Years of 
Frontier Warfare', J. R. U. S. I., 44,286, (1900), pp. 223-4 
63 Maj. -Gen. Sir G. Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier, (London, 1923), p. 312 
64 Atteridge, op cit, pp. 533-4, and Henderson, OF, cit, pp. 12-3 
65 Anon -, I Lessons 
in Hill Fighting I, Navy & ArmY 
-Illustrated, 
7, (1899) ,p- 415 
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tactical instruction had been impressed on the Army in India by the 
Tirah campaign . 66 A similar 'Camp of Exercise in Hill Manoeuvres' was 
held in the Cherat-Attock hills in the northern Punjab in March 1899, 
where the conduct of hill warfare was carefully examined. Troops 
belonging to the Rawalpindi and Peshawar Brigades practised advance 
guard duties, rear guard actions, piqueting and the other lessons 
derived from the 1897-8 campaigns under conditions approximating to 
active service. In an endeavour to add greater realism, they were 
opposed by a 'savage enemy' composed of men from the Pathan companies 
of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, 24th, 25th and 27th Punjab 
Infantry, dressed in mufti, who harassed the regular troops exactly 
as if they were at home in tribal territory. Such skilled opponents 
made officers forcibly aware of the precautions required in hill 
warfare and quickly exploited those errors made by imperial troops. 
The manoeuvres were declared an unqualified success, but this was 
hardly surprising since both brigades were composed of regiments that 
had served during the 1897-98 operations and therefore had a 
practical experience of the trans-border tribes. The camp of exercise 
did, however, provide valuable experience and some guidelines for 
training, indicating that progressive training at company, battalion 
and brigade level was required and that each battalion should spend 
fifteen days training at camps in the hills during October, November 
and December each year before proceeding to exercises that involved 
brigades composed of all arms. After the camp ended Brigadier-General 
E. R. Elles, in command of Peshawar District, singled out the 
importance of special training for British, Sikh and Punjabi 
regiments, as they lacked an 'intuitive, knowledge of mountainous 
terrain which he believed that Gurkhas, Dogras and Pathan units 
possessed, as well as suggesting that a pamphlet on hill warfare 
should be translated into Urdu for use by Indian officers and men. 67 
Similar manoeuvres were held for the Peshawar and Rawalpindi Brigades 
the following year near Nowshera and Khairabad. Sir A. P. Palmer, 
General officer Commanding the Punjab Command observed: 
66 From Q. M. G. in India, 20th Oct. 1898, P/5475 and Command Order by the 
Lieutenant -General Commanding the Forces in Bengal, 18th Oct. 1898, L/MIL/17/5/356 
67 Report on the Attock Manoeuvres March 1899, (Simla, 1899), p. 23, Deninq Mss 
N. A. M. 7810-106-40 
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The troops on the whole worked with much spirit and with 
considerable intelligence, they seemed to have benefited from 
the outing, and to be fit for anything, and to appreciate the 
instruction they were receiving by having the opportunity of 
working over ground which lends itself to acquiring a knowledge 
of how to deal with a Savage Enemy in the hills. Troops of the 
Rawalpindi and Peshawar Brigades are fortunate in being able to 
learn, in such a practical way, what is denied to troops 
serving further south, and which fits them to get more on terms 
with any enemy of their country whom they may be called upon to 
encounter in any part of the world. 68 
A 'skeleton enemy', composed of men from Pathan companies, once again 
added considerable realism to the exercise. Indeed the men behaved 
exactly as if they were opposed to a British column during a punitive 
campaign. Several went so far as to shower the attacking troops with 
boulders until they were restrained, with some difficulty, by their 
British officers before coming to blows with their Gurkha 
opponents! 69 
The lessons learnt during the 1897-98 operations clearly 
convinced the military authorities in India that it was no longer 
possible to leave the regular British and Indian troops without 
official specialised training in hill warfare. Training carried out 
between 1897-98 indicated what needed to be taught to imperial 
battalions regarding the tactics of mountain warfare in India. 
However, the absence of an officially sanctioned manual laying down 
definite tactical procedures to ensure uniformity of training 
throughout the Army in India remained a desideratum. While lecturing 
at the R. U. S. I. in London in January 1900 on the lessons of sixty 
years of frontier warfare, Major A. C. Yate reiterated his earlier 
views regarding the provision of an official training manual: 
I should be glad to see a good official manual on mountain and 
other forms of savage warfare, compiled and issued to the Army. 
We do require some definite source from which we can learn what 
68 Report on the Attock Manoeuvres February 1900, (Sixnla, 1900), p-63 
L/MIL/17/5/1807 
69 Lt. -Gen. R. Baden-Powell, Indian 
Memories; Recollections of Soldierinq, sport, 
Etc., (London, 1915), pp. 272-5 
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hard experience has taught our predecessors. The military 
educational staff both in Great Britain and in India must 
surely feel the need for such a manual; for as everyone knows, 
more especially those who have to pass garrison class and 
tactical examinations, the subject is one that has to be 
studied. 0 
The widespread acceptance of the importance of an authoritative 
'doctrine' and training for savage warfare' on the North-West 
Frontier, finally led to the publication of an official manual 
intended to provide guidance to British and Indian regulars stationed 
in India. A small pamphlet on mountain warfare was published by the 
Adjutant-General in India in 1900 for imperial infantry battalions 
serving in India, whose contents reflected the recent perceived 
lessons of the 1897-98 operations. It laid down various drills to 
instruct squads and companies emphasising the importance of 
skirmishing and the duties of infantry hill scouts. It also included 
and company drill covering general principles of hill skirmishing, 
firing uphill and piqueting for the infantry that was intended to 
complement the existing Drill Book. Particular attention was directed 
towards the conduct of retirements in contact with a tribal opponent, 
stressing the need for independent movement, self-reliance and 
initiative on the part of British and Indian troops operating in the 
hills. 7 1 This represented a unique response to the military 
requirements of colonial warfare, devoted to local Indian conditions. 
A more comprehensive and enlarged manual, entitled Frontier Warfare 
1901, was published the following year specifically intended to 
provide guidance for military operations on the North-West Frontier. 
The preface, written by Major-General E. R. Elles, now Adjutant 
General in India, noted: 
It must be understood that these notes on frontier warfare are 
in no way intended to be in supersession of the Drill Book but 
are writ--en for the assistance of commanders when operating in 
broken and mountainous ground and are based on the experience 
gained in late frontier campaigns. 
70 Yate 1900, op cit, p. 243 
71 Mountain Warfare, (Simla, 1900), Preface 
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The manual contained guidance regarding the tactics required against 
a Pathan opponent for all three arms of service, although it was a 
direct copy of the earlier pamphlet with regard to squad drill, 
skirmishing, scouting, company drill and retirements. An additional 
chapter dealt with the instruction of a battalion, covering 
reconnaissance, flanking duties, advance guards, baggage and rear 
guard duty. Volley firing was condemned as a waste of ammunition in 
hilly country, with controlled independent firing recommended as the 
norm. The movement of large bodies of troops and the lines of 
communication on the frontier formed the subject of further chapters 
although the manual referred primarily to operations by a single 
brigade in mountainous terrain. A chapter was devoted to the 
organisation, working and protection of the lines of communication, 
reflecting the transport and supply problems encountered when 
operating in tribal territory. The final section dealt with the 
principles governing the employment of mountain artillery in frontier 
warfare, recognising the need for greater employment of that arm, now 
that the tribesmen had acquired modern small arms. 72 The Drill Book 
and its successor infantry Training, however, remained the basis of 
the system of training for civilised warfare in India and still 
included a small section on 'savage warfare, ' containing information 
relevant to operations in open terrain which also stressed the 
importance of adapting to local conditions. 73 The of f icial manuals on 
frontier warfare were also complemented by a further series of 
articles and unofficial text books produced by officers directly 
concerned with the training needs of the army, including one volume 
written by a former brigade commander in Tirah. 74 
The conduct of the military operations in Tirah had also 
revealed serious defects in staff planning and command. Several of 
the 'regrettable incidents' and heavy casualties suffered amongst the 
pack transport animals were directly attributable to senior officers' 
ignorance of the tactical, administrative and logistical conduct of 
frontier warfare. In particular, the judgement and ability of some of 
72 Frontier Warfare 1901, (Calcutta, 1901) 
73 Infantry Drill (Provisional), (London, 1902) 
74 See Lt. -Col. E. Gunter, Outlines of Modern Tactics, (London, 1899), pp. 259-69, 
Maj. -Gen. Sir R. C. Hart, Reflections on the Art of War, (London, 1901), 3rd Ed. 
pp. 342a-3421 and Maj. L. J. Shadwell, North-West Frontier Warfare: Beinq an 
Appendix tD Sherston's "Tactics as Applied to Schemes", (Calcutta, 1902) 
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the brigadiers and staff of the T. E. F was heavily criticised and 
several senior officers were accused of incompetence. 75 While those 
officers with prior experience of hill warfare, for example 
Brigadier-General A. Gaselee and Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, had 
generally performed well, others whose training was based on 
conventional military operations, experienced considerable 
problems . 76 In particular, Brigadier-General F. J. Kempster was 
singled out for negligence during the withdrawal down the Bara 
Valley, when the rearguard and transport of the 3rd Brigade had been 
left behind benighted in a village outside the main encampment. 77 To 
be 'Kempstered' became a widely used term of disgust and 'I'm 
Kempstered if I do,, an expression of dissent amongst British 
officers, after his military career in India was brought to an abrupt 
conclusion following the campaign. 78 Initial steps to provide 
guidance for staff officers were implemented after the operations 
but, apart from one small manual written by Colonel A. T. Nixon based 
on his personal experience gained while serving with the Tochi Field 
Force in 1897 and which contained copies of various Standing Orders 
issued during prior frontier campaigns, little information was 
readily available . 
79 Garrison Classes, held for regimental officers 
in India preparing for promotion examinations, included the conduct 
of military operations against the Pathan tribes for the first time 
in 1898 compelling officers to study the subject. Annual promotion 
examinations included questions on hill warfare that either made 
direct comparisons between the specialised requirements of such 
campaigns and European warfare, or discussed the implications of 
improving tribal armament on the conduct of military operations and 
the requisite dispositions of a force operating in the border 
hills. 80 
75 Hamilton to Elgin, 21st Jan. 1898, Elgin MssL Mss. Eur. F. 84/16, and Anon., 'The 
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the decision of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief India in regard to the 
manner in which he exercised his command in the Bara Valley, in December 1897, 
28th April 1898, L/MIL/7/15892 
78 Lt. -Gen. Sir G. F. MacMunn, The Romance of the Indian Frontiers, (London, 1931), 
p. 239 
79 Lt. -Col. J. E. Nixon, Notes for Staff Officers on Field Service, (Lahore, 1897) 
2nd Ed. 1898 
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145 
The Staff College at Camberley included the administrative and 
operational conduct of hill warfare in its curriculum for the first 
time in 1899, with study based primarily on a revised edition of 
Callwell's Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. 81 Practical 
instruction was given during Staff Tours held each year near 
Llanberis, Snowdon and Beddgelert in North Wales, to illustrate the 
principles of hill warfare in terrain which resembled, in some 
respects, that near Tirah. 82 As one Indian Army officer on the staff 
observed, the relevance of such Staff Tours was debatable given the 
wide differences in terrain between the North-West Frontier and 
Wales, but such training did reflect an important new awareness of 
the distinct military requirements of the Empire. 83 Students 
attending the course during the 1900s were asked to prepare detailed 
appreciations, plans of campaign and written guidelines for troops 
new to frontier warfare in order to familiarise themselves with 
conditions inherent in the conduct of punitive campaigns on the 
North-West Frontier. 84 In order to emphasise the different conditions 
between Staff Rides in England and military operations in tribal 
territory, the War Office published a detailed pamphlet in 1906 which 
discussed at length the details of mountain warfare in India intended 
primarily for officers without experience of the country. 85 
The Staff College established by Lord Kitchener in India in 
1903, modelled on that at Camberley, replaced the Garrison Classes 
that had hitherto provided instruction to officers. While temporarily 
based at Deolali, a series of mountain warfare exercises and Staff 
Rides were held by the Senior Division in the Western Ghauts. 86 After 
permanent buildings were constructed at Quetta in Baluchistan, the 
course included questions on tactics and Staff Tours in the 
neighbouring hills, and concluded with an annual tour of the North- 
West Frontier to study the Pathan tribes and terrain at first hand. 87 
81 T. Miller-Maguire, Strateqy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges, (London, 1904), p. 5. 
See also T. Miller-Maguire, Analysis of Callwell's Small Wars, (London, 1902) 
82 Maj. F. G. Marsh, 'The Afridi and Orakzai Country', A. R., 7, (1914), p. 29 
83 Gen. Sir G. de S. Barrow, The Fire of Life, (London, 1941), p. 116 
84 See 'Senior Division, 1914. Staff Tour in Wales 20th-23rd July', July 1914, and 
'Memorandum for issue to units new to Frontier Warfare', 20th July 1914, 
Montqomery-Massingberd Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 31 
85 Notes on Staff Duties in Hill Warfare in India for the use of Officers attendin 
Staff Rides, (London, 1906) 
86 Records of the Staff College, Quetta. (Established 1905), (Simla, 1908), p. 4 
and p. 10 L/MIL/17/5/2276 
87 See Capt. E. HowelL, IState how far, in your opinion, the procedure found 
suitable during the Afridi Campaign of 1897-8 in attack, in retirement, and for 
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Those lectures originally written for the Staff College at Quetta 
formed the basis of a book written by Major W. D. Bird, a former 
instructor, on the principles of mountain warfare which was published 
on his return to England in 1909.88 
The effectiveness of the Army in India's new system of training 
in hill warfare was not tested immediately as the North-West Frontier 
was comparatively peaceful following the 1897-98 campaigns. A 
combination of tribal exhaustion and Lord Curzon's endeavours to 
avoid punitive operations, by progressively withdrawing Indian troops 
from posts established in tribal territory to cantonments in India, 
during the early 1900s, meant comparatively few clashes occurred 
between hostile tribesmen and imperial troops. Various locally 
recruited militias, raised following the great rising, replaced the 
regular troops in the watch and ward of the administrative border of 
the newly formed North-West Frontier Province (N. W. F. P. ), which now 
administered the trans-Indus areas and tribal territory. The mainstay 
of the garrison along the border remained P. F. F. regiments, although 
they were aided by several line regiments of the regular Indian 
Army. 89 However, it was evident that it would be some time before the 
regulars became as efficient as P. F. F. regiments. Two officers from 
the 5th Gurkha Rifles, for example, had to be attached to the 17th 
Bengal Infantry after its inexperienced officers and men encountered 
difficulty in adapting to the unfamiliar conditions in the Derajat. 90 
The 1901-02 Mahsud Blockade was the last military operation 
carried out predominantly by P. F. F. regiments. The force finally 
ceased to exis-tý as an administrative unit on 31st March 1903, after a 
reorganisation of the system of commands on the North-West 
Frontier. 91 Although its units were allowed to retain the title 
"Frontier Force" in their regimental designations, its regiments and 
batteries were now made available for service throughout India and 
protection, would be required to be modified should a second invasion of Tirah 
become necessary, 4th Oct. 1907, Howell Mss, L. H. C. M. A. I/L/1/4-5 and Brig. -Gen. 
W. Braithwaite, 'The Staff College, Quetta', A. R. 3, (1912), p. 418 
88 Brevet. -Maj. W. D. Bird, Some Principles of Frontier Mountain Warfare, (London, 1909) 
89 Maj. -Gen. E. Collen and A. C. Yate, 'Our Position on the North-West Frontier', 
Empire Review, 2,10, (1901), p. 388 
90 Military Department Despatch No. 24 of 1902: Ambush of 17th Bengal Infantry at 
Khusma Khulla by 11ahsuds 3rd Noveirber 1901,30th Jan. 1902, L/MIL/3/160 and 
History of the 5tA Royal Gurkha Rifles, p-160 
91 Military Depariment Despatch No. 186 of 1902: Proposed reconstitution of the 
conmands and staff of the military districts on the North-West Frontier, 2nd Oct. 
1902, L/MIL/7/745,5 
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overseas although by training and tradition they were still regarded 
as experts in frontier warfare. 92 Henceforth the provision of 
training manuals and specific training for hill warfare was even more 
essential, as the garrisons in the N. W. F. P. were filled by British 
and Indian regiments periodically rotated through the area as part of 
the normal sys-. em of regimental reliefs. New units arriving at the 
border cantonments had to quickly acquaint themselves with the 
intricacies of frontier warfare based on the instruction laid down in 
the training manuals and the advice of experienced officers, N. C. O. s, 
and soldiers already serving in their ranks or in other units. As a 
result the principles and minor tactics of frontier warfare were 
closely studied by the local garrisons and those detailed for their 
immediate reinforcement in the event of war. Indeed, there was a 
veritable 'boom, of interest in this class of warfare, as a result of 
which it was hoped that the skills, training and traditions of the 
P. F. F. would be 'passed on' to the rest of the army. Troops stationed 
in the border cantonments, formed into moveable columns ready to 
support the militia carried out a series of 'savage warfare' 
exercises utilising training areas along the border hitherto 
monopolised by P. F. F. regiments. In November 1903 the Bannu moveable 
column, for example, simulated its response to an attack on Kurram 
Garhi post by a party of well armed tribesmen. 93 Instruction in hill 
warfare was also carried out at regimental level throughout India. 94 
During the summer of 1906, units of the 5th (Mhow) Division carried 
out training, for example, in both bush and hill warfare. 95 
Preliminary training was possible, for example, near stations such as 
Rawalpindi and in the mountains surrounding the Quetta plateau. In 
Lahore District suitable terrain also existed nearby Bakloh and 
Duneira where it was possible to exercise troops in brigade strength 
and in parts of Umballa District hilly areas could also be employed 
for realistic training. Training those regiments stationed on the 
plains of India in frontier warfare, however, posed certain intrinsic 
problems that had already been foreseen during the 1890s. It was 
92 Col. G. K. Moncrieff, 'Some Punjab Frontier Recollections', Blackwood's, 176,569, 
(1904), pp. 597-613 and R. S. Dey, A Brief Account of the Punjab Frontier Force, 
(Calcutta, 1905), p-3 
93 Manoeuvres held at Bannu on 3rd November 1903, under Brig-General J. B. Woon, 
Commanding Bannu Tochi Force, Nov. 1903, Deninq Mss, N. A. M. 7810-106-44 
94 Lt. -Gen. Sir G. F. MacMunn, Behind the 
Scenes in Many Wars, (London, 1930), p. 82 
95 Maj. -Gen. L. Dening, Conrianding Vth (Mhow) Division to Brig. -Gen. T. Capper, 
14th July 1906, Deninq Mss, N. A. M. 7810-106-55 
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often impossible to provide realistic instruction as suitable terrain 
did not exist nearby most cantonments, although it was possible to 
practise such elementary skills as the posting and withdrawal of 
piquets on the parade ground. British regiments were in a more 
favourable position, as they moved into hill stations annually to 
avoid the worst effects of the summer heat. The wide differences in 
terrain and vegetation between many hill stations, however, such as 
those on the Himalayan frontier and those in tribal territory 
complicated instruction, but did not prevent units learning useful 
skills that could be utilised in mountain warfare. Despite such 
drawbacks the system of reliefs meant that units, otherwise denied 
frontier service, could now become familiarised with border 
conditions in the most likely theatre of operations for the Army in 
India. However, the system also meant that troops were seldom in one 
location long enough to acquire a detailed knowledge of either the 
local terrain or the people and were seldom able to achieve as high a 
standard of training and efficiency in mountain warfare as P. F. F. 
regiments had during the nineteenth century. The service press 
supplemented the official manuals and published a series of articles 
relating to frontier warfare, as peace time training revealed 
practical changes with regard to scouting, field craft, marksmanship 
and physical fitness. Additionally, a succession of articles relating 
to the conduct of hill warfare appeared in the pages of professional 
military journals in India and England. 96 
The military authority's in India decision to prepare and issue 
manuals and implement training in frontier warfare to complement that 
laid down for European warfare had implications for the development 
of training for other classes of 'savage warfare, also at variance 
with that laid down in the drill book. A manual on jungle warfare was 
written by Captain A. W. Taylor, specifically for Indian Army officers 
attached to Burma Military Police battalions, which contained various 
extracts and references from the pamphlet on mountain warfare 
prepared by the Adjutant General in India. 97 A series of articles and 
96 See Capt. H. Rowan-Robinson, 'The Chitral Canpaign', J. R. U. S. I., 50,345, (1906), 
pp. 1373-86, Capt. H. Rowan-Robinson, 'A Short Account of the Tirah Campaign', Proc. 
R. A. I., 32, (1906-7), pp. 513-69, and Maj. N. Woodyatt, 'Notes on Hill Training', 
J. U. S. I. I., 36,167, (1907), pp. 155-75 
97 Capt. A. W. Taylor, Jungle Warfare: the conduct of small expeditions in the 
junqles and hilly tracts of Burma, and a system of drill and musketry instruction 
connected therewith, for the use of officers of the Burma Military Police, 
(Rangoon, 1902) 
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books also appeared, written by experienced British officers from 
both the Indian and British armies, which emphasised the importance 
of suitable training for officers seconded to the Foreign or Colonial 
Offices, as well as for the Indian Army regiments deployed in Africa. 
These were intended to supplement the existing official manuals based 
on conventional operations and represented a continued reaction 
against the Eurocentric instruction that dominated the training of 
the British Army. 913 Frontier Warfare 1901 was complemented by a small 
appendix published in 1903 entitled Bush Fighting. (An Appendix to 
"Frontier Warfare-) intended to provide guidance for Indian regiments 
deployed on the North-Eastern frontier of India and the increasing 
number of officers and men from Indian regiments serving in east and 
west Africa. It included a 'Syllabus of Instruction in Bush Tactics, 
that contained information on skirmishing and other skills required 
by imperial troops. 99 The two manuals were amalgamated in 1906 to 
produce a final authoritative manual governing the conduct of 
frontier warfare around the peripheries of India and for operations 
elsewhere in the British Empire. Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Chief of 
Staff, emphasised in the preface of Frontier Warfare and Bush 
Fighting: 'It must be understood that these notes... are in no way in 
supersession of the Training Manuals but are written for the 
assistance of commanders when operating in broken and mountainous 
ground and in Bush Countries and are based on the experience gained 
in late various campaigns. ' Although the text and contents were 
identical in most respects to those of the earlier edition, it 
referred throughout the text to the current training manuals - 
Infantry Training 1905, Combined Training 1905 and Field Service 
Regulations - produced to direct training in conventional military 
operations. 100 
The British Army serving elsewhere in the British Empire 
remained without a source of official instruction and training in 
other forms of 'savage warfare'. A small section in Infantry Drill 
represented the sole source of information available to units 
preparing for imperial service, with its continued emphasis on the 
use of close-order formations long abandoned for European warfare. 
98 Maj. C. B. Morgan, Hints on Bush Fiqhtin , (London, 1899) and Lt. -Col- A. F. 
Montanaro, Hints for a Bush Campai , (London, 1901) 
99 Bush Fiqhtinq. (An Appendix to "Frontier Warfare"), (Calcutta, 1903) 
100 Frontier warfare and Bush Fiqhtin , (Calcutta, 1906) 
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Indeed, the square and echelon formations it recommended for 
battalions and brigades employed in savage warfare' now required 
special training as the emphasis on close-order drill had declined 
after the Second Boer War. 101 A succession of books and articles, 
however, appeared in the service press in England addressing for the 
first time in some detail the requirements of desert and bush warfare 
following the official acceptance of appropriate training in India. "' 
In a detailed study of warfare in West Africa, after noting that 
little information was available in official text books, Colonel C. B. 
Wallis asked a fundamental question regarding the British Army and 
colonial warfare: 'Is our training in the art of war efficient for 
our needs in every part of the Empire? Is it sufficiently practical 
and elastic to be able to cope with the Boer on the Veldt, the Afridi 
on the North-West Frontier, the Dervish in the Soudan, the savage in 
the West African forest. and our numerous other possible foes in 
different parts of the civilised and uncivilised world? r103 The 
continued reliance on localised military forces in most parts of the 
Empire, such as the West African Frontier Force of the King's African 
Rifles, solved the problem in many respects as these units contained 
outbreaks of resistance to imperial rule, obviating the need for the 
deployment of regulars. Lieutenant L. F. Renny could still complain 
with some justification that savage warfare, in which a large number 
of British officers and men were constan, --ly engaged, was neglected in 
the official drill books. 104 Although it was never officially adopted 
as a text-book, despite a preface written by the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, the third revised edition of Small Wars: 
Their Principles and Practice which was published in 1906, provided 
the most authoritative, popular and widely available source of 
information for British officers preparing for imperial service up to 
the end of the Second World War. 105 
The puni'ý-ive expedition mounted against the Zakka Khel Afridis 
in February 1908, after a succession of large and well organised 
raids had been perpetrated in Peshawar District, provided the Army in 
India with an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of its troops 
101 Infantry Drill (Provisional), (London, 1902), pp. 234-5 
102 See K. Dunnoley, Drill Made Easy: Savaqe Warfare, (London, 1900) and E. 
Bartlett, Battalim and Briqade Drill for Savage Warfare, (London, 1904) 
103 Col. C. B. Wallis, West African Warfare, (London, 1905), pp. 63-4 
104 Lt. L. F. Renny, 'Savage Warfare', J. R. U. S. I., 50,346, (1906), p. 531 
105 Col. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, (London, 1906) 
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in frontier warfare. The operation, conducted under the command of 
Major-General Sir James Willcocks, represented a dramatic change from 
prior military operations during the 1890s and gave the Indian Army 
an opportunity to apply the principles and minor tactics of frontier 
warfare which had been learnt and practised since 1898. The Bazar 
Valley Field Force, operating with a minimal amount of equipment and 
mule transport was mobilised in thirty-six hours and achieved 
complete surprise over the Zakka Khel, who submitted after punitive 
operations were conducted in the Bazar Valley between 17th-24th 
February 1908. After having sustained only minor casualties during 
the fighting, three killed and 37 wounded, which Sir James Willcocks 
directly attributed to the high state of efficiency and training 
which Indian troops had acquired, the column withdrew back across the 
administrative border on 29th February 1908. The Zakka Khel had 
suffered casualties in excess of those lost in the Tirah Expedition 
despite being heavily armed with Martini-Henry rifles purchased in 
Afghanistan. Indeed, their maliks admitted that every family in the 
Bazar Valley had suffered losses from amongst its fighting men. 106 It 
was clear that improvements in light infantry and musketry training 
following the Tirah campaign and the Boer War had dramatically 
increased the effectiveness of the Indian troops. During negotiations 
preceding the peace settlement, the Zakka Khel openly acknowledged 
the improved fighting ability of the Indian Army. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Roos-Keppel noted: 'The Afridis, who are no mean judges of hill 
fighting, express themselves amazed at the handling and conduct of 
the troops as unlike anything they have seen or heard of, and the 
fact that they have obtained no loot in mules, rifles, stores, or 
ammunition, on which they confidently counted to compensate for their 
own losses, has given them a strong distaste for expeditions 
conducted on these novel lines. f107 The Viceroy, Lord Minto, 
concurred: 
From a military point of view the most satisfactory features of 
the expedition were the ease and rapidity with which it was 
sent off without any dislocation of the separate commands, the 
106 G. O. C. Bazar Valley Force to Foreign secretar- , 
L/P&S/10/46 
y 21st Feb. and 25th Feb. 1908, 
107 Lt. -Col. G. O. Roos-Keppel, 'Political Report of the Bazar Valley Expedition, 
4th March 1908, L/P&S/10/46 
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excellence of the transport and supply arrangements, the 
signalling communications, and above all the unexampled 
efficiency of the troops themselves in their knowledge of hill 
fighting. They proved as good or even better than the Zakkas 
themselves among their own hills. It speaks volumes for the 
pains bestowed on their training. In 1897 the superiority of 
the tribes over us in the hills was very marked and we suffered 
heavily, whilst I believe the Zakka loss on the present 
occasion exceeds the whole tribal loss in the Tirah campaign 
and our own loss has been extremely small. 108 
Two months later, similar operations were mounted against the 
Mohmands and after another short and sharp campaign they submitted 
after suffering heavy casualties at the hands of Indian troops. The 
success of both of what became known as 'Willcocks, Week End Wars' 
was a direct tribute to the improved training in hill warfare born of 
the frontier rising and vastly improved standards of musketry 
instruction in the Indian Army. 109 Both campaigns confirmed the 
importance of training for frontier warfare, provided valuable 
experience for British and Indian regiments and represented an 
important test of changes in the organisation, administration and 
training of the Indian Army during the 1900s. They also confirmed 
that the tribesmen had now acquired large quantities of martini-Henry 
and . 
303 rifles, which they used with effect during night attacks and 
in sniping, although on several occasions swordsmen still reverted to 
ghazi tactics. 110 
The Zakka Khel and Mohmand punitive expeditions represented the 
last major operations mounted by imperial troops against the trans- 
border tribes before the outbreak of the First World War. 
Nevertheless the insistent duties of the watch and ward of the border 
ensured the garrisons in the N. W. F. P. maintained a high level of 
military preparedness and trained primarily for frontier warfare. 
After the 1908 operations, further information regarding hill warfare 
108 Minto to Morley, 23rd March 1908, Morley Mss, Mss. Eur. D. 573/14 
109 C. W. Miles, The Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expedition, (Rawalpindi, 1909), p. 13, 
and Maj. G. F. MacMunn, 'The Old Frontier Story', Fortniqhtly Revie , 27,158, 
(1909), p-251 
110 Gen. Sir J. Willcocks, The Romance of Soldierinq and Sport, (London, 1925), 
pp. 234-5, and Lt. A. H. Burn, 'The Mohmand Expedition. Some Reminiscences', U. S. M., 
38, (1909), pp. 317-8 
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was 'passed on' to units serving along the border. A report on 
training carried out by Bannu Brigade between 10-15th February 1908, 
for example, simulating an attack on a frontier village followed by a 
withdrawal in contact with hostile tribesmen, the construction of a 
perimeter camp and its defence from a night attack, convoy escort 
duty and the duties involved in intercepting parties of tribal 
raiders, was circulated by Northern Command to other units to guide 
instruction. "' The Russo-Japanese War, the declining incidence of 
punitive expeditions and the reorientation of British policy towards 
Europe, however, led to a progressive decline of professional 
interest in frontier warfare elsewhere in India following the boom of 
the early 1900s. Apart from the independent frontier brigades in the 
N. W. F. P., which carried out training predicated on operations against 
a 'savage' opponent, the mainstream of professional attention re- 
focused on training against a 'civilised' opponent. 112 Although the 
service press published a series of articles on the conduct of 
frontier warfare, suggesting further refinements in accepted doctrine 
or examining the role of the respective arms of service, the subject 
had now lost its prior urgency and appeal to many regimental 
officers. 113 The unquestioning acceptance of the guidelines contained 
in the specialised frontier warfare manuals by some regiments as the 
basis of all training caused consternation and alarm amongst the 
General Staff in India. Several units employed perimeter camps during 
manoeuvres for conventional warfare, leading to an important change 
in the approach to training for hill warfare. In accordance with a 
decision made at the Imperial Defence Conference in 1909, the 
specialist frontier warfare manuals were cancelled in an endeavour to 
standardise training regulations and the organisation, administration 
and training of imperial troops throughout the Empire. Training in 
India was brought into line with the rest of the Empire in 1911 with 
the adoption of Field Service Regulations (F. S. R. ), Musketry 
Regulations, Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, the training manuals 
111 Report on Briqade Traininq, Bannu Briqade, under the orders of Malor-General 
C. G. M. Fasken, Conmiandinq Bannu Briqade. February 1908, (Allahabad, 1908) 
112 Birdwood, op, cit, pp. 206-7. See also Field Service Standinq Orders for the 
Kohat Briqade by Briqadier-General W. R. Birdwood Ccumiandinq Kohat Briqad 
(Roorkee, 1911) 
113 See Capt. G. R. Wheatley, 'Safety at Night in Frontier Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 38, 
174, (1909), pp. 97-102, Bvt. -Col. C. B. Unwin, 'A Short Account of the Cavalry Work 
during the Operations of the Mohmand Field Force', C. J., 4, (1909), pp. 88-95 and 
Capt. H. H. Knox, IAre Night Operations Suitable for operations Against North-West 
Frontier Tribes', j. U. S. I. I., 39,178, (1910), pp. 136-49. 
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of the various arms and the Field Service Pocket Book as the basis of 
its organisation, administration and training. 114 The inclusion of all 
official instruction on frontier warfare in F. S. R. met initial 
opposition in India, as many officers did not understand the 
underlying reasons behind the proposal and the draft section on 
mountain warfare did not provide sufficiently comprehensive guidance. 
A Committee headed by the Director of Miiitary Training concluded 
that, while dividing the subject of instruction in frontier warfare 
between F. S. R. and specialist training manuals was sound in theory, 
it did not function in practice and had caused considerable 
confusion. 115 During a lecture at the Staff College at Quetta on 14th 
October 1912, General Sir O'Moore Creagh, the Commander-in-Chief in 
India, observed: 
Up to the time of the Tirah campaign "mountain warfare" was 
looked on as a special prerogative of the Frontier Force, and 
was practically entirely neglected by the Army at large. After 
that campaign there was a violent swing of the pendulum in the 
opposite direction, and tendency rose to stereotype warfare 
into two distinct types, the character of the ground and of the 
enemy were often ignored, and the "perimeter" camp especially 
became almost a fetish, so that at manoeuvres it was common to 
see troops crowded into such camps even when opposed by an 
enemy provided with artillery. The result was no doubt greatly 
due to the fact that the rules for frontier warfare were 
contained in a separate manual, for this manual was 
unfortunately accepted by many officers as containing all that 
was required. It was overlooked that it did not deal with 
principles at all, but only with such modifications of the 
principles as were necessitated by the topographical conditions 
and the character of the enemy on the frontier; and that the 
rules given were merely complementary to those contained in the 
ordinary training manuals. 116 
114 'The General Staff in India, , A. R., 2, (1912), p-22 
115 Gen. Sir 0. Creagh, 'The Army in India and the New Field Service Regulations', 
A. R., 4, (1913), pp. 31-9 
116 Ibid, pp. 34-5 
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A revised edition of F. S. R. published in 1912 contained amendments 
especially for the Indian Army and this became the primary source of 
tactical guidance regarding the conduct of mountain warfare. A new 
chapter, entitled warfare in Uncivilized Countries, began by noting 
that: 'In campaigns against savages the armament, tactics, and 
characteristics of the enemy, and the nature of the theatre of 
operations demand that the principles of regular warfare be somewhat 
modified; the modifications in this chapter are such as experience 
has shown to be necessary. ' It contained sections devoted to both 
bush and mountain warfare, but the latter subject was restricted to 
six paragraphs covering protection on the march, protection when at 
rest, camps and bivouacs, general information and a section on 
piquets. Although it was realised by the General Staff that such 
brief guidelines might create training problems, it was accepted that 
it was impossible to magnify the special sections for India in a 
general manual intended for imperial troops throughout the Empire. "' 
The conduct of conventional European warfare was the main 
preoccupation of the Army in India during training, but it was 
realised that it was still incumbent on British officers to prepare 
for more specialised operations on the North-West Frontier despite 
the comparatively peaceful state of the area. 118 An indication of the 
degree to which training now concentrated on conventional military 
operations was evident by 1911 when one officer observed: 'Situated 
as we are in India it is to be hoped that the pendulum will not swing 
too much one way, leading us to neglect continual practise of the 
plans and tactics mainly suitable for an encounter with unorganized 
tribesmen. 1119 The 1911-12 Memorandum on Army Training cautioned the 
Bannu and Derajat Brigades that, although experience gained during 
local training and the watch and ward of the border was valuable, it 
should not obscure the fact that their troops might be called upon to 
fight in any part of the Empire. Northern Command was also praised 
for carrying out a frontier tour during which the principles of 
civilised warfare were addressed and it concluded with the warning: 
'It is true that the principles of warfare are always the same, but 
117 Field Service Requlations, Part I Operations 1909 (Reprinted with Amendments 
1912), (London, 1912), pp. 191-212 
118 Maj. E. J. Wood, 'Specialisation in Training', J-U-S-I-I-., 40,183, (1911), 
pp. 165-69 
119 By a C. 0. ,' Ref 
lections on the Training of the Inf antry Of f icer J. U. S. I. I. , 
40,183, (1911), p. 147 
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there is a danger of the main principles being obscured in the 
details of guerilla warfare. 120 Despite these changing priorities, 
several books were published which a further important means of 
expanding the information contained in F. S. R. on mountain warfare in 
India. A detailed didactic study of the Tirah Campaign written by 
Colonel Charles Callwell appeared in 1911 in the 'Campaigns and their 
Lessons' series, chosen as an example of a campaign conducted by 
regular troops against irregulars, in which tactics and training 
required for mountain warfare in India were described at length. 121 A 
one volume 'student's history, of frontier warfare written by Captain 
H. L. Nevill, appeared the following year, intended to familiarise 
officers with the North-West Frontier, to illustrate the principles 
of F. S. R. and to provide a detailed account of the gradual changes of 
arms and tactics used by both the tribesmen and the Indian Army, 
which provided a particularly useful source of knowledge for 
interested officers. 122 It was complemented by a general survey of 
operations and campaigns written by Colonel H. C. Wylly in 1912 to 
provide information about the tribes, the borderland and prior 
punitive campaigns which had been conspicuous by its absence in 
1897.123 The decreasing professional interest in frontier warfare was 
the subject of a lecture by Colonel W. E. Venour, a highly experienced 
Frontier Force officer, at the U. S. I. I. in 1913. Venour called for a 
revitalisation of interest in such fighting and stressed its wider 
importance for both Indian and British troops. 
Since 1908 there have been no expeditions on the Pathan border 
and it seems that interest in this particular form of training 
has somewhat waned throughout the army as a whole. In the 
future, as in the past, this is the most likely form of 
fighting in which Indian troops may have to take part, and as 
long as they serve in India the same thing applies to British 
troops; and though they may have to train in Europe or any part 
of our Empire, still a knowledge of frontier warfare is a 
120 'Memorandum or- Army Training in India, 1911-121, A. R., 4, (1913), pp. 96-7 
121 Callwell 1911, op cit 
122 NeVill, op Cit 
123 Wylly, Op Cit 
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useful fighting asset to any unit under any conditions, 
teaching as it does initiative and self reliance. 124 
Venour questioned the wisdom of including instruction regarding 
frontier warfare in a single manual that formed the basis of all 
infantry training throughout the Empire. The six paragraphs included 
in the 1912 edition of the F. S. R. were of necessity so condensed that 
a considerable diversity in the methods of applying the principles 
existed amongst units and between different brigades with regard to 
piquets and perimeter camps. As absolute uniformity in minor tactics 
was required in frontier warfare, he observed that these variations 
made imperial troops vulnerable to tribal attack. As a solution to 
the problem Venour suggested the addition of an Indian appendix to 
F. S. R. and the creation of a training school to provide systematic 
training in the 'peculiarly Indian subject' of frontier warfare 
modelled on similar lines as the Mounted Infantry schools held at 
Umballa and Poona. 125 In the ensuing discussion the Chief of Staff, 
Lieutenant-General Sir P. Lake, noted the dangers inherent in too 
much specialisation in F. S. R., but it was clear that the majority of 
the audience supported the idea of a training school for frontier 
warf are. 126 
Despite such reservations the Indian Army contained a large 
proportion of officers and men who possessed a sound working 
knowledge of the principles and minor tactics required for operations 
on the North-West Frontier by the outbreak of the First World War. 
The former P. F. F. regiments provided a nucleus of highly trained 
soldiers with experience, training and a tradition of expertise in 
mountain warfare against the trans-border Pathan tribes. A large 
number of regular regiments had acquired practical experience, 
familiarised themselves with local conditions and built up a cadre of 
officers, N. C. O. s and men accustomed to the requirements of frontier 
warfare for the first time by a system of periodic reliefs in the 
border garrisons. The steadily increasing fighting strength, armament 
and military effectiveness of the trans-border Pathan tribes, 
however, remained a serious source of concern. It was estimated by 
124 Col. W. E. Venour, 'Training for Frontier Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 42,193, (1913), 
p. 381 
125 Ibid, pp. 382-9 
126 Sir. P. Lake, comnent on Ibid p. 389-90 
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the General Staff in India in 1911 that more than six divisions along 
with additional infantry, cavalry and pioneers would be required to 
deal with a general rising similar to that in 1897-98 or to secure 
the lines of communication in the event of war with Afghanistan. 127 It 
was increasingly apparent that frontier warfare would become more 
costly and protracted in the future, moreover, as lashkars 
assimilated military training through service in the Indian Army and 
militias and acquired increasing quantities of modern breech-loading 
rifles and ammunition. 128 Despite the realisation that the military 
effectiveness of Afridi lashkars had been significantly enhanced by 
ex-servicemen in their ranks, however, large numbers of trans-border 
Pathans were still enlisted into the military. On 1st January 1908 a 
total of 10,600 trans-border Pathans were serving in the ranks of the 
Indian Army and the various irregular forces raised in the N. W. F. P. 
since 1899.129 Indeed, endeavours were made to widen enlistment to 
include tribes other than the Afridis when the Wazirs and Mahsuds 
were recruited into the 30th Baluch Infantry for the first time. 130 
Perhaps of greater significance was the growing availability of 
modern 'arms of precision' in tribal territory. During the early 
1900s a traffic in arms from the Persian Gulf via Afghanistan flooded 
the Pathan borderland with European rifles far superior to earlier 
locally manufactured weapons. The scale of the arms trade threatened 
the political and military stability of the North-West Frontier by 
1909 and posed a serious threat to peace, after large consignments of 
high quality rifles far superior to the weapons which equipped the 
irregular forces responsible for the 'watch and ward, of the 
administrative border began to arrive in tribal territory. 131 As a 
direct result the militias and Border Military Police had to be 
hurriedly rearmed to keep pace with raiding gangs, and in 1910 the 
127 Proceedinqs of the Army in India ConTnittee, 1912. Vol. II Minutes of Evidence, 
(Simla, 1913), p. 163 L/MIL/17/5/1751/3 and Proceedings of the Army in India 
Committee, 1912. Vol. VI Appendices, (Simla, 1913), App. VIII L/MIL/17/5/1751/7 
128 Notes on the Indian Frontiers, (Simla, 1912), pp. 43-4 L/MIL/17/13/9 and Nevill, 
op cit, pp. 365-81 
129 Annual Return showing the Class ConTosition, Countries and Establishments of 
the Indian Army, Imperial Service Troops, Military Police and Militia on 1st 
January 1908, L/MIL/7/17084 
130 Military Department Despatch No. 97 of 1903: General, 11th June 1903, 
L/MIL/7/7118 and Army Departnient Despatch No. 113 of 1910, Recruitment of Mahsuds 
for the Indian Army and reconstitution of the Baluch and Baluchistan Infantry 
Regiments, 22nd Sept. 1910, L/MIL/7/7158 
13 1 Foreign Department Despatch No. 135 of 1909 (External): Proposed measures for 
the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, 2nd Sept. 1909, 
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border villages had to be issued with Martini-Henry rifles to defend 
themselves against attack. 132 A blockade imposed by the Royal Navy and 
Royal Indian Marine and amphibious operations mounted along the 
Mekran Coast successfully interdicted the arms traffic across the 
Persian Gulf from Muscat by 1911, but not before large consignments 
of modern rifles and ammunition had transformed the military position 
on the North-West Frontier. 133 The first detailed investigation of the 
size of the tribal arsenal estimated in 1910 that the trans-border 
tribes now had a potential fighting strength of 301,596 men who were 
armed with 63,564 breech-loading rifles and 40,270 muzzle-loading 
rifles . 134 Further investigations confirmed that the size of the 
tribal arsenal was continuing to grow (See Figure 5). The 
implications of the arms trade for frontier warfare and the watch and 
ward of the administrative border in the future were widely 
appreciated in India. Writing the same year F. Lovat pointed out: 
'Our preventive measures came too late. The mischief is already done, 
and all we can now do is to prevent it spreading farther. The 
tribesmen on the North-West Frontier are now armed as they were never 
armed before, and we shall discover the results of our carelessness 
in the tale of the dead and wounded if we ever again have to send a 
big expedition into the hills between the Khyber and the Gomal. 1 135 
132 Army Department Despatch No. 150 of 1909: Rearmament of the various Militia 
corps in the North-West Frontier Province and of the Zhob Levy Corps, 16th Dec. 
1909, L/MIL/3/195 
133 Report on the Arms Traffic. 1st July 1911 to 30th June 1913. (Includinq a Note 
on the Operations of the Makran Field Force in April and May 1911), (Simla, 1913) 
L/MIL/7/168641 
134 Statement of Fighting Strengths and Armament of Independent Tribes on the 
North-West frontier (Cis-Durand Line), 27th June 1910, L/P&S/7/242 
135 F. Lovat, Arms Traffic, (London, 1911), p. 43 
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Chapter Four 
The Lessons of Waziristan 
Auqust 1914 - October 1925 
Following the outbreak of the First World War the conduct of 
conventional military operations became the preoccupation of the 
Indian Army. However, whilst the mainstream of professional military 
thought was directed towards the battlefields of Flanders, the Middle 
East, Mesopotamia and East Africa, the North-West Frontier remained 
an insistent source of concern to the imperial authorities in India. 
Afghanistan and the independent tribes posed a threat to the security 
of the N. W. F. P. throughout the war. ' Three infantry divisions and a 
cavalry brigade, were mobilised and stationed in the settled areas 
for the duration of the war, in addition to the three existing 
frontier brigades and militia. The quality of these troops steadily 
declined as the war progressed, however, as highly trained and 
experienced long-service professional officers and men were sent 
overseas to France, Egypt and East Africa. Those units that remained 
were steadily 'milked' of officers, N. C. O. s and men, to act as 
instructors or replace casualties, and were soon composed primarily 
of reservists and raw recruits. During 1915, the remaining regulars 
in the Field Army were replaced by newly--raised under-officered and 
poorly-equipped Indian regiments, the Nepalese Contingent and 
Imperial Service Troops, while newly arrived British Territorial Army 
(T. A. ) regimen-cs underwent intensive training. 2 
The military effectiveness of the border garrisons directly 
concerned the General Staff in India, when unrest spread throughout 
tribal territory. In January and March 1915 militia and troops 
repelled two major incursions by Afghan tribesmen across the Durand 
line into Waziristan .3 JSt (Peshawar) Division inflicted heavy 
casualties on a lashkar near Hafiz Kor in April and, along with 2nd 
(Rawalpindi) Division and the Frontier Constabulary, contained 
1 L. Baha. N. -W. F. P. Administration under British Rule 1901-1919, (Islamabad, 
1978) ' p. 81 2 Despatch by His Excellency General Sir C. C. Monro, Coum-ander-in-Chief in India, 
on the part played by India, including the Indian States, in the prosecution of 
the war, 9th April 1919, L/MIL/7/18779 and Gen. E. G. Barrow, 'Minute on the 
Military Situation in India consequent on the War, 6th June 1915, Barrow Mss, 
Mss. Eur. E. 420/8 
3 Report by Major-General Huqh O'Donnell on an attack on Spina Khaisora on the 7th 
JanuaLy 1915, (Simla, 1915), L/MIL/17/13/24 and Report on the operations in the 
vicinity of Miranshah, 25th and 26th March 1915, (Simla, 1915) L/MIL/17/13/25 
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further attacks at Shabkadr and Subhwan Khwar in August, September 
and October 19-15 .4 The declining strength, training and efficiency of 
the troops in Northern Command was, however, partially compensated 
for when a squadron of BE2C aircraft was stationed at Peshawar in 
5 December. Armoured cars and motor transport companies were also 
6 deployed in the N. W. F. P. for the first time in 1915. Throughout the 
war a mixed assortment of Rolls-Royce, Minerva, Daimler, Itala and 
Overland armoured cars patrolled roads, escorted convoys of motor 
vehicles and maintained communications w-i-th isolated posts along the 
7 border. The small proportion of experienced officers and N. C. O. s 
capable of supervising training in Northern Command, the deployment 
of partially trained T. A. battalions and the likelihood of further 
disturbances in tribal territory, however, made appropriate 
instruction in mountain warfare of particular importance. It was soon 
apparent that an additional official source of tactical information 
would be required to supplement the general principles and six 
condensed paragraphs on mountain warfare laid down in F. S. R., as the 
relative novices now filling the border garrisons lacked both basic 
military knowledge and experience. A Mountain Warfare School was 
opened on 21st May 1916 specifically to train T. A. officers and 
N. C. O. s, who would in turn act as instructors at their own units in 
the principles and minor tactics of hill warfare. Four highly 
successful week-long courses were held at Abbottabad, Dharmsala, 
Lansdowne and Wellington, where a total of 27 officers and 108 
N. C. O. s were introduced to the practicalities of mountain warfare 
against a 'savage' opponent. 8 Training for more senior officers in 
the staff duties associated with mountain warfare also received 
attention in the syllabus of the Staff School established at Quetta. 9 
4 Report by Major-General Sir F. Campbell on the Action near Hafiz Kor, 18th April 
1915, (Simla, 1916) L/P&S/10/372 and Summary of the Administration of Lord 
Hardinqe of Penshurst November 1910 - March 1916, (Dehli, 1916), p. 92 V/27/230/72 
5 Squadron-Leader A. J. Young, 'Royal Air Force North-West Frontier, India, 1915- 
391, J. R. U. S. I., 127,1, (1982), p. 59 and Col. Montagu, 'Some Notes on the use of 
Aeroplanes on the N. W. Frontier, 25th May 1915, Montagu Mss, L. H. C. M. A. VII/3 
6 Army Department Despatch No. 38 of 1915: Provision of axmoured motor cars at 
certain centres in India, 15th April 1915, L/MIL/7/12934 and Army Department 
Despatch No. 67 of 1915: Provision of Mechanical Transport for eniployment on the 
North West Frontier, 2nd July 1915, L/MIL/7/6629 
7 Col. Lord Montagu, Report on Mechanical Transport and Armoured Cars in India, 
(Delhi, 1917), pp-12-13 L/MIL/17/5/1868 See Notes on Armoured Cars, (Simla, 1915) 
Montaqu Mss L. H. C. M. A. VII/1 
8 Report on the Principal Measures taken in India durinq the War to Maintain 
Traininq at the Standard required in Modern War, (Calcutta, 1919), p. 2 and App. A 
L/MIL/7/5466 (Hereafter Report on Principal Measures) 
9 Ibid, App. B 
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The lst (Peshawar) and 2nd (Rawalpindi) Divisions conducted 
operations along the Mohmand border in 1916, employing aircraft and 
armoured cars for the first time, exposing differences in the 
existing system of training and tactical procedures amongst their 
units. 10 At a conference held for senior officers in Dehli between 
22nd-24th February 1917, the G. O. C. 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division 
complained that there was a serious lack of uniformity in the 
application of the principles laid down for the conduct of mountain 
warfare in F. S. R., representing a source of confusion and danger in 
the field. Major-General W. E. Bunbury argued that it was necessary to 
lay down more definite rules for such operations: 'Every teacher of 
mountain warfare and every writer on the subject appears to have his 
own ideas, not so much to principles but as to how they should be 
applied, and the result is that one finds different teaching on 
certain points in every brigade and even in the battalions of a 
brigade., Opinion differed between units and formations regarding, 
for example, the correct way of posting and withdrawing piquets and 
the relative merits of piqueting slips or bayonet sentries. Although 
these appeared 'trifling, differences in procedure, he warned that, 
during prior campaigns, they had resulted in serious casualties. 
Despite his criticisms, Bunbury was a firm advocate of F. S. R., 
although he urged that definite rules for the application of its 
principles should be laid down. The ensuing discussion reflected the 
continued interest in the conduct of mountain warfare within the 
Indian Army. Major-General Sir F. Campbell, G. O. C. 1st (Peshawar) 
Division, warned that it was dangerous to lay down precise details or 
specify tactics to be employed on particular occasions. other senior 
officers were opposed to any addition to the manual, stressing the 
importance of relying solely on general principles universally 
applicable to all forms of warfare. Following a discussion of the 
minor tactics employed in various formations on the frontier, the 
Director of Staff Duties and Training observed that the Commander-in- 
Chief was, in principle, strongly opposed to the publication of a 
special manual or any additions to F. S. R.. Brigadier-General H. 
Isacke pointed out all that was required was to ensure that all units 
10 Despatch by His Excellency General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, C-in-C India, 
on the minor military operations undertaken from March 1916 to March 1917 on the 
North-West Frontier of India, and elsewhere in the Indian Enpire, includinq Aden, 
also in South and South-East Persia, (Simla, 1917), pp-3-4 L/MIL/3/1116 
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and formations based their instruction on sound principles and 
observed, that now A. H. Q. had decided to open a mountain warfare 
school at Abbottabad during the summer, more light would be thrown on 
the points that had been raised. " The G. O. C. Northern Command, 
Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett, an officer of extensive frontier 
experience, closed the discussion: 
With regard to this question, I think there is no doubt that 
mountain warfare is a science. I have always regarded it as a 
thing very like a game of chess which wants a great deal of 
skill to avoid mistakes, but at the same time it is not a 
science that can be said at any one time to have reached its 
finality. We are always going on evolving new things and a 
great many of these points that have been raised have been 
evolved gradually from experience. We must not assume that the 
stage we have reached now is the last stage of the process. I 
hope we shall go on evolving many more new points and go on 
improving our skill in this particular science, and in that way 
I think it not at all a bad thing that there should be 
differences of opinion; that one officer should think one way 
and one another and that they should go on practising the 
things in different ways until, in course of time, we shall 
evolve more new methods... We must remember that the increased 
armament of these tribes that we fight against will go on 
modifying our rules and systems. I think that any new 
expedition we might get into now will probably have to be 
conducted on very different lines from any we have had in the 
past. 
As a temporary solution he suggested that particular methods should 
be laid down in Standing Orders issued at the beginning of any 
expedition to assure uniformity of tactics throughout a column. 12 
The skirmishes which occurred between Mahsud tribesmen and 
imperial troops along the Derajat border in the spring of 1917 
reinforced the importance of specialised training for the Army in 
11 Report of a Conference of General Officers held at Dehli 22nd to 24th February 
1917 under the direction of His Excellency the Conmiander-in-Chief in India, 
(Dehli, 1917), pp. 21-5 L/MIL/17/5/1759 
12 Ibid, pp. 25-6 
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India, after heavy casualties were inflicted on inexperienced and 
poorly trained regulars. An unprecedented event occurred on lst May, 
when 51 officers and men were killed with 59 wounded and missing 
primarily due to their inexperience and poor training, during an 
attack on a convoy between Nili Kach and Khajuri Kach. 13 The G. O. C. 
Northern Command noted on 2nd May 1917, that: 'If we employ troops 
inexperienced in hill warfare, it appears to me that incidents in the 
Gomal are likely to be repeated.... To frontier warfare the second 
reserve is quite untrained'. 14 It was all too apparent, however, that 
there was no longer any real difference in experience and training 
between any of the troops left in India and that such incidents would 
continue as fighting in Waziristan increased. 15 In March 1917 the 
Mountain Warfare School reopened at Abbottabad to provide practical 
training, specifically to give instruction in the principles of war 
with special reference to mountain warfare and to establish a common 
doctrine throughout the Army in India. The Commandant, Colonel W. D. 
Villiers-Stuart, a highly experienced officer from the 5th Gurkha 
Rifles (Frontier Force), was instrumental in developing innovative 
methods of teaching to illustrate the principles and minor tactics of 
what he termed 'trans-border warfare'. Six three-week long courses 
were held between March and October 1917, five of which consisted of 
48 officers ranging in rank from Second Lieutenant to General, while 
the final class was reserved for 48 warrant officers and N. C. O. s. The 
primary aim of the school was to give its students sufficient 
training in hill warfare to enable them to instruct their own units 
and to ensure the adoption of a uniform system of training. A large 
part of the course, however, was devoted to studying the normal 
principles of war as the students were so inexperienced, before 
dealing with the specialised modifications required in trans-border 
warfare. Students were taught out by means of lectures, indoor and 
outdoor schemes and sand-table models which provided a theoretical 
idea of the tactics required in tribal territory. An attached 
infantry company, cavalry squadron, machine gun detachment and 
battery of mountain artillery, moreover, enabled instructors to 
demonstrate ambushes, piqueting and other minor tactics in the 
13 Report of the Attack by Mahsuds on a Convoy Proceeding from Nili Kach to Khajuri 
Kach 1st May 1917, (Simla, 1917) L/MIL/7/15933 
14 G. O. C. Northern Cammand to C. G. S., 2nd May 1917, L/P&S/10/373 
15 C. G. S. to G. O. C. Northern Army, 3rd May 1917, L/P&S/10/373 
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surrounding hills, as well as providing manpower with which the 
students could practise while supervised by experienced officers. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the avoidance of ambushes, in which 
the tribesmen excelled. To add realism, the demonstration troops and 
students were opposed by Indian sepoys dressed and armed as a 'savage 
opponent' . 16 The practical system of training proved highly 
successful, making the school extremely popular. After attending the 
course in July 1917, Colonel H. Ross observed: our course was run by 
Lt. Col. Villiers-Stuart who had spent practically the whole of his 
service on the frontier & was not only a keen & knowledgeable 
soldier, but a good & clear lecturer. Our work was very interesting - 
lectures, accompanied by practical examples in the hills. All were 
very well depicted. I found the course of great value to myself as it 
must have been for others. t 17 The lectures, pamphlets and precis 
produced by the school also formed the basis of booklets used to 
train units stationed along the border further ensuring the spread of 
a common doctrine. 18 During 1917 a total of 524 officers, warrant 
officers and N. C. O. s from units stationed throughout India attended 
the course before the school closed to prevent interfering with the 
course of normal collective training. In addition, the service press 
continued to provide a source of information for interested officers 
on the subject of mountain warfare during the war. 19 
The punitive expedition conducted in Waziristan in March-August 
1917, emphasised the continued importance of training in mountain 
warfare. It was fortunate that the poorly trained imperial troops, 
accompanied by an unprecedented amount of supporting arms, services, 
and modern equipment to compensate for their low efficiency, 
encountered little serious opposition. 20 Despite the efforts of the 
Mountain Warfare School, a lack of uniformity in piqueting and other 
minor tactics of frontier warfare was still evident during the 
16 R. M. Maxwell (ed. ), Villiers-Stuart qoes to War, (Edinburgh, 1990), pp-192-200 
and Goverment of India Army Department to C. G. S., 3rd May 1917, L/MIL/7/18930 
17 The Diaries of Harry Ross, (Unpublished T. S. Memoir, 1929), p. 71 Ross Mss, 
Mss. Eur. B. 235/3 
18 See Mountain Warf are Camp and Bivouac Routine, (Ferozepore, 1917) 
19 See Lt. -Col. G. M. Baldwin, I Some Experiences of Indian Cavalry in Frontier 
Warfare', J. U. S. I. I.,. 44,199, (1915), pp. 179-88, Maj. I. Battye, 'Frontier 
Mountain Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 46,206, (1917), pp-91-126 and Maj. I. 
Battye, 'Frontier Mountain Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 46,207, (1917), pp. 241-68 
20 DesDatch bv Lieutenant -General Sir Arthur Arnold Barrett, conmiandina the 
Northern Army, on the operations against the Mahsuds, March-Auqust 1917, (Simla, 
1917) L/MIL/17/13/112 
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fighting. 21 Although afterwards tribal activity was confined 
primarily to raiding, the conduct of mountain warfare remained the 
erving in the border cantonments. primary subject, of study for units s 
In April 1918 the Mountain Warfare School reopened at Abbottabad with 
an increased establishment of instructors and demonstration troops. 
Six courses were held between April and October, each having 
vacancies for 96 British officers. Two were held specifically for 
senior officers, while four were reserved for junior regimental 
officers, as a growing proportion of the temporary officers required 
greater elementary instruction than prior students. 22 Junior officers 
were given greater opportunities to practise the skills they had 
learnt by commanding the demonstration troops and carrying out 
practical exercises on the hill sides. A former chief instructor 
later observed: 
There is so much in this vitally important business that the 
average soldier in India gets no opportunity of learning. 
Theory and the sand table cannot teach the rapid tackling of 
situations unexpectedly sprung upon even the smallest body of 
men in a Frontier campaign. The School of Mountain Warfare 
supplied both the men for the students to handle, and a 
carefully trained enemy who did all that was least expected of 
them, on the rocky spurs out of Abbottabad. 23 
The Mountain Warfare School closed down in October 1918, but had 
succeeded in teaching and disseminating, for the first time, a common 
doctrine of frontier warfare to a large number of officers serving in 
the Army in India. Moreover, it had devised guidelines for the use in 
frontier warfare of new military equipment, developed during the 
First World War, although only small quantities had arrived in India. 
As a result it proved necessary to publish a new manual in June 1918, 
addressing the conduct of operations against both Afghan troops and 
the trans-border tribes and containing tentative information 
regarding the employment of hand and rifle grenades, Lewis Guns, and 
21 Maj. F. O. Wyatt, lMountain Guns for Mountain Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 47,210, 
(1918), p. 103 
22 Government of India Army Department to C. G. S., 15th May 1918, L/MIL/7/18930 
23 G. Dunbar, Frontiers, (London, 1932), pp. 301-2 
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Vickers machine guns in tribal territory. 24 However, despite a total 
of 988 officers and 204 N. c. o. s having attended courses held at 
Abbottabad during the course of the war, the vast majority of units 
in India were still far below pre-war standards of training in 
mountain warfare. 25 
The Afghan invasion on 4th May 1919 directed military attention 
in India towards the North-West Frontier when regular troops crossed 
the Durand Line and occupied the village of Bagh at the head of the 
Khyber Pass. It soon became apparent that their plan of campaign 
depended on the active participation of the Pathan tribes on both 
sides of the border. Throughout the war strenuous efforts were made 
by the Afghans to enlist tribal support by calls for jihad and gifts 
of money and arms. Such concerns proved well founded as throughout 
the war the tribes proved far more formidable opponents than Afghan 
regulars. The three frontier brigades and militia proved incapable of 
dealing with the situation unaided, resulting in the piecemeal 
commitment of the Field Army and the deployment of 340,000 imperial 
troops. The Indian Army, however, was no longer the highly efficient 
force it had been in 1914, largely as a result of the heavy 
casualties and the influx of new officers and men during the war. 
Units remaining in India were now predominately composed of new 
recruits and 'old soldiers', whilst most trained and experienced 
troops remained scattered across the Middle East and Africa. 26 
The Afghan troops were quickly ejected from Bagh on 11th May, 
in an endeavour to forestall local tribal risings. After the position 
had been captured by imperial troops with air support, further 
reinforcements were concentrated in preparation for an attack across 
the Durand Line. 27 When the 1st (Peshawar) Division occupied Dakka in 
Afghanistan on 13th May it divided the Mohmands and Afridis and 
prevented them from joining with Afghan troops. However, when Afghan 
troops and tribesmen appeared at Chitral, Mohmand country, the Peiwar 
Kotal and Fort Baldek in Baluchistan the situation worsened. The 
Afghan troops and tribesmen in the Gandab Valley, however, withdrew 
24 Notes on Trans-Border Warfare with special reference to the Ccmbination of 
Various Arms and Weapons, (Calcutta, 1918) 2nd Ed. 1919 
25 Report on the Principal Measures, p. 18 
26 Despatch by His Excellency General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro on the Third Afqhan 
War, (Simla, 1919), pp. 1-2, L/MIL/17/14/68 (Hereafter Despatch on Third Afghan War), and 
The Third Afqhan War 1919. Official History, (Calcutta, 1926), pp. 17-19 (hereafter 
Official History 1919) 
27 Report of the Action at Baqh Sprinqs 11th May_1919, (Simla, 1919) L/MIL/7/16924 
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when they failed to induce the Mohmands to attack Shabkadr. At 
Chitral a secondary Afghan operation was repulsed by local forces 
while other Afghan troops were quickly dEýfeated at Spin Baldek in 
Baluchistan and forced to withdraw. The security of the Khyber Pass 
became of paramount importance and piquets were constructed between 
Dakka and Haft Chah to secure the road. Despite the deployment of an 
entire infantry brigade, Afridi tribesmen sniped the road, cut 
telegraph and telephone lines, ambushed convoys and constructed road 
blocks. Elements of the 6th Infantry Brigade carried out punitive 
operations against hostile tribesmen near Ali Musjid on 15-16th May 
but, on several occasions, hostile lashkars gathered in the 
surrounding hills. Following the desertion of large numbers of its 
men with their arms and equipment, the Khyber Rifles was disbanded on 
17th May. BE2C aircraft attacked the Afghan line of communications 
near Dakka, while ground operations were in progress and carried out 
air raids on Jalalabad on the 17th, 20th and 24th May 1919, 
destroying the military quarter of the town and dispersing a parade 
of Afghan troops. During the confusion Afridi and Mohmand tribesmen 
looted arms, ammunition and equipment from their erstwhile allies and 
then dispersed into the surrounding hills. Kabul was also bombed on 
24th May by a single four-engined Handley Page aircraft. 28 
The Afghan offensive from Khost, which commenced on 23rd May 
1919, was considerably more successful when regulars and tribesmen 
advancing down the Kaitu valley enlisted the active support of local 
Wazir sections. Isolated detachments of the North Waziristan Militia 
and regular tr(DOPS in the Upper Tochi Valley were ordered to evacuate 
their posts and withdrew to within the administrative border. The 
militia at Miranshah however, mutinied, seizing weapons and 
ammunition from the fort, setting off several similar incidents by 
smaller detachments stationed in the lower Tochi Valley. At Wana and 
in the Gomal, Afridi and Wazir officers and men in the South 
Waziristan Militia mutinied, forcing their British officers and the 
remaining loyal sepoys to withdraw under heavy attack. Further 
desertions occurred en route and, after suffering serious casualties, 
the survivors finally reached safety at Mir Ali (See Figure 6). 29 The 
28 Despatch on Third Af qhan War, p. 10, and Of f icial History 1919, p. 49 
29 Major G. H. Russell, Comandant. South Waziristan Militia, to Inspecting Officer 
Frontier Corps, 15th June 1919, L/P&S/11/155 and C. C. Trench, The Frontier Scouts-, 
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1,100 deserters seized 1,190 rifles and over 700,000 rounds of 
ammunition which were employed with deadly effect against the 
remaining imperial troops. Following the mutiny, emboldened Mahsud 
tribesmen attacked isolated posts at Dardoni, Idak and Jandola and 
commenced raiding the Derajat. Afghan troops and tribesmen surrounded 
the British garrison at Thal on 27th May 1919, but although artillery 
fire destroyed petrol dumps, rations, forage and the wireless 
station, a series of infantry assaults were successfully repulsed. 
Reinforcements, diverted from the Khyber under Brigadier General R. E. 
Dyer, relieved the garrison and buttressed the defences in the 
Kurram, forcing Nadir Shah to withdraw harassed by aircraft, armoured 
cars and cavalry and abandoning large quantities of equipment and 
supplies. 30 
The Afghan Army ceased operations on 3rd June when an armistice 
was announced. During the summer, however, the situation deteriorated 
as a general tribal rising occurred between the Kabul River and 
Chaman. Troops carrying out reconaissances, piquets and foraging 
parties at Dakka were repeatedly sniped at by Afghan tribesmen, while 
Afridis harassed the troops in the Khyber Pass and raided Peshawar 
District. The Khyber Pass was closed on 17th July 1919, when 10,000 
tribesmen gathered in the Bazar Valley and attacked piquets between 
Bagiari and Ali Musjid. Barley Hill piquet was captured the following 
day by Afridi tribesmen and deserters still wearing khaki uniforms, 
who carried out a carefully implemented assault under the cover of 
intense rifle fire. The supporting artillery was unable to 
distinguish between the lashkerwals and the garrison, which was 
overrun when its ammunition was exhausted. Barley Hill piquet was 
soon recaptured, but the engagement demonstrated the growing 
effectiveness of tribal tactics. 31 Normal conditions were gradually 
restored after sweeps were made in the Khajuri Plain for hostile 
lashkars and when the tribesmen returned home at the end of July to 
sow crops. Despite the large number of troops stationed along the 
border, raids were carried out in Peshawar and Kohat districts by 
deserters, whom the maliks were unable to control. The Derajat border 
remained the main source of concern to the imperial authorities as 
Waziristan Force struggled to relieve isolated posts and prevent 
30 Report by Briqadier General R. E. H. Dyer on the Operations for the Relief of Thal 
May-June 1919, (Simla, 1919) L/MIL/7/16924 
31 Official History 1919, pp. 76-8 
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Mahsud raids. A high proportion of ex-servicemen and ex-militiamen in 
the ranks of Mahsud and wazir lashkars added materially to their 
effectiveness. Indeed, their knowledge of piqueting methods employed 
by Indian troops and fire and movement contributed directly to a 
successful attack carried out on a piquet near Drazinda and an attack 
on a convoy at Kapip. 32 
The Third Afghan War ended officially on 8th August 1919, but 
settlements with the independent tribes were hindered by Afghan 
officials and raiding occurred on an unprecedented scale. Afridi 
attacks in the Khyber Pass and across the border of Peshawar and 
Kohat Districts increased during the autumn, despite large numbers of 
troops remaining in the area. Apart from the destruction of Chora 
Fort in the Bazar Valley, however, punitive operations against the 
Afridis were limited to a blockade due to serious fighting in the 
Derajat and the dangers inherent in carrying out operations in 
Tirah . 33 Along with local irregulars, Indian troops concentrated on 
intercepting Afridi and Orakzai raiding gangs in Peshawar and Kohat 
Districts and imposing a blockade of tribal territory while a 
political settlement was arranged. However, it was decided that, 
following the end of hostilities, imperial troops would remain in 
occupation of the Khyber Pass. 34 The situation in the Derajat 
steadily deteriorated between 9th August and 18th November 1919, as 
g4 Mahsud and Wazir raiding gangs, varyin n size between 70-600 
tribesmen, committed 182 offences in Zhob, the Derajat, and the 
Punjab, killing 225 British subjects, wounding 276 and kidnapping and 
ransoming a further 126 civilians; in the process large quantities of 
camels, cattle and private property were stolen and carried off into 
the hills. 35 The punishment of the Mahsuds and Wazirs was judged 
essential to restore British prestige and maintain the security of 
the administrative border. During the autumn, military operations in 
32 Report by Major-General Skipton Hill Clijw on the operations of the Waziristan 
Field Force (Destruction of Drazinda) 24th June to 8th July 1919, (Simla, 1919) 
L/MIL/17/13/118 and Reports by G. O. C. Baluchistan Force on the Operations in the 
vicinity of Lakaband, Kapip and Fort Sandeman 13th-18th July 1919, (Simla, 1919) 
P. R. O. W0106/56 
33 Report by Major-General Sir C. M. Dobell on Operations on 13th September 1919, 
resultinq in the Destruction of Chora Fort, (Simla, 1919) L/MIL/7/16924 
34 Viceroy, Foreign and Political Dept, to SSI, 22nd Dec. 1919, L/MIL/7/15939 and 
Surnmary of Chief Events in North-West Frontier Tribal Territory from Sth Auqust 
1919 to 31st December 1920, (Delhi, 1921), pp. 6-12 L/MIL/7/16944 
35 Chief Canmissioner N. W. F. P., to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 
the Foreign and Political Department, 3rd Dec. 1919, L/P&S/11/167 
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Waziristan were delayed, however, by a shortage of transport, 
extremely hot weather in the Derajat and because the majority of 
Indian troops were war-weary and unready for further operations. 
Tribal morale remained high as a result of the mutinies amongst the 
militia, repeated successful raids, the presence of Afghan troops in 
Waziristan and gifts of arms and ammunit-ion which convinced them that 
the British were unable to maintain control. A shortage of officers 
and a lack of -. raining amongst the local Indian garrisons resulted in 
many successful tribal attacks. In explanation the Viceroy observed 
in October 1919: 
We have roughly two experienced officers per battalion in the 
Indian Army. The rest are men of practically no military 
experience and certainly no frontier war experience. Moreover, 
the troops on the whole, have very short service. The result is 
that vis-a-vis the Wazir and Mahsud our men are inferior, and 
the officers, through their inexperience, are unable to make up 
for deficiencies in the rank and file. It was because of this 
inexperience of our officers and troops that during the recent 
operations we had to mass such large forces on our frontier. 
And, as in the case of tribal operations the junior officer 
have to take responsibility for the work, we must expect these 
set-backs from time to time. 36 
The size of the force which was assembled during the autumn of 1919 
was unprecedented, reflecting the serious fighting that was 
anticipated and the recognised poor quality of the available troops. 
A total of 29,256 raw, untrained Indian troops and 33,987 non- 
combatant followers were placed under the command of Major-General 
S. H. Climo, organised into six infantry brigades, four infantry 
battalions, four cavalry regiments, sappers and miners and two 
mountain batteries. The combatant troops were accompanied by large 
quantities of supporting units - field ambulances, hospitals, survey 
detachments, postal units, pigeon lofts and photographic sections - 
as well as large numbers of unarmed followers greatly increasing the 
size of the force, the number of transport animals and the size of 
36 Chelmsford to Montaqu, 8th Oct. 1919, Montaqu Mss Mss. Eur-D. 523/9 
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supply columns . 37 Despite repeated requests 
by the G. O. C. a notable 
exception from the order of battle were any battalions of the machine 
Gun Corps, as acclimatised British troops were unavailable beyond 
those serving in Indian units and the officers and men of No. 6 
Mountain Battery. While intermittent fighting continued, the 
employment of new weapons on the North-West Frontier was also 
discussed. During the autumn Major-General C. H. Foulkes, the former 
Director of Gas Duties in France, toured the border to evaluate the 
potential use of poison gas in frontier warfare. A memorandum was 
circulated by the C. G. S. to local commanders in November based on his 
appreciation describing its capabilities and possible tactical 
employment, which was favourably received by both senior military and 
political officers. 38 Indeed, the commander of Waziristan Force 
requested that gas should be employed in the forthcoming operations 
against the Mahsuds. 39 Following its successes during the Third 
Afghan War, the R. A. F. was given an opportunity to carry out 
independent bombing raids after modern Bristol fighters, D. H. 9 and 
D. H. 10 bombers augmented the small detachment of now antiquated and 
unreliable BE2C aircraft based at Tank. During the autumn small-scale 
punitive bombing operations were mounted in Waziristan in reprisal 
for raids, but it proved difficult to obtain reliable information 
regarding the impact of bombing on the local inhabitants. 40 
The Tochi Valley was occupied on 18th November 1919 by two 
brigades without resistance, apart from one small section inhabiting 
an area remote from the main valley. After being bombed by 17 
aircraft on 19th November, however, the Madda Khel Wazirs accepted 
British terms. Throughout the operation, fighting was marked by its 
absence, but piqueting and the defence of perimeter camps provided 
useful instruction in mountain warfare for the inexperienced troops. 
While operations in the Tochi were underway between 13th-21st 
November R. A. F. aircraft bombed Mahsud settlements at Kaniguram, 
Makin and Marobi after the Mahsuds failed to comply with terms, 
37 Despatch by His Excellency General Sir Charles Monro on the Operations in 
Waziristan, (Simla, 1920), p. 3 L/MIL/7/16930 (Hereafter Despatch on Waziristan) 
38 E. M. Spiers, 'Gas and the North-West Frontier', J. S. S., 6,4, (1983), pp. 99-102 
and Maj. -Gen C. H. Foulkes, 'Memorandum on the use of Gas in Frontier Warfare, 3rd 
Nov. 1919, Foulkes Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 6/105 
39 Clilno to Wigram, 14th Nov. 1919 Foulkes Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 6/105 
40 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 18th October 1919, P. R. O. 
WO 106/56, Royal Air Force, India. Sunmiary of Operations 28th September to 8th 
October (inclusive), 7th Nov. 1919, L/MIL/17/5/4118 
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dropping a daily average of 10,000 lbs of bombs. Intermittent bombing 
continued until the end of the month, destroying stocks of fodder and 
food and causing cultivation to cease, villages to be evacuated and a 
decline in raiding after livestock was dispersed into small flocks 
requiring men for their protection. When it appeared that all prior 
targets had been destroyed, aircraft commenced attacking houses 
belonging to influential maliks in an endeavour to force them to 
agree terms with the imperial authorities. Despite R. A. F. claims to 
have inflicted severe damage, however, it was soon evident that the 
Mahsuds would not submit and that ground operations would be 
necessary. 41 
The two brigades that had occupied the Tochi Valley and other 
supporting units reorganised at Jandola during early December, while 
air operations continued, in preparation for operations against the 
Mahsuds in central Waziristan. The decision to employ a single 
striking force, renamed the Derajat Column ('Deracol') on 27th 
November under the command of Major-General Andrew Skeen, reflected 
the shortage of transport, the large winter scale of baggage and 
stores required, the recognised low fighting ability of the raw and 
untrained regiments available and the large numbers of breech-loading 
rifles in Mahsud hands. A single line of communication also required 
fewer troops, a smaller number of administrative units and reduced 
the demand for transport and supplies. Moreover, it was hoped a 
single column would encourage the tribesmen to mass, giving imperial 
troops an opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat at the outset of 
the campaign. 42 
The Derajat Column met little resistance when it advanced up 
the Tank Zam, Valley on 18th December 1919, but it halted at Palosina 
to build a perimeter camp and permanent piquets to secure its line of 
communication. An initial attempt to construct a camp piquet on 
Mandanna Hill on 19th December, however, ended in disaster when the 
1/55th Rifles and the 1/103 Mahratta Light Infantry were repulsed, 
with 95 dead and 140 wounded, by a strong Mahsud lashkar which 
captured 131 rifles and 10 Lewis guns from the disorganised sepoys 
41 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 22nd November 1919 and week 
ending 6th December 1919, P. R. O. WO 106/56 and Royal Air Force India. Summary of 
Operations from 9th November to 15th December 1919 (inclusive), 11th Jan. 1920, 
L/MIL/15/5/4120 
42 Waziristan Force Appreciation of the situation from 7th to 16th December 1919, 
P. R. O. WO 106/56 and operations in Waziristan 1919-20, (Calcutta, 1921), pp. 92-3 
Hereafter Waziristan 1919-20) 
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(See Figure 7). 43 19th December 1919 was dubbed 'Derby Day, by the 
troops remaining in camp who watched as both battalions raced to the 
security of the encampment below. The failure of the attack caused 
consternation, and the Derajat Column 'stood to' all night 
anticipating an assault by the tribesmen. 44 Mandanna hill was 
captured the following day when a full brigade supported by all the 
available artillery and aircraft was cornmitted. A 110 man garrison 
belonging to the 2/19th Punjabis, occupying hastily constructed 
sangars on the hill, was overrun by 20-50 Mahsud tribesmen, while 
attempting to consolidate its position. The demoralised survivors, 
abandoning rifles, Lewis Guns and other equipment, frantically 
withdrew to the safety of the perimeter camp in the valley below 
pursued by a Mahsud force half their strength. The Derajat Column was 
forced onto the defensive, although on 21st December, 67th Brigade 
attempted to construct a piquet at 'Black Hill' or Tarakai to the 
north of the perimeter camp in an endeavour to restore the column's 
badly shaken morale. The covering detachment, protecting the working 
party building sangars, was attacked and overrun by 800-1,000 Mahsud 
swordsmen, protected by intense rifle fire from ranges of 1,500 
yards, who approached unseen through the broken terrain. Intense 
hand-to-hand fighting occurred around the position, but the 3-24th 
Sikh Pioneers were forced to withdraw when their supply of ammunition 
and grenades was exhausted. An attempted counterattack failed 
ignominiously, although heavy supporting artillery fire broke up the 
massed tribesmen - inflicting 250 dead and 300 wounded - while the 
covering troops withdrew to the safety of the perimeter camp below. 
However, the Derajat Column had lost a further 66 dead and 250 
wounded during the engagement. 45 
The heavy casualties inflicted on the Derajat Column between 
19th-21st December 1919 indicated that the majority of its infantry 
battalions were incapable of carrying out comparatively simple 
tactical opera--ions against the tribesmen. A combination of poor 
leadership, a lack of basic individual training and ignorance of the 
4 -3 G. O. C. Waziristan Force to War Section, Dehli, 20th Dec. 1920, L/P&S/10/870 and 
Waziristan 1919-20, p. 102 
44 D. Rees, Indian General Service Medal, (Unpublished TS Memoir, 1955), Vol. 4 
pp. 181-8 N. A. M. 6706-21 and Ross, op cit, pp. 47-9 Ross Mss, 
_ 
Mss. Eur. B. 235/4 
45 G. O. C. Waziristan Force to War Section, Dehli, 22nd Dec. 1919, L/MIL/17/5/4119, 
Waziristan 1919-20, pp. 102-6, and Capt. D. Rees, Pioneer Piquet. 21st December 
1919, (London, 1954) 
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principles and minor tactics of hill warfare had played directly into 
Mahsud hands. Perhaps the most alarming feature was the wide 
disparity revealed between the fighting ability of the Mahsuds and 
that of the Indian infantry. Writing on 23rd December, Climo warned: 
The troops have not shown the determination or tenacity that 
was expected of them. A disquieting feature, is that this is 
not confined to one unit but is showing itself in all units 
engaged, and is liable to produce a situation that, if it 
continues or increases may become serious, as the troops lose 
confidence in themselves and in each other. The reasons for 
this lack of morale are the paucity of trained British 
officers, want of training, especially in musketry training, of 
the troops and a deterioration in the quality of the troops due 
to war-weariness and lack of trained supervision. This state of 
affairs has only become apparent in the last few days and has 
been brought about by fearless and dashing attacks by the 
Mahsuds, our infantry showing that they are unwilling to face 
so strong an opponent as the Mahsud is showing himself to be. 46 
Mahsud lashkars had demonstrated a degree of military skill and 
tactical effectiveness never before encountered by Indian troops. 
Their carefully organized attacks were unprecedented, with well- 
concealed marksmen providing sufficient rifle fire to pin down 
imperial troops, enabling swordsmen to close and engage in hand-to- 
hand combat. In prior operations neither the Mahsuds nor Wazirs had 
ever offered such determined resistance. It was evident that the 
character of frontier warfare had altered considerably, primarily as 
a result of the re-armament of the tribes with high velocity rifles 
and by their skilful combination of fire and movement. Their new 
tactical effectiveness was primarily attributable to the presence of 
large numbers of deserters and pensioners from the militia and Indian 
Army in their ranks. An estimated 2,000 ex-servicemen formed 
approximately one-fifth to one-sixth of the Mahsud fighting strength 
encountered during the initial phase of the campaign, providing 
46 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 23rd December 1919, P. R. O. 
WO 106/56 
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lashkars with leadership, discipline and tactical training. 47 Despite 
being highly effective, however, these new tactics were vulnerable to 
artillery fire, Lewis guns, and aircraft and dramatically increased 
their own casualties. As a result the lashkars dispersed on 21st 
December, in heavy rain, to replenish their stores, bury their dead 
and remove their wounded from the fighting at Tarakai which was 
occupied the following day without resistance. The discovery of over 
50 dead Mahsuds and large numbers of abandoned rifles near the 
position provided an indication of tribal losses. The column was 
given a breathing space which it used to build further permanent 
piquets to safeguard the perimeter camp and the line of 
communications without any serious opposition. 48 
The Mahsuds nearly inflicted a decisive defeat on the Indian 
Army in the hills around Palosina. Morale was badly shaken by the 
heavy losses and the apparent inability of imperial troops to secure 
piquets in the surrounding hills. After two days' operations the 
column had marched only three miles and had suffered three serious 
defeats. The Brigade Major of 43rd Brigade observed: 'We had realized 
that our troops were untrained in mountain warfare and they would 
have to buy their experience, but we had hoped that the price would 
not be so high. Only a few people... realized how close we had come to 
a real d6b&cle. '49 As a result Climo and Skeen met the C. G. S. at 
Khirgi on 21st December, where they both requested immediate 
reinforcements to bolster their badly shaken troops as well as 
permission to employ poison gas. 50 Although the C. G. S. was more 
confident than his subordinates, he concurred with their appreciation 
and ordered two battalions of Gurkhas to proceed immediately to 
Waziristan. 51 To compensate for the poor quality of his troops Major- 
General Climo ordered Skeen henceforth to attack with at least a full 
brigade and to ensure that all piquets were thoroughly fortified 
before proceeding with further operations. 52 As a result of poor 
weather, which limited air support, the column halted until 28th 
47 Despatch on Waziristan, p. 10, Waziristan 1919-20, p. 108 and Maj. -Gen. A. Le G. 
Jacob, 'Waziristan', R. E. J., 42, (1928), p. 227 
48 G. O. C. Advanced Waziristan Force to War Section, Dehli, 23rd Dec. 1919, 
L/P&S/10/870 and Despatch on Waziristan, p. 10 L/MIL/7/16930 
49 Sir J. Smyth, Milestones, (London, 1979), p. 70 
50 G. O. C. Waziristan Force to War Section, 21st Dec. 1919, L/P&S/10/870 and G. O. C. 
Waziristan Force -to War Section, Dehli, 22nd Dec. 1919, L/MIL/17/5/4119 
51 Viceroy, (Army Department), to SSI, 22nd Dec. 1919, L/MIL/17/5/4119 
52 G. O. C. Waziristan Force to the War Section, Dehli, 22nd Dec. 1919, L/MIL/17/5/4119 
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December 1919 :o reorganise and secure its line of communications. 
Despite no repetition of the earlier incidents concern remained high 
over the fighting quality and morale of the troops at Palosina. As a 
result two unreliable battalions were removed from the Derajat Column 
and withdrawn below Khirgi. The commander of Waziristan Force 
reiterated his earlier concerns on 30th December 1919: 
The actions last week have given some valuable lessons which 
will be of immediate interest and importance... Those operations 
have shown the vital necessity of regaining some standard of 
musketry efficiency. Marksmanship and fire discipline are two 
of the first essentials in frontier fighting and the present 
Indian Army as a general rule has never learnt these two arts. 
The result is that as the men have no faith in their rifles, 
they have little self-confidence and look to auxiliaries, such 
as Artillery, aeroplanes and Lewis guns for their protection 
and to win the battle. In this connection, it may be remarked 
that practically none of the junior British officers have had 
experience of hill warfare and experience of warfare against a 
civilised and organised enemy is not necessarily good training 
for hill warfare against a savage enemy. In civilised warfare 
much dependence is placed on artillery and machine gun fire and 
the lower the standard of training, the greater is the 
dependence of the Infantry on other arms till the time is 
reached when the necessity for marksmanship and fire discipline 
is almost forgotten and fails to be realised by officers who 
may never have known it. Nothing can replace these arts, and 
frontier warfare must remain expensive on lives and rich in 
unpleasant incidents until our infantry regain some of their 
ancient knowledge of musketry and fire discipline and so get 
renewed confidence in themselves and in their weapons. 53 
To compensate for the low quality of his poorly trained and badly 
shaken troops, Skeen relied heavily on superior numbers and heavy 
fire support from his battery of 3.7" howitzers and Lewis guns, and 
continuous close co-operation by aircraft. Indeed, he was so 
53 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 30th December 1919, P. R. O. 
WO 106/56 
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convinced of the need for air support that no further advances were 
attempted until the weather permitted its use. 54 Lewis guns proved 
more of a liability than an asset, however, as Indian troops were so 
badly trained that they expended vast quantities of ammunition to 
little effect. Many weapons were lost during December due to poor 
training, and as a result Lewis guns had to be withdrawn from 
individual battalions and massed to form battalion or brigade 
reserves under the direct supervision of British officers. 55 During 
December, the Striking Force was hurriedly reinforced by Gurkha and 
Frontier Force battalions replacing a further three badly-shaken 
units that were relegated to the lines of communication. 56 In 
addition, forty experienced officers were collected from units 
throughout India and the Middle East and sent to bolster the 
regiments already in Waziristan. 57 
The Mahsud resistance, poor weather and the difficult terrain 
along the Tank Zam, Valley forced Skeen to mount a slow, deliberate, 
methodical advance during late December and early January, of only 2- 
4 miles a day, interspersed by frequent halts to construct permanent 
piquets, protect the lengthening line of communications and to amass 
stores. 58 An attack on the 4-39th Garwhal Rifles on 2nd January, 
while constructing a piquet north-west of Kotkai, however, gave some 
grounds for optimism, when its comparatively well-trained, well-led 
and disciplined troops defeated the tribesmen in hand-to-hand 
fighting. Indeed, the morale of the Derajat Column slowly improved as 
the promised Gurkha battalions and drafts containing a large 
proportion of trained and seasoned senior officers arrived. As the 
fighting continued it was all too evident that major changes had 
occurred in the nature of frontier warfare and that conditions had 
altered in disfavour of imperial troops. On 6th January 1920 Major- 
General S. H. Climo outlined the difficulties faced by the troops in 
Waziristan: 
54 G. O. C. Advanced Waziristan Force to War Section, Dehli, 24th Dec. 1919, 
L/P&S/10/870 and Royal Air Force, India, Sunniary of Operations from 16th December 
to 31st December 1919 (inclusive), 4th Feb. 1920, L/MIL/17/5/4119 
55 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for the week ending 30th December 1919, 
P. R. O. WO 106/56 
56 R. A. Curties, 7 (Bengal) Indian Mountain Battery, 1919-201, in C. H. MacFetridge 
and J. P. Warren, (eds. ), Tales of the Mountain Gunners, (Edinburgh, 1973), p. 101 
57 Cormnander-in-Chief in India, to the G. O. C. Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 23rd 
Dec. 1919, L/MIL/17/5/4119 
58 G. O. C. Advanced Waziristan Force to Foreign Secretary, 27th Dec. 1919, 
L/P&S/10/870 
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My operations are disclosing much that is new to Frontier 
Warfare and a short summary of the more important developments 
will be of interest. The factor which affects everything is the 
prevalence amongst the tribes of low trajectory rifles with an 
adequate supply of smokeless ammunition.... The tribesmen 
therefore have the arms and ammunition for covering fire. This 
they employ, and under its cover they are able to concentrate 
for attack and carry out much of their approach after 
concentration. This to some extent accounts for the fact that 
they are not hesitating to attack uphill, and though this is 
assisted by the poor shooting abilities of the infantry, the 
latter fact does not fully account for the uphill attacks which 
have so seldom been met with in former campaigns, and it should 
be realised that the tribesman is now a more scientific fighter 
than he has been of the past... Another obvious result of the 
improvement of armament is the increase in casualties. There 
has not been much sniping into camp so far... the tribesmen are 
realising that unaimed fire is a waste of ammunition... Day 
sniping in consequence has increased and is responsible for 
many casualties. It is most difficult to compete with in broken 
and hilly country such as the Column is operating in at 
present. 59 
The range, rate of fire and accuracy of . 303 magazine rifles enabled 
Mahsuds and Wazirs to deliver effective fire on Indian columns and 
inflict casualties at ranges of 1,000-1,200 yards. As had been 
demonstrated twenty-one years before in the Bara Valley, individual 
snipers, or small parties of tribesmen, firing at long range with 
modern rifles could now seriously impede or halt the progress of an 
Indian column. Tribal marksmen hidden on the broken hill sides and 
employing smokeless ammunition were exceedingly difficult to locate, 
causing the advance to grind to a halt until the snipers had been 
killed, suppressed or forced to move position. Imperial troops 
resorted to heavy prophylactic fire in an endeavour to suppress 
snipers, but this usually proved ineffective, bad for morale and 
59 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 6th January 1920, P. R. O. WO 
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consumed vast quantities of ammunition further exacerbating transport 
and supply difficulties. Moreover tribal tactics became increasingly 
sophisticated, indeed lashkars deliberately restricted older black 
powder Enfield, Snider, and Martini-Henry rifles to use at night to 
prevent betraying tribal positions. " 
The main task of the Derajat Column was to precede each march 
by the construction and occupation of heavily fortified permanent 
piquets to protect the main body of the column as it moved towards 
Kaniguram. Such piquets had now to be built at distances of 1,000- 
1,500 yards at commanding points on either side of the route of march 
to keep snipers out of effective range. Their placement and 
withdrawal was frequently heavily contested by lashkars so that a 
full brigade had to be deployed. The strength of Mahsud resistance 
and their modern rifles meant carefully organised deliberate attacks 
had to be staged by the Derajat Column, requiring close co-operation 
between mountain artillery, machine guns and the R. A. F. In many ways 
this approximated to European conditions, but there remained 
important differences in methods due to the terrain and tribal 
tactics. The range of . 
303 rifles meant attempts to outflank Mahsud 
positions were more tiring and time-consuming, often ineffective, and 
had to cover longer distances than before. Indeed, the distinction 
between a deliberate attack and the seizure of piquet positions 
became blurred, as the advance resolved itself into a constant series 
of engagements to force the tribesmen back frontally and on both 
flanks, with continuous fighting to secure piquets and cover the 
movement of transport columns. Imperial troops fought a heavily- 
pressed rearguard action at the end of each day, as they withdrew to 
the security of a perimeter camp harassed relentlessly by Mahsud 
riflemen, who (lid not hesitate to engage in hand-to-hand combat when 
an opportunity offered. 61 It was impossible to ensure that all 
commanding positions within effective rifle range of a column were 
occupied, and piquets had to employ their weapons to deny tribesmen 
all other potentially threatening terrain features and keep them at a 
respectable distance. Piquet positions themselves were now frequently 
overlooked from the surrounding hills and had to be heavily fortified 
with stone walls, traverses, and belts of barbed wire to protect 
60 Waziristan 1919-20, p. 97 
61 Smyth, op cit, p. 68 
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their garrisons from rifle fire or direct assault. This required 
large quantities of engineering stores arid a considerable amount of 
time and labour. Each piquet took a day on average to construct, and 
often led to heavy fighting as the Mahsuds offered determined 
resistance. Between 29th December 1919 and 8th January 1920 the 
Striking Force lost 42 dead, 163 wounded and 30 missing during such 
operations, which often required the commitment of the full strength 
of the column to seize a commanding feature and then protect working 
parties from Mahsud counterattacks. 62 
The Derajat Column was also completely dependent on a permanent 
fixed line of communications. It was impossible for imperial troops 
to operate further than three days' radius of action from the line of 
communication without reducing medical services, ammunition columns 
and defence stores to below an acceptable level. A total of 1,400 
mules and 1,800 camels (excluding first line animals carrying 
equipment with units) accompanied the advancing troops, while 2,000 
camels worked on the lines of communication. 63 The vastly increased 
scale of supporting arms, equipment and medical services now required 
by imperial troops compounded the transport problem, causing a 
further decline in mobility and speed of movement. The tactics 
adopted by the Indian troops further exacerbated transport and supply 
problems as expenditure of ammunition, in addition to food, clothing 
and engineering stores, spiralled to unprecedented levels. A halt was 
required after each stage of the advance to await the collection of 
sufficient stores, causing as much delay as tribal resistance. It was 
necessary to ensure the security of the line of communication and 
widen tracks, as convoys were required on a daily basis to evacuate 
casualties and replenish supplies. The protection of convoys 
necessitated the permanent occupation of heavily fortified piquets at 
half-mile intervals held by large garrisons throughout the 
operations, in place of the small temporary detachments that had 
hitherto been used in frontier warfare. In the face of strong tribal 
opposition, it was simply too costly to piquet commanding features on 
a daily basis. Their construction further exacerbated the supply 
problem as they required large quantities of barbed wire, stakes and 
defence stores. In addition, moveable columns were required in each 
62 Notes from War Diaries, Part DCL Waziristan Force, May 1920, L/MIL/7/18853 
63 Ibid 
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section of the line of communication to escort convoys and carry out 
punitive operations in the immediate vicinity. 
The cumulative effect of the improvement in tribal armament and 
tactics on the conduct of mountain warfare was to slow every phase of 
the operations in Waziristan. Climo concluded: 
I am of opinion that the days of lightning frontier campaigns, 
except against insignificant tribes, are over. Such campaigns 
must be more deliberate, will entail more troops for the de- 
fence of the communications, will require more transport and 
will be more expensive in lives, but the results to be obtained 
will probably be better and more lasting as we will take 
heavier toll of the enemy and will sensibly reduce his stock of 
fighting men. 64 
The Derajat Column halted at Kotkai until 7th January, while 
preparations were made to advance through the precipitous 80 yard 
Ahnai Tangi gorge. As a precursor to an attack on the main position, 
it was necessary to seize and consolidate positions on the heights 
along both flanks of the valley around the entrance of the gorge. 
Intense tribal resistance and difficult terrain made it impossible to 
complete the positions before night fall on 7th January, so the 43rd 
and 67th Brigades returned to camp (See Figure 8). An attempt to 
construct a piquet near Zeriwam on 9th January had to be abandoned as 
darkness approached after heavy attacks. Fighting the following day 
was equally unsuccessful when the covering troops were forced to 
withdraw by heavy and accurate sniping. The casualties suffered on 
the 9-10th January amounted to a further 170 killed and wounded, but 
the vital positions on the east flank of the valley remained in 
tribal hands. The continued strong opposition around the entrance to 
the gorge prompted Major-General Skeen to risk a night advance to 
secure positions overlooking the Ahnai Tangi, before the surprised 
tribesmen could organise an effective defence and to nullify the 
impact of their rifles. 65 Despite the scepticism of experienced 
officers, the attack carried out by 43rd and 67th Brigades on 11th 
January 1920, across difficult terrain, achieved complete surprise 
64 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 6th January 1920, P. R. O. WO 
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Figure 8. map to illustrate operations in the area surrounding the Ahnai 
Tangi Gorge, January 1920. 
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and captured the positions with the loss of only 5 dead and 28 
wounded, as the ill-disciplined opposing tribesmen had not occupied 
their defences overnight due to the cold weather. It was all too 
apparent that Indian troops still could not compete with the Mahsuds 
without full and close co-operation with aircraft and artillery. 
Major-General S. H. Climo noted on 13th January 1920: 
I doubt if it is understood how desperate the fighting has been 
during these operations. It would have tried highly even the 
pre-war Frontier Force or similar regiments with long 
experience of the Frontier and years of training. It is, 
perhaps, to be expected that those who do not know India and 
the frontier, and even some who have fought on the frontier in 
pre-war days, but lack the knowledge and imagination to realise 
what conditions have altered with the great improvement of the 
armament of the tribesmen, cannot understand or believe the 
standard of training that is required for the Infantry in the 
conditions that prevail on the Frontier to-day. To such, the 
belief is natural that the mere frontier tribes cannot be 
formidable opponents to modern troops nor can they believe that 
the standard of training or method of tactics that succeeded in 
the great war can, in former cases, be insufficient for and, in 
the latter case, be inapplicable to a Frontier campaign.... Here, 
however, matters are quite different. Masses cannot be used, a 
man's safety depends on his own efforts and abilities, or at 
the most, on those of a comparatively small body of men. He is 
operating over most difficult hills where a man who knows 
little or nothing of hills is at a great disadvantage and where 
ability to read ground and knowledge of how to use it is of 
great importance. Such knowledge does not come naturally to the 
men of the plains and can only be attained by long practice 
which many of the troops here have no opportunity of 
attaining. 66 
The attack on the Ahnai Tangi gorge on 14th January encountered 
strong resistance as Indian troops attempted to seize positions along 
66 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 13th January 1920, P. R. O. 
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the ridge flanking the Tank zam Valley, leading to the heaviest 
fighting of the campaign. Intense rifle fire and concerted attacks by 
a large lashkar, which had anticipated the tactical importance of the 
position, greeted the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles as its men secured a 
permanent piquet on Flathead Left, while the main column was checked 
by accurate rifle fire from enemy positions at Marble Arch and 
Flathead Right, which made the capture of these positions imperative 
before the advance could continue. After their ammunition was 
exhausted, the Gurkhas repelled the Mahsud assaults at bayonet point, 
while reinforcements were rushed to their support. The strength of 
the Mahsud counterattacks made any advance further along the ridge 
impossible. As a result the hard pressed Indian troops consolidated 
their position at Flathead Left, while heavy rifle fire from Marble 
Arch forced the column to halt in a hastily constructed perimeter 
camp in the valley below at Asa Khan. Four determined attacks were 
made by Mahsud swordsmen under intense covering rifle fire against 
the Gurkhas at Flathead Left during the afternoon. Bayonets, stones, 
knives and grenades were employed to beat off the tribesmen, but at a 
heavy cost to the defending troops. The position was consolidated 
overnight, but its seizure and defence cost 17 officers and 365 other 
ranks dead or wounded, in the most stubbornly contested and decisive 
engagement of the entire campaign. Such losses were extremely serious 
in light of the dissipation of the column's strength in garrisoning 
permanent piquets, perimeter camps and escorting supply columns. 
However, bombing and strafing attacks carried out by Bristol 
Fighters, combined with the physical presence of several aircraft 
overhead which had exhausted their stores, prevented Mahsud attacks 
being pressed home to close quarters. Three aircraft were shot down, 
however, by ri-Ele fire from the ground. A large number of dead men 
and abandoned rifles were left in front of the piquet when the 
lashkar finally withdrew, but the lashkar had nearly captured a 
position from where the main column could have been decimated by 
rifle fire. 67 
The Striking Force remained at Asa Khan for three days to 
evacuate casualties and await the arrival of reinforcements, while 
preparations were made to advance to Sorarogha. Air raids continued 
on Kaniguram, Makin and Sarwekai by D-H-9 and D. H. 10 bombers, while 
67 Despatch on Waziristan, pp. 13-14 L/MIL/7/16930 and Waziristan 1919-20, pp. 115-9 
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Bristol Fighte. --s gave constant close support to the Derajat Column. 
On 18th January the force advanced five miles to the Sorarogha 
plateau where once again it halted to amass a reserve of supplies, 
ammunition and stores for the striking force. When the Inspector 
General of Infantry in Northern Command, Brigadier-General W. D. 
Villiers-Stuarzý, visited the column, Skeen noted that the only troops 
under his command on which he could rely were the 1/55th Rifles and 
Gurkha battalions; he once again requested experienced British 
officers and Gurkhas as reinforcements, with further aircraft, 
artillery, trench mortars and ammunition, as well as asking for 
permission to employ mustard gas. 68 The increasingly successful 
fighting indicated that the Indian troops were now capable of 
withstanding Mahsud attacks, but casualties were still heavy. 
However, writing on 20th January Major-General S. H. Climo observed: 
Some of my battalions are of little value in this fighting 
either from ignorance of hill warfare of both officers and men 
and of inability of some plains men to compete with these 
hills, or those from low fighting value and want of morale. The 
result is that the brunt of the fighting falls on very few 
battalions and the Lines of Communication becomes the location 
of doubtful units backed up by such good ones as can be spared 
from the fighting force. The arrival of three Gurkha battalions 
would enable me to free my Communications of the more doubtful 
elements, and to withdraw from the striking force three of the 
tired battalions who require a rest to refit and absorb 
reinforcements of both officers and men, at the same time 
giving much better security along the communication which are 
going to become more vulnerable as their length increases. 69 
The Derajat Column's confidence and tactical skill steadily improved 
as the continued fighting provided practical experience of hill 
warfare and its men learnt basic infantry skills under active service 
conditions. Between 29th December and 20th January it fought over 
twenty major engagements involving the commitment of more than a 
brigade. Night operations were employed to seize piquets, jumping-off 
68 Maxwell, op cit, pp. 241-3 
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areas and important defensive positions during five of the larger 
operations. These avoided heavy casualties, extended operations 
outside daylight hours and often forestalled the tribesmen occupying 
and defending strong positions and thereby using their rifles to full 
effect. The column made steady progress during January as its 
strength was steadily augmented by further Gurkha battalions, 
accustomed to fighting in mountainous terrain allowing three further 
units to be replaced. 70 
The Derajat Column began preparations while at Sorarogha for an 
attack on the Barari Tangi gorge, held in strength by a Mahsud 
lashkar. An air strip built within the perimeter camp enabled Bristol 
Fighters to closely support troops busily engaged in constructing 
tracks or building permanent piquets on the surrounding high ground, 
without having to return to bases within the settled areas to refuel 
and re-arm. (See Figure 9) . 
71 On 28th January the Barari Tangi gorge 
was captured when a night advance secured positions on the heights at 
Barari Centre, the Barrier and Gibraltar, from the surprised 
tribesmen who offered little effective resistance. A large lashkar 
assembled once again on 29th January emboldened by the presence of an 
Afghan officer and two 91b mountain guns. At Shin Konr on 29th 
January the mountain guns opened fire, while imperial troops 
constructed piquets north of the gorge, but they were rapidly 
suppressed by British artillery. A lashkar spotted ahead of the 
column declined to give battle, although it was successfully engaged 
by artillery and aircraft and forced to disperse. The sudden British 
advance, heavy casualties earlier in the campaign and the inability 
of the Afghans to render effective support effectively shattered 
tribal morale. In comparison, the confidence of the column and its 
commander increased as it became evident that organised tribal 
resistance had ceased when the main lashkars dispersed into the 
hills. 72 During February the Striking Force only encountered sporadic 
resistance from tribesmen inhabiting the immediate area, with 
fighting confined to sniping, raids and attacks on rearguards. 73 As a 
result it was able to complete the further planned stages of the 
70 Despatch on Waziristan, p. 14 L/MIL/7/16930 
71 Viceroy, Army Department, to SSI, 9th Feb. 1920, L/MIL/3/2512 
72 Despatch on Waziristan, p-15 L/MIL/7/16930 and Waziristan Force Weekly 
Appreciation for week ending 3rd February 1920, L/MIL/17/5/4119 
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operation far quicker than had been anticipated despite deteriorating 
weather. The protection of the increasingly vulnerable lengthening 
line of communication, however, was a particular concern and absorbed 
a large proportion of the available troops. Interference with convoys 
was fortunately considerably less than expected due to permanent 
piquets, and as the Mahsuds still concentrated on attacking the head 
of the column. During February punitive operations were conducted for 
the first time in an endeavour to make the Mahsuds agree terms. While 
the Derajat Column occupied Tauda China camp in the heart of Mahsud 
territory, between 19th-28th February, it conducted extensive 
punitive operations in the Makin area destroying 51 towers and 450 
buildings. Many casualties were caused by heavy sniping as the steep 
scrub-covered hills and gorges around Piazha Algad made it difficult 
to locate hidden riflemen. The complete disorganisation of the enemy, 
however, was made apparent by the limited opposition encountered in 
terrain otherwise ideally suited to tribal tactics. 74 After various 
booby traps were left to discourage the desecration of graves, the 
Makin was evacuated on 1st March and the column proceeded to a new 
camp near Kaniguram. from where further punitive operations were 
carried out against the remaining hostile sections. 75 A sign of the 
new efficiency of the troops was demonstrated when snipers were 
stalked by individual riflemen. Raids along the line of 
communication, moreover, were countered by ambushes and other 
offensive measures by Indian troops, indicating a new found 
confidence and proficiency in hill warfare. A raid into the Upper 
Baddar Toi valley between 6th-8th April ended active operations after 
which the Derajat Column occupied a permanent camp at Ladha. 76 
The Waziristan Campaign ended in May 1920, when the 
headquarters of the Derajat Column was dissolved and the number of 
troops in Waziristan Force reduced, although the inability of the 
divided Mahsud sections to make peace and the continued hostility of 
the Wana Wazirs meant that imperial troops remained in Waziristan. It 
was all too apparent to the General Staff in India that a new era had 
begun in frontier warfare against the trans-border tribes. A total of 
74 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 24th February 1920, P. R. O. 
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366 dead, 1683 wounded and 237 missing had been suffered by 
Waziristan Force in fighting of unparalleled severity, which 
represented the highest "butchers bill" ever suffered during 
operations against the trans-border Pathan tribes. 77 Tribal lashkars 
had fought with courage, determination and skill never encountered 
before by imperial troops. As a direct result of the dramatic 
improvements in tribal tactics, their possession of large quantities 
of . 303 rifles and the presence of a significant number of ex- 
servicemen in lashkars, the Indian Army had nearly been defeated. The 
low level of basic individual infantry training and a lack of 
knowledge and experience of the principles and minor tactics of 
mountain warfare amongst imperial troops had been the most alarming 
feature of the fighting, and was responsible for the heavy losses at 
Mahsud hands. During the campaign the learning curve had proved both 
steep and costly in lives as the tribesmen exploited the long list of 
mistakes committed by British officers and Indian troops. Although by 
March 1920 the units in the Derajat Column had successfully learnt 
the tactics of mountain warfare, the majority of the Army in India 
still lacked both training and experience. General Sir Charles Monro, 
the Commander-in-Chief in India, concluded the official report on the 
operations: 
[The operations] have merely borne out the principles of 
mountain warfare, which are well known from many former 
campaigns. It is, however, necessary here to lay emphasis upon 
the supreme importance of adequate training of troops prior to 
their employment in a mountain campaign. Nothing can take the 
place of careful individual training. If possible, it is more 
essential in mountain warfare then in any other class of 
fighting that troops should have confidence in their weapons. 
This can only be obtained by systematic individual training, 
which must include instruction in making the best tactical use 
of ground, in the principles of fire and movement, and the 
mental development of the soldier to such a degree of 
alertness, that no target escapes from detection and 
appropriate action is immediately taken. At the beginning of 
these operations, a proportion of the troops were not fully 
77 Jacob, op cit, p-227 
194 
masters of their weapons. This was due to ignorance of how to 
use them to the best advantage, as, owing to the demands made 
by the Great War, men had been somewhat hastily trained, and it 
is probable the severity of fighting in December was due, to a 
certain degree to this lack of training. 78 
The fighting in Waziristan also led to the first widespread use of 
permanent piquets and night operations to counteract improvements in 
tribal military effectiveness, although there use had been discussed 
by officers in India before the campaign. They had proved highly 
successful and indicated that if heavy tribal resistance was 
encountered they would have to be employed again. Additionally, 
Imperial troops were now reliant on supporting arms, services and 
equipment which exacerbated the transport and supply problems always 
inherent in frontier warfare. Despite the use of modern military 
equipment by the Derajat Column, it had been made all too abundantly 
clear that the post-war Army in India needed, once again, first and 
foremost train its men and organise to deal with two distinct forms 
of warfare: that against a conventionally organised, trained and 
equipped opponent and that against a well-armed tribal adversary in 
the hills of independent territory. 
The Third Afghan War ended with large numbers of imperial 
troops concentrated in the N. W. F. P. in close contact with the trans- 
border Pathan troops and led to a major re-deployment of the Army in 
India as well as a re-evaluation of frontier poliCy. 79 Intermittent 
fighting continued under operational conditions very different from 
that during 1919-20 in Waziristan, with three brigades tied down 
guarding the line of communication of a striking force based at 
Ladha. In March 1920 Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, agreed with the 
General Staff ---hat the occupation of central Waziristan offered the 
best means of pacifying the area and protecting the administrative 
border and sanctioned the construction of roads suitable for motor 
transport from the Derajat to the perimeter camps occupied by the 
forward troops. 80 In June 1920 those units stationed in the N. W. F. P. 
and Baluchistan, comprising 12 Infantry brigades, were redesignated 
78 Despatch on WaZiristan, pp. 18-19 L/MIL/7/16930 
79 M. Jacobson, The Modernisation of he Indian &my, 1925-39, (University of 
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the Covering Troops while the rest of the army was divided between a 
Field Army, organised, trained and equipped primarily for operations 
in Afghanistan, and Internal Security troops intended to maintain 
order in India. A total of 43 Indian infantry battalions, three 
pioneer battalions, six Indian cavalry regiments, four field and 12 
1/2 pack artillery batteries, as well as two 1/2 companies of 
armoured cars were distributed between Peshawar, Kohat and the 
Derajat as well as in Waziristan. Although trained and equipped 
identically with the rest of the Army in India, these units had a 
lower scale of transport, signals and wheeled artillery and were 
maintained on a permanent war footing ready to take the field 
immediately in event of a tribal rising. The number of British units 
- five infantry battalions - was kept at a minimum, however, as the 
climate was regarded as inimical to their health and as Indian troops 
were thought to be better adapted to tribal warfare. 81 It was clear, 
however, that the standard of training of these men was far below 
pre-war standards and that dramatic remedial action was required to 
restore their efficiency in mountain warfare. 
The Waziristan Campaign and the continued unsettled state of 
tribal territory prompted the General Staff in India to take 
immediate steps, while the fighting was underway, to provide 
appropriate training for units in the N. W. F. P.. Northern Command 
hurriedly reopened the Mountain Warfare School at Abbottabad on 1st 
February 1920 to provide sufficient trained instructors for the post- 
war Army in India. Colonel W. D. Villiers Stuart, assisted by four 
experienced officers, an attached infantry battalion, mountain 
artillery battery and a cavalry squadron as demonstration troops, 
once again assumed command. 82 A series of courses were held during 
the spring, summer and autumn to train British officers without 
previous knowledge of mountain warfare, refresh the minds of those 
with limited experience and finally to provide notes, pr6cis and 
examples of training schemes and demonstrations that could be used to 
teach their own units in an endeavour to impart a common doctrine 
81 Anny Department Despatch No. 2 (Special): The size, composition and organisation 
of the military forces in India, L/MIL/7/13315 and Review of important military 
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throughout the Army in India. 83 The curriculum followed the practical 
and realistic system of instruction used before, beginning with an 
explanation of the basic principles of war - in a deliberate attempt 
to prevent the subject becoming too specialised - before introducing 
the modifications required in their application to 'trans-border' 
warfare. As it was assumed that the comparatively well-trained 
students now at Abbottabad already possessed a detailed knowledge of 
the normal principles of war a far greater proportion of the 
curriculum was devoted to the principles and minor tactics of hill 
warfare. Widespread use was made of examples from prior frontier 
campaigns to demonstrate principles and various points made during 
lectures, which were illustrated using sand table models and 
demonstration troops. The Directing Staff pointed out to its students 
that it was impossible to employ all modern weapons because of the 
terrain. Accordingly it stressed the importance of individual skills 
in mountain warfare skill-at-arms, self-reliance, vigilance and 
personal judgement to overcome 'trans-border loneliness', that 
resulted from using small widely dispersed detachments in tribal 
territory. The Directing Staff urged imperial troops to develop a 
Jspirit of suspicion, to defeat a tribal enemy at his own game. In an 
endeavour to prevent 'regrettable incidents', students were 
introduced to the different types of ambushes that had been employed 
by the Pathans in the past and the correct means of countering them. 
The syllabus covered: piqueting, examples of drill preparations, camp 
and bivouac routine, effective covering fire, sangars, cavalry, 
mountain artillery, notes on destroying a village, the use of Lewis 
and Vickers machine guns in trans-border warfare, how to study a hill 
campaign, transport and supply, common mistakes in the field and 
lessons derived from recent fighting. The importance of study and 
learning from prior experience on the frontier was stressed both by 
Villiers-Stuart and his instructors. Particular attention was 
directed towards the modifications in tactics and the employment of 
modern equipment in hill warfare during the recent operations in 
Waziristan. Su(i-. h guidance was particularly important given confusion 
83 Staffs in India, Etc., Ist Jan. 1920, p. 54 Foulkes Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 6/111, To 
General Officer Conmianding Northern Counand, 24th Jan. 1920, P/10875, Graham, op 
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regarding the use of new weapons in tribal territory. 84 The Mountain 
Warfare School was highly popular with its students and was able to 
effect important changes in imperial tactics. 85 Villiers-Stuart later 
observed: 
We were able to revolutionise the methods of building sangars; 
show how very effective smoke candles can be when carried by 
riflemen and used sensibly; we taught a really sound method of 
attacking and destroying villages and retiring from them; the 
use of ambuscades; and a thousand matters of attack, defence, 
camp procedure, removal of wounded and much more which, though 
vaguely known and practised in the old Piffer regiments had 
never been codified as standard practice. 86 
Despite its obvious success, the school was not retained by the Army 
in India as a permanent training establishment, as the principle was 
re-established that units would carry out training under the 
direction of the staff of the formations to which they belonged. 87 
The General Staff was well aware that it would be some time, 
however, before the level of basic individual military skills and 
proficiency of units had been restored to pre-war standards. The 
provision of an up-to-date training manual for units serving 
throughout India again became a concern to many officers. Indeed, 
after the Mountain Warfare School closed it was seen as essential. 
However, the provisional post-war edition of F. S. R. published in 1920 
still referred to 'savage warfare' solely in terms of fighting 
against opponents reliant on shock tactics, and lacked the detail 
that the many inexperienced officers and N. C. O. s of the post-war army 
required. 88 Fighting in Waziristan demonstrated that this was no 
longer the case. Indeed, there was a contradiction in the declaration 
in F. S. R. that the principles of war applied without any reservations 
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to all forms of warfare, but that important modifications were 
required in their application during operations in tribal territory. 
A small pamphlet was prepared during 1920 to complement F. S. R. 
pending the publication of a larger volume on mountain warfare. The 
Commandant of the Staff College at Quetta, however, vigorously 
opposed its circulation, believing it was both misleading and 
dangerous. Major-General L. Vaughan complained that it failed to go 
deeply into the subject and feared it would reduce mountain warfare 
to a set of locally applied specialised rules that would cause 
officers to forget that the wider principles of war underlay all 
military operat-ions. Particular criticism was reserved for the 
Standing Orders it included which he thought officers would accept as 
'gospel' rather than just as an example. 89 A revised edition was 
published by the General Staff, and 15,000 copies were issued during 
January 1921 to units of the Army in India which laid down general 
principles to govern the conduct of 'uncivilized' warfare as well as 
general principles of mountain warfare against the trans-border 
Pathan tribes -for all three arms of service. It outlined the normal 
minor tactics of mountain warfare - piqueting, protection on the 
march, protection of the lines of communication, camps and bivouacs 
and night operations and moreover, provided guidance regarding the 
use of new equipment such as Lewis guns. Two lengthy appendices 
listed the duties of permanent piquet commanders as well as 
suggesting standing orders for use in a frontier campaign. 90 Training 
was also facilitated by several unofficial manuals written by 
experienced Indian Army officers. 91 Additionally, the headquarters of 
Wazirforce produced its own tactical notes, compiled from the 
memoranda it had issued periodically since it was formed, which were 
distributed to units serving in the area and contained guidance for 
all three arms of service. 92 
The conduct of frontier warfare also covered at other training 
establishments. The Royal Military College at Sandhurst, responsible 
for training officers for both the British and Indian armies, covered 
the topic as experienced junior British officers were in such short 
supply throughout the Army in India. A small manual was printed for 
89 Vaughan to Montgomery, 28th July 1920, Montqomery-Massinqberd Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 116 
90 Notes on Mountain Warfare, (Calcutta, 1920) 
91 "Frontier", Frontier Warf are, (Bombay, 192 1) and S. H. C. , Mountain Warf are Notes, 
(Poona, 1921) 
92 Wazirforce Tactical Notes, (Dera Ismail Khan, 1921) 
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use at the college to facilitate instruction including extracts from 
the official history of the Waziristan campaign and Small Wars, and 
listed various lessons derived from the Tirah campaign. 93 when the 
Staff College at Quetta reopened after the First World War, frontier 
warfare once again featured in its curriculum. 94 In 1922 its syllabus 
included seven lectures, indoor exercises and student conferences 
devoted to the conduct of military operations on the North-West 
Frontier and the political problem posed by the tribes. The lessons 
learnt during the fighting in Waziristan formed the subject of three 
detailed lectures which discussed the operations of the Derajat 
Column in depth. 95 Additionally, frontier warfare also formed part of 
the curriculum of the Staff College at Camberley where training 
followed similar lines to those before the First world War, although 
visiting lecturers provided further information regarding the 
military and political problems associated with the frontier. 96 
The N. W. F. P. remained unsettled during the early 1920s, with a 
series of minor operations against tribal raiders in Peshawar and 
Kohat Districts. Units stationed in these areas were able to carry 
out training in mountain warfare without serious interference in 
accordance with instructions issued by local headquarters. 9 7 During 
1920 fighting still continued in Waziristan against the Mahsuds and 
Wazirs. As one junior officer observed: 'on every village green in 
England monuments were rising which proclaimed the war was over, yet 
here I had only to raise my eyes to see once more the piled sandbags. 
the rough stone parapet, and writhing strands of barbed wire. '98A 
continued shortage of trained and experienced officers and men 
handicapped operations in Waziristan. For example, when the 3/151st 
Punjabis arrived in the Tochi Valley from Palestine in 1920, it 
consisted almost entirely of young officers and soldiers unacquainted 
with either the frontier or mountain warfare, with the exception of 
two pre-war regular officers on whom it relied to pass on their 
93 Notes on Frontier Warfare, (Aldershot, 1922) 
94 Vaughan to Montgomery, 28th July 1920, Montqomery-Massinqberd Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 
116 
95 See Staff College Quetta 1922, North-West Frontier Warfare. Ismay Mss L. H. C. M. A. 
111/2/14-27 
96 Anderson to Montgomery, 19th July 1921, Montqomery-Massinqberd Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 
128 
97 See Training Instructions. Mountain Warfare. Peshawar District, (Peshawar, 1920) 
98 Field Marshal Sir W. Slim, Unofficial History, (London, 1959), p. 101 
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experience-99 The G. O. C. Waziristan Force was unwilling to relinquish 
the combat-seasoned troops under his command as the available 
reinforcements were only fit for protecting the lines of 
communication. In March 1920 Major-General S. H. Climo observed: 'My 
present Units have learnt their work by practical experience and are 
good and self-confident, and I am willing to undertake operations 
with them that I would never think of contemplating with Units who 
have not had the experience. 1100 British battalions were especially 
handicapped by their lack of any experienced officers or men. For 
example, when the 2nd Battalion Queen's Royal Regiment arrived in 
October 1920, an experienced officer had to be attached from the 
2/33rd Gurkha Rifles to supervise training. 101 
The intermittent fighting in Waziristan provided further 
lessons with regard to frontier warfare, but under conditions very 
different from that encountered during the advance up the Tank Zam 
Valley as the remaining hostile sections resorted to guerrilla 
warfare. The protection of the advanced perimeter camps and permanent 
piquets, dotted along the lines of communication from Ladha, in the 
Tochi Valley and from Wana (which had been occupied in the winter of 
1919-20), required Indian troops to maintain a high standard of 
vigilance. Active small scale operations continued during which 
casualties were suffered at the hands of hostile tribesmen waiting to 
take advantage of any relaxation of military precautions. Throughout 
the spring of . 1921 heavy raids occurred daily along the lines of 
communication, making the protection of convoys more difficult. As a 
result permanent piquets had to be strengthened, the surrounding area 
searched for hostile tribesmen and extra piquets established before 
convoys with strong escorts passed though each sector. 102 In July 1921 
A. H. Q. noted: 
There are now operating in the three areas troops which 
approximately amount to seven infantry brigades. They are 
engaged in fighting a bold, well armed, and cunning enemy in an 
inhospitable and mountainous country. The heat is intense and 
conditions are very hard; the strain on officers and men is 
99 Brig. R. C. Bristow, Memories of the British Rai. A Soldier in India, (London, 
1974), p. 49 
100 G. O. C. Waziristan Force to C. G. S., 10th March 1920, L/P&S/10/870 
101 Col. H. C. Wylly, History of the Queen's Royal Reqiment, (Aldershot, 1925), pp-129-30 
102 Matheson to Montgomery, 29th April 1921, Matheson Mss 
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great, but they are rising to the occasion and a satisfactory 
standard of efficiency is being maintained. The Waziristan 
operations are nothing more or less than a frontier war on a 
large scale. 103 
It was difficult to prevent British and Indian troops, deployed on 
monotonous road protection duties, from falling into stereotyped, 
predictable routines and neglecting military precautions after long 
periods of time without contact with hostile tribesmen. New methods 
were developed and implemented on each section of the lines of 
communication to provide security from raids. 'Floating platoons', 
post-movable columns and larger escorts with convoys provided 
additional security from tribal raids. 104 The strain on senior 
officers was a constant source of concern. Major-General Sir Torquil 
Matheson observed on 27th March 1921: 'The conditions are far harder 
in a place like Ladha for example than on the Western Front... you are 
in confined place and you ever have to be on the alert. 1 105 Similar 
views were echoed by more junior officers. E. W. Langlands observed: 
'I soon came to the conclusion that commanding a Company in 
Waziristan was far more difficult than commanding a Battalion in 
France. r 106 It proved dif f icult to establish a system of methodical 
and progressive training for the garrison, whose battalions were 
constantly engaged on road and camp protection duties. 101 As the 
standard of training slowly improved greater emphasis was placed on 
offensive tactics, with patrols actively seeking out hostile 
tribesmen in the nearby hills. However, the closely intermingled 
'hostile' and 'peaceful, tribal population meant that Indian troops 
had to exercise considerable restraint and work in close co-operation 
with the local political administration. Tribesmen intent on 
attacking imperial troops frequently hid their arms and melted back 
into the local population to avoid retribution. As a result a series 
of unfortunate incidents occurred. Major-General T. G. Matheson, the 
G. O. C. Wazirforce noted in May 1921: 
103 Precis of important military events in India from ist March 1920 to 28th June 
1921,18th July 1921, P. R. O. WO 106/157 
104 Col. G. M. Orr, 'South Waziristan in 19211, A. Q. 5,2, (1922), pp. 290-2 
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The result is that from the soldiers' point of view, we are 
still at war with the Mahsuds, and everywhere we go we are in 
danger of having a bullet put through us... it is difficult to 
differentiate between the two classes i. e. the hostile and the 
friendly... The blood of the troops is up and their lives in 
danger, and it requires a very high standard of discipline to 
ignore the friendly on such occasions. on many occasions they 
are not ignored. 108 
The payment of blood money in accordance with local customs placated 
tribal sensibilities when 'friendlies' were killed by troops, but 
such incidents were a growing source of friction between soldiers and 
political officers. The arrival of untrained junior British officers 
and drafts without appropriate training or skills remained a problem 
to imperial regiments. When the 29th Punjabis joined Wazirforce in 
January 1921, for example, its ranks had been stripped of trained and 
experienced troops when it demobilised and its remaining men had only 
carried out individual, section and platoon training since the 
war. 109 Similar problems were encountered by other formations in the 
N. W. F. P.. The Commandant of the 4th Indian Brigade at Nowshera 
complained to the D. C. G. S. in March 1921: '1 wish my new battns knew 
frontier warfare - we have to start 'au fond'. At least they have 
nothing to unlearn. 1 110 
The General Staff in India discussed the resuscitation of the 
P. F. F. on several occasions during the early 1920s after the cost and 
inherent difficulties posed by conducting military operations in 
tribal territory under modern conditions were made apparent. A 
committee that met in May 1921 to discuss Indian military 
requirements, observed that frontier warfare was a specialised form 
of fighting, and advocated a reversion to specialised troops 
permanently stationed on the frontier as a means of reducing the 
strength of the Covering Troops. The resuscitation of a new frontier 
force, composed of 14-15 battalions of Gurkhas, Dogras and Pathans 
drawn from the 12th and 13th regimental groups, remained under 
discussion until the end of 1923, but the inherent problems involved 
108 Matheson to Montgomery, 26th May 1921, Matheson Mss 
109 Lt. -Col. P. S. Stoney, A History of the 26th Puniabis 1857-1923, 
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in maintaining a separate specialist force meant that line regiments 
of the Indian Army continued to serve period tours of duty in the 
border cantonments. 111 
The lessons learnt regarding the capabilities and limitations 
of modern weapons were carefully evaluated in India following the 
Third Afghan War. Aircraft, gas, armoured cars and tanks appeared to 
many British officers to offer the means of reducing the frequency 
and duration of punitive expeditions, minimising casualties, 
increasing mobility and providing a means of reducing manpower 
deployed on the frontier. Such interest was fostered by the views of 
proponents of new equipment who believed their employment would 
revolutionise not only European warfare, but also operations carried 
out throughout the British Empire. Moreover, it appeared that the use 
of such equipment against a 'savage' opponent was particularly 
justified following the 1919-20 operations, to counterbalance 
improving tribal armament and military effectiveness, and until the 
Indian Army regained its pre-war efficiency. 112 The Army Department, 
however, noted in June 1920: 'The only limiting factor we should 
accept in this respect is that of mobility, and we consider that our 
forces should be armed and equipped with all modern appliances to the 
highest degree compatible with mobility. "' 3 
The armament of imperial infantry battalions had dramatically 
increased during the First World War, although the rifle remained the 
most effective weapon in tribal territory. Hand and rifle grenades 
enabled soldiers to defend the immediate vicinity of piquets without 
being exposed -ýýo enemy rifle fire, and to clear dead ground. During 
the latter stages of the operations around Makin, rifle grenades 
proved particularly effective in clearing broken wooded terrain used 
as cover by snipers. 114 Automatic weapons appeared the best means to 
counter improved tribal armament and tactics. The number of automatic 
weapons in each battalion had been drama-,, ýically increased by the 
provision of Lewis guns, but opinion was divided regarding their 
111 Montgomery to Marshall, 12th Aug. 1921, Montqomery-Massinqberd Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 
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tactical employment on the frontier and whether they should be a 
115 platoon, company or battalion weapon. The number of weapons in each 
infantry battalions serving in India was finally fixed at only 16 
Lewis guns, one per platoon, to maintain rifle strength and due to 
difficulties in providing adequate ammunition during operations in 
tribal territory. The weight of a Lewis gun (28lbs per gun and a 31b 
bipod), however, was such that a mule was needed to carry the weapon, 
ammunition and equipment in each platoon, which was often unable to 
keep up with the infantry and acted as a drag on mobility in the 
hills. 116 Vickers machine guns were added to the establishment of each 
infantry unit following the disbandment of the Machine Gun Corps in 
1921.117 The long range, accuracy and high sustained rate of fire of 
Vickers heavy machine guns provided the infantry with its own echelon 
of supporting fire between their small arms and mountain artillery. 
These were utilised to protect the placement of piquets, support 
attacks and withdrawals and to defend perimeter camps and outlying 
defences. Their greatest drawback was the additional pack transport 
to carry the weapons, equipment and ammunition, considerably 
increasing the length of columns on the march. Moreover, their 
comparatively slow speed coming in and out of action limited 
mobility, and it was difficult to direct their fire in broken 
terrain. Despi-ýe these limitations they provided a valuable addition 
to the weapons at the disposal of infantry commanders. 118 
The mountain artillery once again demonstrated its 
effectiveness (luring both the Third Afghan War and in Waziristan. 
Several important lessons were evident both with regard to training 
and equipment. When opposed to tribesmen armed with rifles close co- 
operation between the infantry and gunners proved essential, although 
the increased range of modern mountain ordnance meant batteries no 
longer had to operate in such close proximity to the forward troops. 
A lack of a reliable means of communication between the infantry and 
batteries to direct artillery fire indicated, however, that a simple 
115 See Maj. J. G. Lecky, 'Notes on the Tactical Use of Lewis Guns in Mountain 
Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 49,219, (1920), pp. 170-188a and Ishmael, 'Tactical use of 
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and universal system as well as special training was needed to ensure 
effective co-operation between the two arms. 119 The 3.7" Q. F. pack 
howitzer represented a distinct qualitative improvement over 101b and 
2.75" pack guns currently in service, with a range of 5,900 yards, an 
all-round traverse and high trajectory that enabled them to fire from 
positions on the valley floor. It was able to search dead ground and 
clear sangars, nullahs and positions out of the direct line of sight 
of Indian troops with accurate, rapid indirect shell fire. A lack of 
a shrapnel round limited the 3.7" howitzers effectiveness, but its 
heavier high explosive shell was capable of in dislodging tribesmen 
from behind cover and killing those caught in the open. The howitzer, 
also had the disadvantage that it was difficult to range accurately, 
was unable to land shells on ridge, 4 except by chance, it took longer 
to come into action and additional mules were required to carry the 
weapon and its heavy ammunition. The relative tactical value of guns 
and howitzers in mountain warfare remained a subject of debate 
amongst gunners in India, although it was generally accepted that 
both types of ordnance needed to co-operate together to obtain the 
results . 120 Despite the f act that in many respects the role of the 
2.75" gun had been supplanted by the Vickers machine gun, a 
replacement gun was considered in 1922 to complement the 
characteristics of the 3.7" howitzer and to engage targets not 
visible to the forward infantry. 121 
The terrain and problems of transport and supply restricted the 
employment of heavier calibre artillery ý-'-n tribal territory, apart 
from areas where roads existed or where the valleys were negotiable 
by draught animals. A section of 6" guns, capable of firing a 1001b 
shell over 10,000 yards, was manhandled to Ladha in June and shelled 
Makin at intervals until September 1921, destroying buildings and 
preventing crops from being harvested. Although the presence of the 
6" guns and the threat of heavy bombardment proved effective in 
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controlling a large area of central Waziristan, no other heavy 
artillery was deployed because of transport and supply difficulties 
apart from static 151b and four 4.5" post-defence guns scattered in 
forts throughout the area. 122 
The proposals presented during the autumn of 1919 that poison 
gas could be successfully employed in India were widely supported by 
British officers acquainted with recent changes in the conduct of 
frontier warfare. However, despite frequent requests by the commander 
of Wazirforce that gas be employed, gas shells were unavailable in 
India. Brigadier W. S. Leslie summed up the view of officers serving 
with the Derajat Column on 10th January 7.920: 'Gas is the best means 
of reducing the casualty list (on our side) & here we are all 
strongly in f a%rour of it. r 123 The dif f iculties encountered during the 
fighting in Waziristan added weight to Major-General C. H. Foulkes' 
views regarding the efficacy of chemical weapons, and during several 
lectures given to senior civil and military officials at Dehli, he 
stressed that (gas would help redress many of the disadvantages that 
imperial troops worked under when operating in tribal territory with 
regard to transport, supply and the size of the force that could be 
deployed. 124 After close consultation between the Commander- in-Chie f, 
the General Staff in India and the political authorities, the 
Government of India decided in February 1920, that no distinction 
should be made between the use of gas and other modern equipment. 125 
The reluctance of the Secretary of State to sanction its employment 
on moral and political grounds, however, meant a decision was 
deferred until the wider implications of its use had been fully 
discussed in London; although pending a decision, reserves of gas- 
filled shells and aircraft bombs were stockpiled and research was 
conducted regarding gas warfare in India. ' 26 It was finally decided by 
the Government of India in July 1922 that gas should only be employed 
122 Precis of important military events in India from 1st March 1920 to 28th June 
1921,18th July 1921, p. 2 P. R. O. WO 106/157, Despatch by H. E. General Lord 
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by the Army in India in retaliation for an attack on imperial 
troops. 127 
The use of motor transport for the movement and supply of 
imperial troops, hand-in-hand with road construction in tribal 
territory, offered the best means of revolutionising the 
administrative conduct of frontier warfare, although pack transport 
remained essential to all operations in the hills. In 1919, five 
Indian Motor Transport Companies and four R. A. S. C. companies existed 
in India while a further eight Ford Van Companies were being 
formed. 128 During the 1919-20 operations five companies of Ford Vans 
were used on the line of communications of Waziristan Force as far as 
the road head at Khirgi from where pack transport carried supplies to 
the forward troops. 129 As roads were constructed in Waziristan in 
accordance with goverment policy, lorries slowly replaced pack 
transport animals, which had represented the 'Achilles heel' of 
Indian troops during prior frontier operations. Their speed, 
reliability, ease of protection and vastly increased load-carrying 
capacity made them a valuable asset. Motor transport added enormously 
to the mobility and striking power of fighting troops by increasing 
their radius of action and reducing the number of protective 
detachments required on the lines of communication, as well as by 
greatly simplifying the problems of supply and the evacuation of 
wounded. 130 
The versatility and effectiveness of the armoured car had been 
demonstrated in India during the First world War, when their 
mobility, firepower and relative invulnerability to rifle fire had 
made them ideal for reconnaissance, patrolling, the pursuit of 
raiding gangs, escort duties and the support of beleaguered outposts 
in the N. W. F. P. in areas where roads or open terrain existed. 131 The 
extent to which they could be employed in tribal territory depended 
on the nature of the terrain. A company of Jeffrey Quad Armoured cars 
was deployed in Waziristan in October 1921, to open roads', co- 
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12 9 Report on the Working of the Lines of ConmTunication Waziristan Force by 
Briqadier-General H. C. Tytler, Inspector General of Cammunications, Waziristan 
Force, toqether with certain Notes and Appendices collected for the information of 
the Staff Colleqe Camberley, (Dehli, 1920), p-21 
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operate with moveable columns and escort convoys. Similar duties were 
carried out by No. 7 Company, equipped with Rolls-Royce armoured 
cars, in the Tochi valley and the Derajat. A reduction in the number 
of road protection troops resulted, as motor transport convoys were 
faster and shorter and therefore more difficult to attack. 132 
The employment of tanks, with greater protection, firepower and 
off-road mobility than armoured cars, was carefully investigated 
during the spring of 1920 when Colonel P. Johnson, the Superintendent 
of Tank Design and Experiment at the War Office, toured the frontier 
and visited Wazirforce at Kaniguram. In a detailed report discussing 
operations against Afghanistan, internal security and the trans- 
border Pathan tribes, he enthusiastically proposed that punitive 
columns consis4%--ing solely of tanks, personnel carriers, self- 
propelled artillery, engineer tenders and armoured ambulances, 
capable of traversing boulder strewn river beds and invulnerable to 
rifle fire, could be employed in tribal territory in the future. 133 
While he acknowledged that steep and rocky terrain represented an 
insuperable obstacle to existing tanks, he believed that tracked 
vehicles could be devised capable of operating in the valleys on the 
frontier thereby revolutionising hill warfare. The reception his 
proposals received in London and India from experienced frontier 
soldiers was justifiably critical. 134 Several officers serving in 
Waziristan, familiar with the capabilities of tanks, spoke in more 
guarded terms, emphasising their importance on the lines of 
communication rather than just as fighting vehicles. 135 Despite 
believing that ultimately Johnson's views would be correct, Colonel 
J. F. C. Fuller at the war office concurred with their opinion: 
My own opinion is that as regards hill warfare we should not 
trouble too much about tanks as fighting weapons, but that we 
should concentrate in producing reliable cross-country tractors 
which will cut down the enormous number of transport animals 
132 Col. E. B. Hankey, 'Report on visit to India' , 1st Feb. 1922, L/MIL/7/17132 133 'Report on the Possible use of Tanks in India by Lieut. -Colonel P. Johnson, 
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J. R. U. S. I., 66,452, (1921), pp-191-204 
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and coolies which are required at present to supply the 
troops ... the great problem which now faces the military 
authorities in India in hill fighting is an administrative one 
and I am of opinion that a fairly reliable machine can be 
produced in the course of the next year or two which will go 
far to solve the present difficulties. 136 
In India considerable interest was maintained in the capabilities of 
both fighting and supply tanks on the frontier to reduce casualties 
amongst troops and pack animals. 137 Two experimental tropical tanks 
arrived at Ahmednagar in January 1922, but broke down before they 
could be properly evaluated. Colonel E. B. Hankey, who had accompanied 
the vehicles, held further discussions regarding the use of carrier 
and fighting tanks in tribal territory; and after touring the 
frontier added his support to the growing weight of opinion that 
tanks could be used effectively in frontier warfare. 138 It took some 
time, however, before other tanks could be designed and produced that 
were suitable for use in India. 139 An experimental (A. T. 2) "Dragon" 
carrier tank was carefully examined in March-August 1923 at 
Ahmednagar and near Peshawar. 140 It was then evaluated by 5th Indian 
Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel W. D. Villiers-Stuart, 
near Asad Khel in Waziristan between 16th and 21st August 1923. The 
former commandant of the Mountain Warfare School recommended the use 
of tanks for t. --ans-border fighting, in addition to other arms, 
following tests simulating different types of operation common in 
hill warfare. 141 Major-General J. R. E. Charles, G. O. C. Wazirforce, 
added his SUPP(Drt: 'The very great assistance which they are capable 
of rendering, in my opinion, merits their inclusion in the 
establishments of our war formations., 142 The military authorities in 
India concurred that tanks had an 'undoubted future in mountain 
136 Fuller to Cobbe, 20th May 1921, L/MIL/7/17133 
137 Montgomery to Chetwode, 27th Sept. and 16th Nov. 1921, Montqamery-Massinqber 
Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 133 and Rawlinson to Wilson, 27th Sept. 1921, Wilson Mss, I. W. M. 
HHW 2/13F/I 
138 Col. E. B. Hankey, 'Report on visit to India', 1st Feb. 1922, L/MIL/7/17132 
13 9 H. Creedy to Under Secretary of State for India, 14th July 1922, L/MIL/7/17132 
140 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 1 of 1923,15th April 1923, 
L/MIL/7/12491 and Government of India Army Department to Secretary Military 
Department, 24th May 1923, L/MIL/7/17132 
141 Report by Colonel W. D. Villiers -Stuart, officiating Commanding 5th Indian 
Infantry Brigade, Aug. 1923, L/MIL/7/11159 
142 Report by Major-General J. R. E. Charles, officiating Commanding Waziristan 
Force, 30th Aug. 1923, L/MIL/7/11159 
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warfare' although their specifications would have to be altered to 
suit Indian requirements. 143 orders were placed in the spring of 1924 
for four Vickers MK I Light Tanks, armed with two Vickers guns, and 
four Citroen Kergresse half-track cars, for use as carrier vehicles, 
but their arrival was delayed by further modifications in their 
design. 144 A combination of mechanical faults and the cost of 
maintaining the vehicles meant the Government of India declined to 
purchase further tanks after they were tested in 1925 with mixed 
results. 145 
The Third Afghan War and the Waziristan Campaign formed the 
most extensive use of aircraft in the British Empire, giving the 
R. A. F. and General Staff in India an opportunity to assess the 
capabilities of airpower in frontier warfare. 146 Aircraft initially 
appeared to be perhaps the most significant technological weapon at 
the disposal of the imperial authorities, capable of quickly 
penetrating the deepest recesses of tribal territory while enjoying 
relative invulnerability from direct attack. However, after the 
promise displayed during the Third Afghan War, when raids on 
Jalalabad and Kabul directly contributed to a rapid end to the war, 
the results of independent bombing in Waziristan proved 
disappointing. Despite intensive bombing the Mahsuds did not submit 
and rapidly adapted to air attack, refuting claims that air raids 
would demoralise the local population and make them to submit. The 
sparsely inhabited mountainous terrain, the small size of villages 
and the resilience of mud buildings, limited the effectiveness of 
bombing although considerable casualties were inflicted on livestock. 
When the Derajat Column reached Kaniguram a special committee, 
appointed to investigate the damage inflicted by aircraft, discovered 
that bombing had been inaccurate and that most buildings had been 
only slightly damaged. 147 
143 H. R. Pate, Deputy Secretary to Government of India (Army Department) to the 
Secretary, Military Department India Office, 27th Sept. 1923, L/MIL/7/11159 
144 Viceroy, Army Department, to High Commissioner for India, 10th March 1924, 
Birch to Cobbe, 17th March 1924, L/MIL/7/11159 and Review of Important Military 
Events in India ND. 1 of 1924,9th April 1924, L/MIL/7/12491 
14 5 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 4 of 1925,21st Jan. 1925, 
L/MIL/7/12491 and Maj. E. W. Sheppard, 'The Royal Tank Corps in India between the 
Wars', in B. H. Liddell Hart, (ed. ) The Tanks, (London, 1959), Vol. 1 p. 408 
146 See D. E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control. (Manchester, 1991) for a 
detailed account of the R. A. F. in policing the British Empire. 
147 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for week ending 16th March 1920, P. R. O. WO 
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The Bris-,: ol Fighters that provided close support to the Derajat 
Column on the other proved remarkably effective, making the advance 
into Waziristan possible in face of intense tribal opposition. 
Aircraft inflicted heavy casualties on lashkars with bombs and 
machine gun fire, providing heavy, flexible fire support that the 
infantry had long been denied on the frontier. They dramatically 
improved imperial morale while reducing that of the opposing 
tribesmen although several low-flying aircraft were shot down by 
rifle fire. The effect of close support declined, however, after 
heavy casualties taught Mahsud lashkars to utilise the rocky, steep 
terrain for concealment and to cease movement when aircraft operated 
overhead. During the fighting it was apparent that there were, 
however, important differences in providing tactical air support on 
the frontier when compared to conventional military operations. 
Pilots needed to be well acquainted with the tactics of mountain 
warfare and to maintain close contact with troops on the ground. An 
effective means of inter-communication between ground and air was 
essential to allow troops to indicate targets otherwise hidden from 
pilots. Popham Panels proved ineffective in mountainous terrain, 
however, while several ground strips, used to indicate friendly 
positions, fell into tribal hands during the fighting. The employment 
of aircraft to direct artillery fire was unsuccessful as few massed 
bodies of tribesmen, guns or forts were encountered that represented 
a worthwhile target. Aerial reconnaissance also proved generally 
unreliable as mountainous terrain afforded excellent cover and 
concealment, while the clothing of the tribesmen made them difficult 
to spot from the air. Aerial photographs on the other hand provided 
valuable tactical and topographical information that aided 
planning. 148 
The R. A. F. continued to be employed to provide close support, 
direct artillery fire and supply photographic intelligence. The 
system of co-operation developed originally on the Western Front 
between troops and the R. A. F. was gradually modified to meet the 
requirements of frontier warfare. Bristol Fighters closely co- 
operated with Waziristan Force during the Wana Expedition, carrying 
out reconnaissance and bombing sorties with communications between 
148 MaD. -Gen. S. H. Clim, Ccnnanding Waziristan Force, to the C. G. S. , 24th Jan. 
1920, Staff College Library 954.914 IND, Despatci on Waziristan, p. 18 and 
Waziristan 1919-20, pp. 150-1 
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ground and air maintained by a wireless set at column headquarters. 
Aeroplanes were employed to maintain contact between columns and 
advance and rear guards, to support picquets, assist withdrawals and 
engage fleeting targets and also to give assistance to isolated 
piquets and patrols. "' 
The R. A. F. remained firmly convinced, however, that aircraft 
could be most effectively employed independently to control the 
trans-border Pathans by carrying out aerial demonstrations, punitive 
bombing, intercepting raiders and supporting locally recruited 
irregulars, in accordance with the doctrine of air control originally 
developed in the Middle East. 150 Aircraft carried out several 
independent raids on tribal sections implicated in raids on the lines 
of communication. Following an attack on the 4-39th Garwhal Rifles in 
March 1921, for example, Makin was bombed for three days and aircraft 
strafed tribesmen and livestock. '-51 The small number of available 
aircraft, their limited reliability, difficult climatic effects and 
the restrictions imposed by the political authorities meant that any 
lessons learnt were inconclusive at best. 152 In 1922 the R. A. F. was 
given a greater opportunity to employ aircraft in independent bombing 
operations in Waziristan. The Jalal Khel were bombed in March by 
D. H. 9 bombers and Bristol Fighters, although this proved insufficient 
to force them to accept terms. In April, aircraft supported the 
beleaguered khassadar garrison at Wana Fort when it was invested by a 
hostile Wana Wazir lashkar. A shortage of spare parts, the result of 
an embargo imposed by the Finance Department, meant that only seven 
fighters and five bombers could be mustered by the four squadrons 
available, but these drove the tribesmen away. 153 Although the 
operations were successful a total of eleven aircraft crashed due to 
mechanical failure and this along with a shortage of spare parts 
effectively put the air force in India out of action. 154 
149 Despatch by His Excellency General Lord Rawlinson of Trent on the Operations of 
the Waziristan Force for the period 8th May 1920 to 31st March 1921, (Dehli, 
1921), p. 9 L/MIL/7/16930 (Hereafter Despatch on Operations May 1920-March 1921) 
150 Trenchard to Rawlinson, 15th Feb. 1921, Trenchard Mss, MFC 76/1/136 
151 Despatch on Operations May 1920-March 1921, p. 8 
152 S. E. Pears, Resident in Waziristan, to G. O. C. Waziristan Force, L/P&S/12/3260 
153 Rawlinson to Trenchard, 20th April 1922, Trenchard Mss, MFC 76/1/136/2, Deputy 
Secretary to Government of India, Army Department., to Secretary Military 
Department, 4th May 1922, L/MIL/7/16942 and Summary of Chief Events in North-West 
Frontier Tribal Territory from 1st January to 31st December 1922, (Dehli, 1923), 
pp. 6-7 L/P&S/12/3170 
154 G. O. C. Waziristan Force to C. G. S., 10th April 1922, P. R. O. AIR 8/125 and Webb- 
Bowen to Trenchard, 20th April 1922, Trenchard Mss, MFC 76/1/289/3 
213 
The controversy surrounding the R. A. F. in India following the 
Wana debacle pirompted the despatch of a senior air force officer from 
England to prepare a detailed report on its role, organisation and 
administration. Air Vice Marshal J. Salmond and his staff toured the 
North-West Frontier during the summer of 1922, gathering information 
regarding the use of aircraft in operations against both the trans- 
border Pathan tribes and Afghanistan. 155 Despite reservations 
expressed by military and political officers, Salmond was convinced 
that aircraft could replace troops in tribal territory, based on 
experience gained by the R. A. F. in Somaliland and the middle East. In 
August 1922 he submitted a report proposing sweeping changes both in 
the conduct of frontier warfare, and in policy towards the trans- 
border Pathan tribes. This envisaged the R. A. F. as the primary 
instrument of tribal control, resting on the belief that sustained 
independent bombing could disrupt tribal life to such an extent that 
even the most stubborn tribes would accept terms with comparatively 
few casualties and without the legacy of hatred which he believed 
ground operations engendered. An outline scheme was included in which 
six squadrons would assume control of Waziristan, working in close 
co-operation with the political authorities. 156 Such sweeping 
proposals received a mixed reception from the General Staff and the 
Foreign and Political Department. The latter was opposed to the 
R. A. F. being given responsibility for Waziristan, fearing that 
bombing would precipitate further outbreaks of fighting and 
complicate relations with Afghanistan. 157 Despite strong opposition to 
the proposals regarding the potential use of aircraft against 
Afghanistan and for internal security, Lord Rawlinson agreed that the 
experiment could be carried out in Waziristan as long as a General 
Staff scheme to permanently occupy the area currently under 
discussion was also put into effect; however he refused to accept 
that a conclusive case had been presented sufficient to fundamentally 
change policy until air control in Mesopotamia had been tested in 
practice. 158 until sufficient aircraft were available in India and the 
155 CMiSSi, op cit, p. 47 
156 Report by Air Vice Marshal Sir John Salmond on the Royal Air Force in India, 
Aug. 1922, L/MIL/7/7765 
157 Notes by Mr Denys Bray, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign 
Department, 23rd Aug. 1922, L/MIL/7/7765 and S. E. Pears, Resident in Waziristan, 
to H. Q. Waziristan Force, 5th Aug. 1922, Salmond Mss, B2599 
158 Lord Rawlinson, 'Memorandum on Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Salmond's Report, 
n. d., L/MIL/7/7765, Rawlinson to Trenchard, 22nd Aug., 1922, Trenchard Mss, MFC 
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existing squadrons restored to full efficiency, those squadrons 
already employed on the frontier were used both in minor independent 
operations and in close co-operation with troops. 
The Razmak operations during the autumn and winter of 1922-23, 
conducted in accordance with a controversial General Staff plan 
originally proposed in January 1922, finally ended large scale 
military operations in Waziristan. 159 A mixed brigade with two 
additional battalions for camp protection was, however, stationed 
permanently on the Razmak plateau to support the loose political 
administration and newly raised Civil Armed Forces - Scouts and 
Khassadars - created to police the Mahsuds and Wazirs. 160 During 1924 
imperial control was consolidated by the construction of further 
roads, bridges and cantonments in Waziristan while the number of 
incidents between the garrison and local inhabitants declined. 161 
Although the R. A. F. was given an opportunity to carry out independent 
operations against several minor sections in the spring of 1925, the 
control of Waziristan remained primarily the responsibility of the 
imperial troops, for a mixture of ethical-, political and military 
reasons, now that the new 'hearts and minds' policy had been adopted 
in the area. 162 
The extended fighting in Waziristan had provided the Indian 
Army with further important lessons regarding the conduct of frontier 
warfare, complementing that learned in the winter of 1919-20, 
together with further information regarding the capabilities and 
limitations of modern equipment. Henceforth improvements in tribal 
armament and tactical effectiveness on the battlefield meant that 
imperial columns had to operate in considerable strength in the face 
76/1/136/2, Rawlinson to Salmond, 21st/22nd Aug. 1922, Salmond Mss, B2608 and 
Rawlinson to Montgomery, 5th Sept. 1922, Montqomery-Massinqberd Mss. L L. H. C. M. A. 
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160 Army Department Despatch No. 68 of 1923: Policy in regard to Waziristan, 15th 
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of even moderate opposition and any advance through tribal territory 
had to be deliberate, governed by the establishment of a permanent 
and carefully protected line of communication in its rear. The radius 
of action of smaller self-contained columns was so limited by the 
large number of unwieldy pack animals now required that their 
employment was unfeasible in practice except in the face of light 
opposition. 163 It was evident that the standard of training and 
effectiveness of the Indian Army had dramatically improved since the 
disasters of 1919-20 and that imperial units had to train specially 
to fight the Pathans. Trials and the recent operations demonstrated 
that the majority of new weapons and equipment developed in the First 
World War were largely ineffective, due to the terrain and associated 
transport and supply problems. 164 Infantry remained the predominant 
arm and the only means of achieving decisive results in military 
operations on the frontier. Lewis guns, Vickers machine guns and the 
3.7" howitzer were the only significant additions to the Indian 
arsenal capable of being effectively employed in tribal territory. 
After some controversy regarding the appropriate organisation and 
deployment of these weapons, however, it was realised that they did 
not require any fundamental changes in the tactics employed by 
imperial troops. Their cumulative effect, however, was to increase 
the amount of heavy equipment carried in the field, the number of 
pack animals required to support imperial units and to slow the 
movement through the hills. The employment of the latest scientific 
and mechanical equipment, during operations on the North-West 
Frontier, formed the subject of the 1922-23 U. S. I. I. prize essay 
competition. In the prize-winning essay Colonel F. S. Keen warned that 
the employment of modern military technology should be tempered by 
the fact that the Pathans were British subjects and that the ultimate 
objective of British policy was to conciliate them and ensure lasting 
peace on the border. 165 After discussing the use of modern military 
technology in frontier warfare and recommending the extension of road 
building elsewhere in tribal territory, Keen concluded: 
163 General Staff Note on Waziristan, 17th Sept. 1923, Montgomery-Massinqberd mss, 
L. H. C. M. A. 140 
164 Jacobson, op cit, p. 2 
165 Col. F. S. Keen, I To what extent would the use of the latest scientific and 
mechanical methods of warfare affect operations on the North-West Frontier of 
India?,, J. U. S. I. I., 53,233, (1923), pp. 393-415 
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we must not allow ourselves to be led into the error of pinning 
our faith to revolutionary developments and superseding well 
tried arms and weapons by others which have not yet proved 
conclusively that they can perform all that is claimed for 
them. When such questions arise as the replacing of ground 
troops by aeroplanes we must "hasten slowly. " For centuries 
past cavalry, infantry and artillery have been found essential 
for the winning battles. We know that our infantry as at 
present organised and equipped, if well trained, well led and 
adequately supported by artillery, can go anywhere and 
accomplish anything in reason on the Frontier. The day may dawn 
when we shall be able to dispense with these arms, but 
emphatically the time is not yet. Meanwhile there is ample 
scope to apply the developments of science, aerial warfare, 
wireless telegraphy and telephony, mechanical vehicles armed 
and unarmed, in co-operation with and as most useful 
auxiliaries to the more prosaic forces which will inevitably 
bear the brunt of the fight for generations to come... Finally, 
when adopting new weapons and new methods we must be careful 
that in achieving the purely military object, they do not 
endanger the more important political object which we must 
always keep in view. Coercion must be used as a stepping stone 
166 to control. 
Initial enthusiasm regarding the capabilities of new weapons and 
equipment developed for the Western Front was now tempered by the 
realisation that, until adapted or redesigned to meet local 
requirements in India, it had little practical use. Indeed, in many 
respects the advantages accrued from modern weapons did not 
counterbalance vastly improved tribal firepower, tactics and greater 
relative mobility. They also proved more of a handicap when employed 
on the frontier as they were too immobile or required too much 
logistical support, while the potential of other weapons had not been 
fully explored. 167 The drastic retrenchment of the military budget and 
lack of skilled Indian personnel, moreover, also prevented the 
acquisition of large quantities of new arms and equipment. Transport 
166 Ibid, p. 415 
167 Capt. J. G. Smyth, 'Mechanism as a Substitute for Manpower in &npire Defence,, 
j. U. S. I. i., 52,228, (1922), p-251 
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and supply difficulties meant that heavy weapons were restricted to 
operations in the immediate vicinity of the lines of communication, 
although the construction of roads in tribal territory allowed motor 
transport to ease the supply problem that had dogged prior 
operations. The tactical problem faced by Indian troops operating 
from a road differed almost entirely from that when operations were 
conducted on a pack basis, both in terms of the equipment employed 
and expenditure of ammunition and stores. when operating in the hills 
even the limited quantities of new arms and equipment used lowered 
the mobility of imperial troops and increased the quantity of pack 
transport on which they depended, thereby lengthening columns and 
exacerbating problems of protection as well as reducing their rate of 
movement. Captain M. C. Gompertz concluded an article in the Army 
Quarterly discussing the employment of new equipment on the frontier: 
'One cardinal fact remains. The use of the Lewis gun enables a 
reduction in the strength of piquets and to increase fire effect: the 
motor vehicle and the tractor may speed up operations: wireless 
telegraphy may add the personal touch: the glider may become the 
infantry of the air to assist the infantry of the ground: yet the age 
long principle remains that it is the soldier who will win or lose 
the frontier. 1 168 
The lessons learnt at such cost in Waziristan and appropriate 
training formed the subject of several articles in the service press 
written by officers eager to ensure that they were not forgotten by 
the rest of the Indian Army. Imperial tactics had clearly changed on 
the frontier. Writing in 1924, Colonel D. E. Robertson wryly observed: 
A large proportion of India's forces are concentrated on the 
frontier and these troops specialise in hill warfare to a 
greater extent than elsewhere... One sometimes wonders what the 
spirits Of our forbears, those wardens of these same marches, 
whose names inspired awe along the whole border, would have to 
say of our system of permanent piquets, of the numerical 
strength we now think necessary for a picquet, of the barbed 
wire, bombs and other impedimenta which are nowadays 
essentials. Perhaps they would remark that "Safety First, " 
168 Capt. M. C. Gampertz, 'The Application of Science to Indian Frontier Warfare,, 
A. Q., 10, (1925), p-133 
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however admirable a motto for the London streets, never led an 
army to victory; that, in war, achievement, and an avoidance of 
risk, do not go hand in hand, and that mobility is the 
handmaiden of success . 
169 
The impact of improved tribal armament on frontier fighting were 
discussed at length in the J. U. S. I. I. by Colonel F. Kirkpatrick, who 
complained that the section on mountain warfare in the current 
edition of F. S. R. was outdated and pointed out that the Mahsuds and 
Afridis could no longer be regarded as 'savages, in a purely military 
sense, either in terms of their armament or tactics. As the tribesmen 
still mutilated dead and wounded, however, specialised tactics were 
still required to ensure the protection of Indian columns in tribal 
territory. He warned that operations akin to those in Waziristan 
during the winter of 1919-20 would recur if serious resistance was 
encountered, and outlined the modifications in tactics evolved by 
experience during the fighting, emphasising the importance of 
increasing dispersion and supporting fire from machine guns, pack 
artillery and aircraft to facilitate operations. 170 The different 
systems adopted to protect the lines of communication from tribal 
attack merited special attention, as continuous road protection now 
formed such a large part of military operations on the frontier. A 
wide variety of terms were used to describe piqueting, causing 
confusion and uncertainty amongst units from other commands in 
India. 171 The only means of ensuring tactical uniformity lay in 
further Standing Orders produced by units and formations serving on 
the frontier that were issued to all officers. 172 The relative merits 
of different systems of protection used on the march formed the 
subject of a minor controversy in Waziristan and in the service 
press, during which officers discussed the relative merits of 'block, 
or 'battalion and company sector' systems of piqueting. 173 writing in 
October 1925, Colonel C. A. Milward, however, warned: 'It 
169 Col. D. E. Robertson, 'The Organisation and Training of the Army in India', 
J. R. U. S. I., 69,474, (1924), p. 326 
170 Col. C. Kirkpatrick, 'Soine Thoughts on Frontier Fighting', J. U. S. I. I., 54,236, 
(1924), pp. 325-38 
171 Col. C. Kirkpatrick, 'Some Thoughts on Frontier Fighting, III, J. U. S. I. I., 54, 
237, (1924), pp-510-24 
172 See Standing orders for Frontier Warfare. 16th Infantry Briqade 1924, 
(Ahmednagar, 1924) 
173 Capt. B. Bradshaw-Smith, 'Protection on the March in Mountain Warfare', 
i. u. s. i. i., 55,240, (1925), pp. 49-54. See also Wazirforce Training Memorandum No. 
2 Mountain Warfare - Protection on the March, 10th Feb. 1924, Matheson Mss, 
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is contended that it is a great mistake to make mountain warfare too 
specialised and too hide bound by rules in which only troops 
specially trained in this form of warfare can specially participate. 
The general tactics of the British Army as laid down in F. S. R. should 
be applicable to all warfare. 1174 A series of other articles of 
considerable professional interest on the subject appeared in the 
service press in India and England discussing the recent operations 
in considerable depth. 175 Several books also appeared that discussed 
the conduct of frontier warfare under modern conditions and 
appropriate training intended for officers serving in India. 176 As 
Colonel H. de Watteville observed in a detailed study of the 
operations in Waziristan: 'The soldier required for frontier must be 
trained for the end in view. This fact had already been proved in the 
Tirah Campaign of 1897-98. rl77 
The Waziristan operations and the permanent deployment of 
imperial troops in close contact with the trans-border Pathan tribes 
confirmed the need for specialised training in mountain warfare for 
the Army in India. It was now accepted by the General Staff, India 
that the general principles of war and a small section on mountain 
warfare in F. S. R. was an insufficient basis for training the large 
numbers of troops deployed in the N. W. F. P.. The lessons of Waziristan 
were incorporated in a new manual that was compiled at A. H. Q. during 
1924, intended to complement F. S. R. and the training manuals for the 
various arms of service. Although the revised 1924 edition of F. S. R. 
included a chapter on warfare in 'undeveloped, and 'semi-civilized 
countries', with a brief section on mountain warfare, it directed 
readers to a new manual under preparation in India for further 
detailed guidance. 178 The contents of The Manual of Operations on the 
North-West Frontier reflected the important changes that had occurred 
in the conduct of frontier warfare since the First World War. A total 
174 Col. C. A. Milward, 'Protection on the March, Mountain Warfare', J. U. S. I. I. 1 55, 
238, (1925), p. 45 
175 See Maj. H. N. Williamson, 'Mountain Warfare', J. R. A. , 50, (1923-4), pp. 250-5, 
Maj. M. Everett, 'The Destruction of Makin - February 19231, J. U. S. I. I., 55,238, 
(1925), pp. 15-29 and Capt. C. W. Toovey, 'The Engagement of Black Hill Piquet on 
the 21st December 1919', J. U. S. I. I., 55,241, (1925), pp. 54-64 
176 See Lt. -Col. h. de Watteville, Waziristan 1919-20, (London, 1925) and Col. J. P. 
Villiers-Stuart, Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier Force Officer to his Nephe 
qivinq his Ideas on Fiqhtinq on the North West Frontier and in Afqhanistan, (London, 
1925) 
177 de Watteville, op cit,, p. 209 
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of 35,000 copies were printed and by October 1925 had been issued to 
units serving throughout India, after which it formed the doctrinal 
basis of training in hill warfare for the Army in India. Its contents 
reflected the 'Indian Army's extensive experience of military 
operations against the trans-border Pathan tribes, and brought up-to- 
date the existing doctrine and system of training caused by improved 
tribal tactics, leadership and equipment and changes in the 
organisation, training and equipment of imperial troops. It 
represented a significant improvement over solely relying on F. S. R. 
as the basis of all training, although it still discussed the conduct 
of mountain warfare with close reference to the principles of war. 
The manual included chapters describing the trans-border Pathans and 
tribal territory, fighting troops and their characteristics, 
protection on the march and when halted, the organisation and 
protection of the lines of communication, the conduct of the attack 
and withdrawal for all three arms, foraging and demolitions as well 
as administrative routine in camp and on the line of march. It 
emphasised the importance of appropriate training for all three arms 
of service, especially with regard to the development of individual 
skills of self-reliance, vigilance and initiative to overcome the 
peculiar difficulties encountered when fighting in tribal territory. 
Infantry units were urged to achieve a high standard of skill at arms 
and fieldcraft, as well as physical fitness and endurance to enable 
their men to move quickly across hillsides in pursuit of tribesmen. 
Despite the fact that they had not yet been employed, a section was 
included dealing with tanks in hill warfare as well as the use of the 
R. A. F. in tribal territory in co-operation with troops. Particular 
importance was attached to close co-operation between the infantry 
and mountain artillery to counter increasingly well-armed tribal 
lashkars. Imperial troops on duty in tribal territory were warned to 
stay alert and to be suspicious and observant despite long periods 
without contac-zý with hostile tribesmen. Officers were encouraged to 
read histories of past campaigns and it was suggested that, wherever 
possible, training should take place in country approximating the 
frontier hills. It pointed out, however, that a great deal of 
valuable instruction could be carried out by means of sand models, 
maps and cinema films. The manual concluded with three appendices 
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laying down a form of piqueting slip, suggested headings for standing 
orders and an exercise for a platoon on piquet duty. 179 
179 Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, (Calcutta, 1925) 
(Hereafter Manual of operations) 
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Chapter Five 
The modernisation of Mountain Warfare 
November 1925 - September 1939 
The trans-border Pathan tribes were comparatively peaceful 
during the late 1920s, apart from occasional sniping, skirmishes and 
minor operations, allowing the political administration backed by the 
expanded and reorganised Civil Armed Forces (Scouts, Khassadars and 
Frontier Constabulary) to assume the main responsibility for day-to- 
day tribal control. Imperial troops remained in close contact with 
the tribes in the Khyber Pass, the Kurram Valley, Waziristan and the 
administered areas of the N. W. F. P., supported by the R. A. F., ready to 
assist the civil administration if required. Throughout the remainder 
of the inter-war period Indian regiments served a tour of duty of two 
years out of every six in the Covering Troops' Districts, allowing 
them to steadily build up a cadre of trained and experienced officers 
and men. In comparison, British infantry units only served an 
infrequent one year tour of duty in the area. ' While stationed in the 
border cantonments, imperial troops trained intensively in mountain 
warfare, based on The Manual of Operations on the North-West 
Frontier, supervised by the staff and senior officers of the 
formations to which they belonged. Standing orders issued by the 
staff of formations permanently stationed along the border provided 
further sources of tactical guidance for both peacetime training and 
active service, amplifying points laid down in the official manual 
and taking into account local conditions and requirements at each 
station. 2 The service press also provided officers with a valuable 
source of information regarding the conduct of operations in tribal 
territory and on the use of new equipment. 3 New means of instruction 
facilitated training. During 1925 Northern Command prepared several 
1 Lt. -Col. H. B. Hudson, Those Blue Remembered Hills, (Unpublished T. S. Memoir, 
1980), p. 70 Hudson Mss, Photo. Eur. 179, and Col. H. R. Pettigrew, "It Seemed Very 
Ordinary" Memoirs of Sixteen Years Service in the Indian Army 1932-47, 
(Unpublished T. S. Memoir, 1980), p. 65 I. W. M. 84/29/1 
2 See Kohat District Standinq Orders for War and for Local Columns, (Lahore, 1927), 
Landi Kotal Standinq Orders for War 1936, (Landi Kotal, 1936) and Standinq Orders 
for Hill Warfare for 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Briqade, May 1939, (Abbottabad, 
1939) 
3 See Maj. C. F. Boyle, 'The Use of Cavalry in Operations on the North-West Frontier 
of India', i. U. S. I. I. , 56,244, (1926), pp. 52-62, Lt. -Col. G. M. Routh, 'Trans-Indus 
Problems. Some New Aspects Considered', A. Q., 17,1, (1928), pp. 23-36 and Col. H. 
Rowan-Robinson, 'The Pack Gun in Mountain Warfare, J. R. A., 52,3, (1925-26), 
pp. 365-8 
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cinema films demonstrating piqueting and staff duties required during 
operations in --ribal territory-' Indeed by the mid 1920s Indian Army 
units were highly proficient once again in mountain warfare as result 
of a combination of specialised training and frequent practical 
experience. 5 
The tours of duty in the Covering Troops' districts were always 
regarded as providing imperial troops with particularly valuable and 
highly realistic training under 'semi-active service, conditions. 
Indeed the tribesmen were popularly regarded as the best tactical 
, umpires, in the world, ready to exploit the slightest mistake 
committed by unwary troops and thereby secure valuable rifles. 6 As 
one officer observed: 
There was no pretence at all about our daily military 
training. Any fool could see the practical necessity of it, 
and examples were always occurring to show the penalty of 
neglect. There was not an atom of useless trimmings about 
our training on the frontier. Everything we did and learned 
fitted into the essential job of living among a wily and 
warlike enemy... one bit of slackness. one violation of the 
"golden rules" of frontier warfare, or one moment's 
relaxation of vigilance, and retribution would fall quickly 
upon the offending body of soldiers. For the "enemy" never 
relaxed their vigilance. They were always round our camps 
and columns, well armed and tough, just waiting for the 
moment when the soldier would slip up. ' 
The annual report on the 1925-6 collective training season noted: 
'Thus, each year fresh units are tuned up. The experience afforded by 
the conditions already existing on the Frontier will be invaluable in 
case of war. f8 The Waziristan Military District, in particular, 
4 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 2 of 1925,4th July 1925, 
L/MIL/7/12491 
5 C. Chevenix Trench, The Indian Army and the Kinq's Enemies 1900-1947, (London, 
1988), p. 128 
6 Smyth, op cit, p. 63, Lt. -Gen. Sir P. Neame, Playinq with Strife. The 
Autobioqraphy of a Soldier, (London, 1947), p. 134 and Maj. J. Croft, 'North West 
Frontier: Training Ground Supreme', A. Q., 122,1, (1992), pp. 51-60 
7 R. Hilton, Nine Lives: The Autobioqraphy of an Old Soldier, (London, 1955), 
pp. 104-5 
8 Report on Collective Training carried out in India during Year 1925-26,1st July 
1926, L/MIL/7/12491 
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provided ideal opportunities for training during periodic 'flag 
marches' or 'columns' carried out from Razmak, Manzai and Bannu, 
during which imperial troops took full military precautions, as well 
as near continuous camp and road protection duties which now 
dominated all operations on the frontier. Following the completion of 
the circular road, lorries increased the mobility of the garrison, 
extended the circuit of action of columns - the number of days a 
column could operate without replenishing its supplies - and allowed 
a steady reduction in pack and draught animal transport. Armoured 
cars formed a component part of the Razmak column in May 1926 for the 
first time when it marched to Wana and back, proving invaluable where 
roads existed for advance and rear guard work. 9 Former battle-grounds 
in the area, like the Ahnai Tangi, Palosina or Makin, provided 
considerable interest to officers studying frontier warfare, while 
local tribesmen were willing to discuss recent operations from 'the 
other side of the hill'. 10 Those units serving in the settled areas 
also received instruction in mountain warfare in areas where suitable 
terrain existed. For example, in Kohat District training areas 
existed at Chichanna, Dhoda and Siab, Alizai, Khwaja Kizar and 
Chillibagh ideal for battalion training; while manoeuvres at brigade 
level were carried out at Ibrahimzai by the local garrison and near 
Balyamn and Shinwari. 11 In Peshawar District, the Cherat Hills and 
the hills around the Khyber Pass were also regularly used for 
training and manoeuvre purposes. 12 British and Indian units normally 
had a year's notice before they joined formations stationed in the 
N. W. F. P., allowing them to carry out intensive mountain warfare 
training in preparation for their move to the frontier. In those 
districts in India without suitable training areas, officers were 
encouraged carry out basic drills on the parade ground or else use 
maps, sand models and cinema films for instruction. 13 An advance 
party, consisting of officers and N. C. O. s, was normally attached for 
three months to a unit already serving in a border garrison to 
9 Official History of Operations on the N. W. Frontier of India, 1920-1935, (Dehli, 
1945), p. 42 (Hereafter Official History, 1920-1935) and Col. O. C. Borrett, 'Report 
on March to Wana April-May 1926', 24th May 1926, L/MIL/7/16952 
10 Capt. R. E. Wood, 'Life on the Frontier', R. E. J., 42, (1928), p. 243. See also 
IIWII, IMahsud Waziristan 1919-20', J. U. S. I. I.., 60,259, (1930), pp. 193-200 and 
Pettigrew, op cit, p. 54 
11 Military Report on Kohat District, p. 65 
12 Military Report on the Peshawar District 1928, (Dehli, 1928), p. 75 L/P&S/20/B245/1 
13 Traininq and Manoeuvre Requlations 1923 (With additions for India), (Calcutta, 
1924), p. 29 and Manual of Operations, p-52 
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familiarise it with local conditions and to ensure a smooth tactical 
and administrative hand over. 14 These men provided a cadre of 
experienced instructors when a unit arrived and special 'nursery, 
columns gave an opportunity for the troops to learn about mountain 
warfare 'shepherded' by units already in the garrison under the close 
supervision of experienced officers. 15 
The British and Indian units serving in the Field Army were 
free to concentrate on the conduct of conventional 'open' warfare, 
primarily based on operations in Afghanistan against a 'second class 
enemy', during the cycle of individual and collective training into 
which each year was divided. A series of large manoeuvres were held 
during the mid 1920s to study conventional military operations using 
modern equipment. 16 Several of these exercises also took into account 
the impact which the independent tribes, astride the lines of 
communication, would have on operations beyond the North-West 
Frontier. An exercise in Northern Command in 1928, for example, 
examined the effect hostile tribesmen interposed between the two 
opposing armies would have on a conflict in Afghanistan. 17 In 1929 
the J. U. S. I. I. prize-essay competition focused on modifications 
required to the existing doctrine of mountain warfare if the Pathan 
tribes were assisted by troops equipped with modern weapons, 
artillery and aircraft; reflecting a wider awareness of the problems 
likely to be encountered on the frontier in the event of operations 
against either regular Afghan or Soviet troops. 18 
The priority attached by the Army in India to training in 
mountain and open warfare was a subject of professional controversy 
14 Brig. W. J. Jervois, The History of the Northamptonshire Reqiment: 1934-1948, 
(London, 1953), pp. 2-3, Lt. -Col. W. E. Maxwell, Capital Campaigners The History of 
the 3rd Battalion (Queen Mary's Own) The Baluch Reqijnent, (Aldershot, 1948), p. 88 
and D. S. Daniell, The Royal Hampshire Reqiment 1918-1954, (London, 1955) Vol. III 
pp. 21-2 
15 Lt. -Gen. G. N. Molesworth, Curfew on Olympus, (London, 1965), p. 85, Brig. J. H. 
Prendergast, Prender's Proqress: A Soldier in India, 1931-47, (London, 1979), p. 57 
and Grey to Mother, 4th Dec. 1932, Grey Mss Mss. Eur. D. 1037/1 
16 See Eastern Command Manoeuvres, (Simla, 1925) and Report on the Staff Exercise 
and Manoeuvres held under the orders of the G. O. C. -in-C Northern Conunand, India 
22nd November to 30th November 1925, (Calcutta, 1926) 
17 Report on Northern Command Manoeuvres (India) 1928, (Dehli, 1929) 
L/MIL/17/5/1815 
18 Maj. L. E. Dennys, 'In future campaigns on the frontier we may encounter 
tribesmen, either equipped themselves with, or supported by other troops 
possessing modern artillery and aircraft. How can we best, both on the march and 
in bivouac, combine protective measures to safeguard ourselves against tribal 
tactics, as we have known them in the past, supported by such modern weapons. ', 
J. U. S. I. I., 60,258, (1930), pp. 5-16 
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between officers, whose attention focused on a likely conventional 
conflict, and -, -hose concerned with the 
day-to-day requirements of 
Indian defence. Normally the focus of British service officers was 
directed towards conventional military operations and was more 
critical of the doctrine employed for 'savage warfare, on the 
frontier, believing that the lesser was by default contained in the 
greater. Indeed, the tactics of frontier warfare appeared 
increasingly anachronistic and diametrically opposed to European 
practice, as the first hesitant steps to mechanise and to absorb the 
lessons of the First World War were taken in England. After attending 
the Staff College at Quetta in 1927-29, Lieutenant-General F. Morgan 
critically observed: 'Frontier warfare had become, over the 
generations, a matter of extreme formalism, comparable with the wars 
of stereotyped manoeuvre in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. To many of us who were unhampered by practical experience 
or preconceived notions it seemed as if the rules of the game had 
taken charge to the extent of obscuring any well defined strategic 
object. 119 The emphasis placed on training for 'savage warfare, by 
the Army in India and its apparent reluctance to adopt modern 
equipment was increasingly criticised by British Army officers as 
units in England began to adopt new equipment and training. 20 In 
comparison, the Indian Army lagged steadily behind, primarily as a 
result of budgetary constraints and the lack of equipment suitable 
for the local requirements of frontier warfare and internal 
security. 21 The importance of training in mountain warfare, however, 
was more readiiy appreciated by Indian Army officers, for whom 
frontier service formed such a large part of normal military 
experience. As one officer noted in the L'T. U. S. I. I. in July 1930: 
There are two forms of warfare to be taught in India, viz, open 
warfare and mountain warfare. Except for those stationed on the 
frontier the former of course requires the most attention, but 
mountain warfare should never be entirely neglected in view of 
19 Lt. -Gen. Sir F. Morgan, Peace and War: A Soldier's Life, (London, 1961), pp. 90-1 
20 Ironside to Liddell Hart, 29th May 1929 and 27th Sept. 1929, Liddell Hart Mss, 
L. H. C. M. A. 1/401, Bvt. Maj. B. C. Dening, The Future of the British Army: The 
Problem of Duties, Cost and Composition, (London, 1928), pp-60-2, and Jacobson, op 
cit, pp. 27-8 
21 T. A. Heathcote, The Military in British India The Development of British Land 
Forces in South Asia 1600-1946, (Manchester, 1995), p. 242 
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the fact that wherever the Army in India fights in the future 
it is almost certain to be in mountainous country. in addition, 
about a third of our Army in India is presently stationed on 
the frontier and practically every unit takes a turn of duty 
there sooner or later. It has been argued and will continue to 
be argued to the end of all time, particularly by those whose 
knowledge of mountain warfare is limited, that such training is 
unnecessary and even detrimental, but the undoubted fact 
remains that troops unaccustomed to and untrained for warfare 
in mountainous country are at a very great disadvantage until 
they have learnt the "tricks of the trade" and are physically 
fit to climb mountains, which they can never be so long as they 
confine themselves entirely to foot-slogging on the plains. 22 
The criticism of the way the Indian Army conducted mountain 
warfare redoubled during the summer of 1930 when civil disturbances 
in the N. W. F. P. sparked widespread unrest in tribal territory. 
Elements of the Field Army hurriedly reinforced the garrison of the 
Covering Troops Districts to deal with a combination of widespread 
23 internal disorder and tribal incursions into Peshawar District. 
During the fighting tribal tactics were 41-ncreasingly sophisticated 
and new weapons were employed by lashkars against imperial troops for 
the first time. In Waziristan a tribal gun was used against Sorarogha 
post but fortunately for the defenders, the South Waziristan Militia, 
its breech block blew out putting it out of action. 24 Land mines made 
from gelignite or explosives from unexploded R. A. F. bombs were 
employed on the Khajuri Plain as defensive weapons against armoured 
cars and lorries. 25 The conduct of the military operations in 
Peshawar District and Waziristan was heavily criticised in the 
popular press in India while the fighting was in progress. Such 
criticism mounted during the autumn and winter while further 
operations were carried out on the Khajuri Plain by three brigades, 
22 "An Infantry Officer", 'Collective Training in a Battalion', J. U. S. I. I., 60,259, 
(1930), p. 128 
23 See Despatch by H. E. Field Marshal Sir W. R. Birdwood on the Disturbances on the 
North-West Frontier of India from 23rd April to 12th September, 1930, (Dehli, 
1930), L/MIL/7/16956 (Hereafter Despatch on Disturbances) 
24 Summary of Events in North-West Frontier Tribal Territory. 1st January, 1930, to 
31st December, 1930, (Simla, 1931) L/MIL/7/16944 (Hereafter Suriunary January - 
December 1930) 
25 Brig. -Gen. E. B. Matthew- Lannowe, 'Land Mining in Frontier Warfare', J. R. U. S. I., 
79,514, (1934), - p. 339-54 and Official History 1920-1935, pp. 120-1 P 
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intended to deny the Afridis the use of jumping-off areas used 
earlier that year, and to cover the construction of a network of 
roads and post, . 3.26 It appeared to many observers that the army had 
grown ponderous, over-cautious and its 'tactics too stereotyped, 
especially after Afridi lashkars penetrated Peshawar District and 
escaped relatively unscathed back across the administrative border. 
In comparison, the high mobility and effectiveness of the lightly 
equipped Scouts and Frontier Constabulary had enabled them to deal 
successfully with elusive tribal raiders throughout the operations, 
prompting accusations that the Indian Army was incapable of 
performing its role in the watch and ward of tribal territory. The 
fact that it had been found necessary to reinforce the garrison in 
Peshawar District with such irregulars appeared to indicate that its 
effectiveness had declined, prompting several suggestions in the 
press for the re-establishment of a localised force organised, 
trained and equipped exclusively for operations against the trans- 
border Pathans. 27 
The lessons the Indian Army learnt from the 1930-31 operations 
were mixed and contradictory. The mobility conferred by the road 
network in Waziristan and within the N. W. F. P. together with the 
provision Of Motor transport, had altered the tactical and 
administrative conduct of frontier warfare, enabling reinforcements 
to be rushed to threatened points along the border. For example, two 
and a half infantry battalions and a company of sappers were 
transported 42 miles by lorry between 7th and 9th July 1930 from 
Bannu to reinforce the Razmak garrison. Armoured cars were used 
extensively in Peshawar District between 7th and 14th August to 
patrol the area, and in Waziristan to support isolated posts. The 
speed of motor transport columns also simplified piqueting and 
lightened the task of the road protection troops. Lorries transported 
piqueting troops and their supporting machine guns in areas where 
light opposition was encountered, making it possible to employ each 
echelon on more than one task a day, without impeding a column's 
movement and ensuring that troops remained fresh. Perhaps more 
importantly, motor transport greatly simplified the logistical and 
26 Capt. E. E. French, 'Tribal Ordnance,, J. R. A., 57,4, (1930-31), pp. 506-7 and 
"Slora", 'The Siege of Sararoghal, J. U. S. I. I., 61,263, (1931), pp. 174-81 
'Editorial', J. U. S. I. I., 61,262, (1931), pp. 1-9 and Mauser, 'A Forgotten 
Frontier Force', English Review, 52, (1931), pp. 69-72 
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administrative problems encountered by Indian troops operating in 
tribal territory. A convoy of 84 lorries carried 5 1/2 days supplies, 
for example, for the Razmak column on 23rd July 1930, a distance of 
15 1/2 miles from Razmak to Ladha, along roads and the bed of the 
Baddar Toi river, before returning to camp later the same day. Indian 
columns utilising motor transport were tied, however, to advancing 
along predictable routes, enabling hostile tribesmen to anticipate 
their lines of approach, to concentrate and prepare defences. 
Furthermore, the majority of motor vehicles were still restricted to 
those areas where animal-drawn carts had previously been employed as 
no vehicles were capable of operating in the hills. 28 
The off-road mobility and tactical effectiveness of Indian 
columns operating in Waziristan and Peshawar districts had now, 
however, sharply declined due to the large numbers of troops deemed 
necessary and changes in the organisation, equipment and training of 
the Indian Army. Indeed, the pace of an advance and the distance a 
column could march in a single day were lower than they had been 
fifty years earlier as the number of mules on which they depended had 
dramatically increased due to the higher scales of arms, equipment, 
supplies and maintenance services now required in the field. The 
growing tail, of pack animals compounded the administrative and 
tactical problem faced by Indian commanders and acted as a brake on 
mobility, reducing the circuit of action of columns and slowing down 
every stage of operations, lengthening the line of march and 
exacerbating the already difficult problem of ensuring all-round 
protection. 29 The company of Vickers machine guns that had been 
established in each British and Indian infantry battalion in 1929, in 
accordance with a new imperial establishment, compounded the problem 
as additional mules were needed to carry these comparatively immobile 
heavy weapons and their ammunition. The rifle strength of Indian 
battalions, which now consisted of a machine gun and three infantry 
companies, was considerably reduced, despite initial restrictions 
being placed on the number of machine guns in Indian units to 
maintain both numbers and mobility in the hills. 30 Training the 
28 Ibid p. 17, Review of Important Military Events in India No. 3 of 1930,28th Oct. 
1930, L/MIL/7/12491 
29 'Editorial', J. U. S. I. I., 61,262, (1931), p. 8 
30 Kirke to Bethell, 1st June 1928, Kirke Mss, Mss. Eur. E. 396/7, Army Department 
Despatch No. 20 of 1928: Reorganisation of Cavali-y and Infantry units in India, 
29th Nov. 1928, and Memorandum Explaining the Proposed reorganisation of Cavalry 
and Infantry Units in India, L/MIL/7/13317 
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previous winter had already indicated that an infantry battalion was 
unable to provide the same number of piquets, lowering the distance 
it could protect from three to two miles which effectively limited 
the distance a column could march in a single day. 31 Moreover, there 
was little official guidance on how to employ a reorganised battalion 
in tribal territory and experiments during 1930 met with mixed 
results. The extra firepower conferred by the additional machine guns 
dramatically increased the expenditure of ammunition, making lashkars 
wary of engaging Indian columns or following up rearguards, thereby 
limiting opportunities to inflict heavy casualties. 32 The strict 
observance of full military precautions and an obsession with the 
principle of security overrode other operational requirements, 
slowing movement to a crawl and tying Indian columns to cautious and 
unimaginative advances along the valley floors. It now took longer to 
piquet a route as periodic halts were necessary while covering 
machine gun and artillery fire was carefully arranged to support the 
placement and withdrawal of piquets. An avoidance of casualties, the 
recovery of dead and wounded and efforts to prevent the theft of arms 
and ammunition stultified efforts to bring hostile lashkars to battle 
or to achieve surprise. An inability to differentiate between the 
tactical requirements of conventional warfare and those on the 
frontier further compounded the problem. Indian commanders mounted 
deliberate set. -piece attacks backed with a full panoply of supporting 
arms, despite -, ýýhe fact that the lashkars seldom awaited the results. 
Attacks often (jot bogged down while reconnaissance, order groups, 
artillery barrages and close co-operation with other arms were 
organised . 
33 
The Indian Army's role in border defence and tribal control was 
carefully examined by a committee appointed by the Goverment of 
India during the spring of 1931. A series of civil and military 
witnesses were highly critical of the performance of the Indian Army, 
and called for the resuscitation of the P. F. F. and the 'de- 
regularisation' of the units stationed in the N. W. F. P.. The final 
report issued by the Tribal Control and Defence Committee echoed 
earlier criticisms and suggested that the General Staff should 
31 Memorandum on L. = Training (India) Collective Traininq Period 1929-30, (Simla, 
1930), p. 4 L/MIL/17/5/2199 
32 Despatch on Disturbances, p-18 and Review of Important Military Events in India 
No. 3 of 1930,28th Oct. 1930, L/MIL/7/12491 
33 "Mouse", 'Babu Tactics, J. U. S. I-I-, 61,262, (1931), pp. 60-65 
231 
consider the merits of forming a new P. F. F. and measures to lighten 
the arms and equipment of regular units. 24 The General Staff in India 
quickly dismissed the idea that a portion of the Indian Army should 
be localised on the North-West Frontier, due to the inherent 
organisational problems that were involved. Indeed such a drastic 
change ignored the other important roles of the Covering Troops which 
could not be carried out by lightly equipped troops and the reasons 
that had originally prompted the delocalisation of the P. F. F. in 
1903. The General Staff argued that a military organisation designed 
to meet Afghanistan, supported by foreign troops and the frontier 
tribes, was by default automatically suited to fighting the tribesmen 
alone. Moreover, as long as the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan 
remained the most likely theatre of operations of the Indian Army, it 
strongly believed that all imperial troops required experience of the 
terrain and similar tactics to those required in Afghanistan. 35 
The military authorities attempted instead to increase the 
strategic mobility and circuit of action of the Covering Troops by 
building further roads in the N. W. F. P. and mechanisation. A network 
of roads on the Khajuri Plain was the most immediate extension of the 
road building policy outside of Waziristan and further roads were 
completed in the latter area in accordance with the Modified Forward 
poliCy. 36 In 1933 a further series of roads began to be constructed 
on the North-West Frontier as funds became available, although road 
construction proved an expensive and time-consuming process. 37 It was 
accepted that henceforth all punitive operations in tribal territory 
would be combined with road construction to allow small, lightly- 
equipped columns to be supplied and operate in the hills as well as 
extending political control in tribal tet. -ritory. 38 Hand-in hand with 
road building went the introduction into service in India of wheeled 
motor transport, tractors, half-tracks and fully tracked vehicles 
with improved performance and cross-country mobility. Further trials 
34 Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee 1931, (Dehli, 1931), pp. 38-9 
L/MIL/17/13/34 
35 General Staff Criticism of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee, 19th May 
1931, L/P&S/12/3171 and Jacobson, op cit, p. 92 
36 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 4 of 1931,21st Jan. 1932, 
L/MIL/7/12492 and Col. C. V. Jackson, 'The Wana-Ladha Road', R. E. J., 50, (1936), 
pp. 27-37 
37 Field-Marshal Sir P. Chetwode, 'The Army in India', J. R. U. S. I., 82,525, (1937), 
pp. 7-8 and p. 12 and Jacobson, op cit, p. 336 
38 Gen. Sir K. Wigram, 'Defence in the North-West Frontier Province', J. R. C. A. S., 
24,1, (1937), pp-77-8 
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of 30cwt and six-wheeled motor lorries were completed in 1932 that 
had superior performance to those already in service holding out the 
prospect that --hey could be more widely employed in tribal 
territory. 39 Two Carden Lloyd Mark VI Armoured Machine Gun Carriers, 
ordered in 1929, were tested at Quetta and Razmak during the summer 
of 1930, with such success that the military authorities were 
convinced that tracked vehicles would be superior to wheeled for 
Indian requirements. 40 Mk 1A Light Tanks tested in Waziristan the 
following year achieved speeds of 30 miles per hour on level ground, 
4-12 miles per hour cross-country and could climb relatively steep 
gradients. Their ability to move in areas impassable to wheeled 
vehicles, to turn in their own length on narrow roads, climb small 
features and to penetrate to the rear of positions occupied by 
tribesmen armed only with rifles was a significant improvements over 
existing armoured cars. Moreover, the trials indicated that they 
could remain unsupported during withdrawals while other troops 
evacuated a position, and it also appeared they would be able to 
carry out all reconnaissance and protective duties hitherto performed 
by armoured cars. As a result it was decided to re-equip two armoured 
car companies with Light Tanks as soon as possible. 41 
The improvement of the off-road mobility of Indian troops in 
mountainous terrain represented a far more difficult problem. The 
General Staff in India attempted to address it by a combination of 
reducing or lightening personal equipment, decreasing the scale of 
supporting weapons, cutting down the number of pack animals required 
to support imperial troops and changes in training. A reduction in 
the weight of personal clothing, arms and equipment offered the 
easiest means of achieving a greater level of mobility in the hills. 
Many Indian battalions replaced their heavy ammunition boots with 
chaplis (grass sandals), removed gaiters and substituted light weight 
clothing in place of the normal issue. The amount of ammunition and 
grenades carried by each soldier was also reduced. Troops were issued 
39 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 1 of 1932,22nd April 1932, 
L/MIL/7/12492 
40 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 2 of 1929,11th July 1929 and 
Review of Important Military Events in India No. 2 of 1930,12th July 1930, 
L/MIL/7/12491 
41 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 1 of 1931,22nd April 1931, 
L/MIL/7/12491 and Proqress Report for the year 1930-31 on Distribution of the Army 
and Royal Air Force in India, their preparedness for War and for the Maintenance 
of Law and Order within India, 1929 also Measures in Hand during 1931-32, (Dehli, 
1931), p. 19 L/MIL/17/5/1235 
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with iron rations to cut down weight and lower scales of equipment 
were adopted by units while on frontier service. A replacement for 
the heavy, unreliable and cumbersome Lewis Gun, with its attendant 
mule, and the Vickers machine gun was tested during 1932 in India. 42 
Vickers Berthier light machine guns were considerably lighter and 
more reliable than their predecessors, and, after extensive trials, 
began to be issued to Indian units during 1934, increasing the 
mobility of imperial troops without loss of firepower, as the weapon 
and its ammunition could be manhandled in frontier fighting. 43 
Despite continued criticism of the new machine gun company, the 
Vickers was retained in service and the number in each battalion was 
increased during 1931 by two further weapons, to keep Indian 
battalions organised on the same lines as the rest of the British 
Empire. 44 
The reduction or complete replacement of the large quantity of 
pack transport used by the Covering Troops was carefully considered 
as it represented the main brake on the mobility of columns operating 
in the hills. During the early 1930s, the administrative tail of 
Indian columns was successfully docked by cutting down superfluous 
animals and the number of troops required for their care and 
protection. However, despite being regarded as anachronistic by many 
officers in England, pack mules and camels still remained essential 
in all operations mounted beyond a road head in tribal territory. 45 
Air supply was also carefully considered as an alternative means of 
reducing the quantity of pack animals. The ability of transport 
aircraft to maintain and transport troops and to reinforce isolated 
posts had been tentatively investigated by officers at A. H. Q. in 1928 
when a flight of two Bomber Transport aircraft was deployed in 
India. 46 A wireless set and stores were parachuted into Sorarogha 
post in Waziristan in 1930 when it was surrounded by a hostile 
42 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 3 of 1932,9th Nov. 1932, 
L/MIL/7/12492 and Jacobson, op cit, p-320 
43 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 2 of 1934,21st July 1934, 
L/MIL/7/12492 
44 A. H. Q to Headquarters Northern Conuiand, Southern Command, Eastern Coinuand, 
Western Command a-nd Burma Independent District, 1st June 1931, L/MIL/7/5505 and 
Progress Report for the year 1931-32 on Distribution of the Army and Royal Ai 
Force in India, their preparedness for war and for the maintenance of Law and 
Order within India, 1929, also Measures in hand durinq 1932-33, L (Simla, 1932), 
p. 17 L/MIL/17/5/1235 
45 Field Marshal W. R. Birdwood, 'Recent Indian Military Experience', United Empir 
22, (1931), p. 246 
46 Field Marshal Sir W. Slim, Defeat into Victory, (London, 1956), p. 544 
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47 lashkar. Two days, rations were also dropped by aircraft later the 
same year to a column during the biennial Chitral relief . 48 Despite 
the potential that had been demonstrated on both occasions, the 
General Staff remained sceptical because of the limited number of 
aircraft available, the expense and their inability to evacuate 
casualties . 49 A lack of adequate funding decided the issue by 
precluding the purchase of an additional squadron of Bomber Transport 
which had been proposed in 1930.50 
The improvement of the tactical effectiveness and mobility of 
imperial units by changes in current tactical doctrine and training 
was also examined by the General Staff and discussed in the military 
press. It was readily accepted by many officers that continued 
improvements in tribal armament and tactics, required imperial troops 
to improve mobility, display increased initiative, and possess a high 
standard of training in mountain warfare., As Captain D. McK. Kennelly 
observed in an article in the Journal of the Royal Artillerv: 
'Training for mountain warfare cannot remain stationary. With each 
year the danger on the North-West Frontier of India increases; the 
tribesmen are becoming better armed and better acquainted with our 
manner of dealing with them. Every endeavour should be made to 
counter this increase in efficiency on their part by new methods of 
training. '51 Several revisions in The Manual of Operations on the 
North-West Frontier had already been submitted by Northern Command in 
1930 taking into account recent changes in organisation, equipment 
and training, but the publication of a new volume was shelved by 
A. H. Q. until further experience had been assimilated and until other 
commands had submitted their views. 52 The lessons learnt in Peshawar 
District, Waziristan and on the Khajuri Plain during the 1930-31 were 
carefully evaluated by the General Staff. The annual report on 
47 Despatch on Disturbances, p. 17 
48 Summary of Administration of Field Marshal Sir W. R. Birdwood as Commander-in- 
Chief India, (Simla, 1931), p. 39 L/MIL/17/5/1619 and Summary January 1930 - 
December 1930, p. 2 
49 General Staff Criticism of the Tribal Control and Defence Cormnittee, 1931,9th 
May 1931, pp. 3-4 L/P&S/12/3171 
50 Army Department Despatch No. 20 of 1930: Proposal to increase the strength of 
the Royal Air Force in India by an Air Transport Squadron, 25th Sept. 1930, and 
G. M. Young, Secretary to the Goverment of India, Army Department, to the 
Secretary Military Department, India Office, 18th Aug. 1931, L/MIL/7/7769 
51 Capt. D. Mc. Kennelly, 'Artillery Support of Pickets in Mountain Warfare,, 
J. R. A., 57,2, (1930-1), p. 253 
52 Memorandum on Army Traininq (India) Collective Traininq Period 1929-30, (Simla, 
1930), p. 13 L/MIL/17/5/2199 
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collective training issued in July 1931 discussed the employment of 
motor transport for the rapid despatch of reinforcements to the 
Covering Troops and to increase the mobility of columns. Night 
operations on both large and small scales were also recommended as a 
means of combating Pathan lashkars after they were effectively 
employed by Nowshera Brigade on the Khajuri Plain. A large amount of 
experience was also gained on the Khajuri and Aka Khel plains 
regarding the use of armoured cars to carry out tactical 
reconnaissance, cover the advance of columns and establishing 
piquets, protecting perimeter camps and, finally to escort motor 
transport convoys. Further amendments to The Manual of Operations on 
the North-West Frontier of India were suggested by Northern Command, 
but until further experience of the new machine gun organisation in 
infantry units, the mechanisation of the second line transport, and 
the capabilities of light tanks in hill warfare had been gained a 
revised manual was not sanctioned. 53 A series of articles were 
published in the J. U. S. I. I. which took into account changes in the 
organisation, equipment and training of the Indian Army and discussed 
their impact on the conduct of frontier warfare. 54 The inherent 
difference in tactics between 'civilised' and hill warfare, for 
example, was discussed by Lieutenant-Colonel O. D. Bennett in April 
1933 who believed that, although orthodox frontier warfare tactics 
were still effective, the present system of training was responsible 
for the recurrence of 'regrettable incidents' which he ascribed to 
neglect of the principles of surprise and security, incorrect 
application of fire and movement and faulty training in the use of 
ground. 55 
The General Staff did not radically alter the system of 
periodic relief of units stationed in the N. W. F. P. or the system of 
training used by the Army in India, although the amount of time 
devoted to training in mountain warfare was increased. Particular 
attention was now paid to improving physical fitness, speed of cross- 
53 A. H. Q. India Traininq Memorandum No. 2 Collective Traininq period 1930-31, 
(Simla, 1931), pp. 3-6 L/MIL/17/5/2199 
54 "Light Infantry", 'Mobility', J. U. S. I. I., 62,266, (1932), pp. 9-29, Capt. G. H. 
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Frontier', J. U. S. I. I., 62,267, (1932), pp. 163-76, and Capt. H. L. Davies, 'Military 
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63,272, (1933), pp. 289-300 
55 Lt. -Col. O. D. Bennett, 'Some Regrettable Incidents on the N. -W. F. ', J. U. S. I. I., 
63,271, (1933), 'op. 193-203 
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country movement and the individual skills required in tribal 
territory; with a resulting improvement of the general efficiency of 
most units. Hill warfare also formed part of the curriculum of the 
newly opened Military Academy at Dehra Dunn, at which Indian cadets 
were given practical instruction during camps held in the foothills 
of the Himalayas. 56 It was generally accepted that any British or 
Indian unit could quickly become proficient in the tactics of 
mountain warfare. However, the system of reliefs meant that at any 
one time half the border garrisons consisted of units whose standard 
of training on arrival did not meet accepted standards, often 
resulting in too close adherence to the letter of the guidelines laid 
down in the training manuals, lack of confidence and an over- 
obsession with protection. 57 The majority of Indian Army battalions 
contained a large cadre of officers, N. C. O. s and other ranks with 
practical experience and training in frontier warfare. when the 
2nd/14th Punjab Regiment was stationed at Mir Ali in Waziristan in 
November 1933, for example, all its officers, except newly joined 
subalterns, were old hands, with prior frontier experience. The 
frequent incidence of service in the N. W. F. P. kept most Indian 
battalions 'Frontier-minded', allowing them to quickly achieve a full 
state of efficiency by intensive training when they returned to a 
border station. In addition, tactical guidance was issued to troops 
on the frontier, to supplement the offic--al training manuals, 
intended to acquaint them with local conditions. Northern Command 
recommended units arriving in Waziristan, for example, to read the 
official history and an unofficial textbook on the 1919-20 
operations, and provided them with copies of various Standing Orders 
and tactical notes issued by the staff of Waziristan District. 511 
British battalions serving on the frontier were generally 
unprepared for operations in tribal territory, with prior training 
and experience predicated on conventional 'open warfare' or internal 
security duties. An intermittent one year tour of duty with the 
Covering Troops prevented British infantry battalions from 
accumulating an experienced cadre of 'frontier hands', placing even 
greater reliance on 'on the job, training. The only guidance 
56 Brig. J. P. Collins, 'The Indian Military Academy', The Asiatic Review" 33,113, 
(1937), p. 112d 
57 Elliot, op cit, pp. 117-8 
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immediately available to British units arriving in India was a small 
section on 'Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Countries' in 
F. S. R., which recommended that units pay close attention to The 
Manual of operations on the North-West Frontier. 59 British battalions 
normally understudied experienced Indian units until they developed 
an eye for the terrain, became physically fit and acquired knowledge 
of the specialised requirements of hill warfare. Although some 
battalions became highly proficient during their tour of service, in 
general British units were seldom as effective as Indian Army 
battalions in terms of cross-country mobility or familiarity with 
local tactical requirements. Moreover, it often proved more difficult 
to ensure that British troops maintained as high a standard of 
watchfulness and alertness as Indian troops over extended periods of 
time. 60 As Colonel H. Pettigrew later observed: 
How good or bad these regiments were on the frontier depended 
on just one thing, and that was how ready they were to learn. 
All the Indian and Gurkha regiments spent two years in every 
six on the frontier and had a large proportion of old men 
experienced in frontier warfare and the ways of the Pathan. 
Brigadier and Staff of Razmak, Bannu and Wana brigades had all 
spent many years in Waziristan or elsewhere on the frontier. 
They all said the same, and we all came to know it. If a 
British regiment arrived at Razmak, or better still at Bannu 
prior to its march up to Razmak, arid said: "We are new to this. 
You are not. Please teach us! " then it would soon be a regiment 
well able to look after itself and take a share of 
responsibility in mobile columns, piqueting and so on. But let 
a regiment think that it knew, and that it was too famous to 
have to learn, to think that the Highlands of Scotland bore any 
real resemblance to the mountains of Waziristan, and that 
regiment might have trouble. And during its year in Waziristan 
it would be of little use to anyone, and often a liability ... 
61 
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The combination of cap-badge rivalry, a rapid changeover of personnel 
during their period of service in India, the comparative amateurism 
of British officers, and racism militated against the assimilation of 
the necessary skills required on the frontier from experienced Indian 
units. A degree of professional arrogance also acted as a bar to 
learning. As Major General C. W. Gwynn observed in 1934, to many 
British officers trained to think solely in terms of the events of 
the Great War, internal security and frontier policing appeared of 
comparatively insignificant importance. 62 
Training of British officers, N. C. O. s and men was facilitated 
by the publication of an unofficial textbook in 1932 written by 
General Sir Andrew Skeen. Passing it On: Short Talks on Tribal 
Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India provided a detailed 
source of clear and comprehensive information in an easily readable 
form regarding the trans-border Pathan tribes, tactics and 
administration in hill warfare, based on the author's extensive 
experience. 63 It assumed an authoritative position, running to three 
editions, and was widely read in Britain and India. Two copies were 
specially issued to British Army officers, and sergeants' messes and 
one copy to other British and Indian combatant units in India at the 
orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Philip Chetwode, to allow 
British soldiers to benefit from the tactical and administrative 
guidance provided by one of the Indian Army's most experienced 
frontier soldiers. 64 
The tactical handling of frontier operations continued to be 
criticised in the service press, despite a further training directive 
issued in March 1933 by A. H. Q., which emphasised the importance of 
light infantry training, lightening personal equipment, reducing the 
logistical tail of Indian columns and improving cross-country 
mobility not only for mountain warfare but also in conventional 
military operations. 65 Writing in the J. U. S. I. I., one anonymous 
officer sugges--ed that lightly equipped parties of infantry, 
operating without mules or heavy equipment, could achieve sufficient 
62 Maj. -Gen- Sir C. W. Gwynn, Imperial Policin , (London, 1936), p. 7 
63 Gen. Sir A. Skeen, Passinq it On: Short talks on Tribal Fiqhtinq on the North- 
West Frontier of India, (London, 1932), and J. G. S., 'Reviews', J. U. S. I. I-,, 62,269, 
(1932), pp. 589-91 
64 Indian Army Order 80. Books- "Passing it On" by General Sir Andrew Skeen, 22nd 
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31st March 1933, L/MIL/7/12492 
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mobility to secure surprise and bring the tribesmen to battle. 
"Auspex" singled out for criticism the number of Vickers machine guns 
now in each bal--talion and argued that they reinforced dependence on 
brigade columns operating on the roads and piqueting. 66 The growing 
complexity of inodern weapons, mechanisation and the increasing 
dependence of Indian columns on maintenance services in the field was 
explicitly linked to the declining effectiveness and relative 
mobility of the Indian Army in the question set for the 1933 
J. U. S. I. I. prize-essay competition. 'Borderer, argued in the winning 
essay that military organisation, equipment, armament and training 
devised for 'civilised' European mass warfare were inappropriate for 
operations against lightly armed and highly mobile tribal 
skirmishers. Indeed, a growing preoccupation with conventional 
warfare meant that the Indian Army was ignoring the immediate and 
pressing requirements of tribal control in which it was becoming 
increasingly ineffective. In a telling critique, he identified the 
fundamental conflict between the requirements of tribal control and 
European warfare that had been made explicit with the initial 
hesitant attempts of the Indian Army to modernise during the early 
1930s. 'Borderer' noted that the Indian Army needed to compromise 
between large scales of modern weaponry and mobility in the hills: 
Surely the answer is that for operations on the North-West 
Frontier, for the most likely r6le of a large majority of the 
Indian Army year in year out, they are unnecessary and worse 
than unnecessary, dangerous. Damaging because they destroy 
mobility, damaging because they sap morale and initiative, 
damaging because they lead to an inevitable downpeering 
contempt among friend and foe alike, politely veiled sometimes 
on the part of the Scout, jeeringly open on the countenance of 
the more ribald tribesman; damaging because the necessity for 
their study prevents officers from studying their more likely 
r6le and training fully their men in that r6le which two 
matters are in themselves a fully whole time task... Let us teach 
the man in the ranks and the Platoon Commander to rely first on 
his own --ifle with the addition of the grenade if necessary, 
66 "Auspex", 'A Matrimonial Tangle (or Mountains and Machine Guns)', J. U. S. I. I-., 63, 
272, (1933), pp-367-74 
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backing it up with the light automatic which he must render 
more mobile than it is at present. In graver trouble let them 
call upon the bigger brother with the Vickers Gun and when 
things are really sticky let them ask for the final arbiter of 
frontier battle, the 3.7 How. 67 
'Bordererl believed that the growing divergence between the military 
requirements of savage, and 'civilised' warfare in terms of 
training, organisation and equipment could no longer be reconciled, 
and presented such an insuperable problem that he presented a 
detailed scheme for the formation of a localised frontier force for 
service on the North-West Frontier. 68 Despite presenting such 
detailed and well-argued proposals, the localisation of a portion of 
the Indian Army on the North-West Frontier remained an anathema to 
the General Staff in India. Several articles were published during 
1934 which were more explicit regarding the existing tactical 
doctrine. Although it was still generally accepted that to protect 
pack transport piqueting remained essential, many officers questioned 
the continued use of perimeter camps due to the loss of mobility and 
labour their construction entailed. Moreover, as each battalion now 
possessed a large number of automatic weapons which greatly 
simplified protection at night it appeared that massed night assaults 
by tribesmen were a thing of the past. Colonel H. S. Pearson suggested 
in the J. U. S. I. I. in 1934, that mobility could be improved as a ring 
of outposts and machine gun posts could now replace perimeter 
defences thereby freeing an additional two to three hours of each 
day's march .69 The need for some form of perimeter defence, however, 
was supported by most experienced Indian Army officers and training 
remained based on accepted methods, although on several occasions 
during the 1930s dispersed camps were tried by units eager to test 
their effectiveness .70 Apart from those minor modifications 
67 "Borderer", 'With -the Tendency of Modern Military Organisation towards 
Mechanisation, the increasing complexity of modern weapons and the dependency of 
troops on the maintenance services, it is asserted by many that Regular troops are 
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introduced since the First world War the doctrine of frontier warfare 
remained largely unchanged. Writing in 1934, Major-General H. Rowan- 
Robinson, however, summed up an opinion shared by a growing number of 
officers in India: 
The normal methods employed in such operations are elaborately 
described in the training manuals and elsewhere. A considerable 
literature has in fact grown up around them. They are, however, 
recognized to be thoroughly unsatisfactory; and, with the 
multiplication of weapons, vast requirements in ammunition and 
insistence on luxuries, they are daily becoming more SO. 71 
The Loe Agra and Mohmand operations during 1935 provided an 
opportunity to assess the impact of new equipment and changes in the 
training and organisation of the Indian Army. Between February-April 
1935, Nowshera Brigade assisted the political authorities to expel 
hostile tribesmen from the Loe Agra salient. During the fighting, 
night operations were successfully employed on several occasions to 
facilitate movement, counter snipers and seize positions as preludes 
to larger attacks. 72 The annual report on collective training issued 
in July 1935 concluded: 'Such operations were rare in the past, but 
as they offer us a great opportunity for effecting surprise they are 
likely to become common in the future. 1 73 An equivalent of four 
brigade groups, a cavalry regiment, field artillery and a light tank 
company were committed to further operations in Mohmand country in 
August-October, in conjunction with independent operations by No. 1 
(Indian) Wing, after workmen repairing the Gandab road were attacked 
by hostile Burhan Khel and Isa Khel Mohmand tribesmen. 74 The 
combination of lightened and reduced personal equipment carried by 
Indian sepoys and special light infantry training succeeded in 
speeding up piqueting and improved cross-country mobility, but the 
machine gun company in each battalion st--ll acted as a serious brake 
on mobility across difficult terrain. Nearly the entire strength of a 
71 Maj. -Gen. H. Rowan-Robinson, The Infantry Experiment, (London, 1934), p. 10 
72 Report on Loe Agra Operations, 17th July 1935, L/MIL/7/16970 and M. O. 3 
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support company was required to manhandle two Vickers machine guns 
and their ammunition to positions in the hills. The rifle strength of 
British and Indian infantry battalions was quickly absorbed in 
protective duties, especially guarding the growing quantity of 
supporting services used in the operation. The hours of darkness were 
routinely exploited to seize important tactical features and thereby 
preclude tribal resistance, quicken the pace of the advance and 
extend the distance columns could march in a single day. The 
willingness of Indian commanders and units to undertake large 
operations at night was perhaps the most striking feature of the 
campaign, enabling them to seize the initiative, disconcert tribal 
plans, and avoid the delay inherent in mounting deliberate attacks 
against strongly defended positions. As a result, columns were able 
to penetrate deeper into tribal territory before they had to return 
to the security of a perimeter camp each night. During the operations 
around Ghalani, for example, Indian troops operated in the distant 
Toriatigga Valley and could still return to the main perimeter camp. 
Similarly terrain features around the Nahakki gorge were occupied 
before dawn on 18th September enabling troops to seize the pass and 
then construct a new perimeter camp on the Kamalai Plain before 
nightf all. 75 
New equipment was also deployed for the first time in frontier 
warfare during the Mohmand Campaign. A single tractor-drawn battery 
of medium artillery supplemented the mountain artillery, whose longer 
ranged and more powerful 181b guns were able to support several 
Indian columns from a central position. Throughout the campaign a 
single company of Mk II light tanks worked in close co-operation with 
the 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry as mobile troops. They proved 
highly effective, refuting claims that tanks would be ineffectual in 
mountain warfare. Tribal opposition was materially reduced by light 
tanks acting as mobile machine-gun posts in support of infantry. 
Their invulnerability to rifle fire and cross-country mobility 
quickened the pace of operations as tanks could easily advance 
through tribal positions and force the defenders to withdraw by 
firing on the rear and flanks and threatening the opposition's line 
of retreat. Duzing the advance to Dand oil 23rd August they acted as 
advance guard troops supporting the posting of piquets by advancing 
75 Official History 1920-1935, p. 240-1 
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through tribal positions and delivering fire from the rear on 
occupied hills and ridges. Light tanks also successfully covered the 
withdrawal of *Endian columns operating in the Toriatigga Valley on 
14th September and on the Nahakki Plain, pinning down pursuing 
tribesmen with their machine guns until the infantry had rejoined the 
main body. Additionally, infantry officers employed light tanks for 
reconnaissance purposes to carry out personal examination of routes 
used for larger operations. The terrain -ýn the open valleys of 
Mohmand country did not present any serious obstacle, although 
cavalry was used to reconnoitre the ground and engineers had to 
construct tank crossings over nullahs and improve the track across 
the Nahakki Pass. An attempt by the tribesmen to impede the movement 
of tanks by digging pits and strewing the roads with rocks and 
boulders had little effect . 76 
The infantry brigades deployed in Mohmand country were heavily 
dependent on large quantities of support units throughout the 
fighting. A large number of non-combatant signals, field ambulances, 
engineer parks, ordnance depots and motor vehicles accompanied 
'Mohforcel severely complicating the tactical and administrative 
conduct of the operation. To encompass the large number of vulnerable 
vehicles and non-combatant troops in Mohmand country, perimeter camps 
grew in size and complexity. Their construction was time consuming 
and required a considerable amount of labour, and it often proved 
difficult to find a flat space large enough for all troops and 
equipment. A large number of troops were required for their defence, 
moreover, but as the proportion of infantry to other arms had fallen 
it was often difficult to provide sufficient manpower. 77 Such large 
encampments proved vulnerable to the carefully organised sniping 
employed by the Mohmands to harass Indian troops during the campaign. 
Ambushes were successfully employed on several occasions to counter 
large parties of tribesmen operating in the surrounding hills at 
night. During the night of 18th September, for example, the 1/14th 
Punjab Regimen-: ý staged a series of ambushes around Wucha Jawar camp, 
which killed or wounded seven tribesmen and stopped further 
76 Lt. -Col. L. Lawrence -Smith, 'Cavalry and Tanks with Mohf orce, 1935 1, C. J. , 26, 
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77 "Shpagwishtama", I The Changing Aspect of Operations on the North-West Frontier 
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sniping .78A heavy consumption of small arms and artillery ammunition 
made it vital to maintain and protect a permanent line of 
communication along the Gandab Road to service growing logistical 
requirements, facilitate the movement of reinforcements and evacuate 
casualties. Engineers and contract tribal labour constructed a water 
pipe line and a track fit for motor transport along nullah beds from 
the main road, as Indian troops advanced deeper into tribal territory 
and later over the Nahakki Pass .71A large number of motor vehicles 
carried ammunition, supplies and water each day along the track to a 
roadhead from where pack transport carried it to the forward troops. 
Captain L. R. Hall described the situation shortly before the advance 
across the Nahakki Pass: 'The nala bed had the appearance of a busy 
London street during a traffic block, and the supply convoy was to 
arrive in a short time. It was fortunate that the enemy was not 
equipped with artillery, or worse still bombing aeroplanes. '80 
The protection of the lines of communication assumed growing 
importance as dependence on support units increased, leading to 
several important modifications in existing tactical methods and the 
deployment of Large numbers of troops. Armoured cars regularly 
patrolled the Gandab road, but the burden of protection, as always, 
fell on the infantry. Permanent piquets were constructed in the 
Karappa Pass, but the intricate and relatively low-lying land between 
Kialgai and Karappa lacked terrain features that afforded a field of 
vision and fire. Nowshera Brigade and 3rd (Jhelum) Brigade adopted a 
system based on mobility and offensive defence which employed lightly 
equipped fighting patrols, with a strength of 1-2 platoons, who 
operated between strong posts constructed on either side of the road. 
A sweep of the complete sector was made before the road was opened to 
traffic each day, during which all positions from where rifle fire 
could be opened on the column, were carefully searched. The system 
proved successful, indicating that well trained and lightly equipped 
troops could beat the tribesmen at their own game. 81 
78 Maj. J. D. Shapland, 'North-West Frontier Operations - Sept/Oct, 1935.1, J. R. A., 
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The Loe Agra and Mohmand operations demonstrated that major 
changes had occurred in both the tactical and administrative conduct 
of hill warfare. Despite the 'regrettable' incident at Point 4080 the 
a day before the tribesmen sued for peace when two platoons of the 
5/12th Frontier Force Regiment were overrun by a Mohmand lashkar, the 
tribesmen had been unable to offer serious resistance to imperial 
columns. During 1936 the lessons learnt regarding night operations, 
light tanks, armoured cars and the protection of the lines of 
communication were closely studied by the General Staff and laid down 
in the annual report on collective training which the Commander-in- 
Chief ordered units throughout India to adopt. 82 Indeed, the 
operations provided sufficient practical experience of the impact of 
changes in the tactics, training, organisation and equipment on the 
conduct of hill warfare to prompt the military authorities to begin 
preparation of a replacement for The Manual of Operations on the 
North-West Frontier which was becoming out-dated. Training was also 
facilitated by a new unofficial text-book, which provided a series of 
sand table exercises intended to teach elementary routine and tactics 
in mountain warfare specifically aimed at units about to serve on the 
North-West Frontier. 83 During the course of the collective training 
season and minor operations associated with the watch and ward of the 
administrative border, further lessons were learnt regarding the use 
of new equipment on the North-West Frontier. The biennial relief of 
Chitral in September 1936 was carried out with a motor transport 
convoy escorted by armoured cars and light tanks, while Bomber 
Transport aircraft carried two companies directly to the garrison. 84 
The improvement in relations between the Indian Army and the 
R. A. F. in India, following the appointment of Air Marshal E. Ludlow- 
Hewitt as A. O. C. in India in 1935, had important implications for co- 
operation between the two services in frontier warfare at the 
tactical level. 85 In April 1935 the Air Staff in India issued 
instructions that all R. A. F. training henceforth should be directed 
82 A. H. Q. India Training Memorandum No. 12 Collective Traininq period 1935=36 
(Dehli, 1936), pp. 2-8 L/MIL/17/5/2199 
83 Maj. D. B. MackEmzie, Mountain Warfare on the Sand Model, (Aldershot, 1936) and 
R. L. G., 'Reviews - Mountain Warfare on the Sand Model by Major D. B. Mackenzie', 
J. U. S. I. I., 66,294, (1936), p. 307 
84 Review of Important Military Events in India No. 4 of 1936,12th Nov. 1936, 
L/MIL/7/12492 and Smyth, op cit, p-105 
85 D. J. Waldie, Relations between the Army and the Royal Air Force, (London, 
D. Phil., 1980), pp. 210-11 and Ludlow-Hewitt to Chetwode, 28th June 1935, 
Bartholomew Mss, L. H. C. M. A. 2/1/13 
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solely towards efficiency in tribal warfare. This decision 
strengthened Wing Commander J. Slessor's growing conviction that it 
was time for a radical change in the system of army co-operation in 
India as the existing 'Aldershot model' devised for conventional 
European warfare, had proved ineffective in mountainous terrain. 86 
The highly effective close-support methods developed in Waziristan 
between 1920-24 had been largely forgotten as R. A. F. Army Co- 
operation squadrons concentrated on reconnaissance and directing 
artillery fire. Indeed, close support was regarded by many senior 
R. A. F. officers as a last resort and a misuse of valuable aircraft. 87 
A series of exercises had already been carried out in April 1935 by 
No. 3 (Indian) Wing with the Fort Sandeman mobile column at Quetta, 
in an endeavour to determine principles to guide future training and 
a suitable method of communication between ground and air. However, 
the Quetta earthquake prevented further trials until the squadrons 
reformed at Chaklala in the northern Punjab. 88 During the Mohmand 
Campaign a significant improvement in co-operation between the two 
services was evident, adding greater impetus to these experiments. 
Although aircraft from No. 1 and 2 (Indian) Wings primarily conducted 
independent bombing operations against tribal villages in accordance 
with its doctrine of air control, No. 20 (A. C. ) Squadron carried out 
reconnaissance sorties, directed artillery and intervened on the 
battlefield on several occasions. Indeed the latter proved of growing 
importance in light of the skill with which the tribesmen sited 
sangars carefully defiladed from artillery, machine gun and small 
arms fire. 89 Wing Commander J. C. Slessor, tasked with training in 
army co-operation throughout India, was finally able to ensure that 
greater attention was devoted to instruction in close-support and co- 
operation in mountain warfare, after Northern Command was allocated 
sufficient Army Co-operation squadrons during 1936 to carry out 
86 Slessor to Sutton 15th April 1935, Slessor Mss, AC 75/28/28, Air Chief Marshal 
Sir J. Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections, (London, 1956), 
pp. 121-3 and Air Staff (India) Memo No. 1, April 1935: Tactical Methods of 
Conducting Air Operations against Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India, 17th 
May 1935, Bottomley Mss, B22 
87 Sir J. Slessor, These Remain. A Personal Antholo (London, 1969), pp. 118-20 
88 H. Q. No. 3 (Indian) Wing, R. A. F to H. Q., R. A. F India, 17th May 1935, Slessor 
Mss, AC 75/28/28 
89 Report on the Mohmand Operations, 28th Nov. 1935, p. 28 L/MIL/7/16968 
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intensive training. 91 Writing to Air Commodore R. H. Peck in June 
1936, Slessor urged that the proposed new training manual being 
prepared should deal fully with air co-operation and close-support in 
mountain warfare, and that it should form part of the forthcoming 
training season with the army: 
The great cry now-a-days seems to be co-operation - the 
balanced use of all arms and Services in Frontier warfare. I 
see the late Chief has been paying tribute... to the 
effectiveness of air co-operation on the Frontier. I should 
have thought there could be no better way of ensuring that good 
co-operation than by having a combined manual on which we all 
work, containing the description of all methods of Frontier 
warfare. ý' 
T. E. W. T. s were held for officers under his command near Rawalpindi 
during the summer to demonstrate the effectiveness of close air 
support and study the inherent problems from the viewpoint of ground 
troops, while the Vickers-Bomb-Lewis (V. B. L. ) method of ground attack 
was developed by No. 20 (A. C. ) Squadron at Peshawar to enable 
aircraft to engage tribesmen in contact with or near Indian columns. 
Several pilots were also attached to army units to gain an insight 
into the problems involved from their perspective, one of whom had 
been directly involved in fighting in Waziristan. Both the A. O. C. in 
India and A. H. Q. agreed that close air support in mountain warfare 
should form an element of collective training during the cold 
weather. 2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade and aircraft from No. 3 (Indian) 
Wing took part in a large combined exercise at Khanpur staged by 
Northern Command between 17th and 25th November 1936, to both develop 
and test close air support tactics in mountain warfare, based on a 
provisional close-support manual written by Slessor and a draft of 
the new frontier warfare manual. 92 These manoeuvres, simulating 
tribal opposition to an Indian column enqaged in road construction, 
provided valuable guidance regarding the practicalities of close- 
support and indicated the importance of R. A. F. liaison officers at 
90 Secretary to the Government of India (Army Department Air Force Branch) to the 
Secretary, Military Department, India Office, 10th March 1936, and 20th Aug. 1936, 
L/MIL/7/19307 
91 Slessor to Peck, 10th April 1936, Slessor Mss, AC 75/28/28 
92 'Close Support Tactics. Provisional' , 1936, Slessor Mss, AC 75/28/30 
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column headquarters to observe and direct operations, as well as an 
effective means of inter-communication between the aircraft and 
forward troops and between columns and airfields. It was essential 
that the infantry should indicate targets to pilots who otherwise 
were normally unable to locate tribesmen exploiting the scrub-covered 
mountainous terrain for cover. A final report on the exercise 
concluded: 'We consider that the experience of this training gives 
added reason to believe that, with further combined training of 
troops on the ground and aircraft in the air, close support in 
mountain warfare may be very effective in helping to overcome 
opposition, in reducing casualties to our own troops and in helping 
to speed up their Tovement. And the crux of the whole matter is 
ef f ective communications. 93 
The Waziristan Military District provided the Indian Army and 
R. A. F. with an immediate opportunity to test the effectiveness of 
their new tactics and system of training in November 1936, when the 
Tochi Column ('Tocol') and the Razmak Column ('Razcol') conducted 
'flag marches, in the Khaisora Valley. Razcol encountered unexpected 
resistance from Tori Khel Wazir tribesmen, incited by the Faqir of 
Ipi, hidden on the scrub-covered hillsides as it advanced on 25th 
November, despite assurances from the political authorities that they 
were peaceful, and lost 14 dead and 43 wounded by the time it reached 
camp at Bischhe Kaskai. When Tocol crossed the Katira River it was 
also held up by heavy sniping from positions on both sides of the 
valley. A cavalry charge and close air support enabled it to reach 
the Jaler Algad by dusk, after which Brigadier F. H. Maynard decided 
to continue onwards during darkness to rendezvous with Razcol. Heavy 
rifle fire stampeded its pack mules, forcing the column to halt 
benighted 3 1/2 miles from Razcol and construct a perimeter camp. 
Four tons of ammunition and supplies were dropped by parachute to the 
embattled troops which successfully joined the other column the 
following day after further fighting. 94 A combination of a lack of 
artillery, insufficient infantry strength and the excessive length of 
the day's march Tocol had attempted during the short November day had 
93 Ccmbined Report: on Air Co-operation Training 2 (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade and 
3 (Indian) Wing, R. A. F., Khanpur Area 17-25 November 1936.1, Slessor Mss, AC 
75/28/30 
94 official History of the Operations on the N. W. Frontier of India, 1936-7, 
(Dehli, 1943), pp. 5-16 L/MIL/17/13/42 (Hereafter Official History 1936-37) and 
Report on the operations in Waziristan 25th November 1936 to 16th January, 1937 
(First Phase), 21st June 1937, L/MIL/7/16971 
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played directly into tribal hands. As a result of the hitherto 
comparatively peaceful conditions in the area, its commander had 
attempted a longer march than was compatible with the principle of 
security, without adequately piqueting the route or allowing 
sufficient time to construct a perimeter camp while reducing the 
number of machine guns carried to provide more transport for 
supplies. 95 moreover as Colonel H. Pettigrew later observed: 'The 
main cause of the semi-disaster was nearly all the troops in Tocol 
were new to the Frontier, doing their first year in Bannu or Mir Ali. 
In this alone lay the fault, and the lesson. That with a column of 
only two battalions of infantry, with some horsed cavalry and 
mountain guns and the usual services, one of the two battalions 
should always be a seasoned one until the newcomers had been on at 
least two columns. '96 The 3/7th Dogras, for example, had arrived in 
Waziristan from Burma in March 1936 and had been hurriedly introduced 
to frontier warfare at Kurramgarhi during the previous 'cold 
weather. 97 
The Waziristan Military District was immediately reinforced by 
2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade, 11th Light Tank Company, armoured cars, 
artillery and two additional infantry battalions ('Khaicol') along 
with aircraft from No. 3 (Indian) Wing to prevent unrest spreading, 
to punish the 'Pori Khel Wazirs and to construct a road from Mir Ali 
through the Khaisora Valley to facilitate control of the area. 
General Sir J. D. Coleridge, G. O. C. Northern Command, was given full 
authority for the control of land operat-ons, aided by the local 
Civil Armed Forces, and independent air operations. The rapid 
concentration of imperial troops and the construction of a new road 
during December and January from Mir Ali into the Khaisora Valley, 
under close military protection, successfully localised tribal 
unrest. Khaicol encountered little opposition during the slow and 
deliberate advance, apart from intermittE? nt long range sniping and 
during the withdrawal of 2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade to camp on 22nd 
December. After the road had been completed, buildings belonging to 
identified hos-cile tribesmen were destroyed. A senior R. A. F. officer 
attached to the H. Q. of Wazirforce facilitated close co-operation 
95 Prendergast, op cit, p. 86 
96 Pettigrew, op cit. p. 89 
Q7C. T. Atkinson, A History of the Ist (P. W. O. ) Battalion the Doqra Reqin. Lent, 
(Southampton, 1950), pp. 123-5, and Trench, op cit, pp. 126-7 
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between the two services during the operation, although offensive 
operations by aircraft were restricted to a proscribed area five 
miles in advance and on the flanks of the Indian column whose primary 
task was to protect the technical troops engaged in road 
construction. In January hostile Afghan tribesmen were expelled 
across the Durand Line by imperial troops after the Faqir's 
headquarters at Arsal Kot was destroyed. The Tori Khel Wazirs finally 
submitted on 15th January 1937 and the area reverted to civil 
control; after operations that had cost the Indian Army 34 dead and 
132 wounded. 98 
During the spring the situation deteriorated after a series of 
offences were committed by hostile tribesmen in Northern Waziristan 
while raids were mounted in the Derajat. A combination of political 
pressure, limited punitive bombing and proscription by aircraft of 
certain areas, believed to be harbouring the Faqir, failed to restore 
order. Piquets and posts throughout Waziristan were sniped and 
bridges, culverts and telephone lines damaged by small bands of 
hostile tribesmen. The H. Q. of lst (Rawalpindi) Division, 1st 
(Abbottabad) Brigade and 3rd (Jhelum) Brigade reinforced the 
garrison, but these troops were immediately tied down in ensuring 
their own protection and in safeguarding the Bannu-Razmak road after 
local Khassadars became unreliable. This period of relative calm 
before the storm, however, allowed relatively inexperienced and 
untrained British units to be instructed before embarking on active 
operations. Instruction in mountain warfare given to the lst 
Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, for example, had been limited to 
six weeks at Hoshiapur each year, and its officers knew little of 
earlier campaigns in Waziristan or of their Pathan adversary when 
they were deployed. 99 When the 1st Battalion South Wales Borderers 
was deployed as part of 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade, Brigadier 
R. I. Inskip personally supervised intensive instruction at Mir Ali in 
advance guard duties, piqueting, and constructing a perimeter camp, 
especially with regard to the training of junior leaders, 
complementing -: hat received earlier at Abbottabad in mountain 
98 Report on the Operations in Waziristan 25th November 1936 to 16th January, 1937 
(First Phase), 21st June 1937, L/MIL/7/16971, operations in Waziristan, 24th 
November 1936 to 15th January 1937, Jan. 1937, Slessor Mss, AC 75/28/30 and Col. 
R. L. Bond, 'The Khaisora Road, I R. E. J. 52 (1938), pp. 190-203 
99 G. Moore, "Just. as Good as the Rest" A British Battalion in the Faqir of Ipi's 
War Indian N. W. F. 1936-37, (Huntingdon, 1979), p. 10 and p. 42 
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warfare. 100 Imperial troops remained on the defensive during the 
spring while permanent piquets were constructed to secure the roads 
on which they depended. A separate tiring and time consuming road- 
opening operation was required each day to establish control along 
the lines of communication from perimeter camps located in each 
sector. A camp piquet at Damdil was attacked on the night of 
20th/21st March by Tori Khel Wazir tribesmen armed with rifles and 
hand grenades. Hand-to-hand fighting occurred when the position was 
rushed by swordsmen during which two sepoys were killed and eight 
wounded before the attack was repulsed. On 29th March 1937 the 
advance guard of the 1st (Abbottabad) Brigade, guarding the route 
between Dosalli and Damdil, was attacked by 700-1,000 tribesmen who, 
hidden amongst scrub and nullahs alongside the road, opened heavy 
rifle fire while swordsmen closed and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. 
Armoured cars, artillery and aircraft supported the hard pressed 
1/6th Gurkha Rifles, dislodging the tribesmen later during the day, 
inflicting an estimated 94 killed and 64 wounded on the withdrawing 
lashkar. 101 The strength of the 'hostile, lashkar grew steadily during 
the summer to over 4,000 men, composed of Tori Khel Wazirs, a large 
number of Afghan tribesmen and a handful of individuals drawn from 
otherwise peaceful sections. 102 Frequent raids were carried out into 
the settled districts; camps and piquets were sniped and bridges, 
culverts and telephone lines were damaged by tribal gangs. However, 
only a small proportion of tribal fighting strength was involved, 
with the lashkar composed of a fluctuating collection of individuals 
from various tribes and sections rather than complete tribal units. 103 
The length of the lines of communication throughout Waziristan 
and the paucity of troops meant it was impossible to prevent 
successful small-scale tribal attacks against troops tied down in 
purely defensive duties. An attack on a convoy moving through the 
Shahur Tangi gorge in Southern Waziristan in April 1937, by a mixed 
Mahsud and Bhittani gang, strikingly demonstrated the vulnerability 
100 Lt. -Col. G. A. Brett, History of the South Wales Borderers and the Monmouthshire 
Reqiment, 1937-1952 Part 1, (Pontypool, 1953), p. 13 and Maj. -Gen. A. E. 
Williams, Waziristan 19371, n. d. Williams Mss, I. W. M. 88/56/1 
101 'Action of the 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade Near Damdil, 29th March 1937', 
J. U. S. I. I., 68,290, (1938), pp. 33-8 
102 M. 0.3 Unofficial Letter on Afqhanistan and the North-West Frontier of India, 
1st April 1936-March 31st 1937, (Simla, 1937), p-19 L/WS/1/192 
103 Report on the Administration of the Border of the North-West Frontier Province 
for the Year 1936=37, (Dehli, 1937), pp. 1-2 L/P&S/12/3148 
252 
of motor transport convoys. After the soft-skinned lorries at the 
head and tail of the column were destroyed the convoy was penned in 
the defile, where its escort of four armoured cars were unable to 
elevate their machine guns sufficiently to engage the tribesmen on 
the heights above and the infantry escort was pinned down by intense 
rif le f ire. 104 All Government convoys ceased in Waziristan af ter the 
incident except on roads protected by troops. Between April and early 
December the Bannu-Wana road remained closed and the isolated 
garrison at Wana was maintained by the Mahsud-owned Bagai Company, 
operating its lorries under tribal protection, and a flight of Bomber 
Transport Aircraft which flew in ammunition, supplies and relief 
troops. A 46 mile stretch of road between Bannu and Damdil was 
protected by the 1st Division, whose troops were deployed in 
permanent piquets supplemented by daily patrols of infantry and 
armoured cars supported by artillery and aircraft. Although 
effective, these defensive arrangements reduced the number of troops 
free for offensive operations. 105 Armoured car patrols replaced 
infantry detachments escorting convoys in May after it became 
apparent that their rifles offered too tempting and valuable a target 
for the tribesmen. Even so, movement of convoys and troops was 
restricted to specific 'Road Open Days' that required a major 
tactical operation starting from a perimeter camp located in each 
sector of the line of communications. The hostile tribesmen, 
intermingled with the peaceful population, placed a constant strain 
on troops operating in Waziristan, and ensured that full military 
precautions had to be observed at all times by soldiers on monotonous 
'Road Protection' (R. P. ) duty. John Masters, serving with the 2/3rd 
Gurkha Rifles, observed: 
This was the hardest task the Frontier offered, and we did it 
three times a week... R. P. was hard because every day we had to 
cover the same stretch of road, and every day it became more 
difficul-!: ý to obey the Cardinal Frontier principle of never 
104 Anon., 'Attack on the Convoy at Shahur Tangi on the 9th April 1937', J. U. S. I. I., 
67,288, (1937), pp. 261-65, and Lt. -Col. J. A. Bolam, 'The Shahur Tangi Affair', 
nd., Bolam Mss, Mss. Eur. C. 308 
105 Report by the Commander-in-Chief in India on the operations carried out in 
Waziristan between 16th January 1937 and the 15th September 1937 (Second Phase), 
24th Nov. 1937, L/MIL/7/16971, and M. I. Unofficial Letter on Afqhanist! ýý and the 
North-West Frontier of India, April 1937 to March 1938, (Sirnla, 1938), pp. 18-19 
L/WS/1/192 
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doing the same thing in the same way twice running. We had to 
fight against fatigue and carelessness, because someone was 
watching. Someone was always watching - someone with an inborn 
tactical sense, someone who missed nothing. 106 
Those British and Indian regiments unwilling to maintain a high 
standard of vigilance paid the price in casualties from hostile 
tribesmen carefully watching their positions. Even more galling were 
the political restrictions imposed on engaging armed local tribesmen 
until they definitely committed a 'hostile' act. These were an 
unwelcome surprise to regimental officers unacquainted with the basis 
of British policy in Waziristan. Not surprisingly some did not obey 
such restrictions and meted out exemplary punishment to tribesmen 
suspected of firing upon Indian columns or having killed or mutilated 
imperial dead and wounded. 101 
The Waziristan Military District was placed once again under 
the direct control of General J. D. Coleridge on 22nd April 1936, 
after political pressure and limited punitive and proscriptive 
bombing failed to restore order, with orders to restore peaceful 
conditions throughout the area. 2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade, 9th 
(Jhansi) Brigade and two battalions from 7th (Dehra Dunn) Brigade 
reinforced the garrison from the Field Army. 1st (Rawalpindi) 
Division commenced offensive operations on 23rd April 1937, intended 
to bring hostile tribesmen assembled in the Khaisora and Shaktu areas 
to battle over ground chosen to facilitate the use of all arms. 2nd 
(Rawalpindi) Brigade was augmented by four batteries of mountain 
artillery, light tanks and a R. A. F. Army Co-operation squadron, along 
with additional troops for the protection of its lines of 
communication. The brigade advanced from Mir Ali on 23rd April into 
the Khaisora Valley, but were unable to bring the elusive hostile 
lashkar to bat-zýle. The camp piquets surrounding Bische Kashkai 
perimeter camp in the Khaisora Valley however, were heavily sniped 
and bombed on -!: he night of 27th April by Tori Khel tribesmen. A 
determined lashkar simultaneously attacked the main encampment, 
reaching within 20 yards of the perimeter wall before being repulsed 
106 j. Masters, Buqles and a Tiger (London, 1956), p. 222 
107 Ibid, pp. 208-9 and Lt. -Gen. F. I. S. Tuker, 'Frontier 1937', nd, p. 7 Tuker Mss__'_ 
I. W. M. 71/21/5/10 
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with heavy losses by concentrated machine gun and rifle fire. As one 
officer observed: 
Thus ended an experience which in all recent history of 
frontier warfare is probably unique. Picquets and isolated 
detachments had often been attacked at night, and will 
probably continue to be on future occasions as long as the 
tribesman is what he is; but never before has an attack on 
so large a scale been made on a strongly defended camp 
bristling with automatic weapons and manned by some 3,000 
men. one cannot believe that is ever likely again. 108 
Two days' later the lashkar was lured out from the cover of rocks and 
bush, where aircraft, 3.7" howitzers and machine gun fire inflicted 
heavy casualties. Despite the heavy punishment inflicted on the 
lashkar the operations were indecisive as the Faqir of Ipi and the 
main body withdrew to the Shaktu Valley where it increased in 
strength during the summer. 109 
The Waziristan Division ('Wazdiv'), composed of elements of the 
local garrison, concentrated near Dosalli in May to strike against 
hostile Tori Khel lashkars operating in the Shaktu area and open 
communications with the garrison at Razmak. In an endeavour to avoid 
the strongly fortified Sre Mela Gorge, which blocked an advance 
towards the Sham Plain, Bannu Brigade broke with the established 
doctrine of frontier warfare. During the night of 11th-12th May 1937 
Bannu Brigade, led by 8 platoons of Tochi Scouts, slowly advanced 
over the 2,000 foot knife-edged Iblanke Ridge bypassing the gorge and 
reached the Sham Plain virtually unopposed. 1st (Abbottabad) Brigade 
simultaneously launched a converging attack which secured a foothold 
in the Sre Mela gorge with few losses and the retreating lashkar 
suffered heavy casualties from aircraft as they withdrew across the 
Sham Plain. Many dispirited tribesmen dispersed including most of an 
Afghan contingent which had suffered heavy losses as they were not so 
well acquainted with Indian tactics as the local tribesmen. 110 13,000 
108 Maj. D. A. Mackenzie, 'Operations in the Lower Khaisora Valley, Waziristan, in 
193711, J. R. U. S. I., 82,528, (1937), p. 814 
109 M. I. Unofficial Letter on Afqhanistan and the North-West Frontier of India, 
April 1937 to March 1938, (Simla, 1938), pp. 20-1 L/WS/1/192 
110 Maj, W. D. Lentaigne, I "Iblankell - The Advance to the Sham Plains 11/12th May 
19371, J. U. S. I. I., 68,291, (1938), pp. 131-52 and Masters, op cit, pp. 234-41 
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lbs of hard ra-ýions and fodder were dropped by parachute from Bomber 
Transport aircraft on 13th May to supply the advance troops until a 
secure permanent line of communication to Coronation Camp had been 
opened. "' wapiti and Audax aircraft provided tactical reconnaissance 
and close-support to the 1st Division and the Razmak Brigade during 
these operations, while mounting daily sorties co-operating with 
convoys and road protection troops now scattered throughout 
Waziristan (See Figure 10). The destruction of the village of Arsal 
Kot, by troops based at Ghariom Camp, finally broke Tori Khel 
resistance and the majority of tribesmen dispersed to their homes, 
although the Faqir of Ipi evaded capture and took refuge on the 
Mahsud-Bhittani border where he continued to stir up resistance. 112 
The Khaisora Valley and Sham Plain operations ended large scale 
tribal resistance in Northern Waziristan, but Razmak, Bannu and Wana 
brigades carried out further operations to restore peaceful 
conditions west of the Razmak-jandola road and drive the Faqir of Ipi 
towards the Durand Line. It proved difficult for the slow moving 
converging columns to bring the small and elusive bands of tribesmen 
that continued to resist to battle. While these operations were in 
progress, 1st (Rawalpindi) Division remained in the Sham Plain and 
Shaktu River area, covering the construction of a system of roads in 
the country enclosed by the Circular Road, previously only accessible 
to pack animals, which was inhabited by the hostile sections (See 
Figure 11). Four roads were built between May and October by troops, 
engineers and four specially enlisted Mahsud construction battalions 
from Dosalli, the lower Khaisora, Ahmedwam and Razmak that connected 
near Ghariom, making nearly all central Waziristan accessible to 
columns equipped on a pack basis. 113 Throughout the summer Wazdiv and 
Scouts carried out various minor operations in Southern Waziristan to 
disperse small bands of hostile tribesmen. The Razmak and Bannu 
brigades 'mopped up, the remaining hostile tribesmen gathered in the 
Upper Baddar and the Khaisora valleys during September and October, 
destroying villages belonging to those tribesmen implicated in raids. 
111 Supplement No. 3 to Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 5 on Events in Waziristan 
from 12th to 19th May 1937,22nd May 1937, App. A L/MIL/5/1065 and M. F. Kerrmis 
Betty, 'Waziristan, 1937', in MacFetridge and Warren, op cit, p. 118 
112 Report by His Excellency the ConuTiander-in-Chief in India on the operations 
carried out in Waziristan between the 16th January 1937 and the 15th September 
1937 (Second Phase), 24th Nov. 1937, L/MIL/7/16971 
113 Maj. A. E. Armstrong, 'More Roads (Waziristan, 1937)1, R. E. J., 53, (1939), pp-1- 
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After a series of raids in the Derajat, a column operated in Bhittani 
country in October and constructed a new road to the village at Kot. 
Imperial columns moved at will through tribal territory during the 
autumn, although small tribal gangs cut telegraph and telephone 
lines, destroyed bridges and culverts, and ambushed small parties of 
Indian troops. The completion of the new roads at the end of October 
freed troops for offensive operations in those parts of northern 
Waziristan harbouring the remaining hostile gangs. In November, 1st 
(Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade swept the Khaisora and Lower Shaktu 
valleys. These operations represented the last of the campaign after 
which the frequency of minor offences declined, raiding almost ceased 
and several hostile leaders submitted. Although the Faqir of Ipi 
remained at large his influence was limited as columns and aircraft 
forced him to move his base repeatedly. Despite the fact that very 
few local tribesmen were actively engaged in the fighting, 61,000 
regulars from the local garrison, the Field Army and irregulars had 
to be deployed in the area. Despite the low intensity of the 
operations the Indian Army had lost a total of 245 killed and 684 
wounded, in addition to a further 73 deaths from disease. 114 During 
December the additional troops in the area returned to their normal 
stations, with the exception of 3rd (Jhelum) Brigade, a mountain 
battery and light tank company which remained to support the 
garrison. 115 
The 1936-37 Waziristan Campaign represented the largest scale 
fighting carried out by the Army in India since the 1919-24 
operations. Despite the construction of roads and cantonments in 
tribal territory, the heavily armed Mahsuds and Wazirs had 
demonstrated that they could offer effective resistance to imperial 
troops and thaL they remained masters of guertilla warfare. The 
lessons derived from operations in progress in Waziristan were 
carefully studied by the Indian Army. Initial accusations in the 
press following the events of November 1936 that the local garrison 
was untrained in frontier warfare, were simply unfounded as most 
Indian regiments contained officers and men with prior practical 
experience of the frontier, while instruction and practice in 
114 Official History 1936-37, p. 229 
115 Report by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on the operations 
carried out in Waziristan (Final Phase) between the 16th September 1937 and the 
15th December 1937', 14th April 1938, L/MIL/7/16971 
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frontier warfare formed part of normal annual training of all 
units. 116 The fighting generally confirmed the lessons learnt during 
the Mohmand operations, indicating that the principles on which 
tactics and training for frontier warfare were based in India were 
generally sound and that there was no need for a major change in 
imperial tactics. A high standard of specialised training was 
required amongst imperial troops. Those units that neglected the 
, laws, or principles of frontier warfare or were unwilling to 
maintain vigilance suffered at the hands of the ever present 
tribesmen. The fighting in Waziristan also provided further important 
practical experience regarding the use of light tanks, medium 
artillery and aircraft in frontier warfare, although infantry 
remained the predominant arm in tribal territory. operations had been 
divided into two main categories: operations by columns operating in 
rugged, mountainous areas and those associated with road protection 
along the extended lines of communication of Wazirforce. 
The infantryman and the pack mule remained the key to all 
operations in difficult mountainous terrain impassable to wheeled 
transport and where there was limited scope for tracked vehicles. The 
Khaisora operations in November 1936 graphically demonstrated that 
the maximum distance a fully equipped Indian column could march, 
taking full precautions and allowing sufficient time to establish a 
perimeter camp before nightfall, was limited to 8-10 miles in the 
face of active tribal opposition. Despite reductions in their number, 
the factor which dictated the speed of movement and circuit of action 
of a column remained the protection of the large quantity of pack 
transport required to carry supplies, fodder and ammunition. It was 
only possible to move greater distances, or at a faster rate, by 
reducing piqueting below an acceptable margin of safety, or by 
neglecting to provide sufficient supporting artillery and machine gun 
fire. The price paid by Tocol for attempting a longer march than was 
compatible with the principle of security, acted as a strong lesson 
for other commanders. During November it had been impossible for lst 
(Abbottabad) Brigade to cover more than 5-6 miles each day during 
operations in the Lower Shaktu Valley due to the short hours of 
daylight available, the difficult terrain and the time required for 
piqueting and the construction of a perimeter camp. Even this 
116 'Editorial', J. U. S. I. I_,, 67,288, (1937), pp. 238-40 
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distance was only possible because the transport advanced on a broad 
front along a nullah bed which meant that only two miles of the route 
had to be piqueted. 117 The need to pay careful attention to security 
was driven home during the fighting and was essential to prevent 
, regrettable incidents', as hostile tribesmen harassed advancing 
columns and attacked small detached parties of troops whenever an 
opportunity arose. It was necessary to piquet all commanding features 
up to 1,500 yards from the line of march, to protect Indian columns 
on the move or troops halted at night, from sniping. A full platoon 
had to be employed in piquets out of direct support in light of 
growing tribal skill in attacking such positions, which were normally 
provided with a protective ring of barbed wire to prevent their being 
rushed. The effectiveness of night operations were also thoroughly 
vindicated, reducing tribal resistance and increasing mobility in the 
border hills, but the Khaisora operations had also demonstrated that 
such manoeuvres had to be carefully planned and possess surprise to 
prevent imperial columns from falling into disarray. In other 
respects imperial tactics generally conformed closely to existing 
methods. The 3.7" howitzer, now equippin(j all mountain batteries in 
India, had demonstrated its versatility, mobility and firepower once 
again and was the only type of heavy support weapon in imperial hands 
capable of accompanying Indian columns operating in the hills. As one 
infantry officer observed: 'Of all the ubiques it is undoubtedly the 
most ubiquitous. '118 Two companies of Mk II and Mk IIb Light Tanks 
were employed when ground permitted in sections or sub-sections to 
carry out reconnaissance, protect flanks, cover withdrawals and 
directly attack lashkars, adding to the strength and quickening the 
pace of movement. 119 The weight of firepower provided by machine guns, 
artillery, light tanks and aircraft operating with Indian columns had 
proved highly effective against large concentrated lashkars in the 
opening phases of the operations, but conversely exacerbated the 
problem of bringing the elusive tribesmen to battle. Moreover, the 
unrestricted employment of superior firepower with little thought to 
its long term impact was now a thing of the past, as the political 
117 Maj. T. H. Angus, 'Operations in the Lower Shak-tu Valley, 16th/18th November 
1937', J. U. S. I. I. 68,292, (1938), pp. 335-42 
118 Mackenzie, op cit, p. 821 
119 Gort to Inskip, 29th Dec. 1937, Inskip Mss, I. W. M. INP 1/2, Slessor 1956, op 
cit, p. 131 and Mackenzie, op cit, p. 821 
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restrictions associated with the 'hearts and minds, campaign in 
Waziristan exerted a powerful influence on the fighting. 
The 5,000 strong Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts had 
complemented the Indian army, carrying out operations independently 
and in co-operation with regulars throughout Waziristan both with 
columns and on the lines of communication. Their speed, mobility, 
light equipment and local knowledge enabled them to carry out advance 
guard duties, protect the flanks of columns, threaten the flanks and 
rear of the enemy, to exploit success, ambushes, rounding up of 
suspected hostile tribesmen and raids with far greater ease than 
heavily encumbered regulars who were more tied to the roads. However, 
their organization and light scale of equipment meant they were 
unable to overcome serious opposition without support from regular 
troops. 120 
The conduct of military operations by imperial troops was now 
more than ever dependent on roads, especially for those units drawn 
from the Field Army. Roads increased the mobility of units in 
Waziristan and facilitated the supply of imperial columns. Lorries 
were employed on an unprecedented scale allowing the number of pack 
animals and non-combatants to be considerably reduced from those 
needed during prior operations. The circular road allowed lightly 
equipped imperial troops to concentrate quickly and operate off a 
secure line of communication, greatly simplifying the whole problem 
of transport and supply as well as reducing the size and unwieldiness 
of columns. Lorries delivered troops, pack animals and supplies to 
the point where columns left the roads, refilled supply echelons and 
dumped stores at roadheads and were, to that extent, able to increase 
the radius of action of lightly equipped Indian troops. The 
construction of further roads during the operations (see Figure 11) 
allowed motor vehicles to operate in new areas of Waziristan, 
completing a system whereby the whole of central Waziristan was made 
accessible to columns operating from a motor transport road on a pack 
basis with a two-days, radius of action. Roads also allowed heavy 
weapons to be deployed in Waziristan. Five batteries of mechanised 
field artillery, as well as a section of the 20/21st Medium Battery, 
12 0 Report on the Administration of the Border of the North-West Frontier Province 
for the Year 1936=37, (Dehli, 1937), p. 31, R. Bromhead, 'Trust Begets Trust. The 
Problem of Waziristan', J-U-S-I-I-., 69,297, (1939), pp. 470-1 and Pettigrew, op 
cit, P. 88 
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equipped with a mixture of 181b, 4.5" and 6" guns firing a heavier 
weight of shell than normally used in frontier warfare, were employed 
in the vicinity of roads to support and columns and road protection 
troops. Field and medium artillery was kept at locations with a wide 
arc of fire in order to allow fire to be brought rapidly to bear to 
support Indian columns and road protection troops. Harassing fire at 
unexpected intervals, directed by aircraft or registered silently, 
exerted a powerful moral impact and prevented tribesmen from 
sheltering in villages at night. However, it proved difficult to 
maintain communications, between the Forward Observation Officers and 
batteries since the infantry, accustomed to working with only 
mountain batteries, found it difficult to work alongside and direct 
heavy artillery fire . 
121 
The main task carried out by the majority of imperial troops 
deployed in Waziristan was Road Protection along the extended lines 
of communication. 122 A full infantry brigade was normally still 
required to piquet 10-12 miles of road with mobile reserves held in 
each sector ready to respond to tribal raids. The stereotyped 
procedure that most imperial battalions employed for 'Road Open 
Days', normally held three days a week, allowed little opportunity 
for personal initiative or any variation in minor tactics when 
positions of tactical importance had to be occupied on a daily basis. 
Most Road Protection schemes employed in Waziristan surrendered the 
initiative and provided hostile tribesmen an idea of the time, 
direction, method and destination of each detachment as they piqueted 
a road each da, y making them vulnerable to attack. In road protection 
considerable scope existed for the use of tanks and armoured cars, as 
well as motorised infantry battalions, which had considerably 
simplified protection of fast moving convoys of motor transport. 
Armoured cars proved an effective and economical means of protecting 
roads, allowing the number of infantry deployed on such exacting 
duties to be reduced. They escorted convoys, patrolled long stretches 
of the lines of communications and provided fire support when 
necessary to road protection troops. On occasion they were 
supplemented by Light Tanks and improvised home-made armoured 
121 "Chimariot", 'Mountain Artillery in Frontier Warfare', J. R. A., 65, (1938-39), 
pp. 90-5 and Graham, op cit, p. 249 
122 Lt. -Col. F. C. Simpson, 'Review of Frontier Policy from 1849-19391, J. U. S. I. I., 
74,316, (1944), p. 307 
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lorries. Infan, -ry battalions embussed 
in lorries were also used as 
mobile columns and transported to the scenes of raids or to reinforce 
units along routes known to be used by tribal gangs. A clear lesson 
of the campaign was that, despite the employment of armoured cars, 
light tanks and lorry-borne infantry escorts, motor transport was 
highly vulnerable to sniping and ambush in hilly areas outside the 
security of static protective piquets. 123 
The close co-operation between the R. A. F. and the Indian Army 
at tactical level, after long years of acrimonious disagreement over 
air control, was an outstanding feature of the operations in 
Waziristan. Six squadrons - equipped with Westland Wapiti, Hawker 
Audax and Hawker Hart aircraft - were used in the largest air 
operation ever undertaken in India, as well as a flight of the Indian 
Air Force. Independent bombing operations were carried out by No. 1 
and No. 2 (Indian) Wings, operating under the detailed restrictions 
imposed by the Government of India intended to prevent the death of 
women or children and attacks on friendly tribal sections. Aircraft 
carried out punitive bombing raids on houses belonging to those 
individuals directly implicated in attacks and villages belonging to 
hostile tribal sections. After warning notices were distributed 
warning the local inhabitants to evacuate an area large parts of 
Waziristan were 'proscribed, to disperse hostile tribesmen, prevent a 
lashkar moving through an area, prevent access to an area of unrest, 
prevent interference with a line of communication or to reduce 
124 
opposition to an advancing column or for punitive reasons. Daily 
reconnaissance sorties were carried out throughout Waziristan and 
photographic intelligence enabled column commanders to locate hostile 
lashkars, determine the number and location of piquets and perimeter 
camps in advance, and to direct long-range artillery fire. An 
outstanding feature of the operation was the frequent use of Bomber 
Transport Aircraft to drop supplies to imperial columns and to 
maintain isolated posts. It increased the administrative mobility and 
hence the tactical mobility of imperial troops. After four tons of 
supplies and ammunition were dropped during the Khaisora operations 
it was proposed that henceforth supply drops of food, fodder and 
123 C. G. Ogilvie, Secretary to G. O. I. to Secretary Military Department, India 
Office, 4th Feb. 1938, L/MIL/7/7235 and Jacobson, op cit, pp. 81-2 
124 Report on Air operations in Waziristan No. 1 (Indian) Group, 17th February to 
7th December 1937,22nd Dec. 1937, Bottomley Mss, B2304 
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ammunition should form a normal component of military operations in 
tribal territory to reduce the amount of pack transport required, 
remove the need for a permanent line of communication, extend the 
circuit of action of ground columns and to increase both their speed 
and mobility. A flight of Vickers Valentia aircraft from No. 70 
(Bomber Transport) Squadron in Iraq augmented the flight already in 
India, carrying military personnel, storE? s and evacuating seriously 
wounded to base hospitals in India during the campaign. 125 
The close-support tactics developed at Khanpur by No. 3 
(Indian) wing and 2nd (Rawalpindi) Brigade in November 1936 were 
thoroughly vindicated during the Khaisora operations, adding a new 
dimension to the tactical conduct of frontier warfare. 126 They formed 
an integral part of most operations in Waziristan during 1937 with 
aircraft from Army Co-operation squadrons using the V. B. L. system of 
ground attack to engage hostile tribesmen in contact with imperial 
troops and those advancing or retiring in 'proscribed, areas in 
advance or along the flanks of imperial columns. The importance of 
close-support was acknowledged by General Sir J. D. Coleridge, G. O. C. 
Northern Command, in March 1937: 'These operations have definitely 
proved the great value which close support by aircraft in mountain 
warfare can afford, and that this can best be obtained by a column 
commander having at his side an Air Force commander with whom he can 
easily and quickly collaborate. '127 Aircraft constantly patrolled the 
sides and rear of columns during the day while operations were in 
progress, ready to take immediate offensive action and, in the 
process, restricted hostile movement in the area. On several 
occasions close-support aircraft acted as flank guards or 'high 
piquets, when columns moved through steel. ) and difficult country that 
otherwise would have entailed lengthy delays using infantry, even 
though they could not ensure complete security. The provision of 
, ndian columns and inflicted close air SUPP(Drt increased the pace 
of T 
heavy casualties on tribesmen concentrated to oppose advancing 
125 Capt. A. V. Brooke-Webb, 'Relief by Air, J. R. A., 66, (1939-40), pp. 225-8 and 
Review of Import&nt Military Events in India No. 4 of 1937,30th Oct. 1937, 
L/MIL/7/12492 
126 Report on the Operations in the Khaisora-Shaktu area of Waziristan, 25th 
November 1936 to 25th January 1937,25th Feb. 1937, Bottomley Mss, B2300 and 
Mackenzie op cit, p. 822 
127 Gen. J. D. Coleridge to C. G. S., 12th March 1937, Rees Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 274/4 
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troops. 128 A senior R. A. F. officer accompanied each column to advise 
brigade commanders, liaise with units and ensure pilots received all 
necessary information. As had been anticipated, close communication 
between pilots and the forward troops was essential. R/T between 
aircraft and R. A. F. mule-pack sets with column headquarters formed 
the basis of communication, while a simple 'XVT' 'Close Support 
Intercommunication Code, developed during the autumn of 1936 
supplemented Popham Panels and enabled troops to indicate their 
position and targets to supporting aircraft. 12 9 The commander of No. 
20 (A. C. ) Squadron, later observed: 
If any trouble was suspected, the R. A. F. would keep one or more 
aircraft over the area throughout the hours of daylight. The 
support was based on the principle of keeping picket positions 
under general surveillance, and giving them direct assistance 
if they needed it. All pickets carried two white ground strips, 
and whenever they halted they would put these out in the form 
of an "X" where it could be seen from the air. This showed 
their exact position. if the picket. was under fire, it would 
put a "V" with the view pointing in the direction of the enemy 
and there were many times we found the enemy through this help. 
If the picket were in danger of being overrun, it would use the 
emergency "T" sign, the short arm being nearest the enemy. 
There are times when we bombed and shot up the enemy within 
thirty yards of a picket position. The pilot would mark the 
picket positions on his map and periodically drop a message on 
the column headquarters, giving pinpoint map references and 
stating which were in action. 130 
Despite critics who still regarded such operations as a misuse of 
valuable aircraft henceforth close air support established itself as 
a valuable adjunct to all ground operations in tribal territory. 
The Waziristan campaign once again demonstrated the necessity 
of a high standard of specialised training in frontier warfare for 
British and Indian units stationed in the Covering Troops' districts 
128 Air Commodore N. H. Bottcmley, 'The Work of the Royal Air Force on the North-West 
Frontier', J. R. U. S. I., 84,535, (1939), pp. 775-8 
12 9 A. I. L. O.,, Close Support by Aircraft on the North West Frontier', J. U. S. I. I., 
70,298, (1940), p. 16 
1-11 Air Marshal Sir B. Embry, Mission Complete , (London, 1957), p. 80 
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and for those elements of the Field Army in Northern Command detailed 
as immediate reinforcements. The recent lessons learnt in tribal 
territory were included in reports issued by Northern Command and the 
annual report on collective training issued during the summer of 
1937.131 Training in frontier warfare was extended during 1936 to form 
part of the individual and collective training period of every unit 
and brigade in India. Units of the 1st (Rawalpindi) Division and 
those stationed in Lahore District, tasked to reinforce the Covering 
Troops on mobilisation, were also temporarily attached to columns 
operating in tribal territory to gain practical experience. Such 
training had immediate relevance as an estimated 200 'irreconcilable' 
tribesmen remained hostile and continued to snipe troops, sabotage 
roads, hold up traffic and cut telegraph lines in Waziristan during 
1938 and 1939, as well as carrying out raids in the Derajat. Tribal 
ingenuity was demonstrated once again when land mines, fabricated 
from explosives from unexploded bombs or stolen gelignite, were 
planted on roads, parade grounds and tracks necessitating further 
special precautions by troops. In addition, tribal guns were used on 
several occasions during attacks on posts in Waziristan. 132 As a 
result special defensive arrangements were necessary during 1938-1939 
on the line of communication to Razmak employing khassadars, Scouts, 
aircraft and the retention of 3rd (Jhelum) Brigade and other units 
from the Field Army to supplement the normal garrison. 133 
The Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier remained 
the main source of official guidance available to the Army in India 
in the specialised requirements of frontier warfare. Despite 
agreement between the General Staff, Air Staff in India and the 
Foreign and Political Department regarding the contents, the 
publication of its replacement was delayed while the operations in 
Waziristan were underway. The new manual was further delayed while 
revisions were made in accordance with the lessons of the recent 
131 Ccrnments and Deductions on the Khaisora Operations, Waziristan, 8th June 1937, 
Rees Mss, Mss. Eur. F. 274/4 and A. H. Q. India Traininq Memorandum No. 14 Collective 
Traininq Period 1936-37, (Dehli, 1937), pp. 8-12 L/MIL/17/5/2199 
132 M. I. Unofficial Letter on Afqhanistan and the North-West Frontier of India, 
(Simla, 1939), L/WS/1/192, Brabourne to Zetland, 7th Oct. 1938, Linlithqow Mss, 
Mss. Eur. F. 125/6 and Lt. -Col. H. E. Newman, 'Waziristan 1937 to 1939', R. E. J., 98, 
2, (1984), p. 118 
133 See Report by His Excellency the Camnander- in -Chief in India on the operations 
carried out in Waziristan between the 16th December 1937 and the 31st December 
1938 and Report by His Excellency the Connander-in-Chief in India on the 
operations carried out in Waziristan between the 1st January 1939 and the 31st 
December 1939,6th June 1940, L/MIL/7/16971 
267 
fighting, by suggestions from the India Office and by disagreements 
in London. When the first draft was submitted to the India Office for 
approval in February 1936, General Sir W. H. Bartholomew, the C. G. S., 
observed: 
It is most comprehensive and much larger than the old manual, 
but I think that it is right that this should be so. It is 
intended primarily for the use of officers of both services at 
Home and in India who have no knowledge of the Frontier or of 
Frontier fighting. I do not think there is anything 
controversial in the book so far as matters of principle are 
concerned. As regards the details of tactical methods, one can 
never please everybody and I daresay some experienced frontiers 
men will disagree with several things in the book with which 
others, equally experienced, will be in full agreement! 134 
Despite the C. G. S. 's desire to have the new manual published before 
the forthcoming collective training season, the sections referring to 
aircraft became a subject of controversy at the India Office. Lord 
Zetland strongly opposed the publication of information relating to 
air operations after growing public criticism in India and England. 
Indeed, the Secretary of State for India decided that while the 
sections relating to the army were acceptable for publication, those 
relating to the R. A. F. should be classified for 'Official Use Only' 
and be given a limited circulation. 135 This decision was a bitter 
disappointment to Major-General C. J. Auchinleck, who had spent a 
considerable amount of time drafting the manual and securing 
agreement between the R. A. F., military and political authorities in 
India. General Sir Robert Cassels, the Commander-in-Chief in India, 
intervened in May 1937 in an endeavour to prevent what he regarded as 
the 'emasculation, of the manual. Writing to the Military Secretary 
at the India Office he observed: 
The whole object of the book is to present a comprehensive 
picture of modern frontier warfare, as at present in progress 
to all concerned with the idea Of EMphasising need of co- 
134 Bartholomew to Wilson, Feb. 1937, L/WS/1/257 
135 Wilson to Auchinleck, 18th May 1937, and Auchinleck to Wilson, 27th May 1937, 
L/WS/1/257 
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operation between land and air forces and their dependence on 
each other, which have been unfortunately been lacking in the 
past. I have done everything possible to put this right, and it 
is not too much to say that present operations have proved that 
this object has been achieved. 136 
This request and support from both the Air Ministry and War Office 
forced the India Office to reconsider its decision, and the manual 
was completely reclassified as 'For Official Use Only', although it 
was now too late for it to be printed during 1937.137 Its arrival was 
eagerly awaited in India by both services as a means to improve 
relations and to provide guidelines regarding the conduct of 
operations under modern conditions. Indeed, it was hoped by R. A. F. 
officers that the new manual would facilitate further understanding 
and close co-operation between the two services in India and become a 
'live doctrine' that would ensure aircraft would be used to the best 
advantage. 138 Air Commodore R. H. Peck, acting A. O. C. in India, noted 
in October 1937: 'The issue of the new frontier warfare manual will 
be a great help in improving the employment of the air and there is 
no doubt that the authorities here, led now by General Vesey, are 
genuinely anxious to get it right., 13 9 Despite such support, further 
differences regarding types of air operations used by the R. A. F. on 
the frontier during 1938, originating primarily from the Air Staff in 
England, caused further delay and it was not until November 1938 that 
a final draft was approved for publication. 140 
The Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier was 
supplemented by further information published in the annual report on 
collective training and the service press during 1938. A small 
section was included in the annual training report for the Army in 
India issued in July 1938 containing further lessons from the ongoing 
fighting in Waziristan, but information was deliberately limited 
pending the publication of a new of f icial training manual. 141 The 
service press provided the most important means of disseminating 
136 Ccrmiander-in-Chief to Wilson, 28th May 1937,4J/WS/l/257 
137 Wilson to Auchinleck, 2nd July 1937, L/WS/1/257 
138 Newall to Deverell, 20th Sept. 1937, P. R. O. AIR 8/529 
139 Peck to Newall, 16th Oct. 1937, P. R. O. AIR 8/529 
140 Waldie, op cit, p-216, J. S Shattock, Under Secretary to the Government of India 
Defence Department, to the Secretary Military Dept, India Office, 28th June 1938, 
and SSI to Government of India Army Department, 3rd Nov. 1938, L/WS/1/257 
141 A. H. Q. India Training Memorandum No. 16 Collective Traininq period 1937=38, 
(Dehli, 1938), p. 1 L/MIL/17/5/2199 
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information regarding the recent fighting. During 1938 a series of 
articles appeared in the i. U. S. I. I. ranging from accounts of the 
operations to detailed tactical proposals regarding the conduct of 
frontier warfare in the future. "' Many officers were eager to record 
their experiences and discern lessons from the recent operations, 
although not all were satisfied with the tactical methods or system 
of training employed by the Army in India. At the direct request of 
the Deputy C. G. S., Major-General C. J. Auchinleck, Colonel F. I. S. 
Tuker prepared a paper for the J. U. S. I. I. based on the innovative 
method of road protection used by the 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles on the 
Razani sector of the lines of communication, in which a system of 
aggressive patrolling by day and night, based on perimeter camps and 
permanent piquets throughout the sector, replaced the system of 
static road protection used elsewhere in Waziristan. 143 Writing under 
the pseudonym "Auspex", he once again took the opportunity to condemn 
the doctrine of frontier warfare used by the Indian Army, observing 
that the immense value of armoured and mechanised forces supplied 
from the air and supported by close support aircraft had not been 
fully exploited. Particular criticism was reserved for brigade 
columns and the system of piqueting on the move: 
The mountain warfare doctrinaires must be stopped from 
propounding it as a normal and good method. The Pathan's small- 
bore weapons killed it thirty years ago; it only suited the 
jezail. The nearer a commander can bring mountain warfare into 
line with modern warfare, the nearer he comes to success, for 
he will bring his superior firepower to bear to its maximum 
extent and at the right time. 144 
Despite such strong condemnation of orthodox wisdom, the official 
doctrine of frontier warfare remained largely unchanged although 
units and formations stationed on the frontier still experimented 
with new tactics. For example, during the Kharre operations in July 
142 See Lt. -Col. C. J. Wood, 'An Operation in the Vicinity of Spinwam - 20th October 
1937', J. U. S. I. I., 68,292, (1938), pp. 255-66, Maj. M. Glover, 'Ordnance Service in 
Waziristan', J. U. S. I. I., 68,292, (1938), pp. 311-15 and Maj. J. E. Hirst, 'Second 
Echelon in Frontier Operations', J. U. S. I. I., 68,293, (1938), pp. 431-447 
143 Lt. -Col. G. R. Stevens, History of the 2nd Kinq Edward VII's own Goorkha Rifles 
(The Sirmoor Rifles), (Aldershot, 1952), Vol. III pp. 33-4 
144 Auspex,, The Dream Sector, L. Of C. ', J. U. S. I. I., 68,291, (1938), p. 209 
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1938, two brigades and the Tochi Scouts stayed out in mutually 
supporting laagers overnight instead of employing an orthodox 
perimeter camp. 145 
The new manual - Frontier Warfare (Army and Royal Air Force) 
1939 - was issued to British and Indian units and R. A. F. squadrons 
during March 1939, after hurried revisions were made taking into 
account the recent changes in the organisation of infantry 
battalions. It provided the Army in India with a comprehensive and 
up-to-date formal written doctrine of frontier warfare upon which a 
comprehensive system of training was based. 20,000 copies were 
printed and circulated in England and India where it formed the basis 
of training for companies and higher formations for the remainder of 
British rule. It was considerably larger than its predecessor and 
codified the existing doctrine of frontier warfare currently in use 
in India modernised to the extent of discussing the use of aircraft, 
light tanks, and heavy artillery in tribal territory. The greater 
degree of understanding and co-operation between the Indian Army and 
the R. A. F. was reflected in its contents, despite continued 
differences regarding the higher direction of tribal control, and it 
provided a comprehensive picture of frontier warfare that emphasised 
the need for co-operation of land and air forces and their dependence 
on each other. It described, in considerable detail, how aircraft 
could carry out air blockades, proscriptive air action, destructive 
air action and air co-operation in mountain warfare. Despite growing 
criticism of certain aspects of the existing doctrine, the manual 
emphasised the continued importance of the established orthodox 
doctrine of frontier warfare, with columns, protective piquets and 
perimeter camps. It warned officers, however, against the dangers of 
operations bec(DMing too stereotyped, as well as dismissing a growing 
belief in the fighting ability of Pathan lashkars. The Indian Army's 
long experience of operations on the frontier was reflected in 
footnotes throughout the manual which contained references to prior 
operations. officers were encouraged to read histories of military 
operations and it included a bibliography listing works dealing with 
both the frontier and frontier warfare. 146 The new manual was 
complemented by other sources of unofficial guidance such as articles 
14 5 Lt. -Col. F. C. Simpson, 'Review of Frontier Policy from 1849-19391, J. U. S. I. I., 
74,317, (1944), p. 484 
146 Frontier warfare - India (Army and Royal Air Force. j, (Dehli, 1939) 
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in the service press that discussed the conduct of frontier warfare 
under modern conditions, or advocating either the wider use of 
mechanised units or the development of light infantry skills in the 
border hills. 147 Perhaps the most significant addition to the 
unofficial literature relating to training for fighting in tribal 
territory was a revised edition of Passing it On: Short Talks on 
Tribal Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India published in 
1939, which contained an additional chapter written by several Indian 
Army officers that discussed the lessons of the 1936-37 operations in 
Waziristan. 148 
147 See "Vibcjyor", I Mechanisation or Motorisation: the Application of Mobility to 
our Frontier Problems', J. U. S. I. I., 69,295, (1939), pp. 204-11, Anon, 'Cooperation 
between Light Tanks and Infantry (With special Application to Mountain Warfare 
vis-a-vis Infantry Battalion Officers), J. U. S. I. I., 69,296, (1939), pp. 309-23 and 
Maj. C. M. Wingfie ld, 'Mountain Warfare', J. U. S. I. I., 69,297, (1939), pp. 493-505 
148 Gen. Sir A. Skeen, Passinq it On: Short talks on Tribal Fiqhtinq on the North- 
West Frontier of_India, (London, 1939), 4th Ed. 
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Conclusion 
Frontier Warfare in Retrospect 
and Prospect, 1939-1947 
The Army in India possessed 90 years of sustained extensive 
experience of conducting military operations against trans-border 
Pathan lashkars when the Second World War broke out in September 
1939. Despite a long series of major campaigns and a succession of 
border skirmishes, the Pathan tribes remained fiercely independent 
and an insistent threat to the security of the settled areas. Apart 
from where roads had penetrated the hills, the main distinguishing 
features of frontier warfare remained essentially unchanged from 
those initially encountered in 1849. Imperial troops still had to 
move and fight in remote mountainous areas, with all the attendant 
problems of transport and supply, against elusive lightly armed 
tribal lashkars that were, in comparison, inured to local conditions 
and expert in the tactics of gueirilla warfare. As other modern 
supporting weapons could not be effectively exploited in the hills of 
tribal territory, frontier warfare remained primarily the preserve of 
the infantryman and the pack mule. The need for a coherent formal 
written doctrine of frontier warfare for imperial troops and the 
R. A. F. therefore remained as pressing as ever due to a combination of 
the mountainous terrain in independent territory and tribal armament, 
tactics and military characteristics. Minor tactics on the frontier 
remained relatively unchanged from those originally developed by the 
P. F. F., and later disseminated to the rest of the Army in India after 
the Tirah Campaign, as they were more dependent on the terrain than 
any other factor. Although frequently termed mountain warfare, the 
operations carried out in tribal territory were very different from 
those practised in Europe, representing a specialised form of savage 
warfare, tailored to local military requirements in India. 
The regiments of the Indian Army were now highly proficient in 
the 'art, of frontier warfare as a result of a system of specialised 
training combined with frequent opportunities for active service in 
tribal territory. Although troops stationed in the N. W. F. P. still had 
to be warned repeatedly to maintain alertness, the vast majority of 
Indian Army units, by tradition, training and experience were now 
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highly skilled in the intricacies of frontier warfare. ' Indeed, many 
regiments, especially those that belonged to the P. F. F., regarded 
themselves by tradition as specialists in this type of fighting. A 
comprehensive range of official training manuals, incorporating 
lessons learned and a wealth of frontier fighting experience, were 
available to British officers which described in elaborate detail the 
principles and minor tactics of frontier warfare, as well as official 
histories, handbooks and gazetteers containing detailed information 
regarding the trans-border Pathans and tribal territory. Training in 
frontier warfare remained the responsibility of individual regiments, 
supervised by the staff and commanders of the formations to which 
they belonged, during the normal course of individual and collective 
training each year. Standing Orders issued by higher formations and 
brigades complemented the official manuals and laid down local 
variations in minor tactics and details that took into account the 
local terrain. Senior officers also received instruction in the 
specialised staff duties required when conducting operations in 
tribal territory, at both the Staff Colleges at Camberley and at 
Quetta. When the 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles arrived in Waziristan, for 
example, in October 1939 the Commanding Officer and all company 
officers had prior frontier experience while the rest of the 
battalion had received intensive instruction based on official 
training manuals. A. Hayter later observed: 
We had already heard many lectures, read many pamphlets, and 
carried out many TEWTS (Tactical Exercise Without Troops) on 
Frontier Warfare, to teach us the chain of command, 
administrative planning, evacuation of casualties, the tactical 
situations to be expected and their solution. 2 
The military authorities in India clearly still accepted that 
pragmatic ad-hoc adaptation to local military requirements, 'making 
it up as you went along, or common sense was simply insufficient to 
prevent unnecessary casualties, although the bare essentials of 
frontier warfare were simple enough. T. R. Mockaitis is simply 
incorrect to assert that: 'In the bump and shove of military life on 
1 Elliot, OP Cit, P-1 
2 A. Hayter, The Second Ste , (London, 1962), p. 98 
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the Northwest Frontier... soldiers were left to the time-honoured 
method of "making it up as they went alorig. "'3 Frequent 'regrettable 
incidents' made General staff realise that the provision of a formal 
written doctrine and system of training was imperative, perhaps more 
so than in any other part of the Empire, to prevent British and 
Indian units suffering unnecessary casualties that might otherwise 
cause a minor incident to escalate into a major conflict. 
Nevertheless losses were still suffered at Pathan hands, although 
normally these occurred as a result of either a lack of any previous 
experience or a failure to obey the accepted laws, of frontier 
fighting. moreover, such incidents constantly underlined the need for 
a specific tactical doctrine for frontier warfare and specialised 
training which had to be taught and 'passed on, to new generations of 
officers and men as the penalties of neglect were all too apparent. 
The manuals promulgated by the General Staff in India 
represented a clearly thought out formal written doctrine upon which 
was based a comprehensive and progressive training programme to 
ensure its acceptance throughout the Army in India. These manuals 
improved readiness and ensured uniformity of training amongst units 
throughout India, guaranteeing that regiments from various commands 
could operate together at short notice. As a result of the ongoing 
commitment to tribal control and offensive military strategies in 
event of war in Afghanistan, the General Staff devoted considerable 
serious attention to preserving, formulating, and transmitting 
information relating to the conduct of frontier warfare as it 
represented a definite local, immediate and long-term military 
problem. This was an important reflection of military professionalism 
directed towards imperial requirements rather than in imitation of 
European practice. Training manuals were periodically revised and 
annual instructions issued to direct training, incorporating new 
ideas and experience gained during recent operations and 
modifications to existing tactics caused by changes in military 
organisation and equipment. As R. Gregorian has recently observed, a 
combination of near constant active service and a generally more 
professional attitude than its British counterpart, meant the Indian 
Army was more reflective and responsive to changes on the colonial 
3 T. R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurqency in the Post-imperial era, (Manchester, 
1995), p-133 
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battlefield. 4 Such skills also had relevance in other theatres of war 
in which imperial troops were employed. In comparison, the British 
Army at home concentrated on the tactics of a conventional European 
conflict against relatively similarly armed, trained and equipped 
opponents. Those British units that served in India arrived with 
training based on F. S. R. and without any specific instruction for 
local Indian requirements. While in India they trained in accordance 
with local directives, but were never able to acquire the same degree 
of efficiency in the specialised tactics of hill warfare as Indian 
units. A combination of short and infrequent tours of duty in tribal 
territory and the reluctance of British service officers to 
acknowledge that special training was required meant that they often 
suffered unnecessary casualties at tribal hands. 
The official system of manuals and training was complemented by 
other important means of communication outside official channels by 
which the tactics of mountain warfare were 'passed on'. A sizeable 
range of books, pamphlets and unofficial text-books were available to 
British officers written by their predecessors which provided further 
sources of information and guidance regarding operations against the 
trans-border Pathans. These amplified the necessarily condensed and 
often cryptic language of the drill books and training manuals often 
presented in a too indigestible form for junior officers and N. C. O. s. 
Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice remained the most easily 
available and most comprehensive treatment of colonial warfare 
available to officers in England. It is only possible to speculate, 
however, how widely it was read and to what extent training was based 
on its guidelines, although the book had been used at both the Staff 
College at Camberley and the R. A. F Staff College at Andover during 
the inter-war period. 5 Passing it On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting 
on the North-West Frontier written by Major General Sir Andrew Skeen 
assumed an authoritative position in India and gained almost official 
acceptance after it was issued to British and Indian units. Several 
editions were published before the outbreak of the Second World War, 
revised and updated to reflect changes in imperial equipment and 
tribal tactics. Other sources of information and reference were 
4 R. Gregorian, 'Jungle Bashing' in Malaya: Towards a Formal Tactical Doctrine', 
Small Wars and Insurqencies, 5,3 (1994), p. 342 
5 A. D. English, 'The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of British Strategic 
Bombing Policy', J-S. S., 16,3, p. 420 
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available to officers in the form of regimental histories and various 
published personal accounts Of operations against the trans-border 
Pathan tribes. 
The military press represented an important means of 'passing 
on' information to officers. The perceived 'lessons, of frontier 
warfare were regularly discussed at lectures given by serving Indian 
Army officers held at the U. S. I. I. at Simla, while the R. U. S. I. and 
other professional military organisations in India and England 
deliberated periodically upon the subject. The sheer number of 
articles published in the J. U. S. I. I. indicate considerable 
professional interest amongst British officers regarding frontier 
fighting. Articles ranged from general discussions of frontier policy 
and the role of the army, to accounts of operations, potential new 
tactics and training, and detailed technical discussions of tactics 
and equipment for each arm. These represented an important means of 
broadening professional knowledge amongst British officers regarding 
tactics, training and the use of new equipment against the trans- 
border tribes. The service press also provided a medium where 
officers dissatisfied with the methods employed on the frontier could 
present arguments for the adoption of new equipment and methods of 
training. 
The unint-errupted sequence of military operations in tribal 
territory mean-- the ranks of Indian regiments contained a large 
permanent cadre of long serving British and Indian officers, N. C. O. s 
and other ranks who provided the final means of 'passing on' 
information relating to hill warfare. The comparatively short 
intervening period of time between tours of duty in the N. W. F. P. 
meant that nea, -ly all Indian units now contained officers and men who 
had personal knowledge and recent experience of tribal territory and 
its inhabitants. Information regarding the conduct of operations was 
passed on to new subalterns and recruits by these men during 
training. Nearly all Indian Army officers above the rank of Major 
during the inter-war period had served on the North-West Frontier as 
subalterns and knew by personal experience what was involved in 
military opera-: ions against the trans-border tribes. As long as the 
continuity of training and experience was not interrupted this system 
worked effectively, but the transmission of information by word of 
mouth was haphazard at best and frequent omissions and errors often 
occurred. 
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The conduct of frontier warfare was not the sole task performed 
by the Army in India and the training, organisation and equipment 
intended for i-! ý. s other roles affected its tactical effectiveness 
during operations in tribal territory and approach to training. Units 
serving in the Army in India were always primarily trained and 
organised for conventional military operations, either in Asia or as 
part of an imperial expedition, although they were furnished with 
lower scales of equipment. British officers always perceived 
themselves as training first and foremost for a conventional 
conflict, although this was tempered by a recognition of India's 
local military requirements of frontier warfare and internal security 
(the latter always came a poor third in terms of priority). As a 
result it proved difficult to achieve the correct balance between the 
time devoted to training for conventional operations and that for 
frontier warfare, especially during peacetime when local day-to-day 
military requirements in India always loomed larger in the minds of 
Indian Army officers. During the twentieth century the pendulum swung 
from one extreme to another with regard to the importance attached to 
specialised training in hill warfare, as preparations for a 
conventional conflict waxed and waned or when the frequency of 
operations in tribal territory declined. 
The conflicting requirements of the two types of operation 
became more explicit following the First World War when it became 
apparent that the two systems of training were not only at great 
variance, but almost contradictory in many respects. Training and 
equipment for conventional warfare, moreover, directly affected the 
military effectiveness of imperial troops during operations in tribal 
territory during the inter-war period. The relative mobility of 
Indian columns operating in the hills progressively declined as they 
became dependent on supporting arms and services, tying them to fixed 
lines of communication after modern arms and heavy equipment, 
intended for Icivilised warfare,, were adopted. Although the 
construction of roads in Waziristan and other parts of tribal 
territory eased supply and administrative difficulties they did not 
remove the essential problem encountered by imperial troops moving 
through the hills. Armoured cars, light tanks, lorries, field and 
medium artillery were increasingly employed in the immediate vicinity 
of roads, as well as units with higher scales of equipment. The 
mountainous terrain in tribal territory afforded little further scope 
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for mechanisation, however, apart from light tanks, making pack mules 
and infantry essential when columns operated in the hills. The 
tactical flexibility and mobility evident in prior frontier campaigns 
progressively declined, as it was impossible to reconcile the heavy 
scale of equipment carried by regular troops and the attendant first 
line mule transport with rapid cross-country movement over 
mountainous terrain. Despite endeavours to improve their speed and 
mobility, Indian columns could not match that of lashkars as 
increasing quantities of heavy equipment, supplies and maintenance 
services exacerbated transport and supply problems that had always 
dogged operations on the frontier. In many respects the commitment of 
the Indian Army to the frontier mirrored the paradox encountered by 
the United States army during the nineteenth century when fighting 
against native American Indians. The commitment to tribal control 
reduced its effectiveness in conventional military operations, while 
at the same time the army's normal preoccupation with conventional 
war unfitted it for its frontier mission. 6 The various discussions 
regarding the resuscitation of the P. F. F. in the 1920s and 1930s 
reflected widespread recognition that specially trained, lightly 
equipped and appropriately organised troops would be much more 
efficient and mobile than regulars on periodic tours of duty. 
However, such proposals were unacceptable as long as Afghanistan and 
the North-West Frontier remained the most likely theatre of 
operations for the Army in India, as the area provided invaluable 
practical experience of the terrain and tribal tactics likely to be 
encountered across the Durand Line. In any event, the Scouts and 
various militias now performed the policing and, to a lesser degree, 
many of the military tasks previously carried out by the frontier 
force when it had been under civil control. 
The conduct of mountain warfare was closely studied by British 
and Indian troops stationed in Northern Command throughout the Second 
World War, although elsewhere in India attention was directed first 
towards training for operations against a 'modern' opponent either in 
mountains, desert and then jungle following the Japanese invasion of 
Malaya and Burma. 7 Intermittent fighting occurred in Waziristan 
6 R. M. Utley, 'The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition', 
in H. R. Borowski, (ed. ) The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959ý 
1987, (Washington, 1988), p. 58 
7 Army in India Traininq Meporandum, No. 2 War Series, (Simla, 1940), p. 1 
L/MIL/17/5/2240 
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against elusive tribal gangs which inflicted a steady trickle of 
casualties on the units comprising the garrison. As the commander of 
Razmak brigade noted on 24th November 1939: 'Last week we had 16 more 
casualties on one day, in fact we are losing more men here than the 
Army is in France! 8 Between 1939 and 1945 regiments stationed in 
Northern Command were intensively trained in frontier warfare, as 
well as in the modifications required if the tribesmen were assisted 
by foreign troops. 9 Frontier Warfare - India (Army and R. A. F. ) 
remained the main source of official guidance throughout the war, 
although amendments were added as further combat experience was 
collated. 10 The time-honoured doctrine of tribal warfare had 
immediate relevance for the garrison in Waziristan when, in February- 
May 1940, two brigades and supporting troops covered the construction 
of Frontier Constabulary posts in the Ahmadzai salient, used as a 
jumping-off point for tribesmen raiding the Derajat. 11 The importance 
of specialised training in frontier warfare was further emphasised on 
the night of 7th/8th December 1940, when the 5/8th Punjabis lost 58 
killed and 55 wounded near Razmak after a demoralised piquet unwisely 
attempted to retire to a nearby perimeter camp opening itself to 
attack by a Mahsud lashkar. 12 Shortly after the incident, one British 
officer observed: 'Mountain warfare is an art and an art demands 
practice. When well done it is a beautiful thing, distinguished by 
clear cut lines and firm execution but when botched it becomes like a 
daub, a mass of aimless blurred strokes and smudges. And always the 
penalty for clumsiness, for failing to fit the picture together 
properly, will be casualties. f13 Further large scale operations and 
minor skirmishes continued against elusive lashkars led by the Faqir 
14 of Ipi throughout the rest of the war. 
8 Lewis to Wife, 24th Nov. 1939, Lewis Mss, I. W. M. 74/48/1 
9 W. H. Alston, "My Day and Aqe" The Memoirs of William Lowry Alston at one time a 
British Officer in H. M. Indian Army 1917-1947, (Unpublished T. S. Memoir), Vol. VI 
p. 2, Vol. pp. 33-4 and Vol. VIII, pp. 32-3 N. A. M. 8005-151 
10 Army in India Traininq Memorandum No. 14 War Series January-February 1942, 
(Simla, 1942), App. F 
11 Defence Department Despatch No. 2 of 1941: Operations in Waziristan from the 1st 
January 1940 to the 24th May 1940,15th Feb. 1941., L/WS/1/1526 
12 Brig. L. E. Dennys, 'Report of Action on Tabe Zangai on the Night of 7/8th Dec. 
1940, L/MIL/7/169*71 
13 T. J. Phillips, 'Diary Extracts', 23rd Feb. 1941, Phillips Mss, Mss. Eur-C-393/3 
14 See War Department Despatch No. 1 of 1942: Report by His Excellency the 
Commander- in-Chief India on the operations in Waziristan between 25th May 1940 and 
30th September 1941,25th Sept. 1942, and War Department Despatch No. 1 of 1943: 
Report by His Excellency the C onmiander -in -Chief in India on the operations carried 
out in Waziristan between the 1st October 1941 and 31st December 1942,2nd Aug. 
1943, L/WS/1/1526 
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The general military skills learnt on the frontier were also 
deemed to have significance during the Second World War in other 
theatres of war, although the specialised minor tactics of frontier 
warfare were generally conflict specific. For example, at the request 
of the War Office, twenty officers were provided by the Indian Army 
in April 1940 to act as advisers in mountain warfare to British units 
preparing for service in Norway. 15 In the mountains of Italian East 
Africa, the skills learnt in tribal territory had immediate relevance 
to imperial troops. 16 An Army in India Training Memorandum noted in 
1941, with regard to units that had served on the frontier: 'They may 
not have learnt all about modern warfare, but they had learnt the 
basic lessons, leadership, discipline, endurance, speed, fieldcraft; 
all these against a critical teacher - the Pathan. '17 When German 
units advanced through the Caucasus, it appeared that such skills had 
immediate relevance to the troops remaining in India. A pamphlet 
produced in India in 1941, which described tactics required against 
European troops in mountainous terrain, rioted: 
The Army in India starts with having studied the Pathan and his 
ways and having acquaintance with conditions, tactical and 
administrative, of fighting in the mountains. It should, 
therefore, not only be more mobile than its prospective enemy, but 
should also be able to adapt the Pathan's harassing tactic to 
worrying a more stereotyped opponent both near the battle front 
and on the L. of C. 18 
Moreover the skills learnt in frontier warfare were also deemed of 
value for jungle warfare, as long as they were complemented by a 
period of intensive training to develop 'jungle sense' and to 
overcome initial 'jungle phobia,. A report produced by the 1943 
Infantry Committee noted: 'Troops trained in frontier warfare should 
quickly assimilate the technique of jungle warfare, owing to its 
15 GOI Defence to Department to SSI No. 824,24th April 1940, L/WS/1/377 and 
Prendergast, op cit, p-114 
16 Brig. W. E. Condon, The Frontier Force Rifles, (Aldershot, 1953), p. 290 
17 Army in India Traininq Memorandum No. 9 War Series July 1941, (Dehli, 1941) 
L/MIL/17/5/2240 
18 Military Traininq Pamphlet No. 7 (India) Extensive Warfare (Notes on warfare in 
mountainous country between modern forces in Eastern theatres. j, (Simla, 1941), 
p. 3 2nd ed. L/MIL/17/5/2248 
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similarity in principle to mountain warfare, and to the fact that so 
much jungle country is also mountainous. '19 
The British and Indian units serving in the border garrisons 
were once again 'milked' of experienced officers, N. C. O. s and men and 
replaced by an influx of inexperienced and untrained Emergency 
Commissioned Officers and new recruits. A series of mountain warfare 
courses were run initially by Northern Command, using instructors and 
demonstration troops from 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade, on an 
ad-hoc basis for new units, to provide trained officers capable of 
imparting instruction to their men and thereby avoid a repetition of 
the events of 1919-20.20 An Army School of Frontier Warfare opened at 
Kakul in March 1941 to instruct British and Indian N. C. O. s, 
regimental officers and formation commanders in Northern Command and 
Western (Independent) District. 21 Eleven month-long courses were held 
annually, each of which had vacancies for 100 students selected from 
British and Indian battalions, Indian States Forces and the Nepalese 
Contingent, and with a smaller proportion allotted to personnel from 
armoured, engineer, artillery, R. A. F. and Indian Air Force units. 
Particular attention was given to officers from British units, the 
majority of whom lacked any knowledge of frontier warfare or the 
Pathan tribes. Senior officers of new units, or those about to move 
to the frontier for the first time on a tour of duty, were given 
preference on each course. An ability to 'pass it on' also acted as 
the main guide in selecting candidates, who were tested and ranked in 
their ability as instructors at the end of each course before 
returning to their units. 22 The syllabus covered basic tactics, 
battle procedure, fire and movement, piqueting, advance and rearguard 
duty, patrolling and administration. It also taught various 
techniques employed for individual, platoon, company and battalion 
training and culminated with the duties required of a frontier 
brigade operating in tribal territory. An attached demonstration 
battalion gave presentations of piqueting, covering fire, ambushes, 
19 Report of the Infantry Committee 1943,1st-14th June 1943, L/WS/1/1371 
20 Capt. B. J. Donlea, 'Notes on Mountain Warfare Course Abbottabad, ' April 1940, 
Donlea Mss, L. H. A., Col. W. N. Nicholson, The Suffolk Reqiment 1928 to 1946, 
(Ipswich, 1947), p. 151 and Letter to Author from Lt. -Col. R. M. Maxwell, 14th Sept. 
1994 
21 Under Secretary to the Government of India, Defence Department (Army Branch), to 
Chief of the Gene-ral Staff, 7th March 1941, L/WS,, 1/529 
22 Courses of Instruction, India No. 11 Frontier Warfare School, India, Kakul 1941, 
(Dehli, 1941) L/MIL/17/5/2201, and R. M. Maxwell, op cit, p. 209 
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and organisation for the benefit of students and a large sand-table 
model of the local area facilitated training . 
23 Instruction in 
mountain warfare formed part of the syllabus at the Poona Tactical 
School, the Officers' Training School at Bangalore and an element of 
the tactical syllabus of the six month long War Course held between 
1939-1945 at the Staff College at Quetta. 24 A series of military 
training pamphlets was also produced by the authorities in India for 
both army units and the R. A. F. to facilitate training of new 
'hostilities only, officers and men. 25 
The increasing number of newly raised Indian units in the North 
Western Army during 1943 prompted an increase in the output of the 
Frontier Warfare School to meet growing demand. Moreover, the school 
supervised the production of various cinema films of operations on 
the frontier and also helped to develop various backpacks that would 
enable inf antrymen to carry large loads. 26 Despite the authoritative 
guidance issued by the Frontier Warfare School and the existing 
official manuals and pamphlets, the conduct of frontier warfare was 
discussed in the service press by officers serving in the N. W. F. P. 
throughout the war, especially with regard to the employment of 
modern equipment now in use elsewhere by the Army in India. In an 
article critical of the existing tactical methods, Lieutenant-Colonel 
F. C. Simpson observed in 1943: 
It may be said with some justification that the present is 
scarcely the time for such a study of Frontier Warfare, when 
the attention of all soldiers is being directed to other and 
more pressing forms of warfare, which are of immediate and 
pressing concern to all the armies of the Allied nations. At 
the same time Frontier Warfare, and all that it implies, is one 
of the unpleasant things - like many others - which we have 
23 Letter to Author from Lt. -Col. R. M. Maxwell, 14th Sept. 1994, and Interview by 
author with Major F. Delens, 11th Oct. 1994 
24 Prendergast, op cit, p. 142, Hudson, op cit, p. 225 Hudson Mss Photo. Eur. 179 and 
Director of Military Training, General Headquarters India, to Director of Military 
Training, War Office, 1st Aug. 1942, App. G. L/WS/1/1364 
25 Military Traininq Pamphlet No. 16 (India) Platoon Leadinq in Frontier Warfare, 
(Simla, 1942) L/MIL/17/5/2258, Military Traininq Pamphlet No. 6 (India) Th 
Support of Land forces in Tribal Warfare on the Western Frontier of India, 1940, 
(Simla, 1941) L/MIL/17/5/2247, and Army/Air Operations Pamphlet No. 8 (India) Air 
Forces in Support of the Army in Tribal Warfare on the Western Frontier of India 
1944, (Delhi, 1944). L/MIL/17/5/2242 
26 Director of Military Training, General Headquarters India, to Director of 
military Training, War Office, 18th June 1943, L/WS/1/1302 
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always with us, and it can never be neglected, either now or in 
the future... nothing is certain except that we must always be 
prepared to fight on the N. W. frontier, and so we must 
continually be thinking of how we shall fight there when the 
next time comes. 27 
Opinion was still divided amongst Indian Army officers as to the 
respective merits of the minor tactics used on the frontier. Indeed, 
other officers were still sceptical of proposals to introduce modern 
equipment and tactics devised primarily for other theatres of war. 
Lieutenant-Colonel P. A. Meade pointed out: 'certain frontier 
procedures evolved through many years of careful thought and 
experience cannot be lightly discarded as too slow and cumbersome, 
even with the aid of most modern weapons, and that anyone who, fresh 
from the speed of modern war, tries to take too short a cut may 
possibly as a result find himself very badly bogged. '28 Perhaps the 
leading critic of frontier warfare added his voice to the debate, 
reiterating his deeply held criticism of the 'die-hard, school of 
frontiersmen he had so long attacked. "Auspex" argued that it had 
exerted a baleful influence on the Army in India and observed: 
The less is contained in the greater: that is, that training 
and methods employed for fighting a modern enemy will fit us, 
for example, to destroy quickly a N. W. Frontier enemy and that 
there is no need for such a thing as old "Frontier Warfare" 
that some have come so much to love... In fact, the most modern 
methods of getting mobility will do away with most of the 
troublesome things in 'Passing it On'. Dear as their 
perpetuation may be to some whose whole claim to military 
learning is that they can retail them to the layman, their 
continuance is just simply not soldiering. 29 
Such views were given wider currency when Sir Francis Tuker chaired a 
committee appointed to examine the defence of the North-West 
Frontier, which in part criticised the 'cumbersome' and 
27 Lt. -Col. F. C. Simpson, 'Frontier Warfare in Retrospect and Prospect', J. U. S. 
I. I-., 
73,313, (1943), p. 378 
28 Lt. -Col. P. A. Meade, 'Frontier Tactics Defended', J. U. S. I. I., 74,314, (1944), p. 
65 
29 "Auspex", 'Reflections on Mobility in land Forces', J. U. S. I. I_., 74,315, (1944), 
pp. 155-61 
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'unimaginative' tactics used on the frontier and condemned the 
neglect of modern equipment or techniques such as air supply. It made 
a searing indictment of training derived from operations in tribal 
territory and its influence on the organisation, training and 
equipment of the army as a whole which had been predicated primarily 
on conducting small wars in the tribal areas. 30 
The Army in India returned to its normal peacetime duties of 
frontier policing and internal security after the Japanese 
surrendered in August 1945. A Training Directive issued that month 
ordered that troops allotted to the role of frontier defence in North 
Western Army should concentrate solely on instruction in frontier 
warfare. 31 A shortage of trained instructors ensured that the 
Frontier Warfare School remained open until the end of 1946 to train 
officers and N. C. O. s of the post-war army. 32 The importance of 
teaching officers about prior experiences in tribal territory was 
emphasised in the official history of operations on the North-West 
Frontier between 1920-1935 that was published in 1945. It noted: 
Wars between 1st class Modern powers come and go. Armaments and 
battle grounds change with each upheaval. The tribes of the 
North-West Frontier of India however remain as heretofore an 
unsolved problem. The Indian Army of the future will still have 
to deal with Mohmands and Afridis, Mahsuds and Wazirs. The 
Tangis and Kandaos of the past will again be contested. History 
repeats itself. Let it be read profitably. 33 
As comparatively few changes had occurred in either the tactics or 
the weapons employed on either side, perhaps in no other theatre of 
war could such a statement have had such a strong basis of fact. 
Endeavours were made to assimilate lessons from recent experience 
gained fighting against Axis troops in mountainous terrain in Europe, 
when training teams from Indian formations in Italy were sent to the 
North-West Frontier to pass on lessons regarding training and 
30 Lt. -Gen. Sir F. I. Tuker, While Memory Serves, (London, 1956), p. 360 and Frontier 
Committee 1945, (Calcutta, 1945), p. 4 L/MIL/17/13/46 
31 G. O. C. in Chief to North Western Army, Southern Army, Eastern Conmiand and 
Central Comand, 28th Aug. 1945, L/WS/1/767 
32 C. G. S. to HQ North Western Army, Southern Army, Eastern Comnand and Central 
Conniand, 5th Sept. 1945, L/WS/1/789 
33 official History 1920-35, p. vii 
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fighting with modern equipment. 34 In an article published by the 
J. U. S. I. I. Major W. J. Spaight revealed continued differences of 
opinion regarding the relevance of the doctrine still employed by 
imperial troops in tribal territory. 35 His comprehensive indictment 
of the current methods used by the Army in India on the North-West 
Frontier prompted other highly experienced frontier officers to 
vigorously defend both the tactics employed by imperial troops and 
the value of training derived from service in tribal territory. 36 
The conduct of mountain warfare also attracted considerable 
official interest in the immediate aftermath of the war, with regard 
to applying modern tactics and equipment to the conduct of tribal 
warfare, at the same time as discussions were underway for the 
removal of advanced troops from tribal territory. 37 An experimental 
brigade, with an attached Operational Research Section, was formed at 
the request of Field Marshal C. J. Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief 
in India, in Northern Command during the autumn of 1946, to study and 
solve the problem of how to conduct operations against an elusive 
guerilla opponent in a quick and decisive manner. After close 
consultation with experienced frontier officers, extensive trials 
were conducted by No. 47 (Experimental) Infantry Brigade in the 
northern Punjab and N. W. F. P. in October 1946-March 1947. The aim was 
to provide the three Frontier Brigade Groups then stationed along the 
border with tactical guidance, to determine the principles underlying 
the employment of Indian troops in different circumstances and the 
different tasks to be allotted to their commanders and, finally to 
modify and develop modern methods of fighting for all types of 
operations especially with regard to increasing mobility. The British 
Army clearly had an eye on the future as its brief also included 
operations against guerrillas in areas other than India. 38 Despite 
experiments with armour, airborne troops, close support and transport 
aircraft, and other modern equipment, the trials revealed that little 
34 Director of Military Training to the Director of Military Training, War Office, 
1st Aug. 1945, L/WS/1/767 
35 Maj. W. J. Spaight, 'The Frontier Myth', J. U. S. I. I., 75,320, (1945), pp-374-6 
36 See Brig. M. R. Roberts, 'Frontier Realities', J. U. S. I. I., 76,322, (1946), 
pp. 53-9 and "The Admiral", 'Further Thoughts on Frontier Myths', J. U. S. I. I., 76, 
323, (1946), pp-225-9 
37 Record of a Conference held at Government House, Peshawar, on 24th April 1946, 
to discuss the Plan for the substitution of Civil Armed Forces for regular troops 
in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier, 24th April 1946, L/P&S/12/3266. 
38 Brig. M. C. Frye, Director of Weapons & Equipment, to Brig. J. R. Reynolds, 6th 
May 1946, and Directive - The Experimental Frontier Bde, 6th May 1946, L/WS/1/1485 
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had changed in the conduct of mountain warfare. The normal 
precautions and tactical drills as laid down in Frontier Warfare - 
India (R. A. F. and Army), evolved by the Indian Army as the result of 
a century of practical experience, were still relevant as the basis 
of operations against a tribal opponent, although it appeared that an 
increase in the mobility of Indian columns would be made possible by 
cutting down the logistical tail accompanying columns and the amount 
of transport and protection required on the lines of 
communications . 
39 Brigadier T. N. Miller observed: 
It may appear that the final recommendations are not as 
revolutionary as the original directive demands. The reasons 
for this is that nothing has yet changed either in the 
characteristics of mountainous country or of gueirilla 
opposition... On the other hand modern developments make possible 
a great reduction of the administrative tail of columns, so 
increasing their mobility, and enabling, bolder action against 
a guemilla enemy, this in turn leading to the infliction of the 
necessary casualties to bring them to terms in a shorter time 
than heretofore. 40 
The conduct of frontier warfare became irrelevant to the 
British Army when the Raj ended in August 1947 and the Indian Army 
was divided between India and Pakistan. The thorny problem of 
controlling the independent tribes was inherited by the Government of 
Pakistan, but its attention was firmly directed towards the disputed 
border with India. In accordance with a scheme discussed by the 
Government of India that involved the substitution of irregulars for 
the removal of the military garrison, it sanctioned the withdrawal of 
troops from tribal territory. 41 The four Brigade Groups still 
remaining in Waziristan in October 1947 were withdrawn largely 
without incident in November-December 1947, following which the 
39 Mountain Warfare against Guerilla Enemy Final Report on Trials by 25 
(Experiniental) Infantry Brigade, April 1947, P. R. O. WO 231/34 
40 Brig. T. L. Miller, Cmd. 25 Infantry Brigade to G. H. Q. (I) D. M. T. Branch, 20th 
April 1947, P. R. O. WO 231/34 
41 M. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters. A Political Autobioqraphy, (Lahore, 1967), p. 18 
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policing of tribal territory was left to political officers backed by 
various reorganised and expanded Civil Armed Forces. 42 
The British Army quickly forgot the specialised principles and 
minor tactics of frontier warfare, although its ranks contained a 
large number of ex-Indian Army officers, who had transferred to it in 
1947, with considerable experience of conducting operations in 
mountainous terrain against lightly armed guerilla opponents. Most of 
the guidelines laid down in manuals of frontier warfare published in 
India were now only of academic interest and these manuals were soon 
relegated to shelves in military libraries in England and India to 
gather dust. Despite this the minor tactics learnt in tribal 
territory proved of longer-term importance for the British Army. when 
a S. A. S. company was deployed for operations in Oman against rebels 
operating on the Jebel Akhdar in the late 1950s, its commander 
brought with him the 'traditional wisdomf of mountain warfare learnt 
on the North-West Frontier. 43 Both D. Charters and T. R. Mockaitis 
have also noted similarities between frontier operations and those 
conducted by British troops in Southern Arabia in 1963-64.44 In many 
respects the fighting when British troops were sent into the Radfan 
mountains in May-June 1964 was reminiscent of that on the North-West 
Frontier and generally confirmed the tactical lessons learnt 
regarding mountain warfare in India. 45 Major J. M. Slater observed: 
British --roops... were fighting a campaign the like of which... had 
not been conducted on the same scale since before the Second 
World War, on the North West Frontier of India. Tactics were 
similar: mountain routes were piqueted, camps defended from a 
series of stone sangars and the troops were ever prey to the 
sniper's bullet. However, the technology of war had brought its 
sophistications; helicopters lifted the pickets and re-supplied 
42 Lt. -Col. H. E. Cotton, 'Operation Curzon - The Evacuation of Waziristan', R. E. J., 
62, (1948), pp-183-200 and G. Curtis, 'North-West Frontier of Pakistan - an old 
Problem in a New Setting', A. O., 56,2, (1948), pp. 185-6 
43 Gen. Sir P. de la Billiere, Lookinq for Trouble. From SAS to Gulf Comand The 
Autobioqraphy, (London, 1995), pp. 28-9 
44 D. Charters, 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British adaptation to low- 
intensity operations', in D. Charters and M. Tucp7ell (eds. ), Armies in Low- 
Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis, (London, 1989), p. 190 and T. R. 
Mockaitis 1995, op cit, p. 52 
45 See Lt. -Col. T. M. Stevens, 'Operations in the Radfan, 19641 J. R. U. S. I., 110, 
640, (1965), pp. 335-46 and Brig. G. S. Heathcote, 'Operations in the Radfan', 
J. R. U. S. I., ill, 641, (1966), pp. 30-40, 
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isolated outposts. The firepower from guns, mortars and machine 
guns was impressive and air support from supersonic fighters 
was a far cry from the ancient Wapitis of the Frontier. 46 
It was fortunate that a large number of officers were present who had 
prior experience of service in tribal territory which was equally 
applicable in operations against similarly lightly armed tribal 
opponents in the Middle East. It is difficult to discern, however, 
any other use of such specialised minor tactics in other post-1945 
campaigns, although it is perhaps in more general terms that the 
frontier made a lasting contribution to military science. Several 
historians have noted that the lessons learnt while fighting tribal 
lashkars had implications for counter insurgency. 47 In many respects 
frontier warfare during the inter-war period was a 'hybrid' form of 
conflict involving elements of both a counterinsurgency and a more 
traditional 'sinall war,, during which imperial troops learnt to work 
in close co-operation with the civil authorities and to employ 
limited force. T. R. Mockaitis has also argued that a combination of 
military experience gained in fighting lightly equipped and highly 
mobile guerrillas and that gained administering tribal territory, had 
a wider impact on later colonial campaigns. It is difficult to 
disagree with his conclusion that it was the administrative, policing 
and military skills learnt on the frontier in a form of warfare not 
unlike insurgency that proved invaluable in fighting guerrillas 
during a variety of post-war campaigns. 48 It is regrettable that the 
significance of the lessons learnt by British and Indian troops of 
the Army in India on the North-West Frontier have until now have 
generally been forgotten or ignored by the British Army and military 
historians. 
46 Maj. S. M. Slater, 'Radfan', British Army Review, (Dec. 1981), p. 16 
47 C. Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century, 
(London, 1986), p. 150 and James, op cit, p. 53 
48T. R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurqency, 1919-1960, (London, 1990), p. 87 
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